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




MARSHAL SOULT.

(DUC de DALMANIN)

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
HISTORY
OF THE
WAR IN THE PENINSULA
AND IN THE
SOUTH OF FRANCE

FROM A. D. 1807 TO A. D. 1811

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR W. F. P. NAPIER, K.C.B.

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MILITARY SCIENCES

IN FIVE VOLUMES
WITH PORTRAITS AND PLANS
VOL. IV.



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NOTICE.

1. There are no good materials for an accurate map of the Peninsula, but the small one furnished in this volume, together with the sketches in each volume, more accurate than might be supposed, will give a clear general notion of the operations.

2. The additional manuscript authorities consulted for this volume, are the official correspondence of Lord William Bentinck; some notes by Lord Hill; the journal and correspondence of Sir Rufane Donkin; a journal of Colonel Oglander, twenty-sixth regiment; a memoir by Sir George Gipps, royal engineers; and a variety of communications by other officers. Lastly, authenticated copies of the official journals and correspondence of most of the marshals and generals who commanded armies in Spain; which were, at my request, supplied by the French War-Office, with a prompt liberality indicative of that military frankness and just pride, which ought and does characterize the officers of Napoleon's army. I have also been enabled to correct my former accounts of the assaults of Fort Gayetano at Salamanca, and those of Burgos, from the professional papers since published by the engineers.

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HISTORY
OF THE
PENINSULAR WAR.

BOOK XVIII.

CHAPTER I.

Numbers of the French in the Peninsula shown—Joseph commander-in-chief—His dissensions with the French generals—His plans—Opposed by Soult, who recommends different operations, and refuses to obey the King—Lord Wellington's plans described—His numbers—Colonel Sturgeon skilfully repairs the bridge of Alcantara—The advantage of this measure—The navigation of the Tagus and the Douro improved and extended—Rash conduct of a commissary on the Douro—Remarkable letter of Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool—Arrangements for securing the allies' flanks and operating against the enemy's flanks described—Marmont's plans—His military character—He restores discipline to the army of Portugal—His measures for that purpose and the state of the French army described and compared with the state of the British army and Wellington's measures.

In the foregoing book, the political state of the belligerents, and those great chains which bound the war in the Peninsula to the policy of the American as well as of the European nations, have been shown; the minor events of the war have also been narrated, and the point where the decisive struggle was to be made has been indicated; thus naught remains to tell save the particular preparations of each adverse general ere the noble armies were dashed together in the shock of battle.

Nearly three hundred thousand French still trampled upon Spain, above two hundred and forty thousand were with the eagles, and so successful had the plan of raising native soldiers proved, that forty thousand Spaniards well organized marched under the King's banners.

In May, the distribution of this immense army, which however,

according to the French custom, included officers and persons of all kinds attached to the forces, was as follows:—

Seventy-six thousand, of which sixty thousand were with the eagles, composed the armies of Catalonia and Aragon, under Suchet, and they occupied Valencia, and the provinces whose name they bore.*

Forty-nine thousand men, of which thirty-eight thousand were with the eagles, composed the army of the north, under Caffarelli, and were distributed on the grand line of communication from St. Sebastian to Burgos; but of this army, two divisions of infantry, and one of cavalry with artillery, were destined to reinforce Marmont.

Nineteen thousand, of which seventeen thousand were with the eagles, composed the army of the centre, occupying a variety of posts in a circle round the capital, and having a division in La Mancha.

Sixty-three thousand, of which fifty-six thousand were with the eagles, composed the army of the south, under Soult, occupying Andalusia and a part of Estremadura; but some of these troops were detained in distant governments by other generals.

The army of Portugal, under Marmont, consisted of seventy thousand men, fifty-two thousand being with the eagles, and a reinforcement of twelve thousand men were in march to join this army from France. Marmont occupied Leon, part of Old Castile, and the Asturias, having his front upon the Tormes, and a division watching Galicia.

The numerous Spanish *juramentados* were principally employed in Andalusia and with the army of the centre, and the experience of Ocaña, of Badajos, and many other places, proved that for the intrusive monarch they fought with more vigor than their countrymen did against him.

In March Joseph had been appointed commander-in-chief of all the French armies, but the generals as usual resisted his authority. Dorsenne denied it altogether; Caffarelli, who succeeded Dorsenne, disputed even his civil power in the governments of the north; Suchet evaded his orders, Marmont neglected them, and Soult firmly opposed his injudicious military plans. The King was distressed for money, and he complained that Marmont's army had consumed or plundered in three months the whole resources of the province of Toledo and the district of Talavera, whereby Madrid and the army of the centre were famished.† Marmont retorted by complaints of the wasteful extravagance of the King's military ad-

* Appendix 8, § 1.

† Joseph's Correspondence, MS.

ministration in the capital. Thus dissensions were generated when the most absolute union was required.

After the fall of Badajos Joseph judged that the ~~allies~~ would soon move, either against Marmont in Castile, against himself by the valley of the Tagus, or against Soult in Andalusia. In the first case he designed to aid Marmont with the divisions of the north, with the army of the centre, and with fifteen thousand men to be drawn from the army of the south. In the second case, to draw the army of Portugal and a portion of the army of the south into the valley of the Tagus, while the divisions from the army of the north entered Leon. In the third case, the half of Marmont's army, reinforced by a division of the army of the centre, was to pass the Tagus at Arzobispo and follow the allies. But the army of the centre was not ready to take the field, and Wellington knew it; Marmont's complaint was just, waste and confusion prevailed at Madrid, and there was so little military vigor that the Empecinado, with other partida chiefs, pushed their excursions to the very gates of that capital.

Joseph finally ordered Suchet to reinforce the army of the centre, and then calling up the Italian division of Palombini from the army of the Ebro, directed Soult to keep Drouet, with one-third of the army of the south, so far advanced in Estremadura as to have direct communication with General Trielhard in the valley of the Tagus; and he especially ordered that Drouet should pass that river if Hill passed it. It was necessary, he said, to follow the English army, and fight it with advantage of numbers; to do which required a strict co-operation of the three armies, Drouet's corps being the pivot. Meanwhile Marmont and Soult, being each convinced that the English General would invade their separate provinces, desired that the King would so view the coming contest, and oblige the other to regulate his movements thereby. The former complained, that having to observe the Gallicians, and occupy the Asturias, his forces were disseminated, and he asked for reinforcements to chase the partidas, who impeded the gathering of provisions in Castile and Leon. But the King, who overrated the importance of Madrid, designed rather to draw more troops round the capital; and he entirely disapproved of Soult besieging Tarifa and Carthagena; arguing that if Drouet was not ready to pass the Tagus, the whole of the allies could unite on the right bank, and penetrate without opposition to the capital, or that Lord Wellington would concentrate to overwhelm Marmont.

The Duke of Dalmatia would not suffer Drouet to stir, and Joseph,* whose jealousy had been excited by the Marshal's power

* Joseph's Correspondence, MS.

in Andalusia, threatened to deprive him of his command. The inflexible Duke replied that the King had already virtually done so by sending orders direct to Drouet; that he was ready to resign, but he would not commit a gross military error. Drouet could scarcely arrive in time to help Marmont, and would be too weak for the protection of Madrid, but his absence would ruin Andalusia, because the allies, whose force in Estremadura was very considerable, could in five marches reach Seville, and take it on the sixth; then communicating with the fleets at Cadiz, they would change their line of operations without loss, and unite with thirty thousand other troops, British and Spanish, who were at Gibraltar, in the Isla, in the Niebla, on the side of Murcia, and under Ballesteros in the Ronda. A new army might also come from the ocean, and Drouet, once beyond the Tagus, could not return to Andalusia in less than twelve days; Marmont could scarcely come there in a month; the force under his own immediate command was spread all over Andalusia; if collected it would not furnish thirty thousand sabres and bayonets, exclusive of Drouet, and the evacuation of the province would be unavoidable.

The French misfortunes, he said, had invariably arisen from not acting in large masses, and the army of Portugal, by spreading too much to its right, would ruin this campaign, as it had ruined the preceding one. "Marmont should leave one or two divisions on the Tormes, and place the rest of his army in position, on both sides of the pass of Baños, the left near Placentia, and the right extending towards Somosierra, which could be occupied by a detachment. Lord Wellington could not then advance by the valley of the Tagus without lending his left flank; nor to the Tormes without lending his right flank. Neither could he attack Marmont with effect, because the latter could easily concentrate, and according to the nature of the attack secure his retreat by the valley of the Tagus, or by the province of Avila, while the two divisions on the Tormes, reinforced by two others from the army of the north, would act on the allies' flank." For these reasons Soult would not permit Drouet to quit Estremadura, yet he promised to reinforce him, and so to press Hill that Graham, whom he supposed still at Portalegre, should be obliged to bring up the first and sixth divisions. In fine, he promised that a powerful body of the allies should be forced to remain in Estremadura, or Hill would be defeated, and Badajos invested. This dispute raged during May and the beginning of June, and meanwhile the English General, well acquainted from the intercepted letters with these dissensions, made his arrangements so as to confirm each general in his own peculiar views.

Soult was the more easily deceived, because he had obtained a Gibraltar newspaper, in which, so negligent was the Portuguese government, Lord Wellington's secret despatches to Forgas, containing an account of his army, and of his first designs against the south, were printed; and it must be remembered that the plan of invading Andalusia was only relinquished about the middle of May. Hill's exploit at Almaraz menaced the north and south alike, but that General had adroitly spread a report, that his object was to gain time for the invasion of Andalusia, and all Wellington's demonstrations were calculated to aid this artifice and impose upon Soult. Graham indeed returned to Beira with the first and sixth divisions and Cotton's cavalry; but as Hill was at the same time reinforced, and Graham's march sudden and secret, the enemy were again deceived in all quarters. For Marmont and the King, reckoning the number of divisions, thought the bulk of the allies was in the north, and did not discover that Hill's corps had been nearly doubled in numbers, though his division seemed the same, while Soult, not immediately aware of Graham's departure, found Hill more than a match for Drouet, and still expected the allies in Andalusia.

Drouet, willing rather to obey the King than Soult, drew towards Medellin in June, but Soult, as we have seen, sent the reinforcements from Seville by the road of Monasteria, and thus obliged him to come back. Then followed those movements and counter-movements in Estremadura which have been already related, each side being desirous of keeping a great number of their adversaries in that province. Soult's judgment was thus made manifest, for Drouet could only have crossed the Tagus with peril to Andalusia, whereas, without endangering that province, he now made such a powerful diversion for Marmont, that Wellington's army in the north was reduced below the army of Portugal, and much below what the latter could be raised to, by detachments from the armies of the north and of the centre. However, in the beginning of June, while the French generals were still disputing, Lord Wellington's dispositions were completed; he had established at last an extensive system of gaining intelligence all over Spain, and as his campaign was one which posterity will delight to study, it is fitting to show very exactly the foundation on which the operations rested.

His political and military reasons for seeking a battle have been before shown, but this design was always conditional; he would fight on advantage, but he would risk nothing beyond the usual chances of combat. While Portugal was his, every movement which obliged the enemy to concentrate was an advantage, and his

operations were ever in subservience to this vital condition. His whole force amounted to nearly ninety thousand men, of which about six thousand were in Cadiz, but the Walcheren expedition was still to be atoned for: the sick were so numerous amongst the regiments which had served there, that only thirty-two thousand, or a little more than half of the British soldiers, were under arms. This number, with twenty-four thousand Portuguese, made fifty-six thousand sabres and bayonets in the field; and it is to be remembered that now and at all times the Portuguese infantry were mixed with the British either by brigades or regiments; wherefore in speaking of English divisions in battle the Portuguese battalions are always included; and it is to their praise, that their fighting was such as to justify the use of the general term.

The troops were organized in the following manner:

Two thousand cavalry and fifteen thousand infantry, with twenty-four guns, were under Hill, who had also the aid of four garrison Portuguese regiments, and of the fifth Spanish army. Twelve hundred Portuguese cavalry were in the *Tras os Montes* under General d'Urban, and about three thousand five hundred British cavalry and thirty-six thousand infantry, with fifty-four guns, were under Wellington's immediate command, which was now enlarged by three thousand five hundred Spaniards, infantry and cavalry, under Carlos d'España and Julian Sanchez.

The bridge of Almaraz had been destroyed to lengthen the French lateral communications, and Wellington now ordered the bridge of Alcantara to be repaired to shorten his own. The breach in that stupendous structure was ninety feet wide, and one hundred and fifty feet above the water line. Yet the fertile genius of Colonel Sturgeon furnished the means of passing this chasm with heavy artillery, and without the enemy being aware of the preparations made until the moment of execution. In the arsenal of Elvas he secretly prepared a network of strong ropes, after a fashion which permitted it to be carried in parts, and with the beams, planking and other materials, it was transported to Alcantara on seventeen carriages. Straining beams were then fixed in the masonry, on each side of the broken arch, cables were stretched across the chasm, the net-work was drawn over, tarpaulin blinds were placed at each side, and the heaviest guns passed in safety. This remarkable feat produced a new and short internal line of communication, along good roads, while the enemy, by the destruction of the bridge at Almaraz, was thrown upon a long external line, and very bad roads.

Hill's corps was thus suddenly brought a fortnight's march nearer to Wellington than Drouet was to Marmont, if both marched

as armies with artillery ; but there was still a heavy drag upon the English General's operations. He had drawn so largely upon Portugal for means of transport, that agriculture was seriously embarrassed, and yet his subsistence was not secured for more than a few marches beyond the Agueda. To remedy this he set sailors and workmen to remove obstructions in the Douro and the Tagus ; the latter, which in Philip the Second's time had been navigable from Toledo to Lisbon, was opened to Malpica, not far from Alcantara, and the Douro was opened as high as Barca de Alba, below which it ceases to be a Spanish river. The whole land transport of the interior of Portugal was thus relieved ; the magazines were brought up the Tagus, close to the new line of communication by Alcantara on one side ; on the other, the country vessels conveyed provisions to the mouth of the Douro, and that river then served to within a short distance of Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Salamanca. Still danger was to be apprehended from the American privateers along the coast, which the Admiralty neglected, and the navigation of the Douro was suddenly suspended by the overheated zeal of a commissary, who being thwarted by the delays of the boatmen, issued, of his own authority, an edict, establishing regulations, and pronouncing pains and penalties upon all those who did not conform to them. The river was immediately abandoned by the craft, and the government endeavored by a formal protest to give political importance to this affair, which was peculiarly vexatious, inasmuch as the boatmen were already so averse to passing the old points of navigation, that very severe measures were necessary to oblige them to do so.

When this matter was arranged, Wellington had still to dread that if his operations led him far into Spain, the subsistence of his army would be insecure ; for there were many objects of absolute necessity, especially meat, which could not be procured except with ready money, and not only was he unfurnished with specie, but his hopes of obtaining it were nearly extinguished by the sweep Lord William Bentinck had made in the Mediterranean money market ; moreover the English ministers chose this period of difficulty to interfere, and in an ignorant and injurious manner, with his mode of issuing bills to supply his necessities. His resolution to advance could not be shaken, yet before crossing the Agueda, having described his plan of campaign to Lord Liverpool, he finished in these remarkable words :

"I am not insensible to losses and risks, nor am I blind to the disadvantages under which I undertake this operation. My friends in Castile, and I believe no officer ever had better, assure me that we shall not want provisions even before the harvest will be reaped ;

that there exist concealed granaries which shall be opened to us ; and that if we can pay for a part, credit will be given to us for the remainder ; and they have long given me hopes that we should be able to borrow money in Castile upon British securities. In case we should be able to maintain ourselves in Castile, the general action and its results being delayed by the enemy's manœuvres, which I think not improbable, I have in contemplation other resources for drawing supplies from the country, and I shall have at all events our own magazines at Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. *But with all these prospects I cannot reflect without shuddering upon the probability that we shall be distressed ; nor upon the consequences which may result from our wanting money in the interior of Spain.*"

In the contemplated operations Lord Wellington did not fail to look both to his own and his enemy's flanks. His right was secured by the destruction of the forts, the stores and boats at Almaraz ; for the valley of the Tagus was exhausted of provisions, and full of cross rivers which required a pontoon train to pass, if the French should menace Portugal seriously in that line ; moreover he caused the fortress of Monte Santos, which covered the Portuguese frontier between the Tagus and Ciudad Rodrigo, to be put in a state of defence, and the restoration of Alcantara gave Hill the power of quickly interfering. On the other side, if Marmont, strengthened by Caffarelli's division, should operate strongly against the allies' left, a retreat was open either upon Ciudad Rodrigo, or across the mountains into the valley of the Tagus. Such were his arrangements for his own interior line of operations, and to menace his enemy's flanks his measures embraced the whole Peninsula.

1st. He directed Silveira and d'Urban, who were on the frontier of Tras os Montes, to file along the Douro, menace the enemy's right flank and rear, and form a link of connection with the Gallician army, with which Castaños promised to besiege Astorga, as soon as the Anglo-Portuguese should appear on the Tormes. Meanwhile Sir Home Popham's expedition was to commence its operations, in concert with the seventh Spanish army, on the coast of Biscay, and so draw Caffarelli's divisions from the succor of Marmont.

2d. To hinder Suchet from reinforcing the King, or making a movement towards Andalusia, the Sicilian expedition, was to menace Catalonia and Valencia, in concert with the Murcian army.

3d. To prevent Soult overwhelming Hill, Wellington trusted, 1st, to the garrison of Gibraltar, and to the Anglo-Portuguese and Spanish troops in the Isla de Leon ; 2d, to insurrections in the kingdom of Cordoba, where Echevaria, going from Cadiz by the

way of Ayamonte, with three hundred officers, was to organize the partidas of that district, as Mendizabel had done those of the northern parts; 3d, to Ballesteros's army; but he ever dreaded the rashness of this general, who might be crushed in a moment, which would have endangered Hill and rendered any success in the north nugatory.

It was this fear of Ballesteros's rashness that caused Wellington to keep so strong a corps in Estremadura, and hence Soult's resolution to prevent Drouet from quitting Estremadura, even though Hill should cross the Tagus, was wise and military. For though Drouet would undoubtedly have given the King and Marmont a vast superiority in Castile, the general advantage would have remained with Wellington. Hill could at any time have misled Drouet by crossing the bridge of Alcantara, and returning again, when Drouet had passed the bridge of Toledo or Arzobispo. The French general's march would then have led to nothing, for either Hill could have joined Wellington by a shorter line, and Soult, wanting numbers, could not have taken advantage of his absence from Estremadura; or Wellington could have retired within the Portuguese frontier, rendering Drouet's movement to Castile a pure loss; or reinforcing Hill by the bridge of Alcantara, he could have gained a fortnight's march and overwhelmed Soult in Andalusia. The great error of the King's plan was that it depended upon exact co-operation amongst persons who, jealous of each other, were far from obedient to himself, and whose marches it was scarcely possible to time justly, because the armies were separated by a great extent of country, and their lines of communication were external, long, and difficult, while their enemy was acting on internal, short, and easy lines. Moreover the French correspondence, continually intercepted by the partidas, was brought to Wellington, and the knowledge thus gained by one side and lost by the other caused the timely reinforcing of Hill in Estremadura, and the keeping of Palombini's Italian division from Madrid for three weeks; an event which in the sequel proved of vital consequence, inasmuch as it prevented the army of the centre moving until after the crisis of the campaign had passed.

Hill's exploit at Almaraz, and the disorderly state of the army of the centre, having in a manner isolated the army of Portugal, the importance of Galicia and the Asturias, with respect to the projected operations of Lord Wellington, was greatly increased. For the Gallicians could either act in Castile upon the rear of Marmont, and so weaken the line of defence on the Douro; or, marching through the Asturias, spread insurrection along the coast to the Montaña de Santander, and there join the seventh army.

Hence the necessity of keeping Bonnet in the Asturias, and watching the Gallician passes, was become imperative; and Marmont, following Napoleon's instructions, had fortified the different posts in Castile, but his army was too widely spread, and, as Soult observed, was extended to its right instead of concentrating on the left near Baños.

The Duke of Ragusa had resolved to adopt the Tormes and Douro as his lines of defence, and never doubting that he was the object of attack, watched the augmentation of Wellington's forces and magazines with the utmost anxiety. He had collected considerable magazines himself, and the King had formed others for him at Talavera and Segovia; yet he did not approach the Agueda, but continued to occupy a vast extent of country for the convenience of feeding them until June. When he heard of the restoration of the bridge of Alcantara, and of magazines being formed at Cáceres, he observed that the latter would be on the left of the Guadiana if Andalusia were the object; and although not well placed for an army acting against himself, were admirably placed for an army which, having fought in Castile, should afterwards operate against Madrid, because they could be transported at once to the right of the Tagus by Alcantara, and could be secured by removing the temporary restorations. Wherefore, judging that Hill would immediately rejoin Wellington, to aid in the battle, that, with a prophetic feeling he observed, would be fought near the Tormes, he desired Caffarelli to put the divisions of the army of the north in movement; and he prayed the King to have guns and a pontoon train sent from Madrid, that Drouet might pass at Almaraz and join him by the Puerto Pico.

Joseph immediately renewed his orders to Soult, and to Caffarelli, but he only sent two small boats to Almaraz; and Marmont, seeing the allied army suddenly concentrated on the Agueda, recalled Foy from the valley of the Tagus, and Bonnet from the Asturias. His first design was to assemble the army at Medina del Campo, Valladolid, Valdesillas, Toro, Zamora, and Salamanca, leaving two battalions and a brigade of dragoons at Benevente to observe the Gallicians. Thus the bulk of the troops would line the Duero, while two divisions formed an advanced guard, on the Tormes, and the whole could be concentrated in five days. His ultimate object was to hold the Tormes until Wellington's whole army was on that river, then to assemble his own troops on the Duero, and act so as to favor the defence of the forts at Salamanca until reinforcements from the north should enable him to drive the allies again within the Portuguese frontier; and he warned Caffarelli that the forts could not hold out more than

fifteen days after they should be abandoned by the French army.

Marmont was a man to be feared. He possessed quickness of apprehension and courage, moral and physical, scientific acquirements, experience of war, and great facility in the moving of troops; he was strong of body, in the flower of life, eager for glory, and although neither a great nor a fortunate commander, such a one as might bear the test of fire. His army was weak in cavalry, but admirably organized, for he had labored with successful diligence to restore that discipline which had been so much shaken by the misfortunes of Massena's campaign, and by the unceasing operations from the battle of Fuentes Onoro to the last retreat from Beira. Upon this subject a digression must be allowed, because it has been often affirmed, that the bad conduct of the French in the Peninsula was encouraged by their leaders, was unmatched in wickedness, and peculiar to the nation. Such assertions springing from morbid national antipathies it is the duty of the historian to correct. All troops will behave ill when ill-governed, but the best commanders cannot at times prevent the perpetration of the most frightful mischief; and this truth, so important to the welfare of nations, may be proved with respect to the Peninsular war, by the avowals of the generals on either side, and by their endeavors to arrest the evils which they deplored. When Dorsenne returned from his expedition against Galicia, in the latter end of 1811, he reproached his soldiers in the following terms: "The fields have been devastated, and houses have been burned; these excesses are unworthy of the French soldier, they pierce the hearts of the most devoted and friendly of the Spaniards, they are revolting to honest men, and embarrass the provisioning of the army. The General-in-Chief sees them with sorrow, and orders: that besides a permanent court-martial, there shall be at the head-quarters of each division, of every arm, a military commission, which shall try the following crimes, and on conviction, sentence to death, without appeal; execution to be done on the spot, in presence of the troops:

"1st. Quitting a post to pillage. 2d. Desertion of all kinds. 3d. Disobedience in the face of the enemy. 4th. Insubordination of all kinds. 5th. Marauding of all kinds. 6th. Pillage of all kinds.

"*All persons, military or others, shall be considered as pillagers, who quit their posts or their ranks to enter houses, &c., or who use violence to obtain from the inhabitants more than they are legally entitled to.*

"*All persons shall be considered deserters who shall be found with-*

out a passport beyond the advanced posts, and frequent patrols day and night shall be sent to arrest all persons beyond the outposts.

"Before the enemy, when in camp or cantonments, roll-calls shall take place every hour, and all persons absent without leave twice running shall be counted deserters and judged as such. The servants and sutlers of the camp are amenable to this as well as the soldier."*

This order Marmont, after reproaching his troops for like excesses, renewed with the following additions :

"Considering that the disorders of the army have arrived at the highest degree, and require the most vigorous measures of repression, it is ordered :

"1st. All non-commissioned officers and soldiers found a quarter of a league from their quarters, camp, or post without leave, shall be judged pillagers and tried by the military commission.

"2d. The *gens d'armes* shall examine the baggage of all sutlers and followers, and shall seize all effects that appear to be pillaged, and shall burn what will burn, and bring the gold and silver to the Paymaster-General under a '*procès verbal*,' and all persons whose effects have been seized as pillage to the amount of one hundred livres shall be sent to the military commission, and on conviction suffer death.

"3d. All officers who shall not take proper measures to repress disorders under their command shall be sent in arrest to head-quarters, there to be judged."

Then appointing the number of baggage animals to each company, upon a scale which coincides in a remarkable manner with the allowances in the British army, Marmont directed the overplus to be seized and delivered, under a legal process, to the nearest villages, ordering the Provost-General to look to the execution each day, and report thereon. Finally, he clothed the Provost-General with all the powers of the military commissions ; and proof was soon given that his orders were not mere threats, for two captains were arrested for trial, and a soldier of the twenty-sixth regiment was condemned to death by one of the provisional commissions for stealing church vessels.

Such was the conduct of the French, and touching the conduct of the English, Lord Wellington, in the same month, wrote thus to Lord Liverpool :

"The outrages committed by the British soldiers, belonging to this army, have become so enormous, and they have produced an effect on the minds of the people of the country so injurious to the cause, and likely to be so dangerous to the army itself, that I request your lord-

* Intercepted papers, MS.

ship's early attention to the subject. *I am sensible that the best measures to be adopted on this subject are those of prevention, and I believe there are few officers who have paid more attention to the subject than I have done, and I have been so far successful, as that few outrages are committed by the soldiers who are with their regiments, after their regiments have been a short time in this country.*"

"But in the extended system on which we are acting, small detachments of soldiers must be marched long distances, through the country, either as escorts, or returning from being escorts to prisoners, or coming from hospitals, &c., and notwithstanding that these detachments are never allowed to march excepting under the command of an officer or more, in proportion to its size, and that every precaution is taken to provide for the regularity of their subsistence, there is no instance of the march of one of these detachments that outrages of every description are not committed, and I am sorry to say with impunity."

"The guard-rooms are therefore crowded with prisoners, and the offences of which they have been guilty remain unpunished, to the destruction of the discipline of the army, and to the injury of the reputation of the country for justice. I have thought it proper to lay these circumstances before your lordship. I am about to move the army further forward into Spain, and I assure your lordship that I have not a friend in that country, who has not written to me in dread of the consequences which must result to the army and to the cause from a continuance of these disgraceful irregularities, which I declare I have it not in my power to prevent."

To this should have been added, the insubordination, and the evil passions, awakened by the unchecked plunder of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos. But long had the English General complained of the bad discipline of his army, and the following extracts from a letter dated a few months later, show that his distrust at the present time was not ill-founded. After observing that the constitutions of the soldiers were so much shaken from disorders acquired by their service at Walcheren, or by their own irregularities, that a British army was almost a moving hospital, more than one-third, or about twenty thousand men being sick, or attending upon the sick, he thus describes their conduct:

"The disorders which these soldiers have are of a very trifling description; they are considered to render them incapable of serving with their regiments, but they certainly do not incapacitate them from committing outrages of all descriptions on their passage through the country, and in the last movements of the hospitals the soldiers have not only plundered the inhabitants of their property, but the hospital stores which moved with the hospital, and have sold the plunder."

And all these outrages are committed with impunity, no proof can be brought on oath before a court-martial that any individual has committed an outrage, and the soldiers of the army are becoming little better than a band of robbers." "I have carried the establishment and authority of the Provost-Marshal as far as either will go; there are at this moment not less than one Provost-Marshal and nineteen assistant Provost-Marshals, attached to the several divisions of cavalry and infantry and to the hospital stations, to preserve order, but this establishment is not sufficient, and I have not the means of increasing it."

The principal remedies he proposed were, the admitting less rigorous proof of guilt, before courts-martial; the forming a military police, *such as the French and other armies possessed*; the enforcing more attention on the part of the officers to their duties; the increasing the pay and responsibility of the non-commissioned officers, and the throwing upon them the chief care of the discipline. But in treating this part of the subject he broached an opinion which can scarcely be sustained even by his authority. Assuming, somewhat unjustly, that the officers of his army were, from consciousness of like demerit, generally too lenient in their sentences on each other for neglect of duty, he says, "I am inclined to entertain the opinion that in the British army duties of inspection and control over the conduct and habits of the soldiers, the performance of which by somebody is the only effectual check to disorder and all its consequences, are imposed upon the subaltern officers of regiments, which duties British officers, being of the class of gentlemen in society, and being required to appear as such, have never performed, *and which they will never perform*. It is very necessary, however, that the duties should be performed by somebody, and for this reason, and having observed the advantage derived in the guards from the respectable body of non-commissioned officers in those regiments, who perform all the duties required from subalterns in the marching regiments, I had suggested to your lordship the expediency of increasing the pay of the non-commissioned officers in the army."

Now it is a strange assumption, that a gentleman necessarily neglects his duty to his country. When well taught, which was not always the case, gentlemen by birth generally performed their duties in the Peninsula more conscientiously than others, and the experience of every commanding officer will bear out the assertion. If the non-commissioned officers could do all the duties of subaltern officers, why should the country bear the useless expense of the latter? But in truth the system of the guards produced rather a medium goodness, than a superior excellence; the system of Sir

John Moore, founded upon the principle that officers should thoroughly know, and be responsible for the discipline of their soldiers, better bore the test of experience. All the British regiments of the light division were formed in the camps of Shorn-Cliff by that most accomplished commander; very many of the other acknowledged good regiments of the army had been instructed by him in Sicily; and wherever an officer, formed under Moore, obtained a regiment, whether British or Portuguese, that regiment was distinguished in this war for its discipline and enduring qualities; courage was common to all.

CHAPTER II.

Campaign of 1812—Wellington advances to the Tormes—Marmont retires—The allies besiege the forts of Salamanca—General aspect of affairs changes and becomes gloomy—The King concentrates the army of the centre—Marmont returns to the Tormes and cannonades the allies on the position of San Christoval—Various skirmishes—Adventure of Mr. Mackay—Marmont retires to Monte Rubia—Crosses the Tormes with a part of his army—Fine conduct of General Bock's German cavalry—Graham crosses the Tormes, and Marmont retires again to Monte Rubia—Observations on this movement—Assault on San Vincente fails—Heroic death of General Bowes—Siege suspended for want of ammunition—It is renewed—Cajetano is stormed—San Vincente being on fire surrenders—Marmont retires to the Duero followed by Wellington—The French rear-guard suffers some loss between Rueda and Tordesillas—Positions of the armies described—State of affairs in other parts described—Procrastination of the Gallician army—General Bonnet abandons the Asturias—Coincidence of Wellington's and Napoleon's views upon that subject—Sir Home Popham arrives with his squadron on the coast of Biscay—His operations—Powerful effect of them upon the campaign—Wellington and Marmont alike cautious of bringing on a battle—Extreme difficulty and distress of Wellington's situation.

CAMPAIGN OF 1812.

ON the 13th of June, the periodic rains having ceased, and the field magazines being completed, Wellington passed the Agueda and marched toward the Tormes in four columns, one of which was composed of the Spanish troops. The 16th he reached the Valmusa stream, within six miles of Salamanca, and drove a French detachment across the Tormes. All the bridges, save that of Salamanca, which was defended by the forts, had been destroyed, and there was a garrison in the castle of Alba de Tormes, but the 17th the allies passed the river above and below the town, by the deep fords of Santa Marta and Los Cantos, and General Henry Clinton invested the forts the same day with the sixth division. Marmont, with two divisions and some cavalry, retired to Fuente

el Sauco, on the road of Toro, followed by an advanced guard of the allies. Salamanca instantly became a scene of rejoicing, the houses were illuminated, and the people, shouting, singing, and weeping for joy, gave Wellington their welcome, while his army took a position on the mountain of San Christoval, about five miles in advance.

SIEGE OF THE FORTS AT SALAMANCA.

Four eighteen-pounders had followed the army from Almeida, three twenty-four pound howitzers were furnished by the field artillery, and the battering train used by Hill at Almaraz had passed the bridge of Alcantara the 11th.* These were the means of offence, but the strength of the forts had been under-rated; they contained eight hundred men, and it was said that thirteen convents and twenty-two colleges had been destroyed in their construction.† San Vincente, so called from the large convent it inclosed, was the key-fort. Situated on a perpendicular cliff overhanging the Tormes, and irregular in form, but well flanked, it was separated by a deep ravine from the other forts, which were called St. Cajetano and La Merced. These were also on high ground, smaller than San Vincente, and of a square form, but with bomb-proofs and deep ditches, having perpendicular scarps and counter-scarps.

In the night of the 17th, Colonel Burgoyne, the engineer directing the siege, commenced a battery for eight guns at the distance of two hundred and fifty yards from the main wall of Vincente, and as the ruins of the destroyed convents rendered it impossible to excavate, earth was brought from a distance; but the moon was up, the night short, the enemy's fire of musketry heavy, the workmen of the sixth division were inexperienced, and at daybreak the battery was still imperfect. Meanwhile an attempt had been made to attach the miner secretly to the counterscarp, and, when the vigilance of a trained dog baffled this design, the enemy's piquet was driven in, and the attempt openly made, yet it was rendered vain by a plunging fire from the top of the convent.

On the 18th, eight hundred Germans, placed in the ruins, mastered all the enemy's fire, save that from loop-holes, and Colonel May, who directed the artillery service, then placed two field pieces on a neighboring convent, called San Bernardo, overlooking the fort; however, these guns could not silence the French artillery.

In the night the first battery was armed, covering for two field-

* Jones's Sieges.

† Wellington's Secret Despatch, MS.

pieces as a counter-battery was raised a little to its right, and a second breaching battery for two howitzers was constructed on the Cajetano side of the ravine.

At daybreak on the 19th seven guns opened, and at nine o'clock the wall of the convent was cut away to the level of the counter-scarp. The second breaching battery, which saw lower down the scarp, then commenced its fire; but the iron howitzers proved unequal to battering ordnance, and the enemy's musketry being entirely directed on this point, because the first battery, to save ammunition, had ceased firing, brought down a captain and more than twenty gunners. The howitzers did not injure the wall, ammunition was scarce, and as the enemy could easily cut off the breach in the night, the fire ceased.

The 20th, at mid-day, Colonel Dickson arrived with the iron howitzers from Elvas, and the second battery being then reinforced with additional pieces, revived its fire against a re-entering angle of the convent a little beyond the former breach. The wall here was soon broken through, and in an instant a huge cantle of the convent, with its roof, went to the ground, crushing many of the garrison, and laying bare the inside of the building; carcasses were immediately thrown into the opening to burn the convent, but the enemy undauntedly maintained their ground and extinguished the flames. A lieutenant and fifteen gunners were lost this day on the side of the besiegers, and the ammunition being nearly gone, the attack was suspended until fresh stores could come up from Almeida.

During the progress of this siege, the general aspect of affairs had materially changed on both sides. Lord Wellington had been deceived as to the strength of the forts, and intercepted returns of the armies of the south and of Portugal now showed to him that they also were far stronger than he expected; at the same time he heard of Ballesteros's defeat at Bornos, and of Slade's unfortunate cavalry action of Llera. He had calculated that Bonnet would not quit the Asturias, and that General was in full march for Leon; Caffarelli also was preparing to reinforce Marmont, and thus the brilliant prospect of the campaign was suddenly clouded. But on the other hand, Bonnet had unexpectedly relinquished the Asturias after six days' occupation; three thousand Gallicians were in that province, and in communication with the seventh army, and the maritime expedition under Popham had sailed for the coast of Biscay.

Neither was the King's situation agreeable. The partidas intercepted his despatches so surely, that it was the 19th ere Marmont's letter announcing Wellington's advance, and saying that Hill

also was in march for the north, reached Madrid. Soult detained Drouet, Suchet refused to send more than one brigade towards Madrid, and Caffarelli, disturbed that Palombini should march upon the capital instead of Burgos, kept back the divisions promised to Marmont. Something was, however, gained in vigor, for the King, no longer depending upon the assistance of the distant armies, gave orders to blow up Mirabete and abandon La Mancha on one side, and the forts of Somosierra and Buitrago on the other, with a view to unite the army of the centre.

A detachment of eight hundred men under Colonel Noizet, employed to destroy Buitrago, was attacked on his return by the Empecinado with three thousand, but Noizet, an able officer, defeated him, and reached Madrid with little loss. Palombini's march was then hastened, and imperative orders directed Soult to send ten thousand men to Toledo. The garrison of Segovia was reinforced to preserve one of the communications with Marmont, that Marshal was informed of Hill's true position, and the King advised him to give battle to Wellington, for he supposed the latter to have only eighteen thousand English troops, but he had twenty-four thousand, and had yet left Hill so strong that he desired him to fight Drouet if occasion required.

Meanwhile Marmont, who had remained in person at Fuente el Saucedo, united there, on the 20th, four divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, furnishing about twenty-five thousand men of all arms, with which he marched to the succor of the forts. His approach over an open country was descried at a considerable distance, and a brigade of the fifth division was immediately called off from the siege, the battering train was sent across the Tormes, and the army, which was in bivouac on the Salamanca side of St. Christoval, formed in order of battle on the top. This position of Christoval was about four miles long, and rather concave, the ascent in front steep, and tangled with hollow roads and stone inclosures, belonging to the villages, but the summit was broad, even, and covered with ripe corn; the right was flanked by the upper Tormes, and the left dipped into the country bordering the lower Tormes; for in passing Salamanca, that river makes a sweep round the back of the position. The infantry, the heavy cavalry, and the guns crowned the summit of the mountain, but the light cavalry fell back from the front to the low country on the left, where there was a small stream and a marshy flat. The villages of Villares and Monte Rubio were behind the left of the position; the village of Cabrerizos marked the extreme right, though the hill still trended up the river. The villages of Christoval, Castellanos, and Moresco, were nearly in a line along the foot of the heights in

front; the last was somewhat within the allies' ground, and nothing could be stronger than the position, which completely commanded all the country for many miles; but the heat was excessive, and there was neither shade, nor fuel to cook with, nor water nearer than the Tormes.

About five o'clock in the evening the enemy's horsemen approached, pointing towards the left of the position, as if to turn it by the lower Tormes, whereupon the British light cavalry made a short forward movement, and a partial charge took place; but the French opened six guns, and the British retired to their own ground near Monte Rubio and Villares. The light division, which was held in reserve, immediately closed towards the left of the position, until the French cavalry halted, and then returned to the centre. Meanwhile the main body of the enemy bore, in one dark volume, against the right, and halting at the very foot of the position, sent a flight of shells on to the lofty summit; nor did this fire cease until after dark, when the French General, after driving back all the outposts, obtained possession of Moresco, and established himself behind that village and Castellanos, within gun-shot of the allies.

The English General slept that night on the ground amongst the troops, and at the first streak of light the armies were again under arms. Nevertheless, though some signals were interchanged between Marmont and the forts, both sides were quiet until towards evening, when Wellington detached the sixty-eighth regiment from the line to drive the French from Moresco. This attack, made with vigor, succeeded, but the troops being recalled just as daylight failed, a body of French coming unperceived through the standing corn, broke into the village as the British were collecting their posts from the different avenues, and did considerable execution. In the skirmish an officer of the sixty-eighth, named Mackay, being suddenly surrounded, refused to surrender, and, singly fighting against a multitude, received more wounds than the human frame was thought capable of sustaining, yet he still lives to show his honorable scars.

On the 22d, three divisions and a brigade of cavalry joined Marmont, who having now nearly forty thousand men in hand, extended his left and seized a part of the height in advance of the allies' right wing, from whence he could discern the whole of their order of battle and attack their right on even terms. However, General Graham advancing with the seventh division dislodged this French detachment with a sharp skirmish before it could be formidably reinforced, and that night Marmont withdrew from his dangerous position to some heights about six miles in his rear.

It was thought that the French General's tempestuous advance to Moresco with such an inferior force on the evening of the 20th, should have been his ruin. Lord Wellington saw clearly enough the false position of his enemy, but he argued that if Marmont came up to fight, it was better to defend a very strong position than to descend and combat in the plain, seeing that the inferiority of force was not such as to insure the result of the battle being decisive of the campaign; and in case of failure a retreat across the Tormes would have been very difficult. To this may be added, that during the first evening there was some confusion amongst the allies before the troops of the different nations could form their order of battle. Moreover, as the descent of the mountain towards the enemy was by no means easy, because of the walls and avenues, and the two villages which covered the French front, it is probable that Marmont, who had plenty of guns, and whose troops were in perfect order and extremely ready of movement, could have evaded the action until night. This reasoning, however, will not hold good on the 21st. The allies, whose infantry was a third more and their cavalry three times as numerous and much better mounted than the French, might have poured down by all the roads passing over the position at daybreak; then Marmont, turned on both flanks and followed vehemently, could never have made his retreat to the Douro through the open country; but on the 22d, when the French General had received his other divisions, the chances were no longer the same.

Marmont's new position was skilfully chosen; one flank rested on Cabeza Velloso, the other at Huerta, the centre was at Aldea Rubia. He thus refused his right and abandoned the road of Toro to the allies, but he covered the road of Tordesillas, and commanded the fort of Huerta with his left, and he could in a moment pass the Tormes, and operate by the left bank to communicate with the forts. Wellington made corresponding dispositions, closing up his left towards Moresco, and pushing the light division along the salient part of his position to Aldea Lengua, where it overhung a ford, which was, however, scarcely practicable at this period. General Graham with two divisions was placed at the fords of Santa Marta, and the heavy German cavalry under General Bock crossed the Tormes to watch the ford of Huerta. By this disposition the allies covered Salamanca, and could operate on either side of the Tormes on a shorter line than the French could operate.

The 23d, the two armies again remained tranquil, but at break of day on the 24th, some dropping pistol shots, and now and then a shout, came faintly from the mist which covered the lower ground beyond the river; the heavy sound of the artillery succeeded, and

the hissing of the bullets, as they cut through the thickened atmosphere, plainly told that the French were over the Tormes. After a time the fog cleared up, and the German horsemen were seen in close and beautiful order retiring before twelve thousand French infantry, who in battle array were marching steadily onwards. At intervals, twenty guns, ranged in front, would start forward and send their bullets whistling and tearing up the ground beneath the Germans, while scattered parties of light cavalry, scouting out, capped all the hills in succession, and peering abroad, gave signals to the main body. Wellington immediately sent Graham across the river by the fords of Santa Marta with the first and seventh divisions and Le Marchant's brigade of English cavalry; then concentrating the rest of the army between Cabrerizos and Moresco, he awaited the progress of Marmont's operation.

Bock continued his retreat in the same fine and equable order, regardless alike of the cannonade and of the light horsemen on his flanks, until the enemy's scouts had gained a height above Calvarisa Abaxo, from whence, at the distance of three miles, they for the first time perceived Graham's twelve thousand men, and eighteen guns, ranged on an order of battle, perpendicular to the Tormes. From the same point also Wellington's heavy columns were to be seen, clustering on the height above the fords of Santa Marta, and the light division was descried at Aldea Lengua, ready either to advance against the French troops left on the position of Aldea Rubia, or to pass the river to the aid of Graham. This apparition made the French General aware of his error, whereupon hastily facing about, and repassing the Tormes, he resumed his former ground.

Wellington's defensive dispositions on this occasion were very skilful, but it would appear that, unwilling to stir before the forts fell, he had again refused the advantage of the moment; for it is not to be supposed that he misjudged the occasion, since the whole theatre of operation was distinctly seen from St. Christoval, and he had passed many hours in earnest observation; his faculties were indeed so fresh and vigorous, that after the day's work he wrote a detailed memoir upon the proposal for establishing a bank in Portugal, treating that and other financial schemes in all their bearings, with a master hand. Against the weight of his authority, therefore, any criticism must be advanced.

Marmont had the easiest passage over the Tormes, namely, that by the ford of Huerta; the allies had the greatest number of passages and the shortest line of operations. Hence if Graham had been ordered vigorously to attack the French troops on the left

bank, they must have been driven upon the single ford of Huerta, if not reinforced from the heights of Aldea Rubia.* But the allies could also have been reinforced by the fords of Santa Marta and those of Cabrerizos, and even by that of Aldea Lengua, although it was not good at this early season. A partial victory would then have been achieved, or a general battle would have been brought on, when the French troops would have been disadvantageously cooped up in the loop of the Tormes, and without means of escaping if defeated. Again, it is not easy to see how the French General could have avoided a serious defeat if Wellington had moved with all the troops on the right bank, against the divisions left on the hill of Aldea Rubia; for the French army would then have been separated, one part on the hither, one on the further bank of the Tormes. It was said at the time that Marmont hoped to draw the whole of the allies across the river, when he would have seized the position of Christoval, raised the siege and maintained the line of the Tormes. It may, however, be doubted that he expected Wellington to commit so gross an error. It is more likely that holding his own army to be the quickest of movement, his object was to separate the allies' force in the hopes of gaining some partial advantage to enable him to communicate with his forts, which were now in great danger.

When the French retired to the heights at Aldea Rubia on the night of the 23d, the heavy guns had been already brought to the right of the Tormes, and a third battery to breach San Cajetano was armed with four pieces, but the line of fire being oblique, the practice, at four hundred and fifty yards, only beat down the parapet and knocked away the palisades. Time was however of vital importance; the escalade of that fort and La Merced was ordered, and the attack commenced at ten o'clock, but in half an hour failed with a loss of one hundred and twenty men and officers. The wounded were brought off the next day under truce, and the enemy had all the credit of the fight, yet the death of General Bowes must ever be admired. That gallant man, whose rank might have excused his leading so small a force, being wounded early, was having his hurt dressed when he heard that the troops were yielding, and returning to the combat fell.

The siege was now per force suspended for want of ammunition, and the guns were sent across the river, but were immediately brought back in consequence of Marmont having crossed to the left bank. Certain works were meanwhile pushed forward to cut off the communication between the forts and otherwise to straiten them, and the miner was attached to the cliff on which La Merced stood.

* Plan 1, page 27.

The final success was not however influenced by these operations, and they need no further notice.

The 26th, ammunition arrived from Almeida, the second and third batteries were rearmed, the field pieces were again placed in the convent of San Bernardo, and the iron howitzers, throwing hot shot, set the convent of San Vincente on fire in several places. The garrison again extinguished the flames, and this balanced combat continued during the night, but on the morning of the 27th, the fire of both batteries being redoubled, the convent of San Vincente was in a blaze, the breach of San Cajetano was improved, a fresh storming party assembled, and the white flag waved from Cajetano. A negotiation ensued, but Lord Wellington, judging it an artifice to gain time, gave orders for the assault; then the forts fell, for San Cajetano scarcely fired a shot, and the flames raged so violently at San Vincente that no opposition could be made.

Seven hundred prisoners, thirty pieces of artillery, provisions, arms, and clothing, and a secure passage over the Tormes, were the immediate fruits of this capture, which was not the less prized that the breaches were found to be more formidable than those at Ciudad Rodrigo. The success of a storm would have been very doubtful if the garrison could have gained time to extinguish the flames in the convent of San Vincente, and as it was the allies had ninety killed; their whole loss since the passage of the Tormes was nearly five hundred men and officers, of which one hundred and sixty men, with fifty horses, fell outside Salamanca, the rest in the siege.

Marmont had allotted fifteen days as the term of resistance for these forts, but from the facility with which San Vincente caught fire, five would have been too many if ammunition had not failed. His calculation was therefore false. He would however have fought on the 23d, when his force was united, had he not on the 22d received intelligence from Caffarelli, that a powerful body of infantry, with twenty two-guns, and all the cavalry of the north, were actually in march to join him. It was this which induced him to occupy the heights of Villa Rubia on that day to avoid a premature action, but on the evening of the 26th, the signals from the forts having indicated that they could still hold out three days, Marmont, from fresh intelligence, no longer expected Caffarelli's troops, and resolved to give battle on the 28th.* The fall of the forts, which was made known to him on the evening of the 27th, changed this determination; the reasons for fighting on such disadvantageous ground no longer existed, and hence, withdrawing his garrison from

* French Confidential Official Reports, MS.

the castle of Alba de Tormes, he retreated during the night towards the Duero, by the roads of Tordesillas and Toro.

Wellington ordered both the works at Alba and the forts at Salamanca to be destroyed, and following the enemy by easy marches, encamped on the Guarena the 30th. The next day he reached the Trabancos, his advanced guard being at Nava del Rey. On the 2d, he passed the Zapardiel in two columns, the right marching by Medina del Campo, the left following the advanced guard towards Rueda. From this place the French rear-guard was cannonaded and driven upon the main body, which was filing over the bridge of Tordesillas. Some were killed and some made prisoners, not many; but there was great confusion, and a heavy disaster would have befallen the French if the English General had not been deceived by false information that they had broken the bridge the night before. For as he knew by intercepted letters that Marmont intended to take a position near Tordesillas, this report made him suppose the enemy was already over the Duero, and hence he had spread his troops, and was not in sufficient force to attack during the passage of the river.

Marmont, who had fortified posts at Zamora and Toro, and had broken the bridges at those places and at Puente Duero and Tudela, preserving only that of Tordesillas, now took a position on the right of the Duero.* His left was at Simancas, on the Pisuerga, which was unfordable, and the bridges at that place and Valladolid were commanded by fortified posts. His centre was at Tordesillas and very numerous, and his right was on some heights opposite to Pollos. Wellington indeed caused the third division to seize the ford at the last place, which gave him a command of the river, because there was a plain between it and the enemy's heights; but the ford itself was difficult and insufficient for passing the whole army. Head-quarters was therefore fixed at Rueda, and the forces were disposed in a compact form, the head placed in opposition to the ford of Pollos and the bridge of Tordesillas, the rear occupying Medina del Campo and other points on the Zapardiel and Trabancos rivers, ready to oppose the enemy if he should break out from the Valladolid side. Marmont's line of defence, measured from Valladolid to Zamora, was sixty miles, from Simancas to Toro above thirty; but the actual line of occupation was not above twelve; the bend of the river gave him the chord, the allies the arc, and the fords were few and difficult. The advantage was therefore on the side of the enemy; but to understand the true position of the contending generals, it is necessary to know the secondary coincident operations.

* Plan 2, page 43.

While the armies were in presence at Salamanca, Silveira had filed up the Duero, to the Esla river, menacing the French communications with Benevente. D'Urban's horsemen had passed the Duero below Zamora on the 25th, and cut off all intercourse between the French army and that place; but when Marmont fell back from Aldea Rubia, d'Urban re-crossed the Duero at Fresno de la Ribera to avoid being crushed, yet immediately afterwards advanced beyond Toro to Castromonte, behind the right wing of the enemy's new position. It was part of Wellington's plan, that Castaños, after establishing the siege of Astorga, should come down by Benevente with the remainder of his army, and place himself in communication with Silveira. This operation, without disarranging the siege of Astorga, would have placed twelve or fifteen thousand men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, behind the Esla, and with secure lines of retreat; consequently able to check all the enemy's foraging parties, and reduce him to live upon his fixed magazines, which were scanty. The usual Spanish procrastination defeated this plan.

Castaños, by the help of the succors received from England, had assembled fifteen thousand men at Ponteferrada, under the command of Santocildes, but he pretended that he had no battering guns, until Sir Howard Douglas actually pointed them out in the arsenal of Ferrol, and showed him how to convey them to the frontier. Then Santocildes moved, though slowly, and when Bonnet's retreat from the Asturias was known, eleven thousand men invested Astorga, and four thousand others marched to Benevente, but not until Marmont had called his detachment in from that place. The Spanish battering train only reached Villa Franca del Bierzo on the 1st of July. However, the guerilla chief Marquinez appeared about Palencia, and the other partidas of Castile, acting on a line from Leon to Segovia, intercepted Marmont's correspondence with the King.* Thus the immense tract called the *Campo de Tierras* was secured for the subsistence of the Gallician army; and to the surprise of the allies—who had so often heard of the enemy's terrible devastations, that they expected to find Castile a desert—those vast plains and undulating hills were covered with ripe corn or fruitful vines, and the villages bore few marks of the ravages of war.

While the main body of the Gallicians was still at Ponteferrada, a separate division had passed along the coast road into the Asturias, and, in concert with part of the seventh army, had harassed Bonnet's retreat from that kingdom; the French General indeed forced his way by the eastern passes, and taking post on the 30th of June at Reynosa and Aguilar del Campo, chased the neighboring

bands away; but this movement was one of the great errors of the campaign. Napoleon and Wellington felt alike the importance of holding the Asturias at this period.* The one had ordered that they should be retained, the other had calculated that such would be the case, and the judgment of both was quickly made manifest. For the Gallicians, who would not have dared to quit the Bierzo if Bonnet had menaced their province by Lugo, or by the shore line, invested Astorga the moment he quitted the Asturias. And the partidas of the north, who had been completely depressed by Mina's defeat, recovering courage, now moved towards the coast, where Popham's expedition, which had sailed on the 18th of June from Coruña, soon appeared, a formidable spectacle; for there were five sail of the line with many frigates and brigs, in all twenty ships of war.

The port of Lesquito was immediately attacked on the sea-board by this squadron, on the land side by the Pastor, and when Captain Bouverie got a gun up to breach the convent, the Spanish chief assaulted but was repulsed; however, the garrison, two hundred and fifty strong, surrendered to the squadron on the 22d, and on the two following days Bermeo and Palencia fell. The partidas failed to appear at Guetaria, but Castro and Portagalete in the Bilbao river were attacked on the 6th of July in concert with Longa, and though the latter was rebuffed at Bilbao the squadron took Castro. The enemy recovered some of their posts on the 10th, and on the 19th, the attempt on Guetaria being renewed, Mina and the Pastor came down to co-operate, but a French column beat those chiefs, and drove the British seamen to their vessels with the loss of thirty men and two guns.

It was the opinion of General Carrol, who accompanied this expedition, that the plan of operations was ill-arranged; but the local successes merit no attention, the great object of distracting the enemy was obtained. Caffarelli heard at one and the same time, that Palombini's division had been called to Madrid, that Bonnet had abandoned the Asturias, that a Gallician division had entered that province, that a powerful English fleet containing troops was on the coast and acting in concert with all the partidas of the north, that the seventh army was menacing Burgos, and that the whole country was in commotion. Trembling for his own districts, he instantly arrested the march of the divisions destined for Marmont; and although the King, who saw very clearly the real object of the maritime expedition, reiterated the orders to march upon Segovia or Cuellar, with a view to reinforce either the army of the centre or the army of Portugal, Caffarelli delayed obedience until the

* Joseph's Papers, MS. Wellington's Secret Despatches MS.

13th of July, and then sent but eighteen hundred cavalry with twenty guns.

Thus Bonnet's movement, which only brought a reinforcement of six thousand infantry to Marmont, kept away Caffarelli's reserves, which were twelve thousand of all arms, uncovered the whole of the great French line of communication, and caused the siege of Astorga to be commenced. And while Bonnet was in march by Palencia and Valladolid to the position of Tordesillas, the King heard of Marmont's retreat from the Tormes, and that an English column menaced Arevalo; wherefore, not being ready to move with the army of the centre, and fearing for Avila, he withdrew the garrison from that place, and thus lost his direct line of correspondence with the army of Portugal, because Segovia was environed by the partidas. In this state of affairs neither Wellington nor Marmont had reason to fight upon the Duero. The latter because his position was so strong he could safely wait for Bonnet's and Caffarelli's troops, and meanwhile the King could operate against the allies' communications. The former because he could not attack the French except at great disadvantage, for the fords of the Duero were little known, and that of Pollos was very deep. To pass the river there and form within gun-shot of the enemy's left, without other combinations, promised nothing but defeat, and the staff officers sent to examine the course of the river reported that the advantage of ground was entirely on the enemy's side, except at Castro Nuño, half way between Pollos and Toro.

While the enemy commanded the bridge at Tordesillas no attempt to force the passage of the river could be safe, seeing that Marmont might fall on the allies' front and rear if the operation was within his reach; and if beyond his reach, that is to say near Zamora, he could cut their communication with Ciudad Rodrigo and yet preserve his own with Caffarelli and the King. Wellington therefore resolved to wait until the fords should become lower, or the combined operations of the Gallicians and partidas should oblige the enemy either to detach men or to dislodge altogether for want of provisions. In this view he urged Santocildes to press the siege of Astorga vigorously, and to send every man he could spare down the Esla; and an intercepted letter gave hopes that Astorga would surrender on the 7th, yet this seems to have been a device to keep the Gallicians in that quarter, for it was in no danger. Santocildes, expecting its fall, would not detach men, but the vicinity of d'Urban's cavalry, which remained at Castromonte, so incommoded the French right that Foy marched to drive them beyond the Esla. General Pakenham, however, crossed the ford of Pollos with some of the third division, which quickly brought Foy

back, and Marmont then endeavored to augment the number and efficiency of his cavalry by taking a thousand horses from the infantry officers and the sutlers.

On the 8th, Bonnet arrived, and the French Marshal immediately extending his right to Toro, commenced repairing the bridge there. Wellington, in like manner, stretched his left to the Guarena, yet kept his centre still on the Trabancos, and his right at Rueda, with posts near Tordesillas and the ford of Pollos. In this situation the armies remained for some days. Generals Graham and Picton went to England in bad health, and the principal powder magazine at Salamanca exploded with hurt to many, but no other events worth recording occurred. The weather was very fine, the country rich, and the troops received their rations regularly; wine was so plentiful that it was hard to keep the soldiers sober; the caves of Rueda, either natural or cut in the rock below the surface of the earth, were so immense and so well stocked, that the drunkards of the two armies failed to make any very sensible diminution in the quantity. Many men of both sides perished in that labyrinth, and on both sides, also, the soldiers passing the Duero in groups, held amicable intercourse, conversing of the battles that were yet to be fought; the camps on the banks of the Duero seemed at times to belong to one army, so difficult is it to make brave men hate each other.

To the officers of the allies all looked prosperous; their only anxiety was to receive the signal of battle, their only discontent that it was delayed, and many amongst them murmured that the French had been permitted to retreat from Christoval. Had Wellington been finally forced back to Portugal, his reputation would have been grievously assailed by his own people; for the majority, peering through their misty politics, saw Paris in dim perspective, and overlooked the enormous French armies that were close at hand. Meanwhile their General's mind was filled with care and mortification, and all cross and evil circumstances seemed to combine against him.

The mediation for the Spanish colonies had just failed at Cadiz, under such circumstances as left no doubt that the English influence was powerless, and the French influence visibly increasing in the Cortes. Sault had twenty-seven gun-boats in the Trocadero canal, shells were cast day and night into the city, and the people were alarmed; two thousand French had marched from Santa Maria, apparently to reinforce Drouet in Estremadura; Echevaria had effected nothing in the kingdom of Cordoba, and a French division was assembling at Bornos to attack Ballesteros, whose rashness, inviting destruction, might alone put an end to the

campaign in Leon, and bring Wellington back to the Tagus. In the north of Spain, also, affairs appeared equally gloomy; Mina's defeats, and their influence upon the other partidas, were positively known, but the effect of Popham's operations was unknown, or at least doubtful. Bonnet's division had certainly arrived, and the Gallicians, who had done nothing at Astorga, were already in want of ammunition. In Castile the activity of the partidas, instead of increasing, had diminished after Wellington crossed the Tormes, and the chiefs seemed inclined to leave the burthen of the war entirely to their allies. Nor was this feeling confined to them. It had been arranged that new corps, especially of cavalry, should be raised, as the enemy receded in this campaign, and the necessary clothing and equipments supplied by England were placed at the disposal of Lord Wellington, who, to avoid the burthen of carriage, had directed them to Coruña; yet now, when Leon and the Asturias were in a manner recovered, no man would serve voluntarily. There was great enthusiasm in words, there had always been so; but the fighting men were not increased, and even the *juramentados*, many of whom deserted at this time from the King, well clothed and soldier-like men, refused to enter the English ranks.

Now also came the news that Lord William Bentinck's plans were altered, and the intercepted despatches showed that the King had again ordered Drouet to pass the Tagus, but Soult's resistance to this order was not known. Wellington therefore at the same moment saw Marmont's army increase, heard that the King's army, reinforced by Drouet, was on the point of taking the field; that the troops from Sicily, upon whose operations he depended to keep all the army of Aragon in the eastern part of Spain, and even to turn the King's attention that way, were to be sent to Italy; and that two millions of dollars, which he hoped to have obtained at Gibraltar, had been swept off by Lord William Bentinck for this Italian expedition, which thus at once deprived him of men and money! The latter was the most serious blow; the promised remittances from England had not arrived, and as the insufficiency of land-carriage rendered it nearly impossible to feed the army even on the Duero, to venture further into Spain without money would be akin to madness. From Galicia, where no credit was given, came the supply of meat; a stoppage there would have made the war itself stop, and no greater error had been committed by the enemy, than delaying to conquer Galicia, which could many times have been done.

To meet the increasing exigences for money, the English General had, for one resource, obtained a credit of half a million from the

treasury to answer certain certificates, or notes of hand, which his Spanish correspondents promised to get cashed; but of this resource he was now suddenly deprived by the English ministers, who objected to the irregular form of the certificates, because he, with his usual sagacity, had adapted them to the habits of the people he was to deal with. Meanwhile his troops were four, his staff six, his muleteers nearly twelve months in arrears of pay, and he was in debt every where and for every thing. The Portuguese government had become very clamorous for the subsidy; Mr. Stuart acknowledged that their distress was very great, and the desertion from the Portuguese army, which augmented in an alarming manner, and seemed rather to be increased than repressed by severity, sufficiently proved their misery. The personal resources of Wellington alone enabled the army to maintain its forward position, for he had, to a certain extent, carried his commercial speculations into Galicia, as well as Portugal; and he had persuaded the Spanish authorities in Castile to give up a part of their revenue in kind to the army, receiving bills on the British embassy at Cadiz in return. But the situation of affairs may be best learned from the mouths of the generals.

"The arrears of the army are certainly getting to an alarming pitch, and if it is suffered to increase we cannot go on: we have only here two brigades of infantry fed by our own commissariat, and we are now reduced to one of them having barely bread for this day, and the commissary has not a farthing of money. I know not how we shall get on!"

Such were Beresford's words on the 8th of July, and on the 15th, Wellington wrote even more forcibly.

"I have never," said he, "been in such distress as at present, and some serious misfortune must happen, if the government do not attend seriously to the subject, and supply us regularly with money. The arrears and distresses of the Portuguese government are a joke to ours, and if our credit was not better than theirs, we should certainly starve. As it is, if we don't find means to pay our bills for butcher's meat there will be an end to the war at once."

Thus stript as it were to the skin, the English General thought once more to hide his nakedness in the mountains of Portugal, when Marmont, proud of his own unripened skill, and, perhaps, from the experience of San Christoval, undervaluing his adversary's tactics, desirous also, it was said, to gain a victory without the presence of a king, Marmont, pushed on by fate, madly broke the chain which restrained his enemy's strength.

CHAPTER III.

Bonnet arrives in the French camp—Marmont passes the Duero—Combat of Castrejon—Allies retire across the Guarena—Combat on that river—Observations on the movements—Marmont turns Wellington's flank—Retreat to San Christoval—Marmont passes the Tormes—Battle of Salamanca—Anecdote of Mrs. Dalbiac.

WHEN Wellington found by the intercepted letters that the King's orders for Drouet to cross the Tagus were reiterated and imperative, he directed Hill to detach troops in the same proportion. And as this reinforcement, coming by the way of Alcantara, could reach the Duero as soon as Drouet could reach Madrid, he hoped still to maintain the Tormes, if not the Duero, notwithstanding the King's power; for some money, long expected from England, had at last arrived in Oporto, and he thought the Gallicians, maugre their inertness, must soon be felt by the enemy. Moreover, the harvest on the ground, however abundant, could not long feed the French multitudes if Drouet and the King should together join Marmont. Nevertheless, fearing the action of Joseph's cavalry, he ordered D'Urban's horsemen to join the army on the Duero. But to understand the remarkable movements which were now about to commence, the reader must bear in mind, that the French army, from its peculiar organization, could, while the ground harvest lasted, operate without any regard to lines of communication; it had supports on all sides and procured its food every where, for the troops were taught to reap the standing corn, and grind it themselves if their cavalry could not seize flour in the villages. This organization, approaching the ancient Roman military perfection, gave them great advantages; in the field it baffled the irregular, and threw the regular force of the allies entirely upon the defensive; because when the flanks were turned, a retreat only could save the communications, and the French offered no point for retaliation in kind. Wherefore, with a force composed of four different nations, Wellington was to execute the most difficult evolutions in an open country, his chances of success being to arise only from the casual errors of his adversary, who was an able general, who knew the country perfectly, and was at the head of an army, brave, excellently disciplined, and of one nation. The game would have been quite unequal if the English General had not been so strong in cavalry.

FRENCH PASSAGE OF THE DUERO.

In the course of the 15th and 16th, Marmont, who had previously made several deceptive movements, concentrated his beautiful and gallant army between Toro and the Hornija river; and intercepted letters, the reports of deserters, and the talk of peasants, had for several days assigned the former place as his point of passage. On the morning of the 16th, the English exploring officers, passing the Duero near Tordesillas, found only the garrison there, and in the evening the reports stated that two French divisions had already passed the repaired bridge of Toro. Wellington united his centre and left at Canizal on the Guarena during the night, intending to attack those who had passed at Toro; but as he had still some doubts of the enemy's real object, he caused Sir Stapleton Cotton to halt on the Trabancos with the right wing, composed of the fourth and light divisions and Anson's cavalry. Meanwhile Marmont, recalling his troops from the left bank of the Duero, returned to Tordesillas and Pollos, passed that river at those points, and occupied Nava del Rey, where his whole army was concentrated in the evening of the 17th, some of his divisions having marched forty miles, and some above fifty miles, without a halt. The English cavalry posts being thus driven over the Trabancos, advice of the enemy's movement was sent to Lord Wellington; but he was then near Toro, it was midnight ere it reached him, and the troops under Cotton remained near Castrejon behind the Trabancos during the night of the 17th, without orders, exposed, in a bad position, to the attack of the whole French army. Wellington hastened to their aid in person, and he ordered Bock's, Le Marchant's, and Alten's brigades of cavalry to follow him to Alaejos, and the fifth division to take post at Torrecilla de la Orden, six miles in rear of Castrejon.

At daybreak Cotton's outposts were again driven in by the enemy, and the bulk of his cavalry with a troop of horse artillery immediately formed in front of the two infantry divisions, which were drawn up, the fourth division on the left, the light division on the right, but at a considerable distance from each other and separated by a wide ravine. The country was open and hilly, like the downs of England, with here and there water-gullies, dry hollows, and bold naked heads of land, and behind the most prominent of these last, on the other side of the Trabancos, lay the whole French army. Cotton, however, seeing only horsemen, pushed his cavalry again towards the river, advancing cautiously by his right along some high table-land, and his troops were soon lost to the view of the infantry, for the morning fog was thick on the stream, and at

first nothing could be descried beyond. But very soon the deep tones of artillery shook the ground, the sharp ring of musketry was heard in the mist, and the forty-third regiment was hastily brought through Castrejon to support the advancing cavalry; for besides the ravine which separated the fourth from the light division, there was another ravine with a marshy bottom, between the cavalry and infantry, and the village of Castrejon was the only good point of passage.

The cannonade now became heavy, and the spectacle surprisingly beautiful, for the lighter smoke and mist, curling up in fantastic pillars, formed a huge and glittering dome tinged of many colors by the rising sun; and through the grosser vapor below, the restless horsemen were seen or lost as the fume thickened from the rapid play of the artillery, while the bluff head of land, beyond the Trabancos, covered with French troops, appeared, by an optical deception, close at hand, dilated to the size of a mountain, and crowned with gigantic soldiers, who were continually breaking off and sliding down into the fight. Suddenly a dismounted cavalry officer stalked from the midst of the smoke towards the line of infantry; his gait was peculiarly rigid, and he appeared to hold a bloody handkerchief to his heart, but that which seemed a cloth, was a broad and dreadful wound; a bullet had entirely effaced the flesh from his left shoulder and from his breast, and had carried away part of his ribs, his heart was bared, and its movement plainly discerned. It was a piteous and yet a noble sight, for his countenance though ghastly was firm, his step scarcely indicated weakness, and his voice never faltered. This unyielding man's name was Williams; he died a short distance from the field of battle, and it was said in the arms of his son, a youth of fourteen, who had followed his father to the Peninsula in hopes of obtaining a commission, for they were not in affluent circumstances.

General Cotton maintained this exposed position with skill and resolution, from daylight until seven o'clock, at which time Wellington arrived, in company with Beresford, and proceeded to examine the enemy's movements. The time was critical, and the two English Generals were like to have been slain together by a body of French cavalry, not very numerous, which, breaking away from the multitude on the head of land beyond the Trabancos, came galloping at full speed across the valley. It was for a moment thought they were deserting, but with headlong course they mounted the table-land on which Cotton's left wing was posted, and drove a whole line of British cavalry skirmishers back in confusion. The reserves indeed soon came up from Alaejos, and these furious swordsmen being scattered in all directions were in turn driven

away or cut down, but meanwhile thirty or forty, led by a noble officer, had brought up their right shoulders, and came over the edge of the table-land above the hollow which separated the British wings at the instant when Wellington and Beresford arrived on the same slope. There were some infantry piquets in the bottom, and higher up, near the French, were two guns covered by a squadron of light cavalry, which was disposed in perfect order. When the French officer saw this squadron, he reined in his horse with difficulty, and his troopers gathered in a confused body round him as if to retreat. They seemed lost men, for the British instantly charged, but with a shout the gallant fellows soused down upon the squadron, and the latter turning, galloped through the guns; then the whole mass, friends and enemies, went like a whirlwind to the bottom, carrying away Lord Wellington, and the other generals, who with drawn swords and some difficulty got clear of the tumult. The French horsemen were now quite exhausted, and a reserve squadron of heavy dragoons coming in cut most of them to pieces; yet their invincible leader, assaulted by three enemies at once, struck one dead from his horse, and with surprising exertions saved himself from the others, though they rode hewing at him on each side for a quarter of a mile.

While this charge was being executed, Marmont, who had ascertained that a part only of Wellington's army was before him, crossed the Trabancos in two columns, and passing by Alaejos, turned the left of the allies, marching straight upon the Guarena. The British retired by Torecilla de la Orden, the fifth division being in one column on the left, the fourth division on the right as they retreated, and the light division on an intermediate line and nearer to the enemy. The cavalry were on the flanks and rear, the air was extremely sultry, the dust rose in clouds, and the close order of the troops rendered it very oppressive, but the military spectacle was exceedingly strange and grand. For then were seen the hostile columns of infantry, only half musket-shot from each other, marching impetuously towards a common goal, the officers on each side pointing forwards with their swords, or touching their caps, and waving their hands in courtesy, while the German cavalry, huge men, on huge horses, rode between in a close compact body as if to prevent a collision. At times the loud tones of command, to hasten the march, were heard passing from the front to the rear, and now and then the rushing sound of bullets came sweeping over the columns, whose violent pace was continually accelerated.

Thus moving for ten miles, yet keeping the most perfect order, both parties approached the Guarena, and the enemy seeing that the light division, although more in their power than the others,

were yet outstripping them in the march, increased the fire of their guns and menaced an attack with infantry. But the German cavalry instantly drew close round, the column plunged suddenly into a hollow dip of ground on the left, which offered the means of baffling the enemy's aim, and ten minutes after the head of the division was in the stream of the Guarena between Osmo and Castrillo. The fifth division entered the river at the same time but higher up on the left, and the fourth division passed it on the right. The soldiers of the light division, tormented with thirst, yet long used to their enemy's mode of warfare, drank as they marched, and the soldiers of the fifth division stopped in the river for only a few moments, but on the instant, forty French guns, gathered on the heights above, sent a tempest of bullets amongst them. So nicely timed was the operation.

The Guarena, flowing from four distinct sources, which are united below Castrillo, offered a very strong line of defence, and Marmont, hoping to carry it in the first confusion of the passage, and so seize the table-land of Vallesa, had brought up all his artillery to the front; and to distract the allies' attention, he had directed Clausel to push the head of the right column over the river at Castrillo, at the same time. But Wellington, expecting him at Vallesa from the first, had ordered the other divisions of his army, originally assembled at Canizal, to cross one of the upper branches of the river; and they reached the table-land of Vallesa before Marmont's infantry, oppressed by the extreme heat and rapidity of the march, could muster in strength to attempt the passage of the other branch. Clausel, however, sent Carrier's brigade of cavalry across the Guarena at Castrillo, and supported it with a column of infantry; and the fourth division had just gained the heights above Canizal, after passing the stream, when Carrier's horsemen entered the valley on their left, and the infantry in one column menaced their front. The sedgy banks of the river would have been difficult to force in face of an enemy, but Victor Alten, though a very bold man in action, was slow to seize an advantage, and suffered the French cavalry to cross and form in considerable numbers without opposition; he assailed them too late, and by successive squadrons, instead of by regiments, and the result was unfavorable at first. The fourteenth and the German hussars were hard pressed; the third dragoons came up in support, but they were immediately driven back again by the fire of some French infantry, the fight waxed hot with the others, and many fell, but finally General Carrier was wounded and taken, and the French retired. During this cavalry action, the twenty-seventh and fortieth regiments coming down the hill, broke

the enemy's infantry with an impetuous bayonet charge, and Alten's horsemen, being then disengaged, sabred some of the fugitives.

This combat cost the French, who had advanced too far without support, a general and five hundred soldiers ; but Marmont, though baffled at Vallesa and beaten at Castrillo, concentrated his army at the latter place in such a manner as to hold both banks of the Guarena. Whereupon Wellington recalled his troops from Vallesa ; and as the whole loss of the allies during the previous operations was not more than six hundred, nor that of the French more than eight hundred, and that both sides were highly excited, the day still young, and the positions, although strong, open, and within cannon-shot, a battle was expected. Marmont's troops had, however, been marching for two days and nights incessantly, and Wellington's plan did not admit of fighting unless forced to it in defence, or under such circumstances as would enable him to crush his opponent, and yet keep the field afterwards against the King.

By this series of signal operations, the French General had passed a great river, taken the initiatory movement, surprised the right wing of the allies, and pushed it back above ten miles. Yet these advantages are to be traced to the peculiarities of the English General's situation, which have been already noticed, and Wellington's tactical skill was manifested by the extricating of his troops from their dangerous position at Castrejon without loss, and without being forced to fight a battle. He, however, appears to have erred in extending his troops to the right when he first reached the Duero, for seeing that Marmont could at pleasure pass that river and turn his flanks, he should have remained concentrated on the Guarena, and only pushed cavalry posts to the line of the Duero above Toro. Neither should he have risked his right wing so far from his main body from the evening of the 16th to the morning of the 18th. He could scarcely have brought it off without severe loss if Marmont had been stronger in cavalry, and, instead of pushing forward at once to Guarena, had attacked him on the march. On the other hand, the security of the French General's movements from the Trabancos to the Guarena depended entirely on their rapidity ; for as his columns crossed the open country on a line parallel to the march of the allies, a simple wheel by companies to the right would have formed the latter in order of battle on his flank, while the four divisions already on the Guarena could have met them in front.

But it was on the 16th that the French General failed in the most glaring manner. His intent was, by menacing the communi-

cation with Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, to force the allies back and strike some decisive blow during their retreat. Now, on the evening of the 16th, he had passed the Duero at Toro, gained a day's march, and was then actually nearer to Salamanca than the allies were; and, had he persisted in his movement, Wellington must have fought him to disadvantage, or have given up Salamanca and passed the Tormes at Huerta, to regain the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo. This advantage Marmont relinquished to make a forced march of eighty miles in forty-eight hours, and to risk the execution of a variety of nice and difficult evolutions, in which he lost above a thousand men by the sword or by fatigue, and finally found his adversary on the 18th still facing him in the very position which he had turned on the evening of the 16th!

On the 19th, the armies maintained their respective ground in quiet until the evening, when Marmont concentrated his troops in one mass on his left, near the village of Tarazona, and Wellington, fearing for his right, again passed the second branch of the Guarena at Vallesa and El Olmo, and took post on the table-land above those villages. The light division, being in front, advanced to the edge of the table-land, overlooking the enemy's main body, which was at rest round the bivouac fires; yet the piquets would have been quietly posted if Sir Stapleton Cotton, coming up at the moment, had not ordered Captain Ross to turn his battery of six-pounders upon a group of French officers. At the first shot the enemy seemed surprised, at the second their gunners ran to their pieces, and in a few moments a reply from twelve eight-pounders showed the folly of provoking a useless combat. An artillery officer was wounded in the head, several of the British soldiers fell in different parts of the line, one shot swept away a whole section of Portuguese, and finally the division was obliged to withdraw several hundred yards, in a mortifying manner, to avoid a great and unnecessary effusion of blood.

The allies being now formed in two lines on the table-land of Vallesa, offered a fair though not an easy field to the enemy. Wellington expected a battle the next day, because the range of heights which he occupied trended backwards to the Tormes on the shortest line; as he had thrown a Spanish garrison into the castle of Alba de Tormes, he thought Marmont could not turn his right, or if he attempted it, that he would be shouldered off the Tormes at the ford of Huerta. He was mistaken. The French General was more perfectly acquainted with the ground, and proved that he could move an army with wonderful facility.

On the 20th, at daybreak, instead of crossing the Guarena to

dispute the high land of Vallesa, Marmont marched rapidly in several columns, covered by a powerful rear-guard, up the river to Santa la Piedra, and crossed the stream there, though the banks were difficult, before any disposition could be made to oppose him. He thus turned the right flank of the allies and gained a new range of hills trending towards the Tormes, and parallel to those leading from Vallesa. Wellington immediately made a corresponding movement. Then commenced an evolution similar to that of the 18th, but on a greater scale, both as to numbers and length of way. The allies, moving in two lines of battle within musket-shot of the French, endeavored to gain upon and cross their march at Cantalpino; the guns on both sides again exchanged their rough salutations as the accidents of ground favored their play, and again the officers, like gallant gentlemen who bore no malice and knew no fear, made their military recognitions, while the horsemen on each side watched with eager eyes for an opening to charge; but the French General moving his army as one man along the crest of the heights, preserved the lead he had taken and made no mistake.

At Cantalpino it became evident that the allies were outflanked, and all this time Marmont had so skilfully managed his troops that he furnished no opportunity even for a partial attack. Wellington therefore fell off a little and made towards the heights of Cabeça Velloso and Aldea Rubia, intending to halt there while the sixth division and Alten's cavalry, forcing their march, seized Aldea Lengua and secured the position of Christoval. But he made no effort to seize the ford of Huerta, for his own march had been long and the French had passed over nearly twice as much ground, wherefore he thought they would not attempt to reach the Tormes that day. However, when night approached, although his second line had got possession of the heights of Velloso, his first line was heaped up without much order in the low ground between that place and Hornillos; the French army crowned all the summit of the opposite hills, and their fires, stretching in a half circle from Villarueta to Babila Fuente, showed that they commanded the ford of Huerta. They could even have attacked the allies with great advantage had there been light for the battle. The English General immediately ordered the bivouac fires to be made, but filed the troops off in succession with the greatest celerity towards Velloso and Aldea Rubia, and during the movement the Portuguese cavalry, coming in from the front, were mistaken for French, and lost some men by cannon-shot ere they were recognized.

Wellington was deeply disquieted at the unexpected result of this day's operations, which had been entirely to the advantage of

the French General. Marmont had shown himself perfectly acquainted with the country, had outflanked and outmarched the allies, had gained the command of the Tormes, and as his junction with the King's army was thus secured, he might fight or wait for reinforcements, or continue his operations, as it seemed good to himself. But the scope of Wellington's campaign was hourly being more restricted. His reasons for avoiding a battle except at advantage were stronger than before, because Caffarelli's cavalry was known to be in march, and the army of the centre was on the point of taking the field; hence, though he should fight and gain a victory, unless it was decisive, his object would not be advanced. That object was to deliver the Peninsula, which could only be done by a long course of solid operations incompatible with sudden and rash strokes unauthorized by anything but hope; wherefore, yielding to the force of circumstances, he prepared to return to Portugal and abide his time; yet with a bitter spirit, which was not soothed by the recollection that he had refused the opportunity of fighting to advantage exactly one month before, and upon the very hills he now occupied. Nevertheless that steadfast temper which then prevented him from seizing an adventitious chance, would not now let him yield to fortune more than she could ravish from him; he still hoped to give the lion's stroke, and resolved to cover Salamanca and the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo to the last moment. A letter stating his inability to hold his ground was, however, sent to Castaños, but it was intercepted by Marmont, who exultingly pushed forwards without regard to the King's movements; and it is curious that Joseph afterwards imagined this to have been a subtlety of Wellington's to draw the French General into a premature battle.*

On the 21st, while the allies occupied the old position of Christoval, the French threw a garrison into Alba de Tormes, from whence the Spaniards had been withdrawn by Carlos d'España, without the knowledge of the English General. Marmont then passed the Tormes, by the fords between Alba and Huerta, and moving up the valley of Machechuco, encamped behind Calvariza Ariba at the edge of a forest which extended from the river to that place. Wellington also passed the Tormes in the course of the evening by the bridges and by the fords of Santa Marta and Aldea Lengua; but the third division and d'Urban's cavalry remained on the right bank, and intrenched themselves at Cabrerizos, lest the French, who had left a division on the heights of Babila Fuente, should recross the Tormes in the night and overwhelm them.

It was late when the light division descended the rough side

* King's Correspondence, MS.

of the Aldea Lengua mountain to cross the river, and the night came suddenly down with more than common darkness, for a storm, that common precursor of a battle in the Peninsula, was at hand. Torrents of rain deepened the ford, the water foamed and dashed with increasing violence, the thunder was frequent and deafening, and the lightning passed in sheets of fire close over the column, or played upon the points of the bayonets. One flash falling amongst the fifth dragoon guards, near Santa Marta, killed many men and horses, while hundreds of frightened animals, breaking loose from their piquet ropes and galloping wildly about, were supposed to be the enemy's cavalry charging in the darkness, and indeed some of their patrols were at hand; but to a military eye there was nothing more imposing than the close and beautiful order in which the soldiers of that noble light division were seen by the fiery gleams to step from the river to the bank and pursue their march amidst this astounding turmoil, defying alike the storm and the enemy.

The position now taken by the allies was nearly the same as that occupied by General Graham a month before, when the forts of Salamanca were invested. The left wing rested in the low ground on the Tormes near Santa Marta, having a cavalry post in front towards Calvariza de Abaxo. The right wing extended along a range of heights which ended also in low ground, near the village of Arapiles, and this line being perpendicular to the course of the Tormes from Huerta and Salamanca, and parallel to its course from Alba to Huerta, covered Salamanca. But the enemy, extending his left along the edge of the forest, still menaced the line of communication with Ciudad Rodrigo; and in the night advice came that General Chauvel, with near two thousand of Caffarelli's horsemen and twenty guns, had actually reached Pollos on the 20th, and would join Marmont the 22d or 23d. Hence Wellington, feeling that he must now perforce retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo, and fearing that the French cavalry thus reinforced would hamper his movements, determined, unless the enemy attacked him or committed some flagrant fault, to retire before Chauvel's horsemen could arrive.

At daybreak on the 22d, Marmont, who had called the troops at Babila Fuente over the Tormes by the ford of Encina, brought Bonnet's and Maucune's divisions up from the forest and took possession of the ridge of Calvariza de Ariba; he also occupied in advance of it a wooded height on which was an old chapel called Nuestra Señora de la Pena. But at a little distance from his left and from the English right, stood a pair of solitary hills, called the *Two Arapiles*, about half cannon-shot from each other; steep and savagely rugged they were, and the possession of them would have

enabled the French General to form his army across Wellington's right, and thus bring on a battle with every disadvantage to the allies, confined, as the latter would have been, between the French army and the Tormes. These hills were neglected by the English General until a staff officer, who had observed the enemy's detachments stealing towards them, first informed Beresford, and afterwards Wellington, of the fact. The former thought it was of no consequence, but the latter immediately sent the seventh Caçadores to seize the most distant of the rocks, and then a combat occurred similar to that which happened between Cæsar and Afranius at Lerida; for the French seeing the allies' detachment approaching, broke their own ranks, and running without order to the encounter gained the first Arapiles and kept it, but were repulsed in an endeavor to seize the second. This skirmish was followed by one at Nuestra Señora de la Pena, which was also assailed by a detachment of the seventh division, and so far successfully, that half that height was gained, yet the enemy kept the other half, and Victor Alten, flanking the attack with a squadron of German hussars, lost some men and was himself wounded by a musket-shot.

The result of the dispute for the Arapiles rendered a retreat difficult to the allies during daylight, for though the rock gained by the English was a fortress in the way of the French army, Marmont, by extending his left, and by gathering a force behind his own Arapiles, could still frame a dangerous battle and pounce upon the allies during their movement. Wherefore Wellington immediately extended his right into the low ground, placing the light companies of the guards in the village of Arapiles, and the fourth division, with exception of the twenty-seventh regiment, which remained at the rock, on a gentle ridge behind them. The fifth and sixth divisions he gathered in one mass upon the internal slope of the English Arapiles, where, from the hollow nature of the ground, they were quite hidden from the enemy; and during these movements a sharp cannonade was exchanged from the tops of those frowning hills, on whose crowning rocks the two generals sat like ravenous vultures watching for their quarry.

Marmont's project was not yet developed; his troops coming from Babila Fuente were still in the forest and some miles off; he had only two divisions close up, and the occupation of Calvariza Ariba and Nuestra Señora de la Pena was a daring defensive measure to cover the formation of his army. The occupation of the Arapiles was, however, a start forward, for an advantage to be afterwards turned to profit, and seemed to fix the operations on the left of the Tormes. Wellington, therefore, brought up the first and the light divisions to confront the enemy's troops on the height of Calvariza

Ariba, and then calling the third division and D'Urban's cavalry over the river, by the fords of Santa Marta, he posted them in a wood near Aldea Tejada, entirely refused to the enemy and unseen by him, yet in a situation to secure the main road to Ciudad Rodrigo. Thus the position of the allies was suddenly reversed, the left rested on the English Arapiles, the right on Aldea Tejada; that which was the rear became the front, and the interval between the third and the fourth division was occupied by Bradford's Portuguese infantry, by the Spaniards, and by the British cavalry.

This ground had several breaks and hollows, so that few of these troops could be viewed by the enemy, and those which were seemed, both from their movement and from their position, to be pointing to the Ciudad Rodrigo road as in retreat. The commissariat and baggage had also been ordered to the rear, the dust of their march was plainly to be seen many miles off, and hence there was nothing in the relative position of the armies, save their proximity, to indicate an approaching battle. Such a state of affairs could not last long. About twelve o'clock Marmont, fearing that the important bearing of the French Arapiles on Wellington's retreat would induce the latter to drive him thence, hastily brought up Foy's and Ferey's divisions in support, placing the first, with some guns, on a wooded height between the Arapiles and Nuestra Señora de la Peña, the second, and Boyer's dragoons, behind Foy on the ridge of Calvariza de Ariba. Nor was this fear ill-founded, for the English General, thinking that he could not safely retreat in daylight without possessing both Arapiles, had actually issued orders for the seventh division to attack the French, but perceiving the approach of more troops, gave counter-orders lest he should bring on the battle disadvantageously. He judged it better to wait for new events, being certain that at night he could make his retreat good, and wishing rather that Marmont should attack him in his now strong position.

The French troops coming from Babila Fuente had not yet reached the edge of the forest, when Marmont, seeing that the allies would not attack, and fearing that they would retreat before his own dispositions were completed, ordered Thomières' division, covered by fifty guns and supported by the light cavalry, to menace the Ciudad Rodrigo road. He also hastened the march of his other divisions, designing, when Wellington should move in opposition to Thomières, to fall upon him, by the village of Arapiles, with six divisions of infantry and Boyer's dragoons, which last he now put in march to take fresh ground on the left of the Arapiles rocks, leaving only one regiment of cavalry, to guard Foy's right flank at Calvariza.

In these new circumstances, the positions of the two armies embraced an oval basin formed by different ranges of hills, that rose like an amphitheatre of which the Arapiles rocks might be considered the door-posts. This basin was about a mile broad from north to south, and more than two miles long from east to west. The northern and western half formed the allies' position, which extended from the English Arapiles on the left to Aldea Tejada on the right. The eastern heights were held by the French right, and their left, consisting of 'Thomières' division with the artillery and light cavalry, was now moving along the southern side of the basin; but the march was wide and loose, there was a long space between Thomières' and his divisions, which, coming from the edge of the forest, were destined to form the centre, and there was a longer space between him and the divisions about the Arapiles. Nevertheless, the mass of artillery placed on his right flank was very imposing, and opened its fire grandly, taking ground to the left by guns, in succession, as the infantry moved on; and these last marched eagerly, continually contracting their distance from the allies, and bringing up their left shoulders as if to envelope Wellington's position and embrace it with fire. At this time also, Bonnet's troops, one regiment of which held the French Arapiles, carried the village of that name, and, although soon driven from the greatest part of it again, maintained a fierce struggle.

Marmont's first arrangements had occupied several hours, yet as they gave no positive indication of his designs, Wellington, ceasing to watch him, had retired from the Arapiles. But at three o'clock, a report reached him that the French left was in motion and pointing towards the Ciudad Rodrigo road; then starting up he repaired to the high ground, and observed their movements for some time with a stern contentment, for their left wing was entirely separated from the centre. The fault was flagrant, and he fixed it with the stroke of a thunder-bolt. A few orders issued from his lips like the incantations of a wizard, and suddenly the dark mass of troops which covered the English Arapiles was seemingly possessed by some mighty spirit, and rushing violently down the interior slope of the mountain, entered the great basin amidst a storm of bullets which seemed to shear away the whole surface of the earth over which the soldiers moved. The fifth division instantly formed on the right of the fourth, connecting the latter with Bradford's Portuguese, who hastened forward at the same time from the right of the army, and the heavy cavalry galloping up on the right of Bradford, closed this front of battle. The sixth and seventh divisions, flanked on the right by Anson's light cavalry, which had now moved from the Arapiles, were ranged at half cannon-shot in a second line,

which was prolonged by the Spaniards in the direction of the third division ; and this last, reinforced by two squadrons of the fourteenth dragoons, and by D'Urban's Portuguese horsemen, formed the extreme right of the army. Behind all, on the highest ground, the first and light divisions and Pack's Portuguese were disposed in heavy masses as a reserve.

When this grand disposition was completed, the third division and its attendant horsemen, the whole formed in four columns and flanked on the left by twelve guns, received orders to cross the enemy's line of march. The remainder of the first line, including the main body of the cavalry, was directed to advance whenever the attack of the third division should be developed ; and as the fourth division must in this forward movement necessarily lend its flank to the enemy's troops stationed on the French Arapiles, Pack's brigade was commanded to assail that rock the moment the left of the British line should pass it. Thus, after long coiling and winding, the armies came together, and drawing up their huge trains like angry serpents mingled in deadly strife.

BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.

Marmont, from the top of the French Arapiles, saw the country beneath him suddenly covered with enemies at a moment when he was in the act of making a complicated evolution, and when, by the rash advance of his left, his troops were separated into three parts, each at too great a distance to assist the other, and those nearest the enemy neither strong enough to hold their ground, nor aware of what they had to encounter. The third division was, however, still hidden from him by the western heights, and he hoped that the tempest of bullets under which the British line was moving in the basin beneath, would check it until he could bring up his reserve divisions, and by the village of Arapiles fall on what was now the left of the allies' position. But even this, his only resource for saving the battle, was weak, for on that point there were still the first and light divisions and Pack's brigade, forming a mass of twelve thousand troops with thirty pieces of artillery ; the village itself was well disputed ; and the English Arapiles rock stood out as a strong bastion of defence. However, the French General, nothing daunted, despatched officer after officer, some to hasten up the troops from the forest, others to stop the progress of his left wing, and with a sanguine expectation still looked for the victory until he saw Pakenham with the third division shoot like a meteor across 'Thomières' path ; then pride and hope alike died within him, and desperately he was hurrying in person to that fatal point, when an exploding shell stretched him on the earth with a broken arm

and two deep wounds in his side. Confusion ensued, and the troops, distracted by ill-judged orders and counter-orders, knew not where to move, whom to fight, or whom to avoid.

It was about five o'clock when Pakenham fell upon Thomières, and it was at the instant when that General, the head of whose column had gained an open isolated hill at the extremity of the southern range of heights, expected to see the allies in full retreat towards the Ciudad Rodrigo road, closely followed by Marmont from the Arapiles. The counter-stroke was terrible! Two batteries of artillery placed on the summit of the western heights suddenly took his troops in flank, and Pakenham's massive columns, supported by cavalry, were coming on full in his front, while two-thirds of his own division, lengthened out and unconnected, were still behind in a wood where they could hear, but could not see the storm which was now bursting. From the chief to the lowest soldier, all felt that they were lost, and in an instant Pakenham, the most frank and gallant of men, commenced the battle.

The British columns formed lines as they marched, and the French gunners, standing up manfully for the honor of their country, sent showers of grape into the advancing masses, while a crowd of light troops poured in a fire of musketry, under cover of which the main body endeavored to display a front. But bearing onwards through the skirmishers with the might of a giant, Pakenham broke the half-formed lines into fragments, and sent the whole in confusion upon the advancing supports; one only officer, with unyielding spirit, remained by the artillery; standing alone he fired the last gun at the distance of a few yards, but whether he lived or there died could not be seen for the smoke. Some squadrons of light cavalry fell on the right of the third division, but the fifth regiment repulsed them, and then D'Urban's Portuguese horsemen, reinforced by two squadrons of the fourteenth dragoons under Felton Harvey, gained the enemy's flank. The Oporto regiment, led by the English Major Watson, instantly charged the French infantry, yet vainly; Watson fell deeply wounded, and his men retired.*

Pakenham continued his tempestuous course against the remainder of Thomières' troops, which were now arrayed on the wooded heights behind the first hill, yet imperfectly, and offering two fronts, the one opposed to the third division and its attendant horsemen, the other to the fifth division, to Bradford's brigade and the main body of cavalry and artillery, all of which were now moving in one great line across the basin. Meanwhile Bonnet's troops having failed at the village of Arapiles were sharply engaged with the fourth division, Maucune kept his menacing position behind the

* Appendix I.

French Arapiles, and as Clausel's division had come up from the forest, the connection of the centre and left was in some measure restored; two divisions were however still in the rear, and Boyer's dragoons were in march from Calvariza Ariba. Thomières had been killed, and Bonnet, who succeeded Marmont, had been disabled, hence more confusion; but the command of the army devolved on Clausel, and he was of a capacity to sustain this terrible crisis.

The fourth and fifth divisions, and Bradford's brigade, were now hotly engaged and steadily gaining ground; the heavy cavalry, Anson's light dragoons and Bull's troop of artillery were advancing at a trot on Pakenham's left; and on that General's right D'Urban's horsemen overlapped the enemy. Thus in less than half an hour, and before an order of battle had even been formed by the French, their commander-in-chief and two other generals had fallen, and the left of their army was turned, thrown into confusion and enveloped. Clausel's division had indeed joined Thomières', and a front had been spread on the southern heights, but it was loose and unfit to resist; for the troops were, some in double lines, some in columns, some in squares; a powerful sun shone full in their eyes, the light soil, stirred up by the trampling of men and horses, and driven forward by a breeze, which arose in the west at the moment of attack, came full upon them mingled with smoke in such stifling clouds, that scarcely able to breathe and quite unable to see, their fire was given at random.

In this situation, while Pakenham, bearing onward with a conquering violence, was closing on their flank, and the fifth division advancing with a storm of fire on their front, the interval between the two attacks was suddenly filled with a whirling cloud of dust, which moving swiftly forward carried within its womb the trampling sound of a charging multitude. As it passed the left of the third division Le Marchant's heavy horsemen, flanked by Anson's light cavalry, broke forth from it at full speed, and the next instant twelve hundred French infantry, though formed in several lines, were trampled down with a terrible clamor and disturbance. Bewildered and blinded, they cast away their arms and ran through the openings of the British squadrons, stooping and demanding quarter, while the dragoons, big men and on big horses, rode onwards, smiting with their long glittering swords in uncontrollable power, and the third division followed at speed, shouting as the French masses fell in succession before this dreadful charge.

Nor were these valiant swordsmen yet exhausted. Their own General, Le Marchant, and many officers had fallen, but Cotton and all his staff was at their head, and with ranks confused, and

blended together in one mass, still galloping forward they sustained from a fresh column an irregular stream of fire which emptied a hundred saddles; yet with fine courage, and downright force, the survivors broke through this the third and strongest body of men that had encountered them, and Lord Edward Somerset, continuing his course at the head of one squadron, with a happy perseverance captured five guns. The French left was entirely broken, more than two thousand prisoners were taken, the French light horsemen abandoned that part of the field, and Thomières' division no longer existed as a military body. Anson's cavalry, which had passed quite over the hill and had suffered little in the charge, was now joined by D'Urban's troopers, and took the place of Le Marchant's exhausted men; the heavy German dragoons followed in reserve, and with the third and fifth divisions and the guns, formed one formidable line two miles in advance of where Pakenham had first attacked; and that impetuous officer with unmitigated strength still pressed forward, spreading terror and disorder on the enemy's left.

While these signal events, which occupied about forty minutes, were passing on the allies' right, a terrible battle raged in the centre. For when the first shock of the third division had been observed from the Arapiles, the fourth division, moving in a line with the fifth, had passed the village of that name under a prodigious cannonade, and vigorously driving Bonnet's troops backwards, step by step, to the southern and eastern heights, obliged them to mingle with Clausel's and with Thomières' broken remains. When the combatants had passed the French Arapiles, which was about the time of Le Marchant's charge, Pack's Portuguese assailed that rock, and the front of battle was thus completely defined, because Foy's division was now exchanging a distant cannonade with the first and light divisions. However, Bonnet's troops, notwithstanding Marmont's fall, and the loss of their own General, fought strongly, and Clausel made a surprising effort beyond all men's expectations to restore the battle. Already a great change was visible. Ferey's division drawn off from the height of Calvariza Ariba arrived in the centre behind Bonnet's men; the light cavalry, Boyer's dragoons, and two divisions of infantry, from the forest, were also united there, and on this mass of fresh men, Clausel rallied the remnants of his own and Thomières' division. Thus by an able movement, Sarrut's, Brennier's and Ferey's unbroken troops, supported by the whole of the cavalry, were so disposed as to cover the line of retreat to Alba de Tormes, while Maucune's division was still in mass behind the French Arapiles, and Foy's remained untouched on the right.

But Clausel, not content with having brought the separated part of his army together and in a condition to effect a retreat, attempted to stem the tide of victory in the very fulness of its strength and roughness. His hopes were founded on a misfortune which had befallen General Pack; for that officer, ascending the French Arapiles in one heavy column, had driven back the enemy's skirmishers and was within thirty yards of the summit, believing himself victorious, when suddenly the French reserves leapt forward from the rocks upon his front and upon his left flank. The hostile masses closed, there was a thick cloud of smoke, a shout, a stream of fire, and the side of the hill was covered to the very bottom with the dead, the wounded and the flying Portuguese, who were scoffed at for this failure without any justice; no troops could have withstood that crash upon such steep ground, and the propriety of attacking the hill at all seems very questionable. The result went nigh to shake the whole battle. For the fourth division had just then reached the southern ridge of the basin, and one of the best regiments in the service was actually on the summit, when twelve hundred fresh adversaries, arrayed on the reverse slope, charged up hill; and as the British fire was straggling and ineffectual, because the soldiers were breathless and disordered by the previous fighting, the French, who came up resolutely and without firing, won the crest. They were even pursuing down the other side when two regiments placed in line below checked them with a destructive volley.

This vigorous counter-blow took place at the moment when Pack's defeat permitted Maucune, who was no longer in pain for the Arapiles hill, to menace the left flank and rear of the fourth division, but the left wing of the fortieth regiment immediately wheeled about, and with a rough charge cleared the rear. Maucune would not engage himself more deeply at that time, but General Ferey's troops pressed vigorously against the front of the fourth division, and Brennier did the same by the first line of the fifth division, Boyer's dragoons also came on rapidly, and the allies being outflanked and overmatched lost ground. Fiercely and fast the French followed, and the fight once more raged in the basin below. General Cole had before this fallen deeply wounded, and Leith had the same fortune, but Beresford promptly drew Spry's Portuguese brigade from the second line of the fifth division and thus flanked the advancing columns of the enemy; yet he also fell desperately wounded, and Boyer's dragoons then came freely into action because Anson's cavalry had been checked after Le Marchant's charge by a heavy fire of artillery.

The crisis of the battle had now arrived, and the victory was

for the general who had the strongest reserves in hand. Wellington, who was seen that day at every point of the field exactly when his presence was most required, immediately brought up from the second line the sixth division, and its charge was rough, strong and successful. Nevertheless the struggle was no slight one. The men of General Hulse's brigade, which was on the left, went down by hundreds, and the sixty-first and eleventh regiments won their way desperately, and through such a fire as British soldiers only can sustain. Some of Boyer's dragoons also breaking in between the fifth and sixth divisions slew many men, and caused some disorder in the fifty-third; but that brave regiment lost no ground, nor did Clausel's impetuous counter-attack avail at any point, after the first burst, against the steady courage of the allies. The southern ridge was regained, the French General Menne was severely, and General Ferey mortally wounded, Clausel himself was hurt, and the reserve of Boyer's dragoons coming on at a canter were met and broken by the fire of Hulse's noble brigade. Then the changing current of the fight once more set for the British. The third division continued to outflank the enemy's left, Maucune abandoned the French Arapiles, Foy retired from the ridge of Calvariza, and the allied host, righting itself as a gallant ship after a sudden gust, again bore onwards in blood and gloom; for though the air, purified by the storm of the night before, was peculiarly clear, one vast cloud of smoke and dust rolled along the basin, and within it was the battle with all its sights and sounds of terror.

When the English General had thus restored the fight in the centre, he directed the commander of the first division to push between Foy and the rest of the French army, which would have rendered it impossible for the latter to rally or escape; but this order was not executed, and Foy's and Maucune's divisions were skilfully used by Clausel's to protect the retreat. The first, posted on undulating ground and flanked by some squadrons of dragoons, covered the roads to the fords of Huerta and Encina; the second, reinforced with fifteen guns, was placed on a steep ridge in front of the forest, covering the road to Alba de Tormes; and behind this ridge, the rest of the army, then falling back in disorder before the third, fifth, and sixth divisions, took refuge. Wellington immediately sent the light division, formed in two lines and flanked by some squadrons of dragoons, against Foy; and he supported them by the first division in columns, flanked on the right by two brigades of the fourth division which he had drawn off from the centre when the sixth division restored the fight. The seventh division and the Spaniards followed in

reserve, the country was covered with troops, and a new army seemed to have risen out of the earth.

Foy throwing out a cloud of skirmishers retired slowly by wings, turning and firing heavily from every rise of ground upon the light division, which marched steadily forward without returning a shot, save by its skirmishers; for three miles the march was under this musketry, which was occasionally thickened by a cannonade, and yet very few men were lost, because the French aim was baffled, partly by the twilight, partly by the even order and rapid gliding of the lines. But the French General Desgraviere was killed, and the flanking brigades from the fourth division having now penetrated between Maucune and Foy, it seemed difficult for the latter to extricate his troops from the action; nevertheless he did it, and with great dexterity. For having increased his skirmishers on the last defensible ridge, along the foot of which ran a marshy stream, he redoubled his fire of musketry, and made a menacing demonstration with his horsemen just as the darkness fell; the British guns immediately opened their fire, a squadron of dragoons galloped forwards from the left, the infantry, crossing the marshy stream, with an impetuous pace hastened to the summit of the hill, and a rough shock seemed at hand, but there was no longer an enemy; the main body of the French had gone into the thick forest on their own left during the firing, and the skirmishers fled swiftly after, covered by the smoke and by the darkness.

Meanwhile Maucune maintained a noble battle. He was outflanked and outnumbered, but the safety of the French army depended on his courage; he knew it, and Pakenham marking his bold demeanor, advised Clinton, who was immediately in his front, not to assail him until the third division should have turned his left. Nevertheless the sixth division was soon plunged afresh into action under great disadvantage, for after being kept by its commander a long time without reason close under Maucune's batteries, which ploughed heavily through the ranks, it was suddenly directed by a staff officer to attack the hill. Assisted by a brigade of the fourth division, the troops then rushed up, and in the darkness of the night the fire showed from afar how the battle went. On the side of the British a sheet of flame was seen, sometimes advancing with an even front, sometimes pricking forth in spear-heads, now falling back in waving lines, and anon darting upwards in one vast pyramid, the apex of which often approached, yet never gained the actual summit of the mountain; but the French musketry, rapid as lightning, sparkled along the brow of the height, with unvarying fulness, and with what de-

structive effects the dark gaps and changing shapes of the adverse fire showed too plainly. Yet when Pakenham had again turned the enemy's left, and Foy's division had glided into the forest, Maucune's task was completed, the effulgent crest of the ridge became black and silent, and the whole French army vanished as it were in the darkness.

Meanwhile Wellington, who was with the leading regiment of the light division, continued to advance towards the ford of Huerta, leaving the forest to his right, for he thought the Spanish garrison was still in the castle of Alba de Tormes, and that the enemy must of necessity be found in a confused mass at the fords. It was for this final stroke that he had so skilfully strengthened his left wing, nor was he diverted from his aim by marching through standing corn, where no enemy could have preceded him; nor by Foy's retreat into the forest, because it pointed towards the fords of Encina and Gonzalo, which that General might be endeavoring to gain, and the right wing of the allies would find him there. A squadron of French dragoons also burst hastily from the forest in front of the advancing troops, soon after dark, and firing their pistols passed at full gallop towards the ford of Huerta, thus indicating great confusion in the defeated army, and confirming the notion that its retreat was in that direction. Had the castle of Alba been held, the French could not have carried off a third of their army, nor would they have been in much better plight if Carlos d'España, who soon discovered his error in withdrawing the garrison, had informed Wellington of the fact; but he suppressed it and suffered the colonel who had only obeyed his orders to be censured; the left wing therefore continued their march to the ford without meeting any enemy, and the night being far spent, were there halted; the right wing, exhausted by long fighting, had ceased to pursue after the action with Maucune, and thus the French gained Alba unmolested; but the action did not terminate without two remarkable accidents. While riding close behind the forty-third regiment, Wellington was struck in the thigh by a spent musket-ball, which passed through his holster; and the night piquets had just been set at Huerta, when Sir Stapleton Cotton, who had gone to the ford and returned a different road, was shot through the arm by a Portuguese sentinel whose challenge he had disregarded. These were the last events of this famous battle, in which the skill of the general was worthily seconded by troops whose ardor may be appreciated by the following anecdotes.

Captain Brotherton, of the fourteenth dragoons, fighting on the 18th, at the Cuarena, amongst the foremost, as he was always

went to do, had a sword thrust quite through his side, yet on the 22d he was again on horseback, and being denied leave to remain in that condition with his own regiment, secretly joined Pack's Portuguese in an undress, and was again hurt in the unfortunate charge at the Arapiles. Such were the officers. A man of the forty-third, one by no means distinguished above his comrades, was shot through the middle of the thigh, and lost his shoes in passing the marshy stream; but refusing to quit the fight, he limped under fire in rear of his regiment, and with naked feet, and streaming of blood from his wound, he marched for several miles over a country covered with sharp stones. Such were the soldiers, and the devotion of woman was not wanting to the illustration of this great day.

The wife of Colonel Dalbiac, an English lady of a gentle disposition and possessing a very delicate frame, had braved the dangers, and endured the privations of two campaigns, with the patient fortitude which belongs only to her sex; and in this battle, forgetful of everything but that strong affection which had so long supported her, she rode deep amidst the enemy's fire, trembling, yet irresistibly impelled forwards by feelings more imperious than horror, more piercing than the fear of death.

CHAPTER IV.

Clausel passes the Tormes at Alba—Cavalry combat at La Serna—Chauvel's cavalry joins the French army—The King reaches Blasco Sancho—Retires to Espinar on hearing of the battle—Receives letters from Clausel which induce him to march on Segovia—Wellington drives Clausel across the Duero—Takes Valladolid—Brings Sautocildes over the Duero—Marches upon Cuellar—The King abandons Segovia and recrosses the Guadarama—State of affairs in other parts of Spain—General Long defeats Lallemand in Estremadura—Caffarelli is drawn to the coast by Popham's Expedition—Wellington leaves Clinton at Cuellar, and passes the Guadarama—Cavalry combat at Majadahonda—The King unites his army at Valdemoro—Miserable state of the French convoy—Joseph passes the Tagus; hears of the arrival of the Sicilian expedition at Alicante—Retreats upon Valencia instead of Andalusia—Maupoint's brigade succors the garrison of Cuenca, is beaten at Utiel by Villa Campa—Wellington enters Madrid—The Retiro surrenders—Empecinado takes Guadalaxara—Extraordinary journey of Colonel Fabvier—Napoleon hears of Marmont's defeat—His generous conduct towards that Marshal—Receives the King's report against Soult—His magnanimity—Observations.

DURING the few hours of darkness succeeding the battle Clausel passed the Tormes by the narrow bridge of Alba, and the fords below it, and at daylight was in full retreat upon Penceranda

covered by an organized rear-guard. Wellington, having brought up the German dragoons and Anson's cavalry, also crossed the river with his left wing at daylight, and moving up the stream came about ten o'clock upon the French rear, then winding without much order along the Almar, a small stream at the foot of a height near the village of La Serna. He launched his cavalry against them, and the French squadrons flying from Anson's troopers towards their own left abandoned three battalions of infantry who in separate columns were making up a hollow slope on their right, hoping to gain the crest of the heights before the cavalry could fall on. The two foremost reached the higher ground and formed squares, Foy being in the one and General Chemineau in the other. The last regiment, when half-way up, seeing Bock's dragoons galloping hard on, faced about in column and commenced a disorderly fire; the squares above also plied their muskets with far greater effect, and the Germans after crossing the Almar stream dropped fast, for they had under fire to pass a turn of narrow road and clear some rough ground before they could range their squadrons on a charging front. By twos, by threes, by tens, by twenties they fell, yet the rest keeping together surmounted the difficulties of the ground, and hurtling on the column went clean through it: then the squares above retreated, and several hundred prisoners were taken by these able and daring horsemen.

This charge was successful even to wonder, the joyous victors standing in the midst of their captives and of thousands of admiring friends seemed invincible; yet those who witnessed the scene, nay the actors themselves, remained with the conviction of this military truth, that cavalry alone are not able to cope with veteran infantry save by surprise. The hill of La Serna offered a frightful spectacle of the power of the musket, that queen of weapons, and the track of the Germans was marked by their huge bodies. A few minutes only had the combat lasted, and above a hundred had fallen, fifty-one were killed outright, and in several places man and horse had died simultaneously, and so suddenly that falling together on their sides they appeared still alive, the horse's legs stretched out as in movement, the rider's feet in the stirrup, his bridle in hand, the sword raised to strike, and the large hat fastened under the chin giving to the grim but undistorted countenance a supernatural and terrible expression.

When the French main body found their rear-guard attacked they turned to its succor, but seeing the light division coming up re-commenced the retreat and were followed to Nava de Setroval. Near that place Chauvel's horsemen joined them from the Duero, and covered the rear with such a resolute countenance that the

allied cavalry, reduced in numbers and fatigued with continual fighting, did not choose to meddle again. Thus Clausel carried his army clear off without further loss, and with such celerity that his headquarters were that night at Flores de Avila, forty miles from the field of battle. After remaining a few hours there he crossed the Zapardiel, and would have halted the 24th, but the allied cavalry entered Cisla and his march was then continued to Arevalo. This was a wonderful retreat, and the line was chosen with judgment, for Wellington naturally expected the French army would have made for Tordesillas instead of the Adaja. The pursuit was however somewhat slack. The British left wing, being quite fresh, could have ascended the Tormes on the night of the battle and reached the Almar before daylight, or passing at Huerta have marched by Ventosa to Peneranda; but the vigorous following of a beaten enemy was not a prominent characteristic of Lord Wellington's warfare. On the 25th he halted on the Zapardiel and Adaja rivers, to let the commissariat, which had been sent to the rear the morning of the battle, come up.

Meanwhile the King, having quitted Madrid with fourteen thousand men on the 21st, reached the Adaja and pushed his cavalry towards Fontiveros;* he was at Blasco Sancho the 24th, within a few hours' march of Arevalo, and consequently able to effect a junction with Clausel; yet he did not hurry his march, for he knew only of the advance upon Salamanca, not of the defeat, and having sent many messengers to inform Marmont of his approach concluded he would await the junction. The next day he received letters from him and Clausel,† dated Arevalo, describing the battle, and saying the defeated army must pass the Duero immediately to save the dépôt of Valladolid and establish new communications with the army of the north: they promised however to halt behind that river if possible until the King could receive reinforcements from Suchet and Soult.

Joseph by a rapid movement upon Arevalo could still have effected a junction, but he immediately made a forced march to Espinar, leaving in Blasco Sancho two officers and twenty-seven troopers, who were surprised and taken on the 25th by eight troopers under Corporal Henley of the 14th dragoons. Clausel made for Valladolid by Olmedo, thus abandoning the garrisons of Zamora, Toro, and Tordesillas to the allies. Wellington then brought Santocildes, who was now on the Esla with eight thousand Gallicians, to the right of the Duero, across which river he communicated by Castro Nuño with the left of the allies on the Za-

* See Plan 2.

† King's correspondence, MS.

pardiel. The 27th the army entered Olmedo. General Ferey had died there of his wounds, and the Spaniards tearing his body from the grave were going to mutilate it, when the soldiers of the light division who had so often fought against this brave man rescued his corpse; they re-made his grave, and heaped rocks upon it for more security, yet with little need, for the Spaniards, with whom the sentiment of honor is always strong when not stifled by the violence of their passions, immediately applauded the action.

On the 26th Clausel, finding the pursuit had slackened, sent Colonel Fabvier to advise the King of it, and then passing his right wing across the Duero by the ford near Boccillo to cover the evacuation of Valladolid, marched with the other wing towards the bridge of Tudela; he remained however still on the left bank in the hope that Fabvier's mission would bring the King back. Joseph had then passed the Puerta de Guadarama, but immediately repassed it and made a flank movement to Segovia, which he reached the 27th and pushed his cavalry to Santa Maria de Nieva. There he remained until the 31st, expecting Clausel would join him, for he resolved not to quit his hold of the passes over the Guadarama, nor to abandon his communication with Valencia and Andalusia. During these movements Wellington had brought Santocildes across the Duero to the Zapardiel, and crossing the Eresma and Ciga with the 1st and light divisions and the cavalry, compelled Clausel to go over the Duero in the night of the 29th. And that General, fearing the British would then gain Aranda and Lerma while the Gallicians seized Dueñas and Torquemada, retreated in three columns up the valleys of the Arlanza, the Duero and the Esquiva, towards Burgos, in great disorder; for the soldiers, encouraged even by officers of high rank, spread over the whole country pillaging and assassinating the country people: Clausel was forced to shoot fifty marauders ere the wide-spreading anarchy could be checked.*

Valladolid was occupied by the allies amidst the rejoicings of the inhabitants, and eight hundred sick and wounded men were captured there with seventeen pieces of artillery and large stores. Three hundred other prisoners were taken by the guerilla chief Martinez, and a large convoy on its way to Soult was forced to retrograde to Burgos. The left wing of the allies then pursued the enemy up the Arlanza, while the right wing moving against the King reached Cuellar the 1st of August. On the same day the garrison of Tordesillas surrendered to the Gallicians, and Joseph having first dismantled the castle of Segovia and raised a contri-

* Clausel's Letter to the Minister of War, 18th August, 1812.

bution of money and church plate retreated through the Puerta de Guadarama, leaving a rear-guard of cavalry which escaped by the Ildefonso pass on the approach of the allied horsemen. Thus the army of the centre was irrevocably separated from the army of Portugal, the operations against the latter were terminated, and new combinations were made conformable to the altered state of affairs; but to understand these it is necessary to look at the transactions in other parts of the Peninsula.

In Estremadura, after Drouet's retreat to Azagua, General Hill had placed a strong division of infantry at Merida ready to cross the Tagus, but no military event occurred until the 24th of July, when General Lallemand made a fresh incursion with three regiments of cavalry. The third and fourth Portuguese dragoons under Colonel John Campbell retired before him in good order, skirmishing, to the high ground between Ribera and Villa Franca, and being there supported by Long's British cavalry and Wyn-yate's horse artillery, turned and charged with success. Lallemand then repassed the defile of Hinojosa under fire of the guns, and being menaced on both flanks by Long and Slade was driven with a loss of fifty men to Llera. Drouet, desirous to retaliate, immediately executed a flank march towards Merida, and Hill fearing for his detachments there made a corresponding movement, whereupon the French General returned to the Serena; but though he received positive orders from Soult to give battle, no action followed, and the affairs of that part of the Peninsula remained balanced.*

In Andalusia Ballesteros had surprised Colonel Beauvais at Ossuna, taking three hundred prisoners and ruining the French dépôt there, after which he moved against Malaga. He was opposed by Laval in front, and Villatte being detached from the blockade of Cadiz cut off his retreat to San Roque; the road to Murcia was still open to him and he escaped, but his rashness, though of less consequence since the battle of Salamanca, gave Wellington great disquietude, and the more so that Joseph O'Donnell had just sustained a serious defeat near Alicant. This disaster, to be described in a more fitting place, was counterbalanced by information that the revived expedition from Sicily had reached Majorca, had been joined by Whittingham's division, and had received the stores and guns sent from Portugal. In the north, Popham's armament had drawn Caffarelli's troops to the coast, and although this littoral warfare was not followed up the diversion was effectual.

In Castile the siege of Astorga lingered, but Santocildes was

* Intercepted Correspondence.

now in full communication with Wellington, and Silveira was on the Duero; Clausel remained at Burgos, and the King being joined by two thousand men from Suchet's army could concentrate twenty thousand to dispute the passes of the Guadarama. Hence Wellington, having nothing immediate to fear from Soult, nor from the army of Portugal, nor from the army of the north, nor from Suchet, menaced as that Marshal was by the Sicilian expedition, resolved to attack the King in preference to following Clausel. For the latter could not be pursued without exposing Salamanca and the Gallicians to Joseph, who was strong in cavalry; but that monarch might be assailed without risking much in other quarters, seeing that Clausel could not soon renew the campaign, and the immediate fall of Astorga was expected, which would let loose eight thousand additional men. A strong British division could also be spared to co-operate with Santocildes, Silveira, and the partidas, to watch Clausel while Wellington gave the King a blow or forced him to abandon Madrid; and it seemed probable the moral effect of regaining the capital would excite the Spaniards' energy everywhere, and prevent Soult from attacking Hill: if he did attack him the allies, choosing this line of operations, would be at hand to give succor.

These reasons being weighed, Clinton was left at Cuellar with the sixth division increased to eight thousand men by the addition of some sickly regiments and by Anson's cavalry; Santocildes was put in communication with him, and the partidas of Marquinez, Saornil, and El Principe agreed to act with Anson on a prescribed plan. Thus, exclusive of Silveira's militia and the Gallicians about Astorga, eighteen thousand men were left on the Duero, and the English General was still able to march against Joseph with twenty-eight thousand old troops, exclusive of Carlos d'España's Spaniards. He had also assurance from Lord Castle-reagh that a considerable sum in hard money, to be followed by other remittances, had been sent from England, a circumstance of the utmost importance, because grain could be purchased in Spain at one-third the cost of bringing it up from Portugal.

When the King regained Madrid he expected to hear that ten thousand of the army of the south were at Toledo, instead of which he received letters from Soult positively refusing to send that detachment; and from Clausel saying the army of Portugal was in full retreat to Burgos.* This retreat he regarded as a breach of faith, because Clausel had promised to hold the line of the Duero if the allies marched upon Madrid; but Joseph, unable to appreciate Wellington's military combinations, did not perceive

* King's Correspondence, MS.

that before he marched against Madrid the English General had forced Clausel to seek a distant point to re-organize his army. Nor was the King's perception of his own situation much clearer. He had the choice of several lines of operations; that is, he might defend the passes of the Guadarama while his court and enormous convoys evacuated Madrid and marched upon Zaragoza, Valencia or Andalusia; or he might retire, army and convoy together, in one of those directions. Rejecting the defence of the passes, lest the allies should then march by their right to the Tagus and so intercept his communication with the south, he resolved to march towards the Morena; and from Segovia he had ordered Soult to evacuate Andalusia and meet him on the frontier of La Mancha. But to avoid the disgrace of seeming to fly before a detachment he occupied the Escorial mountain, and placed his army across the roads leading from the passes of the Guadarama to Madrid. While in this position, Wellington's advanced guard, composed of D'Urban's Portuguese, a troop of horse artillery, and a battalion of infantry, passed the Guadarama, and the 10th the whole army was over the mountains. Then the King, retaining only eight thousand men in position, sent the rest of his troops to protect the march of his court, which quitted Madrid the same day with two or three thousand carriages of different kinds and nearly twenty thousand persons of all ages and sexes.

On the 11th D'Urban drove back Trielhard's cavalry posts and entered Majadahonda, whilst some German infantry, Bock's heavy cavalry, and a troop of horse artillery, occupied Las Rozas, about a mile in his rear. In the evening, Trielhard, reinforced by Schiazzetti's Italian dragoons and the lancers of Berg, returned, and D'Urban having called up the horse artillery would have charged the enemy's leading squadrons, but the Portuguese cavalry fled, and three of the guns being overturned on the rough ground were taken. The victorious cavalry then passed through Majadahonda in pursuit. The German dragoons, although surprised in their quarters, mounted and stopped the leading French squadrons until Schiazzetti's Italians came up, when the fight would have ended badly if Ponsonby's cavalry and the seventh division had not arrived, whereupon Trielhard abandoned Majadahonda, leaving the captured guns behind him, yet carrying away the Portuguese General Barbacena, the Colonel of the German cavalry, and others of less rank. The whole loss of the allies was above two hundred, and when the infantry passed through Rozas a few hours after the combat the German dead were then lying thickly in the streets, many of them in their shirts and trousers were stretched on the sills of the doors, furnishing proof at once of the sudden-

ness of the action and of their own bravery. Had the King been prepared to follow up the blow with his whole force, the allies must have suffered severely, for Wellington trusting to the advanced guard had not kept his divisions very close together.

After this combat the King retired to Valdemoro, where he met his convoy from Madrid, and when the troops of the three different nations forming his army thus came together a horrible confusion arose; the convoy was plundered, and the miserable people who followed the court were made prey of by the licentious soldiers. Marshal Jourdan, a man at all times distinguished for the noblest sentiments, immediately threw himself into the midst of the disorderly troops, and aided by the other generals, with great personal risk arrested the mischief and succeeded in making the multitude file over the bridge of Aranjuez. The procession was however lugubrious and shocking, for the military line of march was broken by crowds of weeping women and children and despairing men; courtiers of the highest rank were to be seen in full dress desperately struggling with savage soldiers for the possession of even the animals on which they were endeavoring to save their families. The cavalry of the allies could have driven the whole before them into the Tagus, yet Wellington did not molest them, either from ignorance of their situation, or what is more probable, compassionating their misery; he knew that the troops by abandoning the convoy could easily escape over the river, and he would not strike where the blow could only fall on helpless people without affecting the military operations: perhaps also he thought it wise to leave Joseph the burthen of his court.

In the evening of the 13th the whole multitude was over the Tagus, the garrisons of Aranjuez and Toledo joined the army, order was restored, and the King received letters from Soult and Suchet. The first opposed the evacuation of Andalusia; the second gave notice that the Sicilian expedition had landed at Alicante and a considerable army was forming there. Irritated with Soult and alarmed for the safety of Suchet, the King then relinquished his march towards the Morena and commenced his retreat to Valencia. The 15th the advanced guard moved with the sick and wounded who were heaped on country cars, the convoy followed under charge of the infantry, while the cavalry, spreading to the right and left, endeavored to collect provisions. But the people, remembering the wanton devastation committed a few months before by Montbrun's troops on their return from Alicante, fled with their property; and as it was the hottest time of the year and the deserted country was sandy and without shade, this march of one hundred and fifty miles to Almanza was one of continual

suffering. The partida chief Chaleco hovered constantly on the flanks and rear, killing without mercy all persons, civil or military, who straggled or sunk from exhaustion; and while this disastrous journey was in progress another misfortune befell the French on the side of Requena. For the hussars and infantry belonging to Suchet's army having left Madrid to succor Cuenca before the King returned from Segovia, carried off the garrison of that place in despite of the Empecinado and made for Valencia; but Villa Campa crossing their march on the 25th of August, at the passage of a river near Utiel, took all their baggage, their guns, and three hundred men. And then the Empecinado invested Guadalaxara, which had a garrison of seven hundred men.

Wellington seeing that the King had crossed the Tagus in retreat entered Madrid, a very memorable event were it only from the affecting circumstances attending it. He, a foreigner, marching at the head of a foreign army, was met and welcomed to the capital of Spain by the whole remaining population. The multitude who before that hour had never seen him came forth to hail his approach, not with feigned enthusiasm, not with acclamations extorted by the fear of a conqueror's power, nor yet excited by the natural proneness of human nature to laud the successful, for there was no tumultuous exultation; famine was amongst them and long-endured misery had subdued their spirits; but with tears and every other sign of deep emotion they crowded around his horse, hung upon his stirrups, touched his clothes, and throwing themselves upon the earth blessed him aloud as the friend of Spain. His triumph was as pure and glorious as it was uncommon, and he felt it to be so.

Madrid was however still disturbed by the presence of the enemy. The Retiro contained enormous stores, twenty thousand stand of arms, more than one hundred and eighty pieces of artillery, and the eagles of two French regiments; it had a garrison of two thousand fighting men besides invalids and followers, but its inherent weakness was soon made manifest. The works consisted of an interior fort called La China, with an exterior intrenchment; but the fort was too small, the intrenchment too large, and easily deprived of water. In the lodgings of a French officer also was found an order directing the commandant to confine his real defence to the fort; and accordingly in the night of the 13th, he abandoned the intrenchment, and next day accepted honorable terms, because La China was so contracted and filled with combustible buildings that his fine troops would with only a little firing have been smothered in the ruins; yet they were so dissatisfied that many broke their arms, and their commander was like to have

fallen a victim to their wrath. They were immediately sent to Portugal, and French writers with too much truth assert that the escort basely robbed and murdered many of the prisoners. This disgraceful action was perpetrated on the frontier of Portugal by the Spanish garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo; the British troops, who furnished no escorts after the first day's march from Madrid, are guiltless, and Lord Wellington made strenuous but unsuccessful efforts to have the Spanish criminals punished.

Coincident with the fall of the Retiro was that of Guadalaxara, which surrendered to the Empecinado. This mode of wasting an army and its resources was designated by Napoleon as the most glaring and extraordinary of all the errors committed by the King and by Marmont. And surely it was so. For including the garrisons of Toro, Tordesillas, Zamora and Astorga, which were now blockaded, six thousand men had been delivered as it were bound to the allies; and with them stores and equipments sufficient for a new army. These forts had been designed by the Emperor to resist the partidas, but his lieutenants exposed them to the British army, and thus the positive loss of men from the battle of Salamanca was doubled.

Napoleon had notice of Marmont's defeat as early as the 2d of September, a week before the great battle of Borodino; the news was carried by Fabvier, who made the journey from Valladolid in one course, and having fought on the 22d of July at the Arapiles, was wounded on the heights of Moskowa the 7th of September! Marmont, suffering alike in body and in mind, had excused himself with so little strength or clearness, that the Emperor, contemptuously remarking that the despatch contained more complicate stuffing than a clock, desired his war minister to demand why Marmont had delivered battle without the orders of the King? why he had not made his operations subservient to the general plan of the campaign? why he broke from defensive into offensive operations before the army of the centre joined him? why he would not even wait two days for Chauvel's cavalry, which he knew were close at hand? "From personal vanity," said the Emperor with seeming sternness, "the Duke of Ragusa has sacrificed the interests of his country and the good of my service, he is guilty of the crime of insubordination, and is the author of all this misfortune."

But Napoleon's wrath, so just and apparently so dangerous, could not even in its first violence overpower his early friendship. With a kindness, the recollection of which should now pierce Marmont's inmost soul, twice in the same letter he desired that these questions might not even be put to his unhappy lieutenant until his wounds were cured and his health re-established. Nor was this generous feel-

ing shaken by the arrival of the King's agent, Colonel Desprez, who reached Moscow the 18th of October, just after Murat had lost a battle at the outposts and when all hopes of peace with Russia were at end.* Joseph's despatches, bitter against all the generals, were especially so against Marmont and Soult; the former for having lost the battle, the latter because of his resistance to the royal plan. Soult's recall was demanded imperatively, because he had written a letter to the Emperor extremely offensive to the King; and it was also hinted that he designed to make himself King of Andalusia. Idle stories of that Marshal's ambition seem always to have been resorted to when his skilful plans were beyond the military judgment of his accusers; but Marmont was deeply sunk in culpable misfortune, and the King's complaints against him were not unjust. Napoleon had however then seen Wellington's despatch, which was more favorable to the Duke of Ragusa than Joseph's report; for the latter was founded on a belief that the unfortunate General knew the army of the centre was close at hand and would not wait for it; whereas the partidas had intercepted so many of Joseph's letters, it is doubtful if any reached Marmont previous to the battle. It was in vain therefore that Desprez pressed the King's discontent on the Emperor; that great man with unerring sagacity had already disentangled the truth, and Desprez was thus roughly interrogated as to the conduct of his master:

Why was not the army of the centre in the field a month sooner to succor Marmont? Why was the Emperor's example, when in a like case he marched from Madrid against Sir John Moore, forgotten? Why after the battle was not the Duero passed and the beaten troops rallied on the army of the centre? Why were the passes of the Guadarama so early abandoned? Why was the Tagus crossed so soon? Finally, why were not stores and gun-carriages in the Retiro burned, the eagles and the garrison carried off?

To these questions the King's agent could only reply by excuses which must have made the energetic Emperor smile; but when, following his instructions, Desprez harped upon Soult's demeanor, his designs in Andalusia, and still more upon the letter so personally offensive to the King, which shall be more noticed hereafter, Napoleon replied sharply, that he could not enter into such pitiful disputes while he was at the head of five hundred thousand men, and occupied with such immense operations. With respect to Soult's letter, he said he knew his brother's real feelings, but those who judged Joseph by his language could only think with Soult, whose suspicions were natural and partaken by the other generals; where-

* Appendixes, 11, 12, 13.

fore he would not by recalling him deprive the armies in Spain of the only military head they possessed. And then in ridicule of Soult's supposed treachery he observed that the King's fears on that head must have subsided, as the English newspapers said the Duke of Dalmatia was evacuating Andalusia, and he would of course unite with Suchet and with the army of the centre to retake the offensive. Nevertheless the Emperor without hesitation admitted all the evils arising from these disputes between the generals and the King, but said at such a distance he could not give precise orders for their conduct. He had foreseen the mischief, and regretted more than ever that Joseph had disregarded his counsel not to return to Spain in 1811; thus saying, he finished the conversation, but this expression about Joseph not returning to Spain is very remarkable. Napoleon spoke of it as of a well known fact, yet Joseph's letters show that he not only desired but repeatedly offered to resign the crown of Spain and live a private man in France! Did the Emperor mean that he wished his brother to remain a crowned guest at Paris? or had some subtle intriguers misrepresented the brothers to each other? The noblest buildings are often defiled in secret by vile and creeping things.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. *Menace your enemy's flanks, protect your own, and be ready to concentrate on the important points.*

This maxim contains the spirit of Napoleon's instructions to his generals after Badajos was succored in 1811. At that time he had ordered the army of Portugal to occupy the valley of the Tagus and the passes of the Gredos mountains, in which position it covered Madrid and could readily march to aid either the army of the south or the army of the north. Dorsenne who commanded the latter could bring twenty-six thousand men to Ciudad Rodrigo, and Soult could bring a like number to Badajos, but Wellington could not move against one or the other without having Marmont upon his flank; he could not move against Marmont without having the others on both flanks, and he could not turn his opponent's flanks save from the ocean. He took Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos notwithstanding, but by surprise, and because the French did not concentrate on the important points; this proved his superiority, but in no manner affected the principle of Napoleon's plan.

When the exigency of the Russian war had weakened the army of the north, the Emperor giving Marmont two additional divisions ordered him to occupy Castile, not as a defensive position but as a central offensive one from whence he could keep the Gallicians in check, and by prompt menacing movements bar Wellington from

serious operations elsewhere. Marmont was forbidden to invade Portugal while Wellington was on the frontier of Beira, that is, when he could not assail him in flank; and he was directed to guard the Asturias carefully as a protection to the great line of communication with France. In May also he was rebuked for having withdrawn Bonnet from Oviedo, and for delaying to re-occupy the Asturias when the incursion against Beira terminated. But neither then nor afterwards did he comprehend the spirit of the Emperor's views, and that extraordinary man, whose piercing sagacity seized every chance of war, was so disquieted by his lieutenant's want of perception, that all the pomp and vast political and military combinations of Dresden could not put it from his thoughts.

"Twice," said he, "has the Duke of Ragusa placed an interval of thirty leagues between his army and the enemy, contrary to all the rules of war; the English General goes where he will, the French General loses the initial movements, and is of no weight in the affairs of Spain. Biscay and the north are exposed by the evacuation of the Asturias, Santona and St. Sebastian are endangered, and the guerillas communicate freely with the coast. If the Duke of Ragusa has not kept some bridges on the Agueda, he cannot know what Wellington is about, and he will retire before light cavalry instead of operating so as to make the English General concentrate his whole army. The false direction already given to affairs makes it necessary that Caffarelli should keep a strong corps always in hand; that the commander of the reserve at Bayonne should look to the safety of St. Sebastian, holding three thousand men always ready to march; finally that the provisional battalions and dépôts of the interior should reinforce the reserve at Bayonne, be encamped on the Pyrenees, exercised and formed for service. *If Marmont's oversights continue, these troops will prevent the disasters from becoming extreme.*"*

Napoleon was supernaturally gifted in warlike matters. It has been recorded in praise of Caesar's generalship, that he foretold the cohorts mixed with his cavalry would be the cause of victory at Pharsalia. This letter was written by the French Emperor on the 28th of May, before the allies were collected on the Agueda, and when a hundred thousand French troops were between the English General and Bayonne, and its prescience was vindicated at Burgos in October!

2. To meet the Emperor's views, Marmont should, as Soult advised, have left one or two divisions on the Tormes, have encamped near Baños and on the upper Agueda to watch the allies. Caffarelli's divisions could have joined those on the Tormes, and

* Appendix 9.

then Napoleon's plan for 1811 would have been exactly renewed; Madrid would have been covered, a junction with the King secured, and Wellington could scarcely have moved beyond the Agueda. Marmont, apparently because he would not have the King in his camp, run counter to the Emperor and to Soult. He kept no troops on the Agueda, which might be excusable if to feed them there was difficult; but then he did not concentrate behind the Tormes to sustain his forts, neither did he abandon his forts when he abandoned Salamanca; thus eight hundred men were sacrificed merely to secure his concentration behind the Duero. His line of operations was perpendicular to the allies' front, instead of lying on their flank—he abandoned sixty miles of country between the Tormes and the Agueda—he suffered Wellington to take the initial movement—he withdrew Bonnet from the Asturias, whereby he lost Caffarelli's support and realized the Emperor's fears. He regained the initial however by passing the Duero on the 18th, and had he deferred the passage until the King was over the Guadarama, Wellington must have gone back upon Portugal with some show of dishonor. But if Castaños, instead of keeping fifteen thousand Gallicians before Astorga, a weak place with a garrison of only twelve hundred men, had blockaded it with three or four thousand, and detached Santocildes with eleven thousand down the Esla to co-operate with Silveira and D'Urban, sixteen thousand men would have been acting upon Marmont's right flank in June; and as Bonnet did not join until the 8th of July he could scarcely have kept the line of the Duero.

3. The secret of Wellington's success is to be found in the extent of country occupied by the French armies and the impediments to their military communication, while from Portugal, an impregnable central position, he could rush out unexpectedly against any point. This strong post was however of his own making, he had chosen it, had fortified it, had defended it, knew its full value and availed himself of all its advantages. The battle of Salamanca was accidental in itself, but the tree was planted to bear such fruit, and Wellington's combinations must be estimated from the general result. He had only sixty thousand disposable troops, and one hundred thousand were especially appointed to watch and control him; yet he passed the frontier, defeated forty-five thousand in a pitched battle, and drove twenty thousand others from Madrid in confusion, without risking a single strategic point. His campaign up to the conquest of Madrid was therefore strictly in accord with the rules of art, although his means and resources have been shown to be precarious, shifting and uncertain; want of money alone would have prevented him from following up his victory if he had

not persuaded the Spanish authorities in the Salamanca country to yield him the revenues of the government in kind, under a promise of repayment at Cadiz. No general was ever more entitled to the honors of victory.

4. The allies' success indicates a fault in the French plan of invasion. The army of the south, numerous, of approved valor and well commanded, was of so little weight in this campaign as to prove that Andalusia was a point pushed beyond the true line of operations. Its conquest in 1811 was the King's plan, and it was not liked by Napoleon, though he did not absolutely condemn it. The question was indeed a grave one. While the English held Portugal and Cadiz was unsubdued, Andalusia was a burthen rather than a gain. Had the communication with France been first established by the southern line of invasion, to attack Andalusia would have been methodical; or to have held it partially by detachments for the sake of the resources, keeping the base of the army in Estremadura, would have been regularly within the northern system of invasion. For in Estremadura Soult would have covered the capital, been more connected with the army of the centre, and his co-operation with Massena in 1810 would probably have compelled the English to quit Portugal. Reinforcing the army of the south with thirty or forty thousand men would have had the same effect if Soult could have fed such a number. And in favor of the invasion of Andalusia it may be observed, that Seville was the great arsenal of Spain, and the English without abandoning Portugal might have been located in strength at Cadiz, which would have compensated for the loss of Lisbon: finally the English ministers were not then determined to defend Portugal.

5. When the Emperor declared that Soult possessed the only military head in the Peninsula, he referred to a scheme by that Marshal to be noticed in the next chapter; but having regard merely to the disputes between him, Marmont and the King, Suchet's talents not being in question, the justice of the remark may be demonstrated. Napoleon always enforced the military principle of concentration on the important points; but the King and Marshals, though harping continually upon this maxim, desired to apply each in his own sphere. Now to concentrate on a wrong point is to hurt yourself with your own sword, and as each French general desired to be strong, the army at large was scattered instead of being concentrated. The failure of the campaign was attributed to Soult's disobedience, inasmuch as the passage of the Tagus by Drouet would have enabled the King to act before Palombini's division arrived. But it has been shown that Hill could have brought Wellington an equal or superior reinforcement

in less time, whereby the latter could have made head until the French dispersed for want of provisions, or by a rapid counter-movement have fallen upon Andalusia. If the King had menaced Ciudad Rodrigo it would have been no diversion, for he had no battering-train; still less could he have marched on Lisbon, for Wellington would then have overpowered Soult and entered Cadiz before such an operation could become dangerous. Oporto might have been taken, but Joseph would have hesitated to exchange Madrid for that city. The ten thousand men required of Soult by the King on the 19th of June could have been at Madrid before August, and the passes of the Guadarama thus defended until Marmont's army was re-organized! Ay! but Hill could have entered the valley of the Tagus, or being reinforced could have invaded Andalusia while Wellington kept the King in check. Joseph's plan of operations, if exactly executed, might have prevented Wellington's progress on some points; but then the French would have been concentrated in large masses without striking any decisive blow, which it was the pith and marrow of the English General's policy to make them do. It follows that Soult made a true, Joseph a false application of the principle of concentration.

6. If the King had judged well he would have merged the monarch in the general, exchanged the palace for the tent. Holding only the Retiro and a few posts near Madrid, he would have organized a pontoon train, established magazines at Segovia, Avila, Toledo, and Talavera, kept his army constantly united, and employed to open roads through the mountains, and chase the partidas while Wellington remained quiet. Thus acting, he would have been ready to succor any menaced point. By enforcing discipline in his own army he would have given a useful example, and by vigilance and activity have insured the preponderance of force wherever he marched: he would have acquired the esteem of the French, and the Spaniards would more readily have submitted to a warlike monarch. A weak man can wear an inherited crown—it is of gold, the people support it: it requires the strength of a warrior to bear the weight of a usurped diadem—it is of iron.

7. If Marmont and the King were at fault in the general plan of operations, they were not less so in the particular tactics of the campaign. On the 18th of July the army of Portugal passed the Duero in advance. On the 30th it repassed that river in retreat, having in twelve days marched two hundred miles, fought three combats and a general battle.* One marshal, seven generals, twelve thousand five hundred men and officers, had been killed, wounded, or taken; and two eagles, besides those captured in the

* Appendixes 19, 20.

Retiro, several standards, twelve guns and eight carriages, exclusive of the artillery and stores found at Valladolid, fell into the victor's hands. In the same period, the allies marched one hundred and sixty miles, and had one field-marshal, four generals, and nearly six thousand officers and soldiers killed or wounded.

This comparison proves Wellington's sagacity when he determined not to fight except at great advantage. The French army, although surprised in the midst of an evolution and instantly swept from the field, killed and wounded six thousand of the allies,—the eleventh and sixty-first regiments of the sixth division had not together more than one hundred and sixty men and officers left standing at the end of the battle; twice six thousand then would have fallen in a more equal contest, and as Chauvel's cavalry and the King's army were both at hand, a retreat into Portugal would have followed a less perfect victory. The battle ought not, and would not have been fought but for Marmont's false movement on the 22d. Yet it is certain, if Wellington had retired, the murmurs of his army, already louder than was seemly, would have been heard in England; and if an accidental shot had terminated his career, all would have been terminated. The Cortes, ripe for a change, would have accepted the intrusive King, and the American war just declared against England would have so complicated affairs that no new man could have continued the contest. Then the cries of disappointed politicians would have been raised. It would have been said that Wellington, desponding and distrusting his brave troops, dared not venture a battle on even terms, hence these misfortunes! His name would have been made, as Sir John Moore's was, a butt for the malice and falsehood of faction, and his military genius would have been measured by the ignorance of his detractors.

8. In the battle Marmont had forty-two thousand sabres and bayonets; Wellington, who had received some detachments on the 19th, had above forty-six thousand, but the excess was principally Spanish.* The French had seventy-four guns, the allies, including a Spanish battery, had only sixty pieces. Thus Marmont, over-matched in cavalry and infantry, was superior in artillery, and the fight would have been most bloody if the generals had been equal, for courage and strength were in even balance until Wellington's genius struck the beam. Scarcely can a fault be detected in his conduct. It might indeed be asked why the cavalry reserves were not, after Le Marchant's charge, brought up to sustain the fourth, fifth, and sixth divisions and keep off Boyer's dragoons; but it would seem ill to cavil at an action which was decried at the time

* Appendixes 19, 20.

by a French officer, as the "*beating of forty thousand men in forty minutes.*"

9. In the description of the battle, Marmont's own account of his views and the time when he was wounded has been adopted; but there are other versions which tend to place his errors in a stronger light. It is affirmed he twice sent orders to Maucune, once by Fabvier, once by Colonel Richemont his aide-de-camp, to assemble four divisions and press the English army, which was, he said, in full retreat by the Ciudad Rodrigo road. Maucune replied that he was more likely to be attacked himself, and in fact Pakenham fell upon him very soon afterwards.* That so far from wishing or ordering his left wing to fall back on their centre, Marmont was satisfied the allies were retiring; that being at dinner and in the act of holding his plate, he was struck by a shell just before Pakenham's attack commenced. That after the battle he had a violent altercation with Maucune, whom he reproached for having extended the left so rashly, and when the latter pleaded the orders received by Fabvier, Marmont exclaimed against that officer and denied that he had sent any orders to pursue the allies. However that may be, the battle of Salamanca, remarkable in many points of view, was not least so in this, that it was the first decided victory gained by the allies in the Peninsula. In former actions the French had been repulsed, here they were driven headlong as it were before a mighty wind without help or stay, and the results were proportionate. Joseph's secret negotiations with the Cortes were crushed, his partisans were everywhere abashed, the sinking spirit of the Catalans revived, the clamors of the opposition in England were checked, the provisional government of France was dismayed, the secret plots against the French in Germany were resuscitated, and the shock, reaching even to Moscow, heaved and shook the colossal structure of Napoleon's power to its very base.

10. Great battles are often accidental; few generals are able or indeed willing to fix the place and hour where they shall fight. Salamanca was an accident seized with astonishing vigor and quickness, but still an accident. Even its results were accidental; for the French could never have repassed the Tormes if Carlos d'España had not withdrawn the garrison from Alba, hiding the fact from Wellington; and this would have ruined the latter's campaign but for another of those chances which, recurring so frequently in war, make bad generals timid, and great generals trust fortune in adverse circumstances. Joseph was at Blasco Sancho the 24th, and notwithstanding his numerous cavalry, the army of

* Declarations by Colonel Girard, chief of Maucune's staff, and Mercier, engineer of Bonnet's division, MSS.

Portugal passed in retreat across his front at the distance of a few miles without his knowledge; he thus missed one opportunity of effecting his junction with Clausel. On the 25th this junction could still have been made at Arevalo, and Wellington, as if to mock the King's generalship, halted that day behind the Zapardiel; but Joseph retreated towards the Guadarama, wrathful that Clausel made no effort to join him, and forgetful that as a beaten and pursued army must march it was for him to join Clausel. But the true causes of these errors were the secret inclinations of the generals. Joseph, determined to keep his communication with the capital and with Andalusia, wished to draw the beaten army to Madrid, and Marmont was willing to do so; but Clausel desired to have the King behind the Duero, and if he had succeeded the result may be thus traced.

Clausel during the first confusion wrote that only twenty thousand men could be re-organized; this certainly did not include stragglers and marauders; for a reference to the French loss shows nearly thirty thousand fighting men left, and in fact Clausel did in a fortnight re-organize twenty thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and fifty guns, besides gaining a knowledge of five thousand stragglers and marauders. No soldiers rally quicker after a defeat than the French, and as Joseph brought to Blasco Sancho thirty guns and fourteen thousand men, two thousand being horsemen, forty thousand infantry, and more than six thousand cavalry with a powerful artillery, might have been rallied behind the Duero, exclusive of Caffarelli's divisions. Nor would Madrid have been exposed to an insurrection, nor to the operation of a weak detachment from Wellington's army; for two thousand men sent by Suchet had arrived in that capital on the 30th, and there were in the several fortified points of the vicinity six or seven thousand more, who could have been united at the Retiro to protect that dépôt and the families attached to the intrusive court.

Wellington would then have found a more powerful army than Marmont's again on the Duero. But his own army would have been less powerful than before, for the reinforcements from England had not sufficed to replace the current consumption of men; and neither the fresh soldiers nor the old Walcheren regiments were able to sustain the toil of the recent operations. Three thousand troops had joined since the battle, yet the general decrease, including the killed and wounded, was above eight thousand, and the sick were rapidly augmenting from the extreme heat. It may therefore be said that if Marmont was stricken deeply by Wellington, the King poisoned the wound. The English General had fore-calculated all these superior resources of the enemy, and it was

only Marmont's flagrant fault on the 22d that could have wrung the battle from him; yet he fought it as if his genius disdained such trial of its strength. I saw him late in the evening of that great day, when the advancing flashes of cannon and musketry stretching as far as the eye could command showed in the darkness how well the field was won; he was alone, the flush of victory was on his brow, and his eyes were eager and watchful, but his voice was calm and even gentle. More than the rival of Marlborough, since he had defeated greater generals than Marlborough ever encountered, with a prescient pride he seemed only to accept his glory as an earnest of greater things.

BOOK XIX.

CHAPTER I.

State of the war—Eastern operations—Lacy's bad conduct—French army of the Ebro dissolved—Lacy's secret agents blow up the magazines in Lerida—He is afraid to storm the place—Calumniates Sarsfield—Suchet comes to Reus—The hermitage of St. Dimas surrendered to Decaen by Colonel Green—The French General burns the convent of Montserrat and marches to Lerida—General Maitland with the Anglo-Sicilian army appears off Palamos—Sails for Alicant—Reflections on this event—Operations in Murcia—O'Donnell defeated at Castalla—Maitland lands at Alicant—Suchet concentrates his forces at Zativa—Intrenches a camp there—Maitland advances to Alcoy—His difficulties—Returns to Alicant—The King's army arrives at Almanza—The remnant of Maupoint's brigade arrives at Cuenca—Suchet reoccupies Alcoy—O'Donnell comes up to Yecla—Maitland is reinforced from Sicily and intrenches a camp under the walls of Alicant.

WELLINGTON'S operations deeply affected the French in the distant provinces, and it is necessary again to revert to the general progress of the war lest the true bearings of his military policy should be overlooked. The battle of Salamanca, by clearing all the centre of Spain, reduced the invasion to its original lines of operation. Caffarelli had concentrated the scattered troops of the army of the north, and when Clausel led back his vanquished troops to Burgos, the whole French host was divided in two distinct parts, each having a separate line of communication with France, and a circuitous, uncertain, attenuated line of correspondence with each other by Zaragoza, instead of a sure and short one by Madrid. But Wellington was also forced to divide his army, and though his central position gave him the initial power, his lines of communication were long and weak, and the enemy powerful at either flank. On his own simple strength in the centre of Spain he could not rely, and the diversions he had projected against the enemy's rear and flanks became more important than ever. To these we must now turn.

EASTERN OPERATIONS.

The narrative of Catalonian affairs was interrupted when the French General Decaen, after fortifying the coast line and opening some new roads beyond the reach of shot from the English ships, was gathering the harvest of the interior. Lacy was then confined

to the mountain chain which separates the coast territory from the plains of Lerida, and from the Cerdaña; and the insurrectionary spirit was only upheld by Wellington's successes and the hope of succor from Sicily.* Lacy, devoted to the republican party in Spain, had now been made Captain-General as well as commander-in-chief, and sought to keep down the people who were generally of the priestly and royal faction. He publicly spoke of exciting a general insurrection, yet to the English naval officers avowed his wish to repress the patriotism of the *somatenes*. Not ashamed to boast of his assassination plot, he received with honor a man who had murdered the aid-de-camp of Maurice Mathieu; he sowed dissensions amongst his own generals, intriguing against all of them in turn; and when Eroles and Manso, the people's favorites, raised any soldiers, he transferred the latter as soon as they were organized to Sarsfield's division, at the same time calumniating that General to repress his influence. He quarrelled incessantly with Codrington, and had no desire to see an English force in Catalonia, lest a general insurrection should take place; for he feared the multitude, once gathered and armed, would drive him from the province and declare for the opponents of the Cortes.† And in this view the constitution itself, although emanating from the Cortes, was long withheld from the Catalans, because the newly declared popular rights might have interfered with the arbitrary power of the chief.

When the Anglo-Sicilian expedition reached Mahon, the hopes of the Spaniards and the fears of the French were alike excited, and the coast became the object of interest to both. The Catalans opened a communication with the English fleet by Villa Nueva de Sitjes, and sought to collect the grain of the Campo de Tarragona; but Decaen, then coming to meet Suchet who had arrived at Reus, drove them to the hills again. The Lerida district was however open to the enterprises of Lacy, because it was at this period Reille had detached General Paris from Zaragoza to succor the Italians under Palombini; and that Severoli's division was broken up to reinforce the garrisons of Lerida, Tarragona, Barcelona, and Zaragoza. When the army of the Ebro was dissolved, Lacy resolved to march upon Lerida, where he had engaged certain Spaniards in the French service to explode the powder magazine when he should approach; and this odious scheme, which necessarily involved the destruction of hundreds of his own countrymen, was vainly opposed by Eroles and Sarsfield. Their divisions were in-

* Codrington, MSS.

† History of the conspiracies against the French army in Catalonia, published at Barcelona, 1813.

corporated with other troops at Guisona, and the whole journeying day and night reached Tremp. Lacy, having thus turned Lerida, would have resumed the march at mid-day, intending to attack next morning at dawn, but the men were without food and so exhausted that fifteen hundred had fallen behind. A council of war was held, and Sarsfield would have returned, observing that all communication with the sea was abandoned, that the harvests of the Campo de Tarragona and Valls being left to be gathered by the enemy, the loss of the corn would seriously affect the whole principality.* Displeased at the remonstrance, Lacy sent him back to the plain of Urgel with some infantry and the cavalry to keep the garrison of Balaguer in check, but in the night of the 16th made him return to Limiana on the Noguera. Lacy himself had meanwhile advanced by Agen towards Lerida, the explosion of the magazine took place, many houses were thrown down, two hundred inhabitants and one hundred and fifty soldiers were destroyed, two bastions fell, and the place was laid open.

Henriod the governor, though ignorant of the vicinity of the Spaniards, immediately manned the breaches, the garrison of Balaguer hearing the explosion marched to the succor, and when the Catalan troops appeared, the citizens, enraged by the destruction of their habitations, aided the French; Lacy then fled back to Tremp, bearing the burthen of a crime which he had not feared to commit, but wanted courage to turn to his country's advantage. To lessen the odium thus incurred he insidiously attributed the failure to Sarsfield's disobedience; and as that General, to punish the people of Barbastro for siding with the French and killing twenty of his men, had raised a heavy contribution of money and corn in the district, he became so hateful, that some time after, when seeking to raise soldiers in those parts, the people threw boiling water at him from the windows as he passed.†

Before this event Suchet had returned to Valencia, and Decaen and Maurice Mathieu marched against Green, who was intrenched in the hermitage of St. Dimas, one of the highest of the peaked rocks overhanging the convent of Montserrat. Manso raised the somatenes to aid him,‡ he had provisions, and the inaccessible strength of his post seemed to defy capture; yet he surrendered in twenty-four hours, and when the enemy despairing of success was going to relinquish the attack. He was, he said, forced by his own people, yet he signed the capitulation. Decaen set fire to the convent, and the flames seen for miles around was the signal that

* Sarsfield's Vindication, MS.

† Codrington, MSS.

‡ Lafolle.

the warfare on that holy mountain was finished. After this the French General marched to Lerida to gather corn, and Lacy again spread his troops in the mountains.

During his absence Eroles had secretly prepared a general insurrection, to break out when the British army should arrive, and it was supposed he designed to change the government of the province. Lacy himself again spoke of embodying the *somatenes* if arms were given to him by Sir Edward Pellew; but there was really no want of arms; the demand was a deceit to prevent the muskets being given to the people. A general desire for the arrival of the British troops was now prevalent. The miserable people turned anxiously towards any quarter for aid, and this expression of conscious helplessness was given in evidence by the Spanish chiefs, and received as proof of enthusiasm by the English naval commanders, who were more sanguine of success than experience would warrant. All eyes were now turned towards the ocean; the French looked in fear, the Catalans in hope; and the British armament did appear off Palamos, but after three days spread its sails again and steered for Alicant, leaving the principality stupefied with grief and disappointment.

This unexpected event was the natural result of previous errors on all sides, errors which invariably attend warlike proceedings when not directed by a superior genius, and even then not always avoided. It has been shown how ministerial vacillation marred Lord William Bentinck's first intention of landing in person with ten or twelve thousand men on the Catalonian coast; and how, after much delay, Maitland had sailed to Palma with a division of six thousand men, Calabrians, Sicilians and others, troops of no likelihood save that some three thousand British and Germans were amongst them. This force was afterwards joined by vessels from Portugal, having engineers and artillery officers on board, and the honored battering-train which had shattered the gory walls of Badajos. Wellington hoped much from this expedition; he had himself sketched the general plan of operations; and his own campaign was conceived in the expectation that Lord William, a general of rank and reputation, having ten thousand good troops, aided with at least as many Spanish soldiers disciplined under the two British officers Whittingham and Roche, would have early fallen on Catalonia to the destruction of Suchet's plans. And when this his first hope was quashed, he still expected that a force would be disembarked of strength sufficient, in conjunction with the Catalan army, to take Tarragona.

Roche's corps was most advanced in discipline, but the Spanish government hesitated to place it under Maitland; it first sailed

from the islands to Murcia, then returned without orders, again repaired to Murcia, and at the moment of Maitland's arrival off Palamos was, under the command of Joseph O'Donnell, involved in a terrible catastrophe already alluded to, and hereafter to be particularly narrated. Whittingham's levy remained, but when inspected by the Quartermaster-General Donkin was found in a raw state,* scarcely mustering four thousand effective men, amongst which were many French deserters from the island of Cabrera. The sumptuous clothing and equipments of Whittingham's and Roche's men, their pay regularly supplied from the British subsidy, and very much exceeding that of the other Spanish corps, excited envy and dislike; there was no public inspection, no check upon the expenditure or the delivery of stores; and Roche's conduct in this last matter, justly or unjustly, was generally and severely impugned. Whittingham acknowledged that he could not trust his people near the enemy without the aid of British troops; and though the Captain-General Coupigny desired their departure, his opinion was against a descent in Catalonia. Maitland hesitated, but Sir Edward Pellew urged this descent so strongly that he finally assented, and reached Palamos with nine thousand men of all nations on the 31st of July, yet in some confusion as to the transport service, which the staff-officers attributed to the injudicious meddling of the naval chiefs.

Maitland's first care was to open a communication with the Spanish commanders. Eroles came on board at once, and vehemently and unceasingly urged an immediate disembarkation, declaring the fate of Catalonia and his own existence depended upon it;† the other generals showed less eagerness, and their accounts differed greatly with respect to the relative means of the Catalans and the French. Lacy estimated the enemy's disposable troops at fifteen thousand, his own at seven thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry, which he could with difficulty feed or provide with ammunition.‡ Sarsfield judged the French to be, exclusive of Suchet's movable column, eighteen thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry; he thought it rash to invest Tarragona with a less force, and that a free and constant communication with the fleet was absolutely essential in any operation. Eroles rated the enemy at thirteen thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry, including Suchet's column; but the reports of the deserters gave twenty-two thousand infantry, exclusive of Suchet's column, and of the garrisons and migueletes in the enemy's service.

* General Donkin's Papers, MS.

† Notes by General Maitland, MS.

‡ Donkin, MSS.

No insurrection of the *somatenes* had yet taken place, nor was there any appearance of such an event; the French were despatched conducting convoys along the shore with small escorts, and concentrating their troops for battle without molestation. The engineers demanded from six to ten days to reduce Tarragona after investment. Decaen and Maurice Mathieu were then near Montserrat with seven or eight thousand good troops, and could double them in a few days; the Catalans could not so soon join Maitland's force, and there was a general, apparently an unjust notion, abroad, that Lacy was a Frenchman at heart. It was feared the Toulon fleet might come out and burn the transports at their anchorage during the siege, and thus the battering-train, and even the safety of the army, would be involved in an enterprise promising little success. A full council of war was unanimous not to land, and the reluctance of the people to rise, attributed by Codrington to the machinations of traitors, was visible; Maitland also was further swayed by the generous and just consideration, that as the *somatenes* had not voluntarily taken arms, it would be cruel to excite them to such a step when a few days might oblige him to abandon them to the vengeance of the enemy. Wherefore, as Palamos appeared too strong for a sudden assault, the armament sailed towards Valencia to attack that place on a plan furnished by the Quartermaster-General Donkin, in unison also with Wellington's scheme of operations; but Maitland during the voyage changed his mind, and proceeded at once to Alicante.

The Catalans were not more displeased than the British naval commanders at seeing the principality thus shaken off; yet the judgment of the latter seems to have been swayed partly from having given stronger hopes of assistance than circumstances warranted, partly from that confidence which, inspired by continual success, is strength on their own element but rashness on shore. Captain Codrington, from the great interest he took in the struggle, was peculiarly discontented; yet his own description of the state of Catalonia at the time shows his hopes rested more on vague notions of the *somatenes*' enthusiasm, than on facts which a general could calculate upon.* Lord Wellington indeed said, he could see no reason why the plan he had recommended should not have been successful; an observation made however when he was angrily excited by the prospect of having Suchet on his own hands, and probably under some erroneous information. He had been deceived about the strength of the forts at Salamanca, although close to them; and as he had only just established a sure channel of intelligence in Catalonia, he might have been deceived

* Codrington, MSS.

as to Tarragona, which, if not strong in regular works, was well provided, commanded by a very bold, active governor, and offered very great resources for interior retrenchments.

Wellington's information as to the strength of the Catalans came indeed chiefly from Sir E. Pellew, and his from Eroles, who exaggerated. Maitland could scarcely be called a commander-in-chief, for Lord William forbade him to risk the loss of his division lest Sicily should be endangered; and to avoid mischief from the winter season he was instructed to quit the Spanish coast in the second week of September. Lord William and Lord Wellington were therefore not agreed in the object to be attained. The first considered the diversion on the Spanish coast as secondary to the wants of Sicily. Wellington looked only to the Peninsula, and thought Sicily in no danger until the French should reinforce their army in Calabria. Desiring vigorous combined efforts of military and naval forces, his plan was that Tarragona should be attacked—if it fell the warfare he said would be once more established on a good base in Catalonia—if it was succored by a concentration of French troops Valencia would necessarily be weak; the armament could then proceed to attack that place, and if unsuccessful could return to assail Tarragona again.

This was a shrewd plan, but Napoleon never lost sight of that great principle of war so concisely expressed by Sertorius, when he told Pompey a good general should look behind him rather than before. The Emperor, acting on the proverb that fortune favors the brave, often urged his lieutenants to dare desperately with a few men in front; but he invariably covered their communications with heavy masses, and there is no instance of his plan of invasion being shaken by a flank or rear attack, except where his instructions were neglected. His armies made what are called points, such as Massena's invasion of Portugal, Moncey's attack on Valencia, Dupont's on Andalusia; but the general plan of operation was invariably supported by heavy masses protecting the communications. Had his instructions sent from Dresden been strictly obeyed, the walls of Lerida and Tarragona would have been destroyed, and the citadels of each occupied with small garrisons easily provisioned for a long time. The field army would thus have been increased by at least three thousand men, the movable columns spared many harassing marches, and Catalonia would have offered little temptation for a descent.

But notwithstanding this error of Suchet, Maitland's troops were too few and ill-composed to invest Tarragona. The imperial muster-rolls give more than eighty thousand men, including Reille's divisions at Zaragoza, for the armies of Aragon and Cata-

lonia; twenty-seven thousand of the first, thirty-seven thousand of the second, were actually under arms with the eagles; wherefore to say that Decaen could have brought at once ten thousand men to the succor of Tarragona, and, by weakening his garrisons, as many more in a very short time, is not to overrate his power; and this without counting Paris's brigade, three thousand strong, which belonged to Reille's division and was disposable. Suchet had just before come to Reus with two thousand select men of all arms, and as O'Donnell's army had since been defeated near Alicant, he could have returned with a still greater force to oppose Maitland. Now the English fleet was descried by the French off Palamos on the evening of the 31st of July, although it did not anchor before the 1st of August; Decaen and Maurice Mathieu, with some eight thousand disposable men, were then between Montserrat and Barcelona, that is to say, two marches from Tarragona; Lamarque with four or five thousand was between Palamos and Mataro, five marches from Tarragona; Quesnel with a like number was in the Cerdaña, seven marches off; Suchet and Paris could have arrived in less than eight days, and from the garrisons and minor posts smaller succors might have been drawn: Tortosa alone could have furnished two thousand. But Lacy's division was at Vich, Sarsfield's at Villa Franca, Eroles' divided between Montserrat and Urgel, Milan's in the Grao d'Olot; they required five days to assemble, they would not have exceeded seven thousand, and with their disputing captious generals would have been unfit to act vigorously; nor could they have easily joined the allies without fighting, when their defeat would have been almost certain.

Sarsfield judged ten days necessary to reduce Tarragona, and said the army must be entirely fed from the fleet, as the country could scarcely supply the Catalonian troops alone. Maitland therefore would have had to land his men, battering-train and stores, and form his investment in the face of Decaen's power, or, following the rules of war, have defeated that General first. But Decaen's troops, numerically equal without reckoning the garrison of Tarragona, were in composition vastly superior to the allies, seeing that only the British and German troops, three thousand, were to be depended upon in battle: neither does it appear that platforms, sand-bags, fascines and other materials were on board the vessels. Maitland indeed would, if he had been able to resist Decaen at first, which seems doubtful, have effected a great diversion, and Wellington's object would have been gained if a re-embarkation had been secure; but the naval officers, having reference to the nature of the coast, declared that it was not so.

The soundness of this opinion has however been disputed by many seamen well acquainted with the coast, who maintain, that even in winter the Catalonian shore is remarkably safe and tranquil; and that Cape Salou, a place in other respects admirably adapted for a camp, gives facility for re-embarking on one or other of its sides in any weather. To Maitland the coast of Catalonia was represented as unsafe, and this view of the question is also supported by able seamen likewise acquainted with that sea.

OPERATIONS IN MURCIA.

The Anglo-Sicilian armament arrived at Alicant at a critical moment; the Spanish cause was there going to ruin. Joseph O'Donnell, brother to the Regent, had with great difficulty organized a new Murcian army after Blake's surrender at Valencia. Having Alicant and Carthage as a base, he was independent of a division under Freire, which always hung on the frontier of Granada, and communicated through the Alpuxaras with the sea-coast. Suchet and Soult were paralyzed in some degree by the neighborhood of these armies, which were supported by fortresses, supplied by sea from Gibraltar to Cadiz, and had their existence guaranteed by Wellington's march into Spain, by his victory of Salamanca, and by his general combinations. For the two French commanders were forced to watch his movements, and to support at the same time, the one a blockade of the Isla de Leon, the other the fortresses in Catalonia; hence they were in no condition to follow up the prolonged operations necessary to destroy these Murcian armies, which were moreover supported by the arrival of General Ross with British troops at Carthage.

O'Donnell had been joined by Roche in July, and Suchet, after detaching Maupoint's brigade towards Madrid, departed himself with two thousand men for Catalonia, leaving Harispe with four thousand men beyond the Xucar. Ross immediately advised O'Donnell to attack him, and to distract his attention a large fleet with troops on board, which had originally sailed from Cadiz to succor Ballesteros at Malaga, now appeared off the Valencian coast. At the same time Bassecour and Villa Campa, being free to act in consequence of Palombini's and Maupoint's departure for Madrid, came down from their haunts in the mountains of Albaracin upon the right flank and rear of the French positions.* Villa Campa penetrated to Liria, Bassecour to Cofrentes on the Xucar; but ere this attack could take place, Suchet with his usual celerity returned from Reus. At first he detached men against Villa Campa, but when he saw the fleet, fearing it was the Sicilian armament,

* Plan 6.

he recalled them again, and sent for Paris's brigade from Zaragoza, to act by Teruel against Bassecour and Villa Campa. Then he concentrated his own forces at Valencia, but a storm drove the fleet off the coast, and meanwhile O'Donnell's operations brought on the

FIRST BATTLE OF CASTALLA.

Harispe's posts were established at Biar, Castalla, and Onil on his right; at Ibi and Alcoy on his left. This line was not more than one march from Alicant. Colonel Mesclop, with a regiment of infantry and some cuirassiers, held Ibi, and was supported by Harispe himself, with a reserve at Alcoy. General Delort was at Castalla with a regiment of infantry, having some cuirassiers at Onil on his left, and a regiment of dragoons, with three companies of foot, at Biar on his right. In this exposed situation the French awaited O'Donnell, who directed his principal force, consisting of six thousand infantry, seven hundred cavalry, and eight guns, against Delort; Roche, with three thousand men, was to move through the mountains of Xixona, so as to fall upon Ibi simultaneously with the attack at Castalla.* O'Donnell hoped thus to cut the French line, and during these operations, Bassecour, with two thousand men, was to come down from Cofrentes to Villena on the right flank of Delort.† Roche marched the night of the 19th, remained the 20th in the mountains, next night threaded a difficult pass eight miles long, reached Ibi at daybreak on the 21st, and sent notice of his arrival to O'Donnell; and when that General appeared in front of Delort the latter abandoned Castalla, which was situated in the same valley as Ibi, and about five miles distant from it.‡ But he only retired skirmishing to a strong ridge behind that town, which also extended behind Ibi;§ this secured his communication with Mesclop, of whom he demanded succor, and at the same time he called in his own cavalry and infantry from Onil and Biar. Mesclop, leaving some infantry, two guns, and his cuirassiers, to defend Ibi and a small fort on the hill behind it, marched at once towards Delort, and thus Roche, finding only a few men before him, got possession of the town after a sharp skirmish, yet he could not take the fort.

O'Donnell, advancing beyond Castalla, only skirmished with the French, for he had detached the Spanish cavalry by the plains of Villena to turn their right and communicate with Bassecour. While expecting the effects of this movement, he was astonished

* Plan 5.

† Suchet's Correspondence, MS.

‡ Roche's Correspondence, MS.

§ Delort's Report, MS.

to see the French dragoons come trotting through the pass of Biar on his left flank; they were followed by some companies of infantry, and only separated from him by a stream, over which was a narrow bridge without parapets, and at the same moment the cuirassiers appeared on the other side, coming from Onil. The Spanish cavalry had not interrupted this march from Biar, nor followed it through the defile, nor made any effort.* O'Donnell turned two guns against the bridge, supporting them with a battalion of infantry, but the French dragoons, observing this battalion to be unsteady, braved the fire of the guns, and riding furiously over the bridge seized the battery and then broke the infantry. Delort's line advanced at the same moment, the cuirassiers charged into the town of Castalla, and the whole Spanish army fled outright. Several hundred sought refuge in an old castle and there surrendered; of the others, three thousand were killed, wounded, or taken, yet the victors had scarcely fifteen hundred men engaged, and did not lose two hundred. O'Donnell attributed his defeat to the disobedience and inactivity of St. Estevan, who commanded his cavalry, but the great fault was the placing that cavalry beyond the defile of Biar, instead of keeping it in hand for the battle.

This part of the action over, Mesclop, who had not taken any share in it, was reinforced and returned to succor Ibi, to which place also Harispe was now approaching from Alcoy; but Roche, favored by the strength of the passes, escaped and reached Alicant with little hurt, while the remains of O'Donnell's divisions, pursued by the cavalry on the road of Jumilla, fled to the city of Murcia. Bassecour, who had advanced to Almanza, was then driven back to his mountain haunts, where Villa Campa rejoined him. It was at this moment that Maitland's armament disembarked and the remnants of the Spanish force rallied. The King, then flying from Madrid, immediately changed the direction of his march from the Morena to Valencia, giving one more proof that England, not Spain, resisted the French; for Alicant would have fallen, if not as an immediate consequence of this defeat, yet surely when the King's army had joined Suchet. That General, who had heard of the battle of Salamanca, the evacuation of Madrid, the approach of Joseph, and now saw a fresh army springing up in his front, hastened to concentrate his disposable force in the positions of San Felipe de Xativa and Moxente, which he intrenched, as well as the road to Almanza, with a view to secure his junction with the King. At the same time he established a new bridge and bridge-head at Alberique, in addition to that at Alcira on the Xucar; and having called up Paris from Teruel and Maupoint from Cuença,

* Appendix 15.

resolved to abide a battle for which the slowness of his adversaries gave him full time to prepare.

Maitland arrived the 7th, and though his force was not all landed before the 11th, the French were still scattered on various points, and a vigorous commander would have found the means to drive them over the Xucar, and perhaps from Valencia itself; but he had scarcely set foot on shore when the usual Spanish vexations overwhelmed him. Three principal roads led towards the enemy. One on the left passed through Yecla and Fuente la Higuera, and by it the remnant of O'Donnell's army was coming up from Murcia; another passed through Elda, Sax, Villena, and Fuente de la Higuera; the third through Xixona, Alcoy, and Albayda. O'Donnell, whose existence as a general was redeemed by the appearance of Maitland, instantly demanded from the latter a pledge, that he would draw nothing by purchase or requisition, save wine and straw, from any of these lines, nor from the country between them: the English General assented, and instantly sunk under the difficulties thus created. He had designed to attack Harispe at Alcoy and Ibi on the 13th or 14th, but he was only able to get one march from Alicant so late as the 16th, and could not attack before the 18th, but that day Suchet had concentrated his army at Xativa. This delay had been a necessary consequence of the agreement with O'Donnell. For Maitland's commissariat being inefficient, and his field-artillery so shamefully ill-prepared in Sicily as to be nearly useless, he had hired mules at a great expense for the transport of his guns and provisions from Alicant, but the owners soon declared they could not fulfil their contract unless they were fed by the British, and this was barred by O'Donnell's restrictions as to the roads. Many of the muleteers also, after receiving their money, deserted with mules and provisions; and a convoy with six days' supply, being attacked by a partida, was plundered, dispersed, and lost.

Maitland, having no habitude of command, and suffering from illness, disgusted, and fearing for his troops, would have retired at once, perhaps have re-embarked, if Suchet had not gone back to Xativa; then, however, he advanced to Elda, and Roche entered Alcoy, both apparently without an object; for there was no intention of fighting, and the next day Roche retired to Xixona, and Maitland retreated to Alicant. To cover this retreat, Donkin pushed forward with a detachment of Spanish and English cavalry, through Sax, Ibi, and Alcoy, and giving out that an advanced guard of five thousand British was close behind him, coasted all the French line, captured a convoy at Olleria, and then returned through Alcoy. Suchet kept his camp of Xativa, but sent Harispe

to meet the King, who was now near Almanza, and on the 25th the junction of the two armies was effected; at the same time, Maupoint, escaping Villa Campa's assault, arrived from Cuença with the remnant of his brigade. When Joseph arrived, Suchet pushed his outposts again to Villena and Alcoy; but, naturally a courtier, he was so much occupied with royalty as to neglect the allies, when he might have seriously hurt them. Meantime, O'Donnell, having drawn off Freire's division from Lorca, came to Yecla with five or six thousand men, and Maitland, reinforced with detachments from Sicily, commenced fortifying a camp outside Alicante. But his health was quite broken, and he earnestly desired to resign, being filled with anxiety at the near approach of Soult. That Marshal had abandoned Andalusia, and his manner of doing so shall be set forth in the next chapter, for it was a great event, leading to great results, and worthy of deep consideration by those who desire to know upon what the fate of kingdoms may depend.

CHAPTER II.

Operations in Andalusia—The King orders Soult to abandon that province—Soult urges the King to join him with the other armies—Joseph reiterates the order to abandon Andalusia—Soult sends a letter to the Minister of War expressing his suspicions that Joseph was about to make a separate peace with the allies—The King intercepts this letter, and sends Colonel Desprez to Moscow to represent Soult's conduct to the Emperor—Napoleon's magnanimity—Wellington anxiously watches Soult's movements—Orders Hill to fight Dronet, and directs General Cooke to attack the French lines in front of the Isla de Leon—Ballesteros, pursued by Leval and Villatte, skirmishes at Coin—Enters Malaga—Soult's preparations to abandon Andalusia—Lines before the Isla de Leon abandoned—Soult marches towards Granada—Colonel Skerrett and Cruz Margeon land at Huelva—Attack the French rear-guard at Seville—Dronet marches upon Huescar—Soult moving by the mountains reaches Hellin, and effects his junction with the King and Suchet—Maitland desires to return to Sicily—Wellington prevents him—Wellington's general plans considered—State of affairs in Castile—Clausel comes down to Valadolid with the French army—Santocildes retires to Torrelobaton, and Clinton falls back to Arevalo—Foy marches to carry off the French garrisons in Leon—Astorga surrenders before his arrival—He marches to Zamora, and drives Silveira into Portugal—Menaces Salamanca—Is recalled by Clausel—The partidas get possession of the French posts on the Biscay coast—Take the city of Bilbao—Reille abandons several posts in Aragon—The northern provinces become ripe for insurrection.

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA.

SUCHET found resources in Valencia to support the King's court and army without augmenting the pressure on the inhabitants, and a counter-stroke could have been made against the allies if the

French commanders had been of one mind and looked well to the state of affairs. Joseph, exasperated by the previous opposition of the generals and troubled by the distress of numerous Spanish families attached to him, was only intent upon recovering Madrid as soon as he could collect troops enough to give Wellington battle; he had in this view demanded from the French Minister of War, money, stores, and a reinforcement of forty thousand men, and imperatively commanded Soult to abandon Andalusia. That clear-sighted commander could not however understand why the King, who had given him no accurate details of Marmont's misfortunes or of his own operations, should yet order him to abandon at once all the results and all the interests springing from three years' possession of the south of Spain. He thought it a great question not to be treated lightly, and as his vast capacity enabled him to embrace the whole field of operations, he concluded that rumor had exaggerated the catastrophe at Salamanca, and to abandon Andalusia would be the ruin of the French cause.*

"To march on Madrid," he said, "would probably produce another pitched battle, which should be carefully avoided, seeing the whole frame-work of the French invasion was disjointed and no resource would remain after a defeat. Andalusia, hitherto a burthen, now offered means to remedy the present disasters, and to sacrifice that province with all its resources for the sake of regaining the capital of Spain appeared a folly: it was purchasing a town at the price of a kingdom. Madrid was nothing in the Emperor's policy, though it might be something for a King of Spain; yet Philip the Fifth had thrice lost it and preserved his throne. Why then should Joseph set such a value upon that city? The battle of the Arapiles was merely a grand duel which might be fought again with a different result; but to abandon Andalusia with all its stores and establishments,—to raise the blockade of Cadiz,—to sacrifice the guns, the equipments, the hospitals and the magazines, and render null the labors of three years, would be to make the battle of the Arapiles a prodigious historical event, the effect of which would be felt all over Europe and even in the new world. And how was this flight from Andalusia to be safely effected? The army of the south had been able to hold in check sixty thousand enemies disposed on a circuit round it; but the moment it commenced its retreat towards Toledo those sixty thousand men would unite to follow, and Wellington himself would be found on the Tagus in its front. On that line the army of the south could not march, and a retreat through Murcia would be long and difficult. But why

* Appendix 3. Joseph's Papers, MS.

retreat at all? "Where," exclaimed this able warrior, "where is the harm though the allies should possess the centre of Spain?"

"Your Majesty," he continued, "should collect the army of the centre, the army of Aragon, and if possible the army of Portugal, and you should march upon Andalusia even though to do so should involve the abandonment of Valencia. If Marmont's army comes with you, one hundred and twenty thousand men will be close to Portugal; if it cannot or will not come, let it remain, because while Burgos defends itself that army can keep on the right of the Ebro, and the Emperor will take measures for its succor. Let Wellington then occupy Spain from Burgos to the Morena, it shall be my care to provide magazines, stores, and places of arms in Andalusia; and the moment eighty thousand French are assembled in that province, the theatre of war is changed! The English General must fall back to save Lisbon, the army of Portugal may follow him to the Tagus, the line of communication with France will be established by the eastern coast, the final result of the campaign turns in our favor, and a decisive battle may be delivered without fear at the gates of Lisbon. March then with the army of the centre upon the Despeñas Perros, unite all our forces in Andalusia, and all will be well! Abandon that province, and you lose Spain! you will retire behind the Ebro, and famine will drive you thence before the Emperor can from distant Russia provide a remedy; his affairs even in that country will suffer by the blow, and America dismayed by our misfortunes will perhaps make peace with England."

Neither the King's genius nor his passions would permit him to understand the grandeur and vigor of this conception. To change even simple lines of operations suddenly is at all times a nice affair, but thus to change the whole theatre of operations and regain the initial movement after a defeat belongs only to master spirits in war. Now the Emperor had recommended a concentration of force, and Joseph would not understand this save as applied to the recovery of Madrid; he was uneasy for the frontiers of France, as if Wellington could possibly have invaded that country while a great army menaced Lisbon! in fine he could see nothing but his lost capital on one side, a disobedient lieutenant on the other, and peremptorily repeated his orders. Then Soult, knowing his plan could only be effected by union and rapidity, and dreading the responsibility of further delay, took immediate steps to abandon Andalusia; but mortified by this blighting of his fruitful genius, and stung with anger at such a termination to all his political and military labors, his feelings overmastered his judgment. Instead of tracing the King's rigid counteraction of his scheme to

the narrowness of the monarch's military genius, he judged it part of a design to secure his own fortune at the expense of his brother. Joseph had after Ocaña, when irritated at being restricted in his plan of governing Spain as a Spaniard, indicated to Soult a vague design of making himself independent, but to betray his brother deliberately was quite foreign to his honest passionate nature. Soult gave more weight to the matter, and making known his opinion to six generals sworn to secrecy unless interrogated by the Emperor, expressed his doubts of the King's good faith to the Minister of War, founding them on the following facts :*

1. That the extent of Marmont's defeat had been made known to him only by the reports of the enemy, and the King, after remaining for twenty-three days without sending any detailed information of the operations in the north of Spain, although the armies were actively engaged, had peremptorily ordered him to abandon Andalusia, saying it was the only resource remaining for the French. To this opinion Soult said he could not subscribe, yet being unable absolutely to disobey the monarch, he was going to make a movement which must finally lead to the loss of all the French conquests in Spain, seeing that it would then be impossible to remain permanently on the Tagus, or even in the Castiles.

2. This operation, ruinous in itself, was insisted upon when the newspapers of Cadiz affirmed that Joseph's ambassador at the court of Petersburg had joined the Prussian army in the field,—that Joseph himself had made secret overtures to the government in the Isla de Leon,—that Bernadotte, his brother-in-law, had made a treaty with England and had demanded of the Cortes a guard of Spaniards, a fact confirmed by information obtained through an officer sent with a flag of truce to the English Admiral; finally, Moreau and Blücher were at Stockholm, and the aide-de-camp of the former in London.

Reflecting upon all these circumstances, he feared the object of the King's false movements might be to force the French army over the Ebro, in the view of making an arrangement for Spain separate from France; fears, which might be chimerical, but in such a crisis better be too fearful than too confident. This letter was sent by sea, but the vessel having touched at Valencia at the moment of Joseph's arrival there the despatch was opened; it was then in the first burst of his anger the King despatched Desprez on that mission to Moscow, the result of which has been already related. Soult's proceedings, offensive to the King and founded in error, because Joseph's letters, containing the information required, were intercepted, not withheld, were prompted by zeal for his

* Appendix 4.

master's service, and cannot be justly condemned; yet Joseph's indignation was natural and becoming. But the admiration of reflecting men must ever be excited by the greatness of mind and calm sagacity with which Napoleon treated this thorny affair. Neither the complaints of his brother, nor the hints of his Minister of War,—for the Duke of Feltre, a man of mean capacity and intriguing disposition, countenanced Joseph's suspicions that Soult designed to make himself King of Andalusia,*—could disturb the temper or judgment of the Emperor; and it was then, struck with the vigor of Soult's plan, he called him the only military head in Spain.

Wellington was attentive to the effect of these transactions. Anxiously he watched Soult's reluctant motions in Andalusia, and while seemingly enjoying his own triumph amidst feasts and rejoicings at Madrid, his eyes were fixed on Seville: the balls and bull-fights of the capital cloaked both the skill and apprehensions of the consummate captain. Before the allies crossed the Guadarama, Hill had been directed to keep close to Drouet and be ready to move into the valley of the Tagus if that General should hasten to the succor of the King. But when Joseph's retreat upon Valencia was known, Hill received orders to fight Drouet, and even to follow him into Andalusia; at the same time General Cooke was directed to prepare an attack, even though it should be an open assault, on the French lines before Cadiz, while Ballesteros operated on the flank from Gibraltar. By these means Wellington hoped to keep Soult from sending any succor to the King, and even to force him out of Andalusia without the necessity of marching there himself; yet if these measures failed, he was resolved to take twenty thousand men from Madrid, unite with Hill and drive the French from that province.

Previous to these instructions being given, Laval and Villatte had, as before narrated, pursued Ballesteros to Malaga, where he was in such danger of capture, that the maritime expedition already noticed was detached from Cadiz to carry him off. News of the battle of Salamanca then arrested the French, the Spanish General regained San Roque, the fleet went on to Valencia, and Soult, hoping the King would transfer the seat of war to Andalusia, caused Drouet to show a bold front against Hill, sending scouting parties towards Merida. Large magazines were also formed at Cordoba, a central point, equally suited for an advance by Estremadura, a march to La Mancha, or a retreat by Granada; and Hill, who had not then received his orders to advance, remained on the defensive. Nor would Wellington stir from Madrid, al-

* Appendix 5.

though his presence was urgently called for on the Duero, until he was satisfied that Joseph did not mean to join Soult, and that the latter meant to abandon Andalusia. The King finally forced this unwise measure; but the execution required extensive arrangements, for the quarters were distant, the convoys immense, the enemies numerous, the line of march wild, the journey long; and it was important to present the imposing appearance of a great and regular military movement, and not the disgraceful scene of a confused flight.

All the minor posts in the Condado de Niebla and other places were first called in, and then the lines before the Isla were abandoned; for Soult, in obedience to the King's first order, designed to move upon La Mancha, and it was only by accident and indirectly that he heard of Joseph's retreat to Valencia. At the same time he discovered that Drouet, who had received direct orders from the King, was going to Toledo; and it was not without difficulty, and only through the medium of his brother who commanded Drouet's cavalry, that he could prevent that destructive, isolated movement. The Murcian line was then adopted, but everything was hurried, because the works at the Isla were already broken up, in the view of retreating towards La Mancha, and the troops were in march for Seville when the safe assembling of the army at Granada required another arrangement. However, on the 25th of August, a thousand guns, stores in proportion, and all the immense works of Chiclana, St. Maria, and the Trocadero, had been destroyed; the long blockade was thus broken when the bombardment had become serious, and the opposition to English influence taking a dangerous direction—when the French intrigues were nearly ripe—the Cortes alienated from the cause of Ferdinand and the church—when the executive government was weaker than ever, because Henry O'Donnell, the only active regent, had resigned, disgusted that his brother had been superseded by Elio, and censured in the Cortes for the defeat at Castalla. This siege, or rather defence—for Cadiz was never, strictly speaking, besieged—was a curious episode in the war. Whether the Spaniards could have defended it without the aid of British troops is a matter of speculation; but it is certain that, notwithstanding Graham's glorious action at Barosa, Cadiz was always a heavy burthen upon Wellington. The forces there employed would have done better service under his immediate command, and many severe financial difficulties, to say nothing of political crosses, would have been spared.

In the night of the 26th, Soult quitted Seville, to commence his march towards Granada; but now Wellington's orders had set all

the allied troops of Andalusia and Estremadura in motion. Hill advanced against Drouet; Ballesteros moved by the Ronda mountains, to hang on the retiring enemy's flanks; the sea armament, sent to succor him, returned from Valencia; Skerrett and Cruz Murgeon disembarked with four thousand English and Spanish troops at Huelva, and on the 24th drove the French from St. Lucar. The 27th they fell upon the rear-guard at Seville, when the suburb of Triana, the bridge, and the streets beyond, were carried by the English guards and Downie's legion, and two hundred prisoners, several guns and many stores were captured. Downie, wounded and taken, was treated harshly, because the populace, rising in aid of the allies, had mutilated the French soldiers who fell into their hands. Scarcely was this action over, when seven thousand French infantry came up from Chiclana; yet, thinking all Hill's troops were before them, hastily followed their own army, leaving the allies masters of the city. This enterprise, though successful, was isolated and contrary to Wellington's desire. A direct and vigorous assault upon the lines of Chiclana, by the whole of the Anglo-Spanish garrison, was his plan; and such an assault, when the French were abandoning their works there, would have been a far heavier blow to Soult, who was now too strong to be meddled with.

Having issued eight days' bread to his army, he marched leisurely, picking up the garrisons and troops who came in to him from the Ronda and the coast. At Granada he halted eleven days for Drouet, who had quitted Estremadura and was marching by Jaen to Huescar. Ballesteros harassed Soult's march; yet, with an insignificant loss, the latter finally united seventy-two guns and forty-five thousand soldiers under arms, of which six thousand were cavalry. He was, however, still in the midst of enemies. On his left flank was Hill; on his right flank Ballesteros. Wellington himself might come down by the Despeñas Perros. The Murcians were in his front, Skerrett and Cruz Murgeon behind him; and he was clogged with enormous convoys—for his sick and maimed men alone amounted to nearly nine thousand; his Spanish soldiers were deserting daily, and it was necessary to provide for several hundreds of Spanish families attached to the French interests. To march upon the city of Murcia was the direct and the best route for Valencia, but the yellow fever raged there and at Carthage; moreover, S. Bracco, the English consul at Murcia, a resolute man, declared his intention to inundate the country if the French advanced; wherefore he marched by the mountain-ways leading from Huescar to Cehejin and Calasparra, and then moving by Hellin, gained Almanza on the great road to Madrid, his flank

being covered by a detachment from Suchet's army, which skirmished with Maitland's advanced posts at San Vicente, close to Alicant. At Hellin he met the advanced guard of the army of Aragon, and on the 3d of October the military junction of all the French forces was effected.

Soult's difficult task was thus completed, and in a manner worthy of so great a commander; for it must be recollected that, besides the drawing together of the different divisions, the march itself was three hundred miles—great part through mountain roads, and the population every where hostile. Hill had menaced him with twenty-five thousand men, including Morillo and Penne Villemur's forces—Ballesteros, reinforced from Cadiz and by deserters, had nearly twenty thousand—there were fourteen thousand soldiers still in the Isla, Skerrett and Cruz Murgeon had four thousand, and the partidas were in all parts numerous: yet from the midst of these multitudes he had carried off his army, his convoys, and his sick, without any disasters. In this manner Andalusia, which had once been saved by the indirect influence of a single march made by Moore from Salamanca, was now, after three years' subjection, recovered by the indirect effect of a single battle, delivered by Wellington close to the same city.

Maitland's proceedings had been a source of uneasiness to Wellington; for though the recovery of Andalusia was politically and militarily a great gain, the result he saw must necessarily be hurtful to the ultimate success of his campaign by bringing together such powerful forces. He still thought regular operations would not so effectually occupy Suchet as littoral warfare; yet he was content that Maitland should try his own plan, and he advised him to march by the coast and have constant communication with the fleet, referring to his own campaign against Junot in 1808 as an example to be followed. But the coast roads were difficult, the access for the fleet uncertain; and though the same obstacles, and the latter in a greater degree, had occurred in Portugal, the different constitution of the armies, still more that of the generals, was a bar to like proceedings in Valencia. Maitland desired to quit his command, and the time appointed by Lord William for the return of the troops to Sicily was approaching. The moment was critical, but Wellington forbade their departure, and even asked the ministers to place them under his own command. And with gentleness and delicacy he showed to Maitland, who was a man of high honor, courage and feeling, although inexperienced in command, that his situation was not dangerous; that the intrenched camp of Alicant might be safely defended; that he was comparatively better off than Wellington himself had been when in the lines of Torres

Vedras; and that it was even desirable the enemy should attack him on such strong ground, because the Spaniards when joined with the English soldiers in a secure position would certainly fight. He also desired that Carthagená should be well looked to by Ross lest Soult should turn aside to surprise it. Then taking advantage of Elio's fear of Soult, he drew him with the army that had been O'Donnell's towards Madrid, and so got some control over his operations.

If Wellington had been well furnished with money, and the yellow fever had not raged in Murcia, it is probable he would have followed Joseph rapidly, and rallying all the scattered Spanish forces and Sicilian armament on his own army, have endeavored to crush the King and Suchet before Soult could arrive. Or he might have formed a junction with Hill at Despeñas Perros and so have fallen on Soult himself during his march, although such an operation would have endangered his line of communication on the Duero. But the fever and want of money induced him to avoid operations in the south, which would have involved him in new and immense combinations, until he had secured his northern line of operations by the capture of Burgos, meaning then with his whole army united to attack the enemy in the south. He could not however stir from Madrid unless assured that Soult would march on Valencia and not on La Mancha; and that was not clear until Córdoba was abandoned. Hence Hill was ordered to advance on Zalamea de la Serena, where he commanded the passes leading to Córdoba in front, those leading to La Mancha on the left, and those leading by Truxillo to the Tagus in the rear; he could thus at pleasure either join Wellington, follow Drouet towards Grenada, or interpose between Soult and Madrid, if the latter turned towards the Despeñas Perros; meanwhile Skerrett's troops were marching to join him, and the rest of the Anglo-Portuguese garrison of Cadiz sailed to Lisbon, with intent to join Wellington by the regular line of operations.

During these transactions the allies' affairs in Old Castile had been greatly deranged, for where Wellington was not the French warfare generally assumed a severe and menacing aspect. Castaños conducted the siege of Astorga with so little vigor, it appeared rather a blockade than a siege; but the forts at Toro and Zamora had been invested, the first by the partidas, the second by Silveira's militia, who with great spirit had passed their own frontier, although well aware they could not be legally compelled to do so. Thus all the French garrisons abandoned by Clausel's retreat were endangered, and though the slow progress of the Spaniards before Astorga was infinitely disgraceful to their military prowess, final

success seemed certain. For Clinton was at Cuellar, Santocildes occupied Valladolid, Anson's cavalry was in the valley of the Esqueva, and the front looked fair enough. But in the rear the line of communication as far as the frontier of Portugal was in disorder, the discipline of the army was deteriorating rapidly, and excesses were committed on all the routes. A detachment of Portuguese, not more than a thousand strong, either instigated by want or by their hatred of the Spaniards, had perpetrated such enormities on their march from Pinhel to Salamanca, that as an example five were executed, and many others severely punished by stripes; yet even this did not check the growing evil, the origin of which may be partly traced to the license at the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, principally to the sufferings of the soldiers.

All the hospitals in the rear were crowded. Salamanca, in which there were six thousand sick and wounded, besides French prisoners, was the abode of misery. The soldiers endured much during the first two or three days after the battle, and the inferior officers' sufferings were still more heavy and protracted. They had no money, and many sold their horses and other property to sustain life; some actually died of want, and though Wellington, hearing of this, gave orders they should be supplied from the purveyor's stores in the same manner as the soldiers, the relief came late. It is a common yet erroneous notion, that the English system of hospitals in the Peninsula was admirable, and the French hospitals neglected. Strenuous and unceasing exertions were made by Wellington and the chiefs of the medical staff to form good hospital establishments, but the want of money, and still more the want of previous institutions, foiled their utmost efforts. Now there was no point of warfare which more engaged Napoleon's attention than the care of his sick and wounded; and he being monarch as well as general, furnished his hospitals with all things requisite, even with luxuries. Under his fostering care also, Larrey, justly celebrated were it for this alone, organized the establishment called the hospital "*Ambulance*," that is to say, wagons of a peculiar construction, well horsed and served by men trained and incorporated as soldiers, who being rewarded for their courage and devotion like other soldiers were always at hand, and whether in action or on a march, ready to pick up, to salve, and to carry off wounded men. The astonishing rapidity with which the fallen French soldiers disappeared from a field of battle attested the excellence of this institution.

In the British army, the carrying off the wounded depended partly upon the casual assistance of a weak wagon train very badly disciplined, furnishing only three wagons to a division and

not originally appropriated to that service ; partly upon the spare commissariat animals, but principally upon the resources of the country, whether of bullock carts, mules, or donkeys, and hence the most doleful scenes after a battle or when a hospital was to be evacuated. The increasing numbers of the sick and wounded as the war enlarged pressed on the limited number of regular medical officers, and Wellington complained that when he demanded more, the military medical board in London neglected his demands, and thwarted his arrangements. Shoals of hospital mates and students were indeed sent out, and they arrived for the most part ignorant alike of war and their own profession ; while a heterogeneous mass of purveyors and their subordinates, acting without any military organization or effectual superintendence, baffled the exertions of those medical officers, and they were many, whose experience, zeal, and talents would, with a good institution to work upon, have rendered this branch of the service most distinguished. Nay, many even of the well-educated surgeons sent out were for some time of little use, for superior professional skill is of little value in comparison of experience in military organization ; where one soldier dies from the want of a delicate operation, hundreds perish from the absence of military arrangement. War tries the strength of the military frame-work ; it is in peace the frame-work itself must be formed, otherwise barbarians would be the leading soldiers of the world. A perfect army can only be made by civil institutions, and those, rightly considered, would tend to confine the horrors of war to the field of battle, which would be the next best thing to the perfection of civilization that would prevent war altogether.

Such was the state of affairs on the allies' line of communication, when, on the 14th of August, Clausel suddenly came down the Pisuerga. Anson's cavalry immediately recrossed the Duero at Tudela. Santocildes, following Wellington's instructions, fell back to Torrelobaton, but left behind four hundred prisoners and all the guns and stores which had been captured there by the allies. On the 18th, the French assembled at Valladolid to the number of twenty thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and fifty guns well provided with ammunition ; and five thousand stragglers, who in the confusion of defeat had fled to Burgos and Vittoria, were also collected and in march to join.* Clausel's design was to be at hand when Joseph, reinforced from the south, should drive Wellington from Madrid, for he thought the latter must then retire by Avila and the Valle de Ambles, and he purposed to gain the mountains of Avila himself and harass the English General's flank. While awaiting this opportunity, Foy proposed, with two divisions

* Clausel's Correspondence, MS.

of infantry and sixteen hundred cavalry, to succor the garrisons of Toro, Zamora, and Astorga; and Clausel consented, though he was somewhat fearful of this dangerous experiment, and did not believe Astorga near its fall.* His hesitation ruined the scheme. Foy wished to march the 15th by Placentia, but was not despatched until the evening of the 17th and then by the line of Toro, the garrison of which place he carried off in passing. The 19th he sabred some of the Spanish rear-guard at Castro Gonzalo on the Esla; the 20th, at three o'clock in the evening, he reached La Baneza, but was mortified to learn that Castaños had by artful negotiation persuaded the garrison of Astorga, twelve hundred good troops, to surrender, although there was no breach. The Gallicians had then retired to their mountains, and Foy marched upon Carvajales, hoping to inclose Silveira's militia between the Duero and the Esla, to sweep them off in his course, and then relieving Zamora, to penetrate to Salamanca and seize the trophies of the Arapiles. And this would infallibly have happened but for the judicious activity of Douglas, who divining Foy's object sent Silveira with timely notice into Portugal;† yet so critical was the movement that Foy's cavalry skirmished with the Portuguese rear-guard near Constantin at daybreak on the 24th. The 25th the French entered Zamora, but Wellington was now in movement upon Arevalo, and Clausel recalled Foy at the moment when his infantry was actually in march upon Salamanca to seize the trophies, and his cavalry was moving by Ledesma to break up the line of communication with Ciudad Rodrigo.

That Foy was thus able to disturb the line of communication was Clinton's error. Wellington left eighteen thousand men, exclusive of the troops besieging Astorga, to protect his flank and rear, and he had a right to think it enough, because he momentarily expected Astorga to fall, and the French army, a beaten one, was then in full retreat. It is true none of the French garrisons yielded before Clausel returned, but Clinton alone had eight thousand good troops, and might with the aid of Santocildes and the partidas have baffled the French; he might even have menaced Valladolid after Foy's departure, which would have certainly brought that General back. And if he dared not venture so much, he should, following his instructions, have regulated his movements, along the left of the Duero, so as to be always in a condition to protect Salamanca; that is, he should have gone to Olmedo when Clausel first occupied Valladolid, but he retired to Arevalo, which enabled Foy to advance. The mere escape of the garrisons from

* Foy's Correspondence, MS.

† Sir H. Douglas's MSS.

Toro and Zamora was thought no misfortune. It would have cost a long march and two sieges in the hottest season to have reduced them, which was more than they were worth; yet to use Wellington's words, "*It was not very encouraging to find that the best Spanish army was unable to stand before the remains of Marmont's beaten troops; that in more than two months, it had been unable even to breach Astorga, and that all important operations must still be performed by the British troops.*" The Spaniards, now in the fifth year of the war, were still in the state described by Sir John Moore, "*without an army, without a government, without a general.*"

While these events were passing in Castile, Popham's armament remained on the Biscay coast, and the partidas thus encouraged became so active, that with the exception of Santona and Gueteria all the littoral posts were abandoned by Caffarelli. Porlier, Renvalles, and Mendizabel, the nominal commanders of all the bands, immediately took possession of Castro, Santander, and even of Bilbao. Rouget, who came from Vittoria to recover the last, was after some sharp fighting compelled to retire again to Durango; and Reille, deluded by a rumor that Wellington was marching through the centre of Spain upon Zaragoza, abandoned several important outposts; Aragon, hitherto so tranquil, then became unquiet, and all the northern provinces were ripe for insurrection.

THE END OF BOOK XIX.

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CHAPTER III.

Wellington's combinations described—Foolish arrangements of the English ministers relative to the Spanish clothing—Want of Money—Political persecution in Madrid—Miserable state of that city—Character of the Madrilenos—Wellington marches against Clausel—Device of the Portuguese Regency to avoid supplying their troops—Wellington enters Valladolid—Waits for Castaños—His opinion of the Spaniards—Clausel retreats to Burgos—His able generalship—The allies enter Burgos, which is in danger of destruction from the partidas—Reflections upon the movements of the two armies—Siege of the castle of Burgos.

THE END OF CHAPTER III.

WHILE the various military combinations described in the foregoing chapter were thickening, Wellington watched very eagerly the right moment for striking. The problem to be solved was one of time, which, to be turned to account, depended upon the activity of the Spaniards in cutting off all correspondence between the French armies. The manner in which Suchet and Caffarelli were paralyzed by the Anglo-Sicilian armies and by Popham's armament has been shown; but Clausel's force, though re-organized,

was still little more than a wreck ; and to render it powerless by taking Burgos was the English General's design. Meanwhile, to oppose Soult and the King, required extensive arrangements. Hence, when it was known that Andalusia was absolutely abandoned, Hill was directed upon Toledo, by the bridge of Almaraz ; for Sturgeon's genius had rendered that stupendous ruin, although more lofty than Alcantara, also passable for artillery. Elio was then induced to bring the Murcian army to the same quarter, and Ballesteros was ordered to take post on the mountain of Alcaraz, and guard the neighboring fortress of Chinchilla, which, being situated on the confines of Murcia and La Mancha, and perched on a rugged, isolated hill, in a vast plain, was peculiarly strong, both from construction and site, and was the knot of all the great lines of communication. Bassecour, Villa Campa, and the Empecinado, were desired to enter La Mancha with their bands. Hill could bring up twenty thousand men, and the third, fourth, and light divisions, two brigades of cavalry, and Carlos d'España's troops, were to remain near Madrid, while the rest of the army marched into Old Castile. Thus sixty thousand men, thirty thousand being excellent troops, well commanded, and having the Chinchilla fortress in front, would have been assembled before Soult could unite with the King ; and there was still the army of Estremadura, eight thousand strong, lying about Badajos in reserve.

The British troops at Carthagena were directed, when Soult should have passed that city, to leave small garrisons in the forts there and join the army at Alicant, which, with the reinforcements from Sicily, would then be sixteen thousand strong, seven thousand being British troops ; and while this force was at Alicant, Wellington judged the French could not bring more than fifty thousand against Madrid, without risking the loss of Valencia itself. Not that he expected the heterogeneous mass he had collected to resist, on a fair field, the veteran and powerfully constituted army which would finally be opposed to them ; but he calculated that, ere the French generals could act seriously, the rivers would be full, and Hill could then hold his ground long enough for the army to come back from Burgos : indeed, he had little doubt of reducing that place, and being again on the Tagus in time to take the initial movements himself.

By these dispositions, the allies had several lines of operations. Ballesteros, from the mountains of Alcaraz, could harass the flanks of the advancing French, and, when they passed, could unite with Maitland to overpower Suchet. Hill could retire, if pressed, by Madrid or by Toledo, and could gain the passes of the Guadarama or the valley of the Tagus. Elio, Villa Campa, Bassecour, and

the Empecinado, could act by Cuença and Requeña against Suchet, or against Madrid if the French followed Hill obstinately; or they could join Ballesteros: and, besides all these forces, there were ten or twelve thousand new Spanish levies in the Isla, waiting for clothing and arms, which, under the recent treaty, were to come from England. The English ministers had nominally confided the distribution of these succors to Wellington, but following their usual vicious manner of doing business, they also gave Mr. Stuart a control without Wellington's knowledge; hence the stores, expected by the latter at Lisbon or Cadiz, were by Stuart unwittingly directed to Coruña, with which place the English General had no secure communication; moreover there were very few Spanish levies there, and no confidential person to superintend the delivery of them. Other political crosses, which shall be noticed in due time, were also experienced, but it will suffice here to say the want of money was now become intolerable. The army was many months in arrears, those officers who went to the rear sick suffered the most cruel privations, those who remained in Madrid, tempted by the pleasures of the capital, obtained some dollars at an exorbitant premium from a money-broker, and it was grievously suspected that his means resulted from the nefarious proceedings of an under commissary; the soldiers, equally tempted and having no such resource, plundered the stores of the Retiro. In fine, discipline became relaxed throughout the army, and the troops kept in the field were gloomy, envying those who remained at Madrid.

The city exhibited a sad mixture of luxury and desolation. When it was first entered a violent, cruel, and unjust persecution of those who were called "*Afrancesados*" was commenced, and continued until the English General interfered, and as an example made no distinction in his invitations to the palace feasts. Truly it was not necessary to increase the sufferings of the miserable people, for though the markets were full of provisions there was no money wherewith to buy; and though the houses were full of rich furniture there were neither purchasers nor lenders; even noble families secretly sought charity that they might live. At night the groans and stifled cries of famishing people were heard, and every morning emaciated dead bodies, cast into the streets, showed why those cries had ceased. The calm resignation with which these terrible sufferings were borne was a distinctive mark of the national character; not many begged, none complained, there was no violence, no reproaches, very few thefts; the allies lost a few animals, nothing more, and these were generally thought to be taken by robbers from the country. But with this patient endurance of calamity the *Madridenses* discovered a deep and unaffected gratitude for kindness


received at the hands of the British officers who contributed, not much for they had it not, but enough of money to form soup charities by which hundreds were succored. It was in the third division the example was set, and by the forty-fifth regiment, and it was not the least of the many honorable distinctions those brave men have earned.

Wellington, desirous of sheltering his troops from the extreme heat, had early sent four divisions and the cavalry to the Escorial and St. Ildefonso, from whence they could join Hill by the valley of the Tagus, or Clinton by Arevalo; but when he knew the King's retreat upon Valencia was decided, that Soult had abandoned Cordoba, and Clinton was falling back before Clausel, he ordered the first, fifth, and seventh divisions, Pack's and Bradford's Portuguese brigades, Ponsonby's light horsemen, and the heavy German cavalry, to move rapidly upon Arevalo, and on the first of September quitted Madrid himself to take the command. Yet his army had been so diminished by sickness that only twenty-one thousand men, including three thousand cavalry, were assembled in that town. He could scarcely feed the Portuguese soldiers, who were also very ill equipped, and their government, instead of transmitting money and stores, endeavored to throw off the burthen by an ingenious device. For having always a running account with the Spanish government, they now made a treaty, by which the Spaniards were to feed the Portuguese troops and check off the expense on the national account, which was then in favor of the Portuguese; that is, the soldiers were to starve under the sanction of this treaty, because the Spaniards could not feed their own men, and would not, if they could, have fed the Portuguese. Neither could the latter take provisions from the country, because Wellington demanded the resources of the valleys of the Duero and Pisuerga for the English soldiers, as a set-off against the money advanced by Sir Henry Wellesley to the Spanish Regency at Cadiz. To stop this shameful expedient, he refused payment of the subsidy from the chest of aids, whereupon the old discontents and disputes revived and acquired new force, the Regency became intractable, and the whole military system of Portugal was like to fall to pieces.

On the 4th the allies quitted Arevalo, the 6th they passed the Duero by the ford above Puente de Duero, the 7th they entered Valladolid, and the Gallicians, who had returned to the Esla when Foy retreated, were ordered to join the Anglo-Portuguese army. Clausel abandoned Valladolid in the night of the 6th, and though closely followed by Ponsonby's cavalry, crossed the Pisuerga and destroyed the bridge of Bercal on that river. The 8th the allies

halted for rest and to await the arrival of Castaños; but seldom during the war did a Spanish general deviate into activity, and Wellington observed that in his whole intercourse with that people he had not met with an able man, while amongst the Portuguese he had found several. The Gallicians came not, Santocildes even avoided a junction, and the French retreated slowly up the Pisuerga and Arlanzan valleys, which, in denial of the stories about French devastation, were carefully cultivated, and filled to repletion with corn, wine, and oil. Nor were they deficient in military strength. Off the high road, on both sides, ditches and rivulets impeded the troops, while cross ridges continually furnished strong parallel positions flanked by the lofty hills on either side. In these valleys Clausel baffled his great adversary in the most surprising manner. Each day he offered battle, yet on ground which Wellington was unwilling to assail in front, partly because he momentarily expected the Gallicians up, chiefly because of the declining state of his own army from sickness, which, combined with the hope of ulterior operations in the south, made him unwilling to lose men. By flank movements he dislodged the enemy, yet each day darkness fell ere they were completed, and the morning's sun always saw Clausel again in position. At Cigales and Dueñas in the Pisuerga valley,—at Magoz, Torquemada, Cordobilla, Revilla, Vallejera, and Pampliega in the valley of the Arlanzan, the French General thus offered battle, and finally covered Burgos on the 16th by taking the strong position of Cellada del Camino.

But eleven thousand Spanish infantry, three hundred cavalry, and eight guns had now joined the allies, and Wellington would have attacked frankly on the 17th, had not Clausel, alike wary and skilful, observed the increased numbers and retired in the night to Frandovinez; his rear-guard was however next day pushed sharply back to the heights of Burgos, and in the following night he passed through that town, leaving behind him large stores of grain. Caffarelli, who had come down to place the castle of Burgos in a state of defence, now joined him, and the two generals retreated upon Briviesca, where they were immediately reinforced by that reserve which, with such an extraordinary foresight, the Emperor had directed to be assembled and exercised on the Pyrenees in anticipation of Marmont's disaster. The allies entered Burgos amidst great confusion, for the garrison of the castle had set fire to some houses impeding the defence of the fortress, the conflagration spread widely, and the partidas, who were already gathered like wolves around a carcass, entered the town for mischief. Mr. Sydenham, an eye-witness and not unused to scenes



of war, thus describes their proceedings: "What with the flames and the plundering of the guerillas, who are as bad as Tartars and Cossacks of the Kischack or Zagatay hordes, I was afraid Burgos would be entirely destroyed, but order was at length restored by the manful exertions of Don Miguel Alava."

Clausel's beautiful movements merit every praise, but it may be questioned if the English General's marches were in the true direction, or made in good time; for though Clinton's retreat upon Arevalo influenced, it did not absolutely dictate the line of operations. Wellington had expected Clausel's advance to Valladolid, it was therefore no surprise, and on the 26th of August Foy was still at Zamora. At that period the English General might have had his army, Clinton's troops excepted, at Segovia; and as the distance from thence to Valladolid is rather less than from Valladolid to Zamora, a rapid march upon the former, Clinton advancing at the same time, might have separated Clausel from Foy. Again, Wellington might have marched upon Burgos by Aranda de Duero and Lerma, that road being as short as by Valladolid; he might also have brought forward the third and light divisions by the Somosierra from Madrid, and directed Clinton and the Spaniards to close upon the French rear. He would thus have turned the valleys of the Pisuegra and the Arlanzan, and could from Aranda or Lerma have fallen upon Clausel while in march. That General, having Clinton and the Gallicians on his rear, and Wellington reinforced by the divisions from Madrid on his front or flank, would then have had to fight a decisive battle under every disadvantage. In fine, the object was to crush Clausel, and this should have been effected though Madrid had been entirely abandoned to secure success. It is however probable that want of money and means of transport decided the line of operations, for the route by the Somosierra was savage and barren, and the feeding of the troops even by Valladolid was from hand to mouth, or painfully supported by convoys from Portugal.

SIEGE OF THE CASTLE OF BURGOS.

Caffarelli had placed eighteen hundred infantry, besides artillerymen, in this place, and the governor Dubreton was of such courage and skill that he surpassed even the hopes of his sanguine and warlike countrymen. The castle and its works inclosed a rugged hill, between which and the river the city of Burgos was situated. An old wall with a new parapet and flanks constructed by the French offered the first line of defence; the second line was earthen, of the nature of a field retrenchment and well palisaded; the third line was similarly constructed, and contained the two most

elevated points of the hill, on one of which was an intrenched building called the White Church, and on the other the ancient keep of the castle: this last was the highest point, intrenched and surmounted with a heavy casemated work called the Napoleon battery.* Thus there were five separate inclosures, and the Napoleon battery commanded everything around it, save to the north, where at the distance of three hundred yards there was a second height scarcely less elevated than that of the fortress. This point, called the hill of San Michael, was defended by a large horn-work with a hard sloping scarp forty-five feet high, and a counterscarp not less than ten feet high; it was unfinished and only closed by strong palisades, but it was under the fire of the Napoleon battery, was well flanked by the castle defences, and covered in front by slight intrenchments for the out piquets. Nine heavy guns, eleven field-pieces, and six mortars or howitzers were mounted in the fortress; Clausel's reserve artillery and stores were also deposited there, and the armament could therefore be increased.

FIRST ASSAULT.

All the bridges and fords over the Arlanzan were commanded by the batteries, and two days elapsed ere the allies could cross; but on the 19th, the passage of the river being effected above the town by the first division, Major Somers Cocks, supported by Pack's Portuguese, drove in the French outposts on the hill of San Michael. In the night, the same troops, reinforced with the forty-second regiment, stormed that horn-work, and the conflict was murderous. The Highlanders, who bore the ladders under the command of the engineer, Pitt, placed them very well, splicing them together to meet the great height of the scarp, yet the stormers were beaten back with great loss, and would have failed if the gallant Cocks had not forced an entrance by the gorge, with the seventy-ninth.† The garrison was thus cut off, and must have surrendered if Cocks had been well supported; but he was only followed by the second battalion of the forty-second, and the French, being still five hundred, broke through and escaped. The affair was censured, the troops complained of each other, and the loss was above four hundred, whilst that of the enemy did not exceed one hundred and fifty.

Wellington was now enabled to examine the defences of the castle. He found them feeble and incomplete, and yet his means were so scant, he relied more upon the enemy's weakness than his own power; for it was said the garrison wanted water, and that

* Jones's Sieges.

† Memoir by Colonel Reid, R.E.

their provision magazines could be burned. Upon this information, he adopted the following plan of attack.

Twelve thousand men, composing the first and sixth divisions and the two Portuguese brigades, were to undertake the works; the rest of the troops, twenty thousand exclusive of the partidas, were to form the covering army. The trenches were to be opened from the suburb of San Pedro, and a parallel formed in the direction of the hill of San Michael. A battery for five guns was to be established close to the right of the captured horn-work. A sap was to be pushed from the parallel as near the first wall as possible without being seen into from the upper works, and from thence the engineer was to proceed by gallery and mine.*

When the first mine should be completed, the battery on the hill of San Michael was to open against the second line of defence, and the assault was to be given on the first line. If a lodgment was formed, the approaches were to be continued against the second line, and the battery on San Michael was to be turned against the third line in front of the White Church, because the defences there were exceedingly weak. Meanwhile, a trench for musketry was to be dug along the brow of San Michael, and a concealed battery was to be prepared within the horn-work itself, with a view to the final attack of the Napoleon battery. Head-quarters were fixed at Villa Toro; Colonel Burgoyne conducted the operations of the engineers, Robe and Dickson those of the artillery, which consisted of three eighteen-pounders and the five iron twenty-four-pound howitzers used at the siege of the Salamanca forts; and it was with regard to these slender means, rather than the defects of the fortress, that the line of attack was chosen.

When the horn-work fell, a lodgment was commenced in the interior, and continued vigorously, although under a destructive fire from the Napoleon battery, because the besiegers feared the enemy would at daylight endeavor to retake the work by the gorge: good cover was however obtained in the night, and the first battery was also begun.

The 21st the garrison mounted several fresh field-guns, and at night kept up a heavy fire of grape and shells on the workmen, who were digging the musketry trench in front of the first battery. The 22d, the fire of the besieged was redoubled, but the besiegers worked with little loss, and their musketeers galled the enemy. In the night, the first battery was armed with two eighteen-pounders and three howitzers, and the secret battery within the horn-work was commenced. Wellington, deviating from his first plan, then resolved to try an escalade against the first line of defence,

* Jones's Sieges.

and selected a point half-way between the suburb of San Pedro and the horn-work. At midnight four hundred men, provided with ladders, marched from under the hill on which the horn-work stood, to the attack of the wall, which was from twenty-three to twenty-five feet high, but had no flanks; this was the main column, and a Portuguese battalion was also assembled in the town of Burgos, to make a combined flank attack on that side.

SECOND ASSAULT.

It was commenced by the Portuguese, but they were repelled by the fire of the common guard alone; and the principal escalading party, composed of detachments from different regiments under Major Lawrie, seventy-ninth regiment, although acting with great resolution, got disordered in passing a hollow way fifty yards from the wall, and had no success. The ladders were indeed placed, and the troops entered the ditch, yet confusedly; Lawrie was killed, the bravest soldiers who first mounted were met hand to hand and bayoneted, and the ladders were reared and overturned several times; combustibles were also cast down in abundance, and the British, giving way, left half their number behind. The wounded were brought off next day under a truce, and it was said the French found on a dead officer a plan of the siege; certain it is, that this disastrous attack augmented the enemy's courage and produced a bad effect on the allies, some of whom had been also greatly dispirited by the previous assault on the horn-work.

The hollow way which had disordered the escaladers, and which at fifty yards' distance ran along the front of defence, was converted into a parallel and connected with the suburb of San Pedro; the trenches were made deep and narrow, to secure them from the plunging shot of the castle, and musketeers were planted to keep down the enemy's fire; but heavy rains incommoded the troops, and though the allied marksmen got the mastery over those of the French immediately in their front, the latter, having a raised and palisaded work on their own right which in some measure flanked the approaches, killed so many of the besiegers that the latter were finally withdrawn. In the night a flying sap was commenced from the right of the parallel, and was pushed within twenty yards of the enemy's first line of defence; but the directing engineer was killed, and with him many men, for the French plied their musketry sharply, and rolled large shells down the steep side of the hill. The head of the sap was indeed so commanded, as it approached the wall, that a six-foot trench, added to the height of the gabion above, scarcely protected the workmen: the gallery of the mine was therefore opened, and worked as rapidly as the inexpe-

rience of the miners, who were merely volunteers from the line, would permit.

A concealed battery within the horn-work of San Michael being now completed, two eighteen-pounders were removed from the first battery to arm it, and they were replaced by two iron howitzers, which opened upon the advanced palisade below to drive the French marksmen from that point; when they had fired one hundred and forty rounds without success this project was abandoned, for ammunition was so scarce the soldiers were paid to collect the enemy's bullets. This day also a zigzag was commenced in front of the first battery down the face of San Michael, to obtain footing for a musketry trench to overlook the enemy's defences below; and though the workmen were exposed to the whole fire of the castle at the distance of two hundred yards, and were knocked down fast, the work went steadily on.

On the 26th the gallery of the mine was advanced eighteen feet, and the soil was found favorable, yet the men in passing the sap were hit fast by the French marksmen, and an assistant engineer was killed. In the night the parallel was prolonged on the right within twenty yards of the enemy's ramparts, with a view to a second gallery and mine, and musketeers were planted there to oppose the enemy's marksmen and to protect the sap; at the same time the zigzag on the hill of San Michael was continued, and the musket trench there was completed under cover of gabions, and with little loss, although the whole fire of the castle was concentrated on the spot.

On the 27th the French were seen strengthening their second line, and they had already cut a step along the edge of the counterscarp for a covered way, and had palisaded the communication. The besiegers likewise finished the musketry trench on the right of their parallel, and opened the gallery for the second mine; but the first mine went on slowly, the men in the sap were galled and disturbed by stones, grenades, and small shells which the French threw into the trenches by hand: the artillery fire also knocked over the gabions of the musketry trench on San Michael so fast that the troops were withdrawn during the day.

In the night, a trench of communication, forming a second parallel behind the first, was begun, and nearly completed, from the hill of San Michael towards the suburb of San Pedro, and the musketry trench on the hill was deepened. Next day an attempt was made to perfect this new parallel of communication, but the French fire became heavy, and the shells which passed over came rolling down the hill again into the trench, so the work was deferred until night and was then perfected. The back roll of the

shells continued to gall the troops, yet the whole of this trench, that in front of the horn-work above, and that on the right of the parallel below, were filled with men whose fire was incessant; and as the first mine was now loaded with more than a thousand weight of powder, the gallery strongly tamped for fifteen feet with bags of clay and all ready for explosion, Wellington ordered the

THIRD ASSAULT.

At midnight the hollow road, fifty yards from the mine, was lined with troops to fire on the defences, and three hundred stormers were assembled there, attended by others who carried tools and materials to secure the lodgment when the breach should be carried: the mine was then exploded, the wall fell, and an officer with twenty men rushed forward to the assault. The explosion was not so efficacious as it ought to have been, yet it brought the wall down, the enemy was stupefied, and the forlorn hope, consisting of a sergeant and four daring soldiers, gained the summit of the breach and there stood until the French, recovering, drove them down pierced with bayonet wounds. Meanwhile the officer and twenty men, who were to have been followed by a party of fifty and those by the remainder of the stormers, missed the breach in the dark, and finding the wall unbroken, retired and reported there was no breach; the main body immediately regained the trenches, and before the sergeant and his men returned with streaming wounds to tell their tale, the enemy was reinforced. Scarcity of ammunition stopped the artillery practice against the breach during the night, and the French raised a parapet behind it, placing obstacles sufficient to deter the besiegers from renewing the assault at daylight.

This failure arose from the darkness and the want of a conducting engineer; out of four regular officers of that branch engaged in the siege, one had been killed, one badly wounded, and one was sick; wherefore the remaining one was necessarily reserved for the conducting of the works. The aspect of affairs was gloomy. Twelve days had elapsed since the siege commenced, one assault had succeeded, two had failed; twelve hundred men had been killed or wounded, little progress made, and the troops generally showed symptoms of despondency, especially the Portuguese, who seemed to be losing their ancient spirit. Discipline was relaxed, the soldiers wasted ammunition, the work in the trenches was avoided or neglected both by officers and men, insubordination was gaining ground, and reproachful orders were issued, the guards only being noticed as presenting an honorable exception. In this state it was essential to make some change in the

operations, and as the French marksmen in the advanced palisaded work below were now so expert as to hit everything seen, the howitzer battery on San Michael was reinforced with a French eight-pounder, by the aid of which this mischievous post was at last demolished. The gallery of the second mine was also pushed forward, and a new breaching-battery for three guns was constructed behind it, so close to the enemy's defences that the latter screened the work from the artillery fire of their upper fortress; but the parapet of the battery was only made musket-proof, because the besieged had no guns on the lower line of this front.

In the night, the three eighteen-pounders were brought from the hill of San Michael without being discovered, and at daylight, though a very galling fire of muskets thinned the workmen, they persevered until nine o'clock, when the battery was finished and armed. But at that moment the watchful Dubreton brought a howitzer down from the upper works, and with a low charge threw shells into the battery; then making a hole through a flank wall, he thrust out a light gun, which sent its bullets whizzing through the thin parapet at every round, and at the same time his marksmen plied their shot so sharply, the allies were driven from their pieces without firing. More French cannon being now brought from the upper works, the defences of the battery were quite demolished, two of the gun-carriages were disabled, a trunnion was knocked off one of the eighteen-pounders, and the muzzle of another was split. It was in vain the besiegers' marksmen, aided by some officers who considered themselves good shots, endeavored to quell the enemy's fire; the French, being on a height, were too well covered and remained masters of the fight.

In the night, a second and more solid battery being formed a little to the left of the ruined one, the French observed it at daylight, and their fire plunging from above made the parapet fly off so rapidly that it was relinquished. Recourse was then again had to the galleries and mine and to the breaching battery on the hill of San Michael; the two guns still serviceable were therefore removed towards the upper battery to beat down a retrenchment formed by the French behind the old breach. It was intended to have placed them on this new position in the night of the 3d, but the weather was very wet and stormy, and the workmen, those of the guards only excepted, abandoned the trenches; hence at daylight the guns were still short of their destination, and nothing more could be done until the following night.

On the 4th, at nine o'clock in the morning, the two eighteen-pounders and three iron howitzers again opened from San Michael's, and at four o'clock in the evening, the old breach being

cleared of all incumbrances and the second mine strongly tamped for explosion, a double assault was ordered. The second battalion of the twenty-fourth British regiment under Captain Hedderwick being selected, was formed in the hollow way, having one advanced party under Lieutenant Holmes pushed forward as close to the new mine as it was safe to be, and a second party under Lieutenant Fraser in like manner pushed towards the old breach.

FOURTH ASSAULT.

At five o'clock the mine was exploded with a terrific effect, blowing many of the French into the air and breaking down one hundred feet of the wall; the next instant Holmes and his brave men went rushing through the smoke and crumbling ruins, and Fraser as quick and daring was already fighting on the summit of the old breach; opposed with spears, he was seen to tear one from the hands of an enemy, and leap into the midst of the hostile mass followed by his men.* The supports followed closely, and both breaches were carried, with a loss to the assailants of thirty-seven killed and two hundred wounded, seven of the latter being officers, and amongst them the conducting engineer. During the night lodgments were formed in advance of the old and on the ruins of the new breach, yet very imperfectly and under a destructive fire from the upper defences. This happy attack revived the spirits of the army, vessels with powder were coming coastwise from Coruña, a convoy was expected by land from Ciudad Rodrigo, a supply of ammunition sent by Sir Home Popham reached the camp, the howitzers continued to knock away the palisades in the ditch, and the battery on San Michael's was directed to open a third breach, at a point where the first line of defence was joined to the second.

This promising state of affairs was of short duration.

On the 5th, at five o'clock in the evening, while the working parties were extending the lodgments, three hundred French came swiftly down the hill, and sweeping away the laborers and guards from the trenches killed or wounded a hundred and fifty men, got possession of the old breach, destroyed the works, and carried off all the tools. In the night the allies repaired the damage and pushed saps from each flank, to meet in the centre near the second French line and serve as a parallel to check future sallies; the howitzers also continued their fire from San Michael against the palisades, and the breaching in the horn-work opened, but the guns being unable to see the walls sufficiently low soon ceased to speak and the embrasures were masked. On the other

* Memoir by Colonel Reid, B.E.

hand the besieged were unable, from the steepness of the castle hill, to depress their guns sufficiently to bear on the lodgment at the breaches in the first line, but their musketry was destructive, and they rolled down large shells to retard the approaches towards the second line.

On the 7th the besiegers got so close to the wall below that the howitzers above could no longer play without danger to the workmen, wherefore two French field-pieces taken in the horn-work were substituted and did good service. The breaching-battery on San Michael's being altered, also renewed its fire, and at five o'clock had broken fifty feet off the parapet of the second line, yet the enemy's return was heavy, and another eighteen-pounder lost a trunnion. In the night block carriages with supports for the broken trunnions were provided, and the disabled guns were enabled to recommence their fire with low charges. A constant rain now filled the trenches, the communications were injured, the workmen negligent, the approaches to the second line went on slowly, and again Dubreton came thundering down from the upper ground, driving the guards and workmen from the new parallel at the lodgments, levelling all the works, carrying off all the tools, and killing or wounding two hundred men. Colonel Cocks, promoted for his gallant conduct at the storming of San Michael, restored the fight and repulsed the French, but fell dead on the ground he had recovered. He was a young man of a modest demeanor, brave, thoughtful and enterprising; he lived and died as a good soldier.

After this severe check the approaches to the second line were abandoned, and the trenches were extended so as to embrace the whole of the fronts attacked. The battery on San Michael had meantime formed a practicable breach twenty-five feet wide, and the parallel at the old breach of the first line was prolonged by zigzags on the left towards this new breach, while a trench was opened to enable marksmen to fire upon the latter at thirty yards distance. Nevertheless another assault could not be risked, because the great expenditure of powder had again exhausted the magazines; and without a new supply, the troops might have found themselves without ammunition in front of the French army, which was now gathering head near Briviesca. Heated shot were however thrown at the White Church, with a view to burn the magazines; and the miners were directed to drive a gallery on the other side of the castle against the church of San Roman, which was pushed out a little beyond the French external line of defence on the side of the city.

On the 10th, when the besiegers' ammunition was nearly all gone, a fresh supply arrived from Santander, but no effect had

been produced upon the White Church, and Dubreton had strengthened his works to meet the assault; he had also isolated the new breach on one flank by a strong stockade extending at right angles from the second to the third line of defence. The fire from the Napoleon battery had compelled the besiegers again to withdraw their battering-guns within the horn-work, and the attempt to burn the White Church was relinquished, but the gallery against San Roman was continued. In this state things remained for several days with little change, save that the French, maugre the musketry from the nearest zigzag trench, had scarped eight feet at the top of the new breach and formed a small trench at the back.

On the 15th the battery in the horn-work was again armed, and the guns pointed to breach the wall of the Napoleon battery; they were however overmatched and silenced in three-quarters of an hour, and the embrasures were once more altered that the guns might bear on the breach in the second line. Some slight works and counter-works were also made on different points, the besiegers being principally occupied repairing the mischief done by the rain, and pushing the gallery under San Roman, where the French were now distinctly heard talking in the church; the mine was therefore formed and loaded with nine hundred pounds of powder.

On the 17th the battery of the horn-work was renewed, the fire of the eighteen-pounders cleared away the enemy's temporary defences at the breach, the howitzers damaged the rampart on each side, and a small mine was sprung on the extreme right of the lower parallel, with a view to take possession of a cavalier or mound which the French had raised there, and from which they had killed many men in the trenches; it was successful, and a lodgment was effected, yet the enemy returned in force and compelled the besiegers to abandon it again. On the 18th the new breach was rendered practicable, and Wellington ordered it to be stormed. The explosion of the mine under San Roman was to be the signal, the church was also to be assaulted, and at the same time a third detachment was to escalate the works in front of the ancient breach and thus connect the attacks.

FIFTH ASSAULT.

At half-past four o'clock the springing of the mine at San Roman broke down a terrace in front of that building, yet with little injury to the church itself; the latter was however resolutely attacked by Colonel Browne at the head of some Spanish and Portuguese troops, and though the enemy sprung a countermine which brought the

building down, the assailants lodged themselves in the ruins. Meanwhile two hundred of the foot-guards, with strong supports, poured through the old breach in the first line and escalated the second line, beyond which, in the open ground between the second and third lines, they were encountered by the French and a sharp musketry fight commenced. At the same time a like number of the German legion under Major Wurmb, similarly supported, stormed the new breach on the left of the guards so vigorously that it was carried in a moment, and some men mounted the hill above and actually gained the third line. Unhappily, at neither of these assaults did the supports follow closely; the Germans, cramped on their left by the enemy's stockade, extended their right towards the guards, and at that moment Dubreton came dashing like a torrent from the upper ground and in an instant cleared the breaches. Wurmb and many other brave men fell, and the French, gathering round the guards who were still unsupported, forced them beyond the outer line: more than two hundred men and officers were killed or wounded in this combat, and the next night the enemy recovered San Roman by a sally.

The siege was thus virtually terminated. The French were indeed beaten out of San Roman again, and a gallery was opened from that church against the second line; but these were mere demonstrations, and the contemporary events which compelled a victorious army to abandon the siege of a small fortress, strong in nothing but the skill and bravery of the governor and his gallant soldiers, shall now be related.

CHAPTER IV.

State of the war in various parts of Spain—Joseph's distress for money—Massena declines the command of the army of Portugal—Caffarelli joins that army—Reinforcements come from France—Mischief occasioned by the English newspapers—Souham takes the command—Operations of the partidas—Hill reaches Toledo—Souham advances to relieve the castle of Burgos—Skirmish at Monasterio—Wellington takes a position of battle in front of Burgos—Second skirmish—Wellington weak in artillery—Negligence of the British government on that head—The relative situation of the belligerents—Wellington offered the chief command of the Spanish armies—His reasons for accepting it—Contumacious conduct of Ballesteros—He is arrested and sent to Ceuta—Suchet and Jourdan refuse the command of the army of the south—Soult reduces Chinchilla—The King communicates with Souham—Hill communicates with Wellington—Retreat from Burgos—Combat of Venta de Pozo—Drunkenness at Torquemada—Combat on the Carrion—Wellington retires behind the Pisuerga—Disorders in the rear of the army—Souham skirmishes at the bridge of Cabegon—Wellington orders Hill to retreat from the Tagus to the Adaja—Souham fails to force the bridges of Valladolid and Simancas—The French Captain Guingret swims the Duero and surprises the bridge of Tordesillas—Wellington retires behind the Duero—Makes a rapid movement to gain a position in front of the bridge of Tordesillas, and destroys the bridges of Toro and Zamora, which arrests the march of the French.

At Valencia Joseph obtained three millions of francs from Suchet, but the pecuniary distress of the French generally was so great that Wellington at one time supposed it would drive them from Spain. The Anglo-Portuguese soldiers had not received pay for six months, the French armies of the south, the centre, and Portugal were a whole year behindhand; and the salaries of the ministers and civil servants were two years in arrears. Suchet's army, the only one which depended entirely on the country, was however through his excellent management regularly paid; its discipline was conformable; his troops refrained from plunder themselves, and repressed some excesses of Joseph's and Soult's men so vigorously as to come to blows in defence of the inhabitants. Soldiers without pay must become robbers. Napoleon knew the King's necessity to be extreme, but the Russian war absorbed the resources of France; twenty thousand men chiefly conscripts, and a little money, were all he could send to Spain.

Clausel's army had during the siege been quartered at Pancorbo and along the Ebro as far as Logroño, an advance guard only remaining at Briviesca; there they were re-organized, and Massena was appointed with full powers to command all the northern provinces. A fine opportunity to avenge the retreat from Torres Vedras was thus furnished to the old warrior; but he, doubting the issue of affairs or tamed by age, pleaded illness and sent Souham

to command.* Then arose contention, for Marmont designated Clausel as the fittest to lead, Massena insisted that Souham was the abler general, and the King desired to appoint Drouet. Clausel's abilities were not inferior to those of any French general, and to more perfect acquaintance with the theatre of war he added better knowledge of the enemy, was more known to the soldiers, and had gained their confidence by his recent operations, no mean considerations in such a matter. However, Souham was appointed.

Caffarelli, anxious to succor Burgos which belonged to his command, had at last united at Vittoria a thousand cavalry, sixteen guns, and eight thousand infantry, of which three thousand were of the Young Guard. The army of Portugal, reinforced from France with twelve thousand men, had thirty-five thousand present under arms organized in six divisions, and by Clausel's vigor restored to its former excellent discipline; forty-four thousand good troops were therefore ready in the beginning of October to succor the castle; and the two generals were eager to do so, but were forced to await Souham's arrival, and news from the King.† But here Wellington's arrangements with the partidas interfered; they had no direct tidings from Valencia, because the circuitous lines of correspondence were so beset by the bands that the most speedy and certain communication was through the Minister of War at Paris; and he obtained his surest information from the English newspapers!‡ For the latter, while deceiving the public with stories of victories never gained, battles never fought, enthusiasm and vigor which had no existence, did most assiduously enlighten the enemy as to the numbers, situation, movements and reinforcements of the allies.§

Souham arrived the 3d of October with the last reinforcements from France, but he imagined Wellington had sixty thousand troops around Burgos exclusive of the partidas, and that three divisions were marching from Madrid to his aid;|| whereas none were coming from that capital, and little more than thirty thousand were near Burgos, eleven thousand being Gallicians scarcely so good as the partidas. The Anglo-Portuguese were not twenty thousand, and the sick were going to the rear faster than the recovered men came up. Some unattached regiments and escorts were about Segovia, and other points north of the Guadarama, and a reinforcement of five thousand men had been sent from England in Sep-

* Duke of Feltre to Joseph, Oct. 1812, MS.

† Souham's Report, MS.

‡ Appendix, No. 15, B.

§ Duke of Feltre's Correspondence, MS.

|| Souham's official Correspondence, MS.

tember; but the former belonged to Hill's army, and of the latter the life-guards and blues had gone to Lisbon. One regiment of foot guards and some detachments for the line, in all three thousand, were the only available force in the rear.

During the first part of the siege, the English General seeing the French scattered along the Ebro and only reinforced by conscripts, did not fear any interruption, and the less so that Popham was again menacing the coast line. Even now, when the French were beginning to concentrate, he cared little for them and was resolved to give battle; for he thought Popham and the guerillas would keep Caffarelli employed, and felt himself a match for the army of Portugal; nor did the partidas fail to harass the enemy. Mina having obtained three thousand stand of English arms domineered on the left bank of the Ebro, Duran with four thousand men was uncontrolled on the right bank. The Empecinado, Villa Campa, and Bassecour descended from Cuença against Requeña and Albacete. The Frayle interrupted the communications between Valencia and Tortosa. Saornil, Cuesta, Firmin, and others were in La Mancha and Estremadura. Juan Palarea, called the Medico, was near Segovia; and though Marquinez had been murdered by one of his own men, his partida and that of Julian Sanchez acted as regular troops with Wellington's army.

Sir Home Popham, in conjunction with Mendizabel, Porlier and Renovales, again assailed Gueteria, but they were driven thence with the loss of some guns on the 30th of September, and the Empecinado was also defeated at Requeña. Duran likewise was beaten at Catalatayud by Severoli, who withdrew the garrison of that place; but the Spanish chief next attacked Almunia, one march from Zaragoza, and when again driven away by Severoli, who dismantled the place, he fell on Borja and took it. Zaragoza was thus deprived of outposts on the right of the Ebro; and on the left bank Mina hovered close to the gates, while his lieutenant, Chaplangara, falling on three hundred Italians, killed forty, and would have destroyed the whole but for the timely succor of some mounted gens-d'armes. Reille, always thinking Wellington designed to march upon Zaragoza, had suffered these enterprises to avoid spreading his troops; now better informed, he restored his outposts—but the whole chain of partidas was in activity, and Bassecour had united with Villa Campa to harass Joseph's quarters at Albacete.

While Soult was on the march to Valencia, Elio reduced a small French post left at Consuegra. Hill, who had left three Portuguese regiments of infantry and one of cavalry at Almendralejos, and Truxillo to protect his line of supply, then entered Toledo,

spread his left to Aranjuez, and was joined by the fourth division, Victor Alten's cavalry, and the detachments quartered about Ildefonso and Segovia. On the 8th, hearing of Soult's arrival at Hellin, he pushed his cavalry to Belmonte on the San Clemente road, and found in La Mancha as in Old Castile the stories of French devastation belied by the abundance of provisions. Bassecour, Villa Campa, and the Empecinado then united on the road leading from Cuença to Valencia, while the Medico and other chiefs gathered in the Toledo mountains. The allies were thus extended from Toledo on the right, by Belmonte, Cuença, and Calatayud to near Jaca on the left, and were also in military communication with the coast; for Caffarelli's force was concentrated to relieve Burgos, and Mina had free intercourse with Mendizabel, Renovales and Popham.

Souham, overrating the allied force and dreading defeat as being the only barrier between Wellington and France, far from meditating an advance, expected at first to be attacked; and as the want of provisions would not let him concentrate his army permanently near Monasterio, his dispositions were made to fight on the Ebro. The Minister of War had even desired him to detach a division against the partidas.* But when, by the English newspapers and by information sent from Paris, he knew that Soult was in march from Granada,—that the King intended to move upon Madrid,—that no English troops had left that capital,—that Wellington's army was not very numerous, and the castle of Burgos sorely pressed, he called up Caffarelli from Vittoria, concentrated his own troops at Briviesca, and resolved to raise the siege.*

On the 13th a skirmish took place at a stream beyond Monasterio, where Captain Persse of the sixteenth dragoons was twice forced from the bridge and twice recovered it in the most gallant manner, maintaining his post until F. Ponsonby who commanded the reserves arrived. Ponsonby and Persse were both wounded, and this demonstration was followed by various others until the evening of the 18th, when the whole French army was united, and the advanced guard captured a piquet of Brunswickers that had remained in St. Ollala against orders. This sudden movement prevented Wellington from occupying the position of Monasterio, and his outposts fell back the 19th to Quintanapala and Olmos, behind which he drew up his army in order of battle,—the right at Ibeas on the Arlanzan,—his centre at Riobena and Majarradas on the main road behind Olmos,—his left thrown back near Soto Palacio on a small river.

* Duke of Feltre's Correspondence, MS.

† Souham's official Report, MS.

The 20th, Maucune, having two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, drove the allies from Quintanapala, but Olmos was successfully defended by the Chasseurs Britanniques, and Maucune, outflanked on the right, was forced back to Monasterio by two divisions under Sir Edward Paget. There were now in position, including Pack's Portuguese blockading the castle, thirty-three thousand men, namely, twenty-one thousand Anglo-Portuguese infantry and cavalry, eleven thousand Gallicians, and the horsemen of Marquinez and Julian Sanchez; of these four thousand troopers only two thousand six hundred were British and German, and the Spanish horsemen, regular or irregular, could scarcely be counted in the line of battle. The number of guns and howitzers was forty-two, including twelve Spanish pieces ill equipped and scant of ammunition; for though Wellington, who had long felt the want of artillery, sent a memoir upon the subject to the British government in the beginning of the year, his ordnance establishment had not been augmented. Hence his siege difficulties, and instead of ninety British and Portuguese field-pieces, which was the just complement for his army, he had only fifty serviceable guns, of which twenty-four were with Hill; and all were British, for the Portuguese artillery had from the abuses and the poverty of their government entirely melted away. Souham had forty-four thousand men, nearly five thousand being cavalry, and more than sixty guns;* a matter of no small importance, for besides the actual power, soldiers are excited when the noise is greatest on their side. Wellington stood at disadvantage in numbers, composition, position and real strength. In his rear was Dubreton's castle, whose guns commanded all the fords and bridges of the Arlanzan; his generals of division, Paget excepted, were not of any marked ability, his troops were somewhat desponding and deteriorated in discipline. A victory could scarcely be expected, a defeat would have been destructive; he should not have provoked a battle; nor would he have done so had he known Caffarelli's troops were united to Souham's.

On the other hand, Souham should have forced on an action, because his ground was strong, his retreat open, his army powerful and compact, his soldiers full of confidence; his lieutenants, Clausel, Maucune, and Foy, were of distinguished talent, able to second and able to succeed him in the chief command. The chances of victory and profit to be derived were great, the chances of defeat and dangers to be incurred comparatively small; and it was thus he judged the matter, for Maucune's advance was intended to be the prelude to a great battle.* But generals are not absolute

* Official roll of the army given to Massena, MS.

masters of events, and as the extraneous influence which here restrained both sides came from afar, it is fitting to show how in war movements distant and apparently unconnected with those immediately under a general's eye will break his measures, and make him appear undecided or foolish when in truth he is both wise and firm.

While Wellington was still engaged with the siege the Cortes made him commander of all the Spanish armies. He had before refused this responsible situation, but the circumstances were now changed; for the Spaniards, having lost nearly all their cavalry and guns in the course of the war, could not safely act except in connection with the Anglo-Portuguese forces, and it was absolutely necessary that one head should direct. He therefore demanded leave of his own government to accept the offer, observing, however, that the Spanish troops were not improved in discipline, equipments, or military spirit; but he thought that conjoined with the British they might behave well, and so escape more of those terrible disasters which had heretofore overwhelmed the country and nearly brought the war to a conclusion. He was willing to save the dignity of the Spanish government by leaving it a certain body of men wherewith to operate after its own plans; but that he might exercise his own power efficiently and to the profit of the troops under himself, he desired the English government vigorously to insist upon the strict application of the subsidy to the payment of the Spanish soldiers acting with the British army, otherwise the care of the Spanish troops would only cramp his own operations.

To the Cortes, his acceptance of the offer was rendered dependent upon the assent of his own government; and he was careful to guard himself from a danger not unlikely to arise, namely, that the Cortes, when he should finally accept the offer, would in virtue of that acceptance assume the right of directing the whole operations of the war. The intermediate want of power to move the Spanish armies he judged of little consequence, because hitherto his suggestions had been cheerfully attended to by the Spanish chiefs, and he expected no change: he was grievously mistaken.

Previous to this offer, the Spanish government had at his desire directed Ballesteros to cross the Morena and place himself at Alcaraz, in support of the Chinchilla fort, where, joined by Cruz Murgcon, by Elio, and by the partidas, he would have had a corps of thirty thousand men: from thence, while supported by Hill, and having the mountains behind him for a retreat, he could

* Appendix, 8 A.

have safely menaced the enemy's flank, and delayed the march against Madrid, or at least have compelled the King to leave a strong corps of observation to watch him. But Ballesteros, swelling with arrogant folly, never moved from Granada; and when he found Wellington was created Generalissimo, published a manifesto appealing to the Spanish pride against the degradation of serving under a foreigner. He thus sacrificed to his own spleen the welfare of his country, but with a result he little expected, for while he judged himself a man to sway the destinies of Spain, he suddenly found himself a criminal and nothing more. The Cortes caused him to be arrested in the midst of his soldiers, who, indifferent to his fate, suffered him to be sent a prisoner to Ceuta. Abisbal was then declared Captain-General of Andalusia, and Del Parque was appointed to command Ballesteros' army, which General Verues immediately led by Jaen towards La Mancha, but the campaign was over then, and Soult was on the Tormes.

That Marshal had joined the King on the 3d of October. His troops required rest, his numerous sick were to be sent to the Valencian hospitals, and his first interview with Joseph was of a warm nature, for each had griefs and passions to exhale. Finally the monarch yielded to the mental power of his opponent, and resolved to profit from his great military capacity, yet reluctantly, and more from prudence than liking;* for Clarke, the French Minister of War, though secretly Soult's enemy, and believing or pretending to believe the foolish charges of disorderly ambition made against him, was yet opposed to a decided exercise of the King's authority until the Emperor's will was known: this however would not have restrained the King, if Jourdan and Suchet had not each declined accepting chief command when Joseph offered it to them.

Soult's first operation was to reduce Chinchilla, a well-constructed fort, which being in the midst of his quarters, commanded the great roads so as to compel his army to move under its fire, or avoid it by circuitous routes.† A vigorous defence was expected, but on the 6th it fell after a few hours' attack; for a thunderstorm suddenly arising in a clear sky and discharging itself upon the fort, killed the governor and many other persons, whereupon the garrison, influenced it is said by superstitious fear, surrendered. This was the first fruit of Ballesteros' disobedience; for neither could Soult have taken Chinchilla, nor scattered his troops as he did at Albacete, Almanza, Yecla, and Hellin, if thirty thousand Spaniards had been posted between Alcaraz and Chinchilla, sup-

* Appendix, 6 A.

† Joseph's Correspondence, MS.

ported by thirty thousand Anglo-Portuguese at Toledo under Hill. Those scattered quarters were required to feed the army of the south, which under cover of Chinchilla was thus safely cantoned, while the great convoys of sick, of maimed men and Spanish families, proceeded leisurely to Valencia. The cavalry then scoured La Mancha, and drove Bassecour and Villa Campa to Cuença, but the great operations which succeeded belong to another place; it must here suffice to say that Joseph, having now seventy thousand men, was able to hold Valencia while he advanced towards the Tagus, and that he sent Souham urgent orders to act in concert without risking a battle. Hill also, being thus menaced and reduced by Ballesteros' defection to defend the Tagus when it was becoming fordable in all places, gave notice of the danger to Wellington. Joseph's letter was despatched on the 1st of October, and six others followed in succession, day by day, yet the last, carried by Colonel Lucotte, first reached Souham; the advantages of the allies' central position, and the value of the partidas, were here made manifest. Hill's letter, only despatched the 17th, reached Wellington at the same moment that Joseph's reached Souham. The latter General was thus forced to relinquish his design of fighting on the 20th; nevertheless, having but four days' provisions left, he designed when those should be consumed to attack, notwithstanding the King's prohibition, if Wellington should still confront him.* But the English General, considering that his own army, already in a very critical situation, would be quite isolated if the King should, as was probable, force the allies from the Tagus, resolved, though with a bitter pang, to raise the siege and retreat so far as would enable him to secure his junction with Hill.

Whilst the armies were in presence some fighting had taken place at Burgos, Dubreton again obtained possession of the San Roman church, but was driven away next morning; and then, the retreat being decided, mines of destruction were formed in the horn-work by the besiegers, and the guns and stores were removed from the batteries to the parc at Villa Toro. But the greatest part of the draught animals had been sent to Reynosa, to meet the powder and artillery coming from Santander, and hence the eighteen-pounders could not be carried off, nor from some error were the mines of destruction exploded. The rest of the stores and howitzers were sent by Villaton and Frandovinez to Cellada del Camino, and the siege was raised after five assaults, several sallies, and thirty-three days' investment, during which the besiegers lost more than two thousand men, and the besieged six hundred in killed or wounded: the French also suffered severely from


* Appendix, B A.

continual labor, want of water, and bad weather; for the fortress was too small to shelter the garrison, and the greater part bivouacked between the lines of defence.

RETREAT FROM BURGOS.

This enforced and remarkable operation was commenced on the night of the 21st by a measure of great nicety and boldness; for the road, divaricating at Gamonal, led to the bridge of Villaton on the one hand, and the bridge of Burgos on the other; and Wellington chose the latter, as being the shortest, though it passed the Arlanzan river, close under the guns of the castle. The army quitted the position after dark, the artillery-wheels were muffled with straw, and defiled over the bridge of Burgos with such silence and celerity, that Dubreton, watchful and suspicious as he was, knew nothing of their march until the partidas, failing in nerve, commenced galloping; then he poured a destructive fire down, but soon lost the range. By this delicate operation, the infantry gained Cellada del Camino and Hormillas that night, but the light cavalry halted at Estepar and the bridge of Villa Baniel. Souham did not discover the retreat until the evening of the 22d, and was fain to follow, and by a forced march overtake the allies, whereas, if Wellington, to avoid the fire of the castle, had gone by Villaton and Frandovinez, the French might have forestalled him at Cellada del Camino.

On the 23d, the infantry crossed the Pisuerga at Cordavillas and Torquemada, above and below its junction with the Arlanzan; but while the main body made this long march, the French, having passed Burgos on the night of the 22d, vigorously attacked the rear-guard, commanded by Sir Stapleton Cotton. It was strongly composed of all the cavalry, two troops of horse artillery, under Norman Ramsay and Downman, two German battalions, under Colin Halket, and the partidas of Marquez and Sanchez, who were beyond the Arlanzan. The cavalry piquets were first vigorously driven from the bridge of Baniel as early as seven o'clock; but they rallied on their reserves, and disputed the Hormaza stream, where Captain Persse of the sixteenth dragoons made a charge of distinguished bravery; finally, however, the passage was forced, and the British took post in a plain behind Cellada Camino. On their left, a range of hills was occupied by the partida of Marquez; on their right was the Arlanzan, beyond which Julian Sanchez was placed. Across the middle of the plain ran a marshy rivulet, cutting the main road, and only passable by a bridge near a little house, called the Venta de Pozo; and half-way between this stream and Cellada there was a broad



ditch with a second bridge, in front of a small village. Cotton retired over the marshy rivulet, leaving Anson's horsemen and Halket's infantry as a rear-guard beyond the ditch; and Anson, to cover his own passage of that obstacle, left the eleventh dragoons and the guns at Cellada Camino, which was situated on a gentle eminence.

COMBAT OF VENTA DE POZO.

When the French approached Cellada, Major Money of the eleventh, galloping from the left of the village, at the head of two squadrons, overturned their leading horsemen, and the artillery plied them briskly with shot; but the main body advancing at a trot along the road, outflanked the British, compelling Money to fall back, while the guns retired over the bridge of Venta de Pozo. Meantime the French General Curto, ascending the hill on his right with a brigade of hussars, followed by Boyer's dragoons, put Marquinez' *partida* to flight. A deep ravine ran along the foot of these hills, it could only be passed at certain places, and towards the first of them the *partidas* galloped at the moment when the leading French squadrons on the plain were forming in front of Cellada to attack the eleventh regiment. The latter charged, and drove the first line upon the second, but then both lines coming forward together, the eleventh were pushed precipitately over the ditch in confusion, yet with small loss, being covered by the fire of Halket's Germans, who were in the village, behind the bridge. The ditch was now turned by Curto's cavalry on the hills, and Anson fell back, designing to cross the bridge of Venta de Pozo; but then Marquinez' *partida* came pouring from the hills in flight, pursued by the French hussars, who mixed with the fugitives, and the whole mass dashed on the flank of the sixteenth dragoons, then covering Anson's movements; and at the same moment, the enemy's squadrons, who had meanwhile crossed the ditch, charged. The *partida* chief was wounded, Colonel Pelly and another officer were taken, with thirty of the eleventh, and the regiment was driven in disorder on the reserves. While the French were re-forming after this charge, Anson got over the rivulet, and drew up beyond it on the left of the road, which was defended by Halket's infantry and the guns, which, being supported by the German heavy cavalry, presented an imposing mass.

Hitherto the action had been sustained by Clausel's cavalry, but now Caffarelli's horsemen, namely, the lancers of Berg, the fifteenth dragoons, and some squadrons of "*gens-d'armes*," all fresh men, came down in line to the rivulet; finding it impassable,

with a quick and daring decision, they wheeled to their right, and despite of the heavy pounding of the artillery, trotted over the bridge, and formed line in opposition to the German dragoons. Their position was dangerous, but they were full of mettle, and though the Germans, who had let too many come over, charged with a rough shock and broke the right, the French left had the advantage, and the others rallied; then began a close and furious sword contest; yet the *gens-d'armes* fought so fiercely, that the Germans, maugre their size and courage, lost ground, and finally gave way in disorder. The French followed on the spur with shrill and eager cries, and Anson's brigade, outflanked and threatened on both sides, fell back also, but not happily, for Boyer's dragoons having continued their march by the hills to the village of Balbaces, had there crossed the ravine and now came thundering in on the left: then the British ranks were broken, the regiments got intermixed, and all went to the rear in confusion; finally, however, the Germans extricated themselves, and formed a fresh line to the left of the road, upon which the others rallied.

The *gens-d'armes* and lancers having suffered severely from the artillery and in the sword-fight, now halted, but Boyer's dragoons, ten squadrons, again came to the charge, and though the German officers rode gallantly forward, and their men followed a short way, the enemy was too powerful, and the swiftness of the English horses alone prevented a terrible catastrophe. Some favorable ground enabled the line to re-form once more; yet it was only to be again broken, and Wellington, who was present, placed Halket's infantry and all the guns in a position to cover the disordered masses. These troops remained tranquil until the enemy came galloping down, when the power of the musket was quickly made manifest; a tempest of bullets emptied the French saddles by scores, and their hitherto victorious horsemen, after three fruitless attempts to charge, each weaker than the other, reined up, and drew off to the hills. The British cavalry, covered by the infantry, then retreated to Quintana la Puente, near the Pisuerga, and the bivouacs of the enemy were established at Villadiego. The loss was considerable on both sides; the French suffered most, but they took a colonel and seventy other prisoners, and before the fight captured a small commissariat store near Burgos.

While the rear-guard was thus engaged, drunkenness and insubordination, the usual concomitants of an English retreat, were exhibited at Torquemada, where the great wine-vaults were invaded, and it is said, twelve thousand men were at one time in a state of helpless inebriety. In this crisis, the English General,

who had now retreated some fifty miles, seeing the enemy so hot and menacing in pursuit, resolved to check his course, because the means of transport being scanty, and the weather bad, the convoys of sick and wounded were still on the wrong side of the Duero. Wherefore, having by a short march crossed the Carrion at its confluence with the Pisuerga, he halted behind it, and was there fortunately joined by a regiment of the guards and by detachments coming from Coruña. His position, extending from Villa Muriel to Dueñas, below the meeting of the waters, was strong, being along a range of hills, lofty, yet descending with an easy sweep to the Carrion, which covered his left, while the Pisuerga secured his right wing. A detachment was employed to destroy the bridge of Baños on the Pisuerga, a battalion of the royals was sent to aid the Spaniards in destroying the bridges at Palencia; and some houses and convents beyond the rivers furnished good posts, behind which the bridges of Muriel and San Isidro on the Carrion, and that of Dueñas on the Pisuerga, could be broken.

Souham, excited by his success, cannonaded the rear-guard at Torquemada, passed the Pisuerga, directed Foy's division upon Palencia, and sent Maucune with an advanced guard against the bridges of Baños, Isidro, and Muriel; but he halted himself at Magoz; and, if fame does not lie, because the number of French drunkards at Torquemada were even more numerous than those of the British army.

COMBAT ON THE CARRION.

Before the enemy appeared, the hills were crowned by the allies, the bridges ruined, and that of San Isidro protected by a convent filled with troops. But in the divisional arrangements, the advantage of a dry canal with high banks and parallel to the river was not sufficiently considered, nor was the village of Muriel occupied in sufficient strength. Foy soon reached Palencia, where, according to some French writers, under pretence of a parley, a treacherous attempt was made to kill him; but he drove the allies from the town so hastily, that all the bridges were abandoned undamaged, and the French cavalry crossing, gathered up baggage and prisoners. This untoward event compelled Wellington to throw back his left, composed of the fifth division and Spaniards at Muriel, thus offering two fronts, one facing Palencia, the other the Carrion. Meanwhile, Maucune, first dispersing the 8th caçadores at a ford between San Isidro and Muriel, came with a strong body of infantry and guns upon the latter place, just as a mine was fired to destroy the bridge. The explosion checked

the French, but suddenly a horseman dashing out at full speed, rode down under a flight of bullets, calling out that he was a deserter; he reached the edge of the chasm, violently checked his foaming horse, held up his hands, and exclaiming that he was a lost man, with hurried accents asked if there was no ford. The good-natured soldiers pointed to one, and the gallant fellow looked earnestly for a few moments, as if to fix the exact point, but then wheeling his horse, kissed his hand in derision, and bending over his saddle-bow, dashed back to his own comrades amidst showers of shot and shouts of laughter on both sides. The next moment, Maucune, protected by a concentrated fire of guns, passed the river at the ford thus discovered, and at the bridge by means of ladders; he also made some prisoners in the village, and lined the dry bed of the canal.

But just then, Wellington coming up, turned some guns on the enemy, and desired General Oswald, commanding the fifth division, to retake the village and canal. Oswald expressed a doubt if they could be held when retaken. Wellington, whose retreat was endangered by the enemy's presence, was peremptory; he directed General Barnes with one brigade against the main body, and another under General Pringle to clear the canal. The first body was reinforced with Spaniards and Brunswickers, and a sharp fire of artillery and musketry ensued, but the cannon-shot from the other side of the river plumped heavily into the reserves, the Spaniards got into confusion and were falling back, when their fiery countryman, Miguel Alava, with exhortation and example, for though wounded he would not retire, urged them forward to the fight. Finally the enemy was driven over the river, the village was re-occupied in force, and the canal was strongly lined. Other troops had attempted without success to seize the bridge of San Isidro; there the mine was exploded; but at the bridge of Baños on the Pisuerga the mine failed, and the French cavalry galloping over made both the working and covering party prisoners. This sapped the strength of the position. Souham could assemble his army on the allies' left by Palencia, and force them to action with their back upon the Pisuerga, or he could pass that river by his own left, and forestall them on the Duero at Tudela. If Wellington passed the Pisuerga by the bridge of Dueñas, Souham having the initial move might be first on the ground in front, while Foy's division came down on the rear. If by a rapid movement along the right bank of the Pisuerga he sought to gain the Duero by Cabeçon, which was the next bridge on his rear, Souham, moving along the left bank of the former river, might fall upon him in march, and while hampered between the Duero, the Pisuerga, and

the Esquevilla; and once cut off from the Duero he must have retired through Valladolid and Simancas to Tordesillas or Toro, giving up his communications with Hill. In this critical state of affairs, keeping good watch upon the left of the Pisuerga, and knowing the ground there was rugged, the roads narrow and bad, while on the right bank they were good and wide, he sent his baggage in the night to Valladolid, and withdrawing the troops before daybreak on the 26th, made a clean march of sixteen miles to Cabeçon, passed to the left of the Pisuerga, and barricaded and mined the bridge. Then sending a detachment to hold the bridge of Tudela on the Duero behind him, he caused the seventh division under Lord Dalhousie to secure the bridges of Valladolid, Simancas, and Tordesillas. The Duero was in full water, and being thus assured of a retreat, he again halted, partly because the ground was favorable, partly to give the Commissary-General Kennedy time for indispensable arrangements.

This functionary had gone to England sick in the latter end of 1811, and returned to the army only the day before the siege of Burgos was raised. On his way from Lisbon he found the inexperience of the gentleman acting during his absence had caused serious mischief. The magazines established between Lisbon and Badajos, and from thence by Almaraz to the valley of the Tagus, for the supply of the army in Madrid, had not been removed when the retreat commenced, and Soult would have found them full if his march had been made rapidly on that side: on the other hand, the magazines on the line of operations between Lisbon and Salamanca were nearly empty. He had therefore to remove the magazines south of the Tagus, and bring up stores upon the line of the present retreat. His dispositions were not completed when Wellington desired him to remove the sick and wounded and every other incumbrance from Salamanca, promising to hold his position until the operation was effected. The means were indeed sufficient, but the negligence of many medical and escorting officers conducting the convoys of sick to the rear, and the consequent bad conduct of the soldiers, (for where the officers are careless the soldiers will be licentious,) produced the worst effects. Outrages were perpetrated on the inhabitants along the whole line of march, terror was everywhere predominant, the ill-used drivers and muleteers deserted, some with, some without their cattle, and Kennedy's operation was disastrous. The commissariat lost nearly all the animals and carriages employed, the villages were abandoned, and the under commissaries were bewildered or paralyzed by the terrible disorder thus spread along the line.

Souham repaired the bridges and resumed pursuit the 26th, by

the right of the Pisuerga, deterred probably from taking the left bank by the rugged nature of the ground, and the King's orders not to risk a serious action. Early on the 27th, he was in front of Cabeçon, but contented himself with a cannonade and display of his force. The first cost the allies Colonel Robe of the artillery, a practised officer and a worthy man; the second enabled the English General, for the first time, to count the numbers he had to contend with, and to discover that he could hold neither the Pisuerga nor the Duero permanently. However, his object being to gain time, he still held his position, and when the French, leaving a division in front of Cabeçon, extended their right by Cigales and Valladolid to Simancas, he caused the bridges at the two latter places to be destroyed in succession. Happy that he had not fought in front of Burgos with so powerful an army, he now resolved to go behind the Duero and finally over the Tormes; but as Hill would then be exposed to a flank attack, and the more certainly if ill-fortune befell the troops on the Duero, he ordered him to retreat, giving a discretion as to the line, but desiring him, if possible, to come by the Guadarama passes; for he designed to unite on the Adaja river, and from that central position, if occasion offered, to keep Souham in check with a part of his army, and with the remainder fall upon Soult.

On the 28th, Souham, always intent to dislodge the allies from their position by turning their left, endeavored to force the bridges at Valladolid and Simancas on the Pisuerga, and that of Tordesillas on the Duero. The first was defended by Lord Dalhousie, but Colonel Halket, finding the French strong and eager at the second, destroyed it, and detached the regiment of Brunswick Oels to ruin that of Tordesillas, which was done, and a tower behind the ruins occupied. The remainder of the Brunswickers entered a pine wood some distance off, and when the French arrived, sixty officers and sub-officers headed by Captain Guingret, a daring man, formed a small raft to hold their arms and clothes, and plunged into the water, holding their swords with their teeth, swimming and pushing their raft before them. Under protection of a cannonade they crossed this great river, though it was in full and strong water, and the weather very cold, and having reached the other side, naked as they were, stormed the tower: the Brunswick regiment then abandoned the wood, and the gallant Frenchmen remained masters of the bridge.

When Wellington heard of the attack at Simancas, and had seen the whole French army in march by its right along the hills beyond the Pisuerga the evening of the 28th, he destroyed the bridges at Valladolid and Cabeçon, and crossed the Duero at Tu-

dela and Puente de Duero on the 29th. But scarcely had he effected this operation when intelligence of Guingret's splendid action at Tordesillas reached him, and with the decision of a great captain, he instantly marched by his left until he reached the heights between Rueda and Tordesillas; there on the 30th he fronted the enemy, forbidding further progress; for though the bridge had been already repaired by the French, Souham's main body had not arrived, and Wellington's menacing position was too significant to be misunderstood. The bridges of Toro and Zamora were now destroyed by detachments, and though the French commenced repairing the former, the junction with Hill's army was insured. The English General, thinking the bridge of Toro could not be restored for several days, even hoped to maintain the line of the Duero permanently, expecting that Hill, of whose operations it is now time to speak, would be on the Adaja by the 3d of November.

CHAPTER V.

The King and Soult advance from Valencia to the Tagus—General Hill takes a position of battle—the French pass the Tagus—Skirmish at the Puente Largo—Hill blows up the Retiro and abandons Madrid—Riot in that city—Attachment of the Madrileños towards the British troops—The hostile armies pass the Guadarama—Souham restores the bridge of Toro—Wellington retreats towards Salamanca and orders Hill to retreat upon Alba de Tormes—The allies take a position of battle behind the Tormes—The Spaniards at Salamanca display a hatred of the British—Instances of their ferocity—Soult cannonades the castle of Alba—The King re-organizes the French armies—Soult and Jourdan propose different plans—Soult's plan adopted—French pass the Tormes—Wellington by a remarkable movement gains the Valmusa river and retreats—Misconduct of the troops—Sir Edward Paget taken prisoner—Combat on the Huebra—Anecdote—Retreat from thence to Ciudad Rodrigo—The armies on both sides take winter cantonments.

FRENCH PASSAGE OF THE TAGUS.—RETREAT FROM MADRID.

JOSEPH designed to unite great part of Suchet's forces to his own, and Soult, probably influenced by a false report that Ballesteros had actually reached La Mancha, urged this measure. Suchet resisted. He said Valencia must be well defended against the increasing power of the Anglo-Sicilian and Spanish armies at Alicante, because until the French army could open a new line of communication with Zaragoza, Valencia would be the only base. Joseph then resolved to incorporate part of Soult's army with his own, and give the command to Drouet, who was to move by the road of Cuença and Tarancon towards the Tagus. This arrange-

ment, dictated by a desire to advance Drouet's authority, was displeasing to Soult; he urged that his army, so constituted physically and morally as to be the best in the Peninsula, owed its excellence to its peculiar organization, and it would be dangerous to break that up. Nor was there good reason for the change; for if Joseph only wished to be strong on the Cuença road, his own army could be reinforced with one or two divisions, and the whole unite again on the Tagus, without injury to the army of the south. Better, he said, to incorporate the King's army with his, and march altogether by the road of San Clemente, leaving a few troops on the Cuença road, who might be reinforced by Suchet. But if the King's desire was to march in person with a large body, he could do so with greater dignity by joining the army of the south on the main line of operations. Joseph's reply was a peremptory order to obey or retire to France, and Drouet marched to Cuença.

Soult had thirty-five thousand infantry, six thousand excellent cavalry and seventy-two guns, making, with the artillerymen, a total of forty-six thousand veteran combatants.* The King's army, including the guards, was twelve thousand, two thousand being cavalry with twelve guns. Thus fifty-eight thousand fighting men and eighty-four pieces of artillery were in motion to drive Hill from the Tagus.† Joseph designed to pass that river and operate against Wellington's rear if he should continue the siege of Burgos; but if he concentrated on the Tagus, Souham was to menace his rear by Aranda de Duero and the Somosierra; sending detachments towards Guadalaxara, to be met by other detachments coming from the King through Sacedon. Finally, if Wellington, as indeed happened, should abandon both Burgos and Madrid, the united French forces were to drive him into Portugal.‡

The march of Soult's sick convoys to Valencia, and other difficulties, retarded the movement, and the King became uneasy for his supplies; because the people of La Mancha, still remembering Montbrun's devastations, were again flying with their beasts and grain, and from frequent repetition were become exceedingly expert in evading the researches of the foragers. Such however is the great advantage of discipline and order, that while La Mancha was thus desolate from fear, confidence and tranquillity reigned in Valencia. Joseph marched on the 18th upon Cuença, where he found Drouet with a division of Soult's infantry and some cavalry. He then proceeded by Tarancon, the only artillery road on that side leading to the Tagus, while Soult moved by San Clemente

* Imperial Muster rolls, MS.

† Joseph's Correspondence, MS.

‡ Official Papers, French Bureau de la Guerre, MS.

upon Ocaña and Aranjuez. Hill immediately sent that notice to Wellington which caused the retreat from Burgos, and concentrated his own forces on the Tagus; his right was at Toledo, his left at Fuente Dueñas; and there were Spanish and Portuguese troops in the valley of the Tagus as far as Talavera. The Tagus was however fordable from its junction with the Jarama near Aranjuez upwards; and this line could not easily be supported, as the troops would have been too distant from the point of action if the French operated against Toledo. Hill therefore drew his left behind the Tajuna, which is a branch of the Jarama running nearly parallel to the Tagus; his right occupied strong ground from Añover to Toledo, he destroyed the bridges at Aranjuez, and securing that below the confluence of the Jarama and Henares, called the Puente Larga, threw one of boats over the former river a little above Bayona. The light division and Elio's troops, on the extreme left, then marched upon Arganda, Skerrett's brigade arrived from Cadiz, and including the Spanish regulars, forty thousand men were in line, while a multitude of partidas hovered about. The lateral communications were easy, the scouts, passing over the bridge of Toledo, covered all the country beyond the Tagus, and the bridges at each end of the line furnished means to sally upon the flanks of a force attacking the front: it required several marches to force the right, and on the left the Jarama with its marshy banks and many confluent offered positions for interposing between the enemy and Madrid.

Drouet passed the Tagus the 29th at the abandoned fords of Fuente Dueñas and Villa Maurique; the King went with his guards to Zarza de la Cruz; and Soult, whose divisions were coming fast up to Ocaña, restored the bridge of Aranjuez, and passed with his advanced guard. On the 30th he attacked Cole at the Puente Larga; the mines failed, and the French attempted to carry the bridge with the bayonet, but were vigorously repulsed by the forty-seventh under Skerrett; after a heavy cannonade and a sharp musketry which cost the allies sixty men, the attempt was relinquished. Had the Puente Larga been forced, the fourth division which was at Añover would have been cut off from Madrid; but the weather being thick and rainy, Soult could not discover what supporting force was on the high land of Valdemoro behind the bridge, and was afraid to push forward too fast.* Discontented with this caution Joseph designed to operate by Toledo, but during the night the Puente Larga was abandoned, and Soult, still in doubt of Hill's real object, advised Joseph to unite the army of the centre at Arganda and Chinchon, throwing bridges for re-

* Soult's Correspondence with the King, MS.

treachery at Villa Maurique and Fuente Dueñas as a precaution in case a battle should take place. Hill's movement was however a decided retreat, which would have commenced twenty-four hours sooner but for the failure of the mines and the combat at the Puente Larga, for the order to retreat had reached him when Soult first appeared on the Tagus; and the affair was so sudden, that the light division, which had just come from Alcala to Arganda to close the left, was compelled to return again without halting in the night, a march of forty miles.

Hill had a discretionary power to retire by the valley of the Tagus or the Guadarama; a position in the former taken on the flank of the enemy would have prevented the King from passing the Guadarama, and at the same time have covered Lisbon; a retreat by the Guadarama exposed Lisbon; but thinking the valley of the Tagus in that advanced season would not support the French army, and knowing Wellington to be pressed by superior forces, he chose the Guadarama. Wherefore, burning his pontoons and causing La China and the stores remaining there to be blown up in the night of the 30th, he retreated by different roads, and united his army the 31st near Majadahonda. This movement uncovered the magazines, so negligently left along the line of communication to Badajos; the enemy could have sent men to seize them; nor were the removal and destruction of the stores in Madrid effected without disorders of a singular nature. The municipality demanded all the provision remaining there, as if for the enemy, and when refused excited a mob to attack the magazines; firing even took place, and the fourth division was called in to restore order. Some wheat being finally given to the poorest of the people, Madrid was abandoned, and it was affecting to see the earnest and true friendship of the population. Men, women, and children, crowding around the troops, bewailed their departure, and moving with them in one vast mass for more than two miles left their houses empty when the French cavalry scouts were at the gates on the other side. This emotion was distinct from political feeling, because there was a very strong French party in Madrid, and among the causes of wailing, the return of the plundering and cruel partidas unchecked by the presence of the British was very loudly proclaimed. The Madrileños have been stigmatized as a savage and faithless people: the British army found them patient, gentle, generous and loyal. Nor is this fact to be disputed because of the riot which occurred in the destruction of the magazines; for the provisions had been obtained by requisition from the country around Madrid, under an agreement with the Spanish government to pay at the end of the war; and it was natural for the people, excited

as they were by the authorities, to endeavor to get their own flour back rather than have it destroyed when they were starving.

With the Anglo-Portuguese troops marched Penne Villemur, Morillo and Carlos d'España; and it was Wellington's wish that Elio, Bassecour and Villa Campa should throw themselves into the valley of the Tagus, cross the bridge of Arzobispo, and join Ballesteros' army under Virues. A great body of men, including the Portuguese regiments left by Hill in Estremadura, would thus have been placed on the flank of any French army marching upon Lisbon; and if the enemy neglected this line the Spaniards could operate against Madrid or against Suchet at pleasure. Elio however, being cut off from Hill by the French advance, remained at the bridge of Añion near Sacedon, and was there joined by Villa Campa and the Empecinado. Soult meanwhile brought up his army as quickly as possible to Valdemoro, and his information as to Hill's real force was becoming more distinct; but there was also a rumor that Wellington was close at hand with three British divisions, and the French Marshal's movements were consequently cautious, lest he should find himself suddenly engaged in battle before his whole force was collected; for his rear was still at Ocaña, and the army of the centre had not yet passed the Tajuna. This disposition of his troops was probably intentional to prevent the King from fighting; for Soult did not think this a fitting time to fight a battle unless upon great advantage. In the disjointed state of their affairs a defeat would have been more injurious to the French than a victory would have been beneficial; the former would have lost Spain, the latter would not have gained Portugal.

On the 1st of November, the bulk of the army being assembled at Getafé, Soult sent scouting parties in all directions to feel for the allies and to ascertain the direction of their march; the next day the army of the centre joined him not far from Madrid, but Hill was then in full retreat for the Guadarama, covered by a powerful rear-guard under Cole. Soult pursued on the 3d, and the King entering Madrid placed a garrison in the Retiro for the protection of his court and of the Spanish families attached to his cause; hitherto moving in one great convoy they had impeded all the movements of the army of the centre, but being now disposed of, Joseph rejoined Soult at the Guadarama with his guards, which always moved as a separate body. He had left Palombini beyond the Tagus near Tarancon to scour the roads on the side of Cuenca, but some dragoons sent towards Huerta were surprised by the partidas and lost forty men, whereupon Palombini rejoined the army.

Hill was moving upon Arevalo, when fresh orders founded on new combinations changed the direction of his march. Souham

had repaired the bridge of Toro the 4th, several days sooner than was expected, and thus Wellington, while watching to join Hill on the Adaja, was again baffled; that movement could not then be made lest Souham should from Toro and Tordesillas follow the rear. Nor, if Hill came up, could Souham be attacked for want of means to pass the Duero, and Soult would then reach the Tormes. In fine, the allies' central position being no longer available, General Hill was ordered to gain Alba de Tormes at once by the way of Fontiveros, and on the 6th Wellington also fell back to San Christoval in front of Salamanca.

Joseph, thinking to prevent the junction of the allies, had gained Arevalo by the Segovia road the 5th, Souham's scouts were met with at Medina del Campo the 8th, and for the first time since he had quitted Valencia the King obtained news of the army of Portugal. One hundred thousand combatants, twelve thousand being cavalry with a hundred and thirty pieces of artillery, were thus assembled on those plains over which, three months before, Marmont had marched with so much confidence to his own destruction. Soult, then expelled from Andalusia by Marmont's defeat, was now, after having made half the circuit of the Peninsula, come to drive into Portugal that very army whose victory had driven him from the south; and, as Wellington had foreseen and foretold, the recovery of Andalusia, politically important and useful as it was, proved injurious to himself; it had concentrated a mighty power to escape from which both skill and fortune were necessary; and the Spanish armies, let loose by this union of all the French troops, kept aloof, or coming to aid were found a burthen.

On the 7th Hill passed the Tormes at Alba and mined the bridge, the light division and Long's cavalry remaining on the right bank during the night. Wellington held San Christoval, and the King, even at this late period, was doubtful if Ballesteros' troops had or had not joined the allied army at Avila.* Wellington also was uncertain of the King's numbers, but designed to maintain the Tormes permanently and give his troops repose. He had retreated two hundred miles, and Hill had retired the same distance besides his march from Estremadura. Skerrett had come from Cadiz, and all required rest, for the soldiers, especially those who besieged Burgos, had been in the field with scarcely an interval of repose since January; the infantry were barefooted, their equipments spoiled, the cavalry weak, the horses out of condition, the discipline of all failing. The excesses committed on the Burgos line have been shown, and during the first day's march from the Tagus, five hundred of the rear-guard under Cole, chiefly of one

* Joseph's Correspondence, MS.

regiment, finding the inhabitants had fled according to custom, whichever side was approaching, broke open the houses, plundered and got drunk; a multitude were left in the cellars of Valdemoro, and two hundred and fifty fell into the hands of the enemy. The rest of the retreat being unmolested was made with more regularity, but the excesses still committed furnished glaring evidence that the moral conduct of a general cannot be fairly judged by following in the wake of a retreating army. There was no want of provisions, no hardships to exasperate the men, and yet the author of this history counted on the first day's march from Madrid seventeen bodies of murdered peasants; by whom killed, or for what, whether by English or Germans, by Spaniards or Portuguese, in dispute, in robbery or in wanton villany, was unknown; but their bodies were in the ditches, and a shallow observer might thence have drawn foul and false conclusions against the English General and nation.

Another notable thing was the discontent of the veteran troops with the staff officers. The assembling of the sick men at the place and time prescribed to form the convoys was punctually attended to by the regimental officers,—not so by the others, nor by the commissaries who had charge to provide the means of transport,—hence delay and great suffering to the sick, and the wearing out of healthy men's strength by waiting with their knapsacks on for the negligent. When the light division was left on the right bank of the Tormes to cover the passage at Alba, a prudent order that all baggage or other impediments should pass rapidly over the narrow bridge at that place without halting on the enemy's side, was, by those charged with the execution, so rigorously interpreted as to deprive the troops of their ration bullocks and flour mules at the very moment of distribution; and the tired soldiers, thus absurdly denied food, had the further mortification to see a string of commissariat carts deliberately passing their post many hours afterwards. All regimental officers know that discontent thus created is most hurtful to discipline, and it is in these particulars the value of a good and experienced staff is found.

Wellington's position extended from Christoval to Aldea Lengua on the right bank of the Tormes, and on the left of that river to the bridge of Alba, where the castle which was on the right bank was garrisoned by Howard's brigade of the second division. Hamilton's Portuguese were on the left bank as a reserve for Howard; the remainder of the second division watched the fords of Huerta and Enciña, and behind them the third and fourth divisions occupied the heights of Calvariza de Ariba. The light division and the Spanish infantry entered Salamanca, the cavalry were disposed beyond the Tormes, covering all the front. The heights of Chris-

toval were strong and compact, the position of the Arapiles on the other side of the Tormes glorious as well as strong ; and the bridge of Salamanca and the fords furnished the power of concentrating on either side of that river by a shorter line than the enemy could move upon.

However, while desirous to fight, the English General looked also to retreat ; he sending his sick to the rear, brought up small magazines from Rodrigo to intermediate points, caused the surplus ammunition at Salamanca to be destroyed by small explosions, and delivered large stores of clothing, arms, and equipments to the Spaniards, who were thus completely furnished ; but in an hour after they were selling their accoutrement under his own windows ! Salamanca presented indeed an extraordinary scene, and the Spaniards, civil and military, evinced hatred of the British. Daily did they attempt or perpetrate murder, and one act of peculiar atrocity merits notice. A horse led by an English soldier being frightened backed against a Spanish officer commanding at a gate ; he caused the soldier to be dragged into his guard-house, and there bayoneted him in cold blood ; and no redress could be had for this or other crimes, save by counter-violence, which was not long withheld. A Spanish officer while wantonly stabbing at a rifleman was shot dead by the latter ; and a British volunteer slew a Spanish officer at the head of his own regiment in a sword-fight, the troops of both nations looking on.

The civil authorities, not less savage, were more insolent than the military, treating every English person with an intolerable arrogance. Even the Prince of Orange was like to have lost his life ; for upon remonstrating about quarters with the sitting junta, they ordered one of their guards to kill him ; and he would have been killed had not Lieutenant Steele of the forty-third, a bold athletic person, felled the man before he could stab ; yet both the Prince and his defender were forced to fly from the soldier's comrades. The exasperation caused by these things was leading to serious mischief when the enemy's movements gave another direction to the soldiers' passions.

On the 9th Long's cavalry had been driven in upon Alba, and next day Soult sent some skirmishers forward and opened eighteen guns against that place. The castle, crowning a bare rocky knoll hastily intrenched, scarcely gave shelter from this tempest, and for two hours the garrison could only reply with musketry ; but finally it was aided by four pieces from the left bank of the river, and the post was defended with such vigor the enemy dared not assault. During the night Hamilton reinforced the garrison, repaired the damaged walls and formed barricades, and in the morning after a

short cannonade the enemy withdrew. This combat cost the allies a hundred men.

On the 11th the King re-organized the army, giving Soult command of the whole, and removing Souham to make way for Drouet. Caffarelli then returned to Burgos with his divisions and guns, and as Souham had left garrisons in Toro, Tordesillas, Zamora, and Valladolid, and the King one in the Retiro, only ninety thousand combatants remained on the Tormes; but twelve thousand were cavalry, nearly all were veteran troops, and they had one hundred and twenty pieces of artillery. Such a mighty power could not remain idling. The country was exhausted, the soldiers wanted bread, and Joseph, eager to fight, for he was of a brave spirit and had something of his brother's greatness of soul, sought counsel how to deliver battle with most advantage. Jourdan, with a martial fire unquenched by age, was for bringing affairs to a crisis by the boldest and shortest mode. He observed that Wellington's position was composed of three parts, the right at Alba, the centre at Calvariza de Ariba, the left separated by the Tormes from the centre at San Christoval. The whole distance was about fifteen miles, and the Tormes was fordable in many places above Salamanca; wherefore he proposed to assemble the French army in the night, pass the river at daybreak, by the fords between Villa Gonzalo and Huerta, and make a concentrated attack upon Calvariza de Ariba, which would force on a decisive battle.*

Soult objected to attack Wellington in a position he was so well acquainted with, which he might have fortified, and where the army must fight its way even from the fords to gain room for an order of battle.† He proposed, instead, to move by the left to certain fords, three in number, between Exème and Galisancho, some seven or eight miles above Alba de Tormes; easy in themselves, they were suited from the conformation of the banks for forcing a passage if it should be disputed, and by a slight circuit the troops in march could not be seen by the enemy. Passing there, the French army would gain two marches upon the allies, be placed on their flank and rear, and could fight on ground chosen by its own generals instead of delivering battle on ground chosen by the enemy; or it could force on an action in a new position whence the allies could with difficulty retire in the event of disaster. Wellington must then fight to disadvantage, or retire hastily, sacrificing part of his army to save the rest; and the effect, military and political, would be the same as if he was beaten by a front attack. Jourdan replied, that this was prudent and might be successful if Wellington ac-

* Appendix 9.

† French official Correspondence, MS.

cepted battle, but he could not thereby be forced to fight, which was the great object; he would have time to retreat before the French could reach the line of his communications with Ciudad Rodrigo; and it was supposed by some of the generals he would retreat to Almeida at once by San Felices and Barba de Puerco.

Neither Soult nor Jourdan knew the position of the Arapiles in detail, and the former, though he urged his own plan, offered to yield if the King was so inclined.* Jourdan's proposition was supported by all the generals of the army of Portugal except Clausel, who leaned to Soult's opinion; but as that Marshal commanded two-thirds of the army while Jourdan had no ostensible command, the question was finally decided agreeably to his counsel. Nor is it easy to determine which was right, for though Jourdan's reasons were strong and the result was conformable to his views and contradictory of Soult's, the failure was in the execution. Nevertheless it would seem that so great an army and so confident, for the French soldiers eagerly demanded battle, should have grappled in the shortest way. A rapid development of Jourdan's plan would probably have cut off Hamilton's Portuguese and the brigade in the castle of Alba from Calvariza Ariba. On the other hand, Wellington desired a battle on either side of the Tormes. His hope was indeed to prevent the passage of that river until the rains rendered it unfordable, and thus force the French to retire from want of provisions, or to engage him on the position of Christoval; yet he also courted a fight on the Arapiles, those rocky monuments of his former victory. He had sixty-eight thousand combatants, fifty-two thousand of which, including four thousand British cavalry, were Anglo-Portuguese, and he had nearly seventy guns.† This force was so disposed, that besides Hamilton's Portuguese, three divisions guarded the fords, which were also defended by intrenchments, and the whole army might have been united in good time upon the ridges of Calvariza Ariba and the two Arapiles, where the superiority of fifteen thousand men would not have availed the French much. A defeat would only have sent the British to Portugal, a victory would have taken them once more to Madrid. To draw in Hamilton's Portuguese and the troops from the Alba in time would have been the vital point; but as the French, if they did not surprise the allies, must have fought up from the river, this danger might have proved less than it seemed. In fine the general was Wellington, and he knew his ground.

* Letter to the King, MS.

† Letter to Lord Liverpool, MS.

FRENCH PASSAGE OF THE TORMES.—RETREAT TO CIUDAD RODRIGO.

Soult's plan being adopted, the army of Portugal was directed to make frequent demonstrations against Christoval, Aldea Lengua, and the fords between Huerta and Alba; the road over the hills to the Galisancho fords was repaired, and two trestle-bridges were constructed for the passage of the artillery. The united armies of the south and centre were to pass at Galisancho, and if the allies withdrew from Alba de Tormes, Drouet was to pass there by the bridge and by the fords, and assail their rear; but if they maintained Alba he was to follow Soult's movement.

At daybreak on the 14th the bridges were thrown, the cavalry and infantry passed by the fords, the allies' outposts were driven back, and Soult took a position at Mozarbes, having the road from Alba to Tamames under his left flank. Wellington remained too confidently in Salamanca, and when the first report said the enemy were over the Tormes, made the caustic observation that he would not recommend it to some of them. Soon however other reports convinced him of his mistake. He galloped to the Arapiles, and having ascertained the direction of Soult's march, drew off the second division, the cavalry, and some guns to attack the head of the French column. The fourth division and Hamilton's Portuguese remained at Alba to protect this movement; the third division secured the Arapiles rocks until the troops from San Christoval should arrive; and he was still so confident of driving the French back over the Tormes, that the bulk of the troops did not quit San Christoval that day. But when he reached Mozarbes, the French were already too strong to be seriously meddled with; and when under cover of a cannonade he examined their position, extending from Mozarbes to the heights of Nuestra Señora de Utiero, he found it so good there was no remedy; wherefore, drawing off the troops from Alba and destroying the bridge, he left three hundred Spaniards in the castle, with orders if the army retired the next day, to abandon the place and save themselves as they best could.

During the night and following morning the allied army was united in the position of the Arapiles, and it was still hoped the French would give battle there; but the first division was placed at Aldea Tejada, on the Junguen stream, to secure that passage in case of retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo. Drouet, finding the bridge of Alba broken and the castle occupied, had meantime crossed at Galisancho and taken post on the ridge of Señora de Utiero; and Soult, who had commenced fortifying Mozarbes, extended his left

at the same time to the height of Señora de la Buena near the Rodrigo road; yet slowly, for the ground was heavy, and the many sources of the Junguen and Valmusa being filled by rain impeded his march. This evolution was nearly the same as that practised by Marmont, but it was on a wider circle, by a second range of heights inclosing as it were those by which the Duke of Ragusa moved, and beyond the reach of such a sudden attack and catastrophe. The result in each case was remarkable. Marmont, closing with a short quick turn, a falcon striking at an eagle, received a buffet that broke his pinions and spoiled his flight. Soult, a wary kite, sailing slowly and with a wide wheel to seize a helpless prey, lost it altogether.

About two o'clock, Wellington, too weak to attack, and seeing the French cavalry pointing to the Ciudad Rodrigo road, thought the King wished to establish a fortified head of cantonments at Mozarbes, and then operate against the allies' communication with Rodrigo; wherefore, suddenly casting his army into three columns, he crossed the Junguen, and then covering his left flank with his cavalry and guns, defiled in order of battle before the enemy at little more than cannon-shot. With a wonderful boldness and facility, and good fortune also, for there was a thick fog and a heavy rain which rendered the by-ways and fields by which the enemy moved nearly impassable, while the allies had the use of the high-roads, he carried his whole army in one mass quite round the French left: thus he gained the Valmusa river, and halted at night in rear of those who had been threatening him in front a few hours before. This exploit, foretold by Jourdan, was certainly surprising, but it was not creditable to the generalship on either side; for first it may be asked why the English commander, having somewhat carelessly suffered Soult to pass the Tormes and turn his position, waited so long on the Arapiles as to render this dangerous movement necessary,—a movement which bad roads, bad weather, and want of vigor on the other side, rendered possible, and no more.

It has been said the drawback to Soult's genius is want of promptness in seizing the decisive moment. It is a great thing to fight a great battle, and against such a general as Wellington, and such troops as the British, a man may well be excused if he thinks twice ere he puts his life and fame, and the lives and fame of thousands of his countrymen, the weal or woe of nations, upon the hazard of an event which may be decided by the existence of a ditch five feet wide, or the single blunder of a single fool, or the confusion of a coward, or by any other circumstance, however trivial. It is no mean consideration, that the praise or the hatred of nations,

universal glory, or universal, perhaps eternal contempt, waits on an action, the object of which may be more safely gained by other means, for in war there is infinite variety. And here Soult certainly vacillated after passing the Tormes, purposely perhaps, to avoid an action; holding it unwise, in the disjointed state of French affairs, and when without any fixed base or reserves in case of defeat, to fight a decisive battle. Nor is this prudence blamable, for though he who would be great in war must be daring, to set all upon one throw belongs only to an irresponsible chief, not to a lieutenant whose task is but a portion of the general plan; neither is it wise in monarch or general to fight when all may be lost by defeat, unless all may be won by victory. The King, more unfettered than Soult, desired a battle, and with an army so good and numerous, the latter's prudence seems misplaced; he should have grappled with his enemy, for once engaged at any point the allies could not have retreated, and there were ninety thousand men to fight less than seventy thousand.

On the 16th the allies retired by the three roads which lead across the Matilla stream through Tamames, San Munos, and Martin del Rio; the light division and the cavalry closed the rear, and the country was a forest penetrable in all directions. The troops bivouacked in the evening behind the Matilla stream, and the march was only twelve miles, yet the stragglers were numerous; for the soldiers, meeting with vast herds of swine, quitted their colors by hundreds to shoot them, and such a rolling musketry echoed through the forest it was thought the French were attacking. It was in vain the staff officers endeavored to stop this disgraceful practice, which had indeed commenced the evening before; in vain that two offenders were hanged; the hungry soldiers still broke from the columns, the property of whole districts was swept away in a few hours, and the army was in some degree placed at the mercy of the enemy. The latter, however, were contented to glean the stragglers, of whom they captured two thousand; they did not press the rear until near Matilla, where their lancers fell on, but were checked by the light companies of the twenty-eighth, and afterwards charged by the fourteenth dragoons.

On the 17th a different yet a not less curious scene occurred. During the night the cavalry in front of the light division had, for some unknown reason, filed off by the flanks to the rear without giving any information to the infantry, who, trusting to the horsemen, had thrown out their piquets at a very short distance in front.

At daybreak the soldiers were putting on their accoutrements, when some strange horsemen being seen in the rear of the bivouac, were mistaken for Spaniards; but very soon their cautious move-

ments and vivacity of gestures showed them to be French; the troops then ran to arms, and in good time, for five hundred yards in front the wood opened on to a large plain where, in place of the British cavalry, eight thousand French horsemen were discovered advancing in one solid mass, yet carelessly and without suspecting the vicinity of the allies. The division was immediately formed in columns, a squadron of the fourteenth dragoons and one of the German hussars came hastily up from the rear, Julian Sanchez' cavalry appeared in small parties on the right flank, and every precaution was taken to secure the retreat. This checked the enemy, but as the infantry fell back, the French, though fearing to approach them in the wood, sent squadrons to the right and left, some of which rode on the flanks near enough to bandy wit in the Spanish tongue with the English soldiers, who marched without firing. Very soon, however, the signs of mischief appeared, the road was strewn with baggage, the bat-men came running in for protection, some wounded, some without arms, and all breathless, as just escaped from a surprise. The thickness of the forest had enabled the French to pass along unperceived on the flanks of the line of march; and, as opportunity offered, they galloped from side to side, sweeping away the baggage and sabring the conductors and guards; they even menaced one of the columns, but were checked by the fire of the artillery. In one of these charges General Paget was carried off from the midst of his own men, and it might have been Wellington's fortune, for he also was continually riding between the columns and without an escort.

Soon, however, the main body passed the Huebra and took position, the right at Tamames, the left near Boadilla, the centre at San Munos, Buena Barba, and Gallego de Huebra. But when the light division arrived at the edge of the table-land which overhangs the fords at the last named place, the French cavalry suddenly thickened, and the sharp whistle of musket-bullets, with the splintering of branches on the left, showed that their infantry was also up. Soult, in the hope of forestalling the allies at Tamames, had pushed his columns towards that place by a road leading from Salamanca through Vecinos; but finding Hill's troops in his front, he turned short to his right in hopes to cut off Wellington's rear-guard, which led to the

COMBAT OF THE HUEBRA.

Warned by the musketry, the cavalry crossed the fords in time, and the light division should have followed without delay, because the forest ended on the edge of the table-land, and the descent from thence to the river, eight hundred yards, was open, and the fords

of the Huebra deep. Instead of this an order was given to form squares, and the officers looked at each other in amazement; but at that moment Wellington fortunately appeared, and under his directions the battalions instantly glided off to the fords, leaving four companies of the forty-third, and one of the riflemen, to cover the passage. These companies, spreading as skirmishers, were assailed in front and both flanks with a fire showing that a large force was before them; moreover, a driving rain and mist prevented them from seeing their adversaries, and being pressed closer each moment, they gathered by degrees at the edge of the wood, where they maintained their ground for a quarter of an hour; then seeing the division was beyond the river, they swiftly cleared the open slope of the hill and passed the fords under a sharp musketry. Only twenty-seven soldiers fell, for the tempest beating in the Frenchmen's faces baffled their aim, and Ross's guns playing from the low ground with grape checked the pursuit; but the deep bellowing of thirty pieces of heavy French artillery showed how critically timed was the passage.

Steep and broken were the banks of the Huebra, and the enemy spread his infantry to the right and left along the edge of the forest, making demonstrations on every side, and there were several fords to be guarded; the fifty-second and the Portuguese defended those below, Ross's guns, supported by the riflemen and forty-third, defended those above, and behind the right, on higher ground, was the seventh division. The second division, Hamilton's Portuguese, and a brigade of cavalry, were in front of Tamames, and thus the bulk of the army was massed on the right, hugging the Pena de Francia, and covering the roads leading to Ciudad, as well as those leading to the passes of the Gata hills. In this situation an attempt to force the fords guarded by the fifty-second was vigorously repulsed, yet the skirmishing and cannonade continued until dark, and heavily the French guns played upon the light and seventh divisions. The former, forced to keep near the fords in column, lest a sudden rush of cavalry should take the guns on the flat ground, were plunged into at every round, yet suffered little loss, because the saturated clayey soil swallowed the shot and smothered the shells; but it was a matter of astonishment to see the seventh division kept in one huge mass by Lord Dalhousie on open and hard ground, thus tempting havoc for several hours, when, only a hundred yards in its rear, the rise of the hill and the thick forest would have sheltered it without at all weakening the position.

On the 18th the army was to have drawn off before daylight, and the English General was disquieted, because the position,

though good for defence, was difficult to remove from at that season. The roads, hollow and narrow, led up a steep bank to a table-land which was open, flat, marshy, and scored with water-gullies; and from the overflowing of one of the streams the principal road was impassable a mile in rear of the position; hence to bring the columns off in time without jostling, and without being attacked, required nice management. All the baggage and stores had marched in the night, with orders not to halt until they reached the high lands near Ciudad Rodrigo; but if the preceding days had produced some strange occurrences, the 18th was not less fertile in them.

In a former part of this work it has been stated that even the successes and long confirmed reputation of Wellington could not protect him from the vanity and presumption of subordinate officers. The allusion fixes here. Knowing the direct road was impassable, he ordered the movement by another road longer and apparently more difficult; this seemed so extraordinary to some general officers, that, after consulting together, they deemed their commander unfit to conduct the army, and led their troops by what appeared to them the fittest line of retreat! He had before daylight placed himself at an important point on his own road, and waited impatiently for the arrival of the leading division until dawn; then suspecting what had happened, he galloped to the other road and found the would-be commanders stopped by water. The insubordination and the danger to the army were alike glaring, yet the practical rebuke was so severe and well-timed, the humiliation so complete and so deeply felt, that with one proud sarcastic observation, indicating contempt more than anger, he led back the troops and drew off all his forces safely. Some confusion and great danger still attended the operation, for even on his road one water gully was so deep that the light division, bringing up the rear, could only pass it man by man over a felled tree, and it was fortunate that Soult, unable to feed his troops, stopped on the Huebra and only sent some cavalry to Tamames. The retreat was unmolested, but whether from necessity or negligence in the subordinates many wounded men, most of them hurt by cannon-shot, were left behind, the enemy never passed the Huebra, and the miserable creatures perished by a horrible and lingering death.

The marshy plains now to be passed exhausted the strength of the tired soldiers, thousands straggled, the depredations on the herds of swine were repeated, and the temper of the army generally prognosticated the greatest misfortunes if the retreat should be continued. This was however the last day of trial; the weather cleared up, some hills afforded dry bivouacs and fuel, the distribu-

tion of good rations restored the strength and spirits of the men, and the next day Rodrigo and the neighboring villages were occupied in tranquillity. The cavalry was then sent out to the forest, and being aided by Julian Sanchez' partidas, brought in from a thousand to fifteen hundred stragglers who must otherwise have perished. During these events Joseph occupied Salamanca, but Colonel Miranda, the Spanish officer left at Alba de Tormes, held that place until the 27th, and then carried off his garrison in the night.

Thus ended the retreat from Burgos. The French gathered a good spoil of baggage, but the loss of the allies in men cannot be exactly determined, because no Spanish returns were ever seen. An approximation may however be easily made. According to the muster-rolls, about a thousand Anglo-Portuguese were killed, wounded and missing between the 21st and 29th of October, the period of their crossing the Duero, but this only refers to loss in action; Hill's loss between the Tagus and the Tormes was, including stragglers, four hundred, and the defence of Alba de Tormes cost one hundred. If the Spanish regulars and partidas marching with the two armies be reckoned to have lost a thousand, which considering their want of discipline is not exaggerated, the whole loss previous to the French passage of the Tormes will amount perhaps to three thousand men. But the loss between the Tormes and the Agueda was certainly greater, for nearly three hundred were killed and wounded at the Huebra; many stragglers died in the woods, and Jourdan said the prisoners, Spanish, Portuguese and English, brought into Salamanca up to the 20th November, were three thousand five hundred and twenty.* The whole loss of the double retreat cannot therefore be set down at less than nine thousand, including the loss in the siege.

Some French writers have spoken of ten thousand being taken between the Tormes and the Agueda, and Souham estimated the previous loss, including the siege of Burgos, at seven thousand. But the King in his despatches called the whole loss twelve thousand, including therein the garrison of Chinchilla; and he observed that if the cavalry generals, Soult and Tilley, had followed the allies vigorously from Salamanca the loss would have been much greater. Certainly the army was so little pressed that none would have supposed the French horsemen were numerous. On the other hand English authors have most unaccountably reduced the British loss to as many hundreds.

Although the French halted on the Huebra, the English troops were kept together behind the Agueda, because Soult retired with

* Appendix 9.

the troops under his immediate command to Los Santos on the upper Tormes, thus pointing towards the pass of Baños; and it was rumored he designed to march that way with a view to invade Portugal by the valley of the Tagus. Wellington disbelieved this rumor, but could not disregard it, because nearly all his channels of intelligence had been suddenly dried up by a tyrannical and foolish decree of the Cortes, which compelled every man to justify himself for having remained in a district occupied by the enemy; hence to avoid persecution those who used to transmit information had fled from their homes. Hill's division was therefore moved to the right as far as Robledo to cover the pass of Perales, the rest of the troops were ready to follow, and the fifth Spanish army occupied Coria.

Joseph, after hesitating whether he should leave the army of the south or the army of Portugal in Castile, finally ordered the headquarters of the latter to be fixed at Valladolid and the former at Toledo; the one to maintain the country between the Tormes and the Escla; the other to occupy La Mancha with its left, the valley of the Tagus as far as the Tietar with its centre, Avila with its right. The army of the centre went to Segovia, where the King joined it with his guards, and when these movements were known the allies took the following winter quarters. The fifth Spanish army, crossing the Tagus at Alcantara, entered Estremadura. Hill occupied Coria and Placentia, holding the town of Bejar by a detachment. Two divisions were quartered behind Hill about Castello Branco and in the upper Beira. The light division remained on the Agueda, the rest of the infantry was distributed along the Douro from Lamego downwards. The Portuguese cavalry quartered in Moncorvo, and the British cavalry, with the exception of Victor Alten's brigade which was attached to the light division, occupied the valley of the Mondego. Carlos d'España's troops garrisoned Ciudad Rodrigo. The Gallicians marched through the Tras os Montes to their own country.

In these quarters the Anglo-Portuguese were easily fed, because the improved navigation of the Tagus, the Douro, and the Mondego, furnished water-carriage close to all their cantonments; moreover, the army could be quickly collected on either frontier, for the front line of communication from Estremadura passed by the bridge of Alcantara to Coria, and from thence through the pass of Perales to the Agueda; the second line ran by Penamacor and Guinaldo, and both were direct; but the post of Bejar, although necessary to secure Hill's quarters from a surprise, was itself exposed. A double and direct communication across the Gredos mountain was also made by the French. On their first line they had now com-

pletely restored the Roman road, leading from Horcajada on the upper Tormes by the Puerto de Pico to Monbeltran and Talavera. To ease their second line, they finished a road begun the year before by Marmont, leading from Avila by the convent of Guisando and Escalona to Toledo. But these communications were in winter so difficult, that Laval, in crossing the mountains from Avila, was forced to harness forty horses to a carriage; moreover, the allies, having the interior and shorter lines, had a more menacing position, and a more easy one for defence. Wellington had ordered all boats to be destroyed at Almaraz, Arzobispo, and other points where the great roads came down to the Tagus, and the French, as anxious to prevent him from passing that river as he was to prevent them, sent parties to destroy what had been overlooked. Each feared the other would move, yet there was no desire to continue the campaign; the allies wanted rest, and more than one-third were in the hospitals! the French could not feed, and had to refix their general base of operations, which had been broken up by the guerillas.

Wellington was, however, most at ease. He knew the best French officers thought it useless to continue the contest in Spain, unless the British army was first mastered; Soult's intercepted letters showed indeed how that Marshal desired to fix the war in Portugal, and there was now a most powerful force on the frontier; but Badajos, Rodrigo, and Almeida blocked the principal entrances; and though the two former were ill-provided, they were in little danger, because the last campaign had deprived the French of all their ordnance, arsenals, and magazines in Andalusia, Almaraz, Madrid, Salamanca, and Valladolid, and it was nearly impossible for them to make any impression upon Portugal until new establishments were formed. The Anglo-Portuguese could, therefore, take tranquil quarters to receive reinforcements, restore their equipments, and recover strength. It was not so with the French. Their secondary warfare, now to be again noticed, would have made the military reputation of any nation before Napoleon had enlarged the measure of glory; for when quit of their most formidable enemy, they had to chase the partidas, to form sieges, recover posts lost by concentration, and to send movable columns by long winter marches over a vast extent, seeking food, fighting for what they got, and living hard, because the magazines were reserved for operations against the Anglo-Portuguese. Certainly it was a great and terrible war for them, and formidable soldiers they were, to sustain it so manfully amidst the many errors of their generals.

CHAPTER VI.

Continuation of the partisan warfare—General Lameth made governor of Santona—Reille takes the command of the army of Portugal—Drouet, Count d'Erlon, commands that of the centre—Works of Astorga destroyed by the Spaniards—Mina's operations in Aragon—Villa Campa's operations—Empeinado and others enter Madrid—The Duke del Parque enters La Mancha—Elio and Bassecour march to Albacete and communicate with the Anglo-Sicilian army—The King enters Madrid—Soult's cavalry scour La Mancha—Suchet's operations—General Donkin menaces Denia—General W. Clinton takes the command of the Anglo-Sicilian army—Suchet intrenches a camp at Xativa—The Anglo-Sicilian army falls into disrepute—General Campbell takes the command—Inactivity of the army—The Frayle surprises a convoy of French artillery—Operations in Catalonia—Dissensions in that province—Eroles and Codrington menace Tarragona—Eroles surprises a French detachment at Arbeça—Lacy threatens Mattaro and Hostalrich—Returns to Vich—Manso defeats a French detachment near Molino del Rey—Decaen defeats the united Catalonian army and penetrates to Vich—The Spanish divisions separate—Colonel Villanil attempts to surprise San Felipe de Balaguer—Attacks it a second time in concert with Codrington—The place succored by the garrison of Tortosa—Lacy suffers a French convoy to reach Barcelona, is accused of treachery and displaced—The regular warfare in Catalonia ceases—The partisan warfare continues—England the real support of the war.

CONTINUATION OF THE PARTISAN WARFARE.

IN the north, while Souham was gathering in front of Burgos, some of Mendizabel's bands had blockaded Santona by land, and Popham, after his failure at Gueteria, blockaded it by sea. It was not well provisioned, but Napoleon had sent an especial governor, Lameth, and a chosen engineer, D'Abadie, from Paris, to complete the works. By their activity, a hundred and twenty pieces of cannon were soon mounted, and including the crew of a corvette, the garrison was eighteen hundred strong. Lameth had to fight his way into the place in September, but he soon formed an armed flotilla, with which, when the English squadron was driven off the port by gales of wind, he made frequent captures. Meanwhile Mendizabel surprised the garrison of Briviesca, Longa captured a large convoy with its escort, near Burgos, and all the bands increased in numbers and boldness.

When Caffarelli returned from the Duero, Reille took command of the army of Portugal, Drouet assumed that of the army of the centre, and Souham returned to France. Reille then spread his troops over the country, Avila was occupied, Sarrut took possession of Leon, the bands of Marquinez and Salazar were beaten, and Foy, marching to seize Astorga, surprised and captured ninety men, employed to dismantle that fortress; but twenty breaches had been opened, and the place ceased to be of importance.

Caffarelli, troubled by the care of a number of convoys, one of which, under General Frimont, although strongly escorted and having two pieces of cannon, fell into Longa's hands on the 30th of November, was unable to commence active operations until the 29th of December. Then his detachments chased the bands from Bilbao, while he marched himself to succor and provision Santona and Gueteria, and to re-establish his other posts along the coasts; but while near Santona, the Spaniards attacked St. Domingo in Navarre, and invested Logroño. Popham had, however, quitted the Bay of Biscay with his squadron, leaving a few vessels to continue the littoral warfare, which enabled Caffarelli to succor Santona, and important events followed, but the relation must be deferred, as belonging to the transactions of 1813.

Tracing the chain of guerilla operations from Biscay to the other parts, we find Abbé, who commanded in Pampeluna, Severoli, who guarded the right of the Ebro, and Paris, who had returned from Valencia to Zaragoza, continually and at times successfully attacked in the latter end of 1812; for after Chaplangarra's exploit near Jaca, Mina intercepted all communication with France, and on the 22d of November surprised and drove back to Zaragoza with loss a very large convoy. Then he besieged the castle of Huesca, and when a considerable force coming from Zaragoza forced him to desist, he re-appeared at Barbastro. Finally, in a severe action fought on the heights of Señora del Poya, towards the end of December, his troops were dispersed by Colonel Colbert; yet the French lost seventy men, and in a few weeks Mina took the field again with forces more numerous than he had ever before commanded.

About this time Villa Campa, who had intrenched himself near Segorbé to harass Suchet's rear, was driven from thence by Panetier, but being afterwards joined by Gayan, invested the castle of Daroca with three thousand men. Severoli succored the place, but Villa Campa re-assembled near Carineña behind Severoli, who was forced to fight his way back to Zaragoza. The Spaniards re-appeared at Almunia, and on the 22d of December another battle was fought, when Villa Campa, defeated with considerable slaughter, retired to New Castile, and there soon repaired his losses. In the centre of Spain, Elio, Bassecour, and Empecinado, having waited until the great French armies passed in pursuit of Hill, came down upon Madrid. Wellington, when at Salamanca, expected this would draw troops from the Tormes, but the only effect was to cause the garrison left by Joseph to follow the great army, which it rejoined between the Duero and the Tormes, with a great incumbrance of civil servants and families

The *partidas* then entered Madrid, and committed great excesses, treating the people as enemies.

Soult and Joseph had been earnest with Suchet to send a strong division by Cuença as a protection for Madrid, and that Marshal did move in person with a considerable body of troops as far as Requeña on the 28th of November; but being in fear for his line towards Alicant, soon returned to Valencia in a state of indecision, leaving only one brigade at Requeña. He had been reinforced by three thousand fresh men from Catalonia, yet he would not undertake any operation until he knew something of the King's progress, and at Requeña he had gained no intelligence even of the passage of the Tagus. The Spaniards being thus uncontrolled gathered in all directions.

Del Parque advanced with Ballesteros' army to Villa Nueva de los Infantes on the La Mancha side of the Sierra Morena, his cavalry entered the plains, and some new levies from Granada came to Alcaraz on his right. Elio and Bassecour, leaving Madrid to the *partidas*, marched to Albacete without hindrance from Suchet, and re-opened the communication with Alicant; hence, exclusive of the Sicilian army, nearly thirty thousand regular Spanish troops were said to be assembled on the borders of Murcia, and six thousand new levies came to Cordoba as a reserve. However, on the 3d of December Joseph drove the *partidas* from the capital, and re-occupied Guadalaxara and the neighboring posts; Soult then entered Toledo, and his cavalry advanced towards Del Parque, who immediately recrossed the Morena, whereupon the French horsemen swept La Mancha to gather contributions and fill the magazines at Toledo.

By these operations Del Parque, now joined by the Granadan troops from Alcaraz, was separated from Elio; Suchet was thus relieved from a danger which he had dreaded too much, and by his own inaction contributed to increase. It is true he had all the sick men belonging to the King's and to Soult's army on his hands, but he had also many effective men of those armies. The yellow fever had shown itself in some of his hospitals, and he was also uneasy for the security of his base in Aragon, where the *partida* warfare was reviving; yet with fifteen thousand infantry and a fine division of cavalry disposable, he should not have permitted Elio to pass his flank. He was afraid of the Sicilian army, and it had a great influence on all the preceding operations; for it is certain Suchet would otherwise have detached troops to Madrid by the Cuença road, and then Soult would probably have sought a battle between the Tagus and the Guadarama mountains; but this influence arose entirely from the position of

the Alicant army, not from its operations, which were feeble and vacillating.

Maitland had resigned in the beginning of October. His successor, Mackenzie, pushed some troops to the front, and there was a slight descent upon Xabea by the navy; but there was no plan or object, the only signs of vitality being a fruitless demonstration against the castle of Denia, where Donkin disembarked on the 4th of October with a detachment of the eighty-first regiment. The walls had been represented as weak, they were found high and strong, the garrison had been unexpectedly doubled that morning, and in the evening a second reinforcement arrived, whereupon the British re-embarked. The water was however full of pointed rocks, and it was by great exertions Lieutenant Penruddocke of the *Fame* got the boats in, when the soldiers, wading and fighting, got on board with little loss, but in confusion.

Soon after this General William Clinton came from Sicily to take the command, and Wellington, who was then before Burgos, thinking Suchet would weaken his army to help the King, recommended an attempt upon the city of Valencia either by a coast attack or by a land operation, warning Clinton however to avoid an action in a cavalry country. This was not very difficult, because the land was generally rocky and mountainous, but Clinton would not stir without first having possession of the citadel of Alicant, and thus all things fell into disorder and weakness. For the Spanish governor, avowing that he hated the English more than the French, would not suffer them to hold even a gate; and he sent Elio a large convoy of clothing and other stores with an escort of only twenty men, that he might retain two battalions to resist the attempt which he pretended to believe Clinton would make on the citadel. The latter, leaving Whittingham and Roche at Alcoy and Xixona, drew in his other troops from the posts previously occupied in front by Mackenzie; he feared Suchet's cavalry, but the Marshal, estimating the allied armies at more than fifty thousand men, would undertake no serious enterprise while ignorant of the King's progress in the north.* He however diligently strengthened his camp at St. Felipe de Xativa, threw another bridge over the Xucar, intrenched the passes in his front, covered Denia with a detachment, compelled Whittingham to abandon Alcoy, dismantled the extensive walls of Valencia, and fortified a citadel there.

In this state Elio came down to Albacete, and priding himself upon the dexterity with which he had avoided the French armies, proposed to Clinton a combined attack upon Suchet. But he exaggerated his own numbers, and giving out that Del Parque's

* Suchet's Correspondence, MS.

force was under his command, pretended he could bring forty thousand men into the field, four thousand being cavalry. The two Spanish armies united would, however, scarcely have produced twenty thousand effective infantry;* moreover Del Parque, a sickly, unwieldy, incapable person, with mutinous soldiers, had no intention of moving beyond Alcaraz. With such allies it was difficult for the English General to co-operate, yet something might have been effected while Suchet was at Requena before Elio arrived, and more surely after he had reached Albacete. Clinton had twelve thousand men, five thousand being British, there was a fleet to aid, and Elio had ten thousand infantry. Nothing was attempted, and Napoleon assured Suchet, that however difficult his position was from the extent of country, the enemy in his front was not really formidable.† Events justified this observation. The French works were soon completed, and the British army fell into such disrepute, that the Spaniards, with sarcastic malice, affirmed it was to be put under Elio to make it useful.

Roche's and Whittingham's division continued to excite the utmost jealousy in the other Spanish troops, who asked very reasonably, what they did to merit such advantages? England paid and clothed them, the Spaniards were bound to feed them; they did not do so, and Canga Arguelles, the intendant of the province, said he had twice provided magazines for them in Alicant, which were twice plundered by the governor: yet the other Spanish troops were worse off.‡ But on every side intrigues, discontent, vacillation, weakness were visible, and if England was the stay of the Peninsula, Wellington alone supported the war.

On the 22d of November, the obstinacy of the governor being overcome, he gave up the citadel to the British, yet no offensive operations followed, though Suchet, on the 26th, drove Roche's troops out of Alcoy with loss, and defeated the Spanish cavalry at Yecla. On the 2d of December General Campbell came from Sicily with four thousand men, principally British, and assumed the command, making the fourth general-in-chief in the same number of months. His presence, the strong reinforcement he brought, and the intelligence that Lord William was to follow with another reinforcement, again raised the public expectation, and Elio desired the British to occupy the enemy on the lower Xucar while he attacked Requena; but Campbell, after some feeble demonstrations, declared he would await Lord William's arrival. Then Elio, who had hitherto, abstained from disputes with the

* General Donkin, MS.

† Duke of Feltra, MS.

‡ Appendix 17.

British, became discontented and dispersed his army for subsistence, and Campbell complained that he was abandoned.

Suchet, expecting an attack, had withdrawn his outposts to concentrate at Xativa; but when he found Campbell as inactive as his predecessors, and saw the Spanish troops scattered, he surprised one Spanish post at Onteniente, another in Ibi, and re-occupied all his former offensive positions in front of Alicant. Soult's detachments were now also felt in La Mancha, wherefore Elio retired into Murcia, and Del Parque went over the Morena. Thus the storm menacing the French was dissipated, for Campbell, following his instructions, refused rations to Whittingham's corps and desired it to separate for subsistence;* and as the rest of the Spanish troops were actually starving, no danger was to be apprehended from them: Habert even marched up to Alicant, killing and wounding men almost under the walls, and the Anglo-Italian soldiers deserted to him by whole companies when opportunity offered.

Suchet feared nothing in front, but was unquiet for his rear, where, besides the operations of Villa Campa, Gayan, Duran and Mina in Aragon, the Frayle and other partida chiefs continually vexed his communications with Tortosa. Fifty men had been surprised near Segorbe, the 22d of November, by Villa Campa, and Panetier, though he destroyed that chief's intrenched camp, could not hinder him attacking Daroca, as before shown. The Frayle surprised an ordnance convoy, took several guns and four hundred horses, and killed in cold blood, after the action, a hundred artillerymen and officers. A movable column destroyed his dépôts and many of his men, but the Frayle himself escaped, and soon reappeared upon the communications. The loss of this convoy was the first disgrace of the kind which had befallen the army of Aragon, and to use Suchet's expression, a battle would have cost him less.†

Nor were the Spaniards quite inactive in Catalonia, although the departure of Maitland had so dispirited them that the regular warfare was upon the point of ceasing altogether. The army was indeed called twenty thousand, and the tercios of reserve forty-five thousand; yet a column of nine hundred French controlled the sea-line, and cut off all supplies landed for the interior.‡ Lacy being about Vich with seven thousand men, affirmed that he could not feed his army on the coast; Codrington said that nineteen feluccas laden with flour had, in two nights, landed their cargoes between

* Appendixes 17, 18.

† Suchet to the King, MS.

‡ Codrington, MS.

Mattaro and Barcelona for the supply of the latter city, and these, and many other ventures of the same kind, might have been captured without difficulty,—that Claros and Milans continued corruptly to connive at the passage of French convoys,—that the rich merchants of Mattaro and Arens invited the enemy to protect their contraband convoys going to France, and yet accused him publicly of interrupting their lawful trade, when he was only disturbing a treasonable commerce, so openly followed that he had to declare a blockade of the whole coast.

A plot to deliver the Medas islands was also discovered, and Lacy, when pressed to call out the somatenes, a favorite project with the English naval officers, said he could scarcely feed and provide ammunition for the regular troops. He also observed that the efforts of that nature hitherto made, and under more favorable circumstances, had produced only a waste of life, of treasure, of provisions, of ammunition, and of arms, and now the French possessed all the strong places. But so bitter were party dissensions that Sir Edward Pellew anticipated the ruin of the principality from that cause alone. Lacy, Sarsfield, Eroles and Codrington continued their old disputes, and Sarsfield, then in Aragon, had also quarrelled with Mina,—Lacy demanded Codrington's recall, and the Junta demanded Lacy's removal,—and such was the misery of the soldiers, the officers of one regiment actually begged at the doors of private houses to obtain old clothing for their men, and were denied! A few isolated efforts by some of the partisans were the only signs of war, when the victory of Salamanca again raised the public spirit. Then, for the first time, the new constitution was proclaimed in Catalonia, the Junta was suppressed, Eroles obtained greater powers, and had hope of becoming Captain-General, for the Regency agreed to recall Lacy. Many thousand English muskets and other weapons were by Sir Edward Pellew then given to the partisans as well as the regular troops, which enabled them to receive cartridges from the ships, instead of the loose powder formerly demanded on account of the difference in the bore of the Spanish muskets.

The effect of these happy coincidences was soon displayed. Eroles, who had raised a new division of three thousand men, contrived in concert with Codrington a combined movement in September against Tarragona. Marching in the night of the 27th from Reus to the mouth of the Francoli, he was met by the boats of the squadron, and repulsing a sally from the fortress, drove some Catalans in the French service from the ruins of the Olivo, while the boats swept the mole, taking five vessels. After this affair he encamped on the hills separating Lerida, Tarragona, and Tortosa,

meaning to intercept the communication between those places and keep up an intercourse with the fleet; the more necessary because Lacy had lost this advantage eastward of Barcelona. While thus posted he heard that a French detachment had come from Lerida to Arbaca, upon which, making a forced march over the mountains, he destroyed the greatest part on the 2d of October, and then returned to his former quarters. Meanwhile Lacy, embarking scaling-ladders and battering guns on board the English ships, made a pompous movement against Mattaro with his whole force, yet at the moment of execution changed his plan and attempted to surprise Hostalrich; but he kept no secrecy, the enemy obtained succor, and he returned to Vich. Manso defeated two hundred French near Molino del Rey, gained some advantage over one Pelligri, a French miguelete partisan, and captured some French boats at Mattaro after Lacy's departure; but Sarsfield's mission to raise an army in Aragon failed, and Decaen, desiring to check the reviving spirit of the Catalans, made a combined movement against Vich in the latter end of October. Lacy immediately drew Eroles, Manso, and Milans towards that point, and thus the fertile country about Reus was again resigned to the French, the intercourse with the fleet totally lost, and the garrison of Tarragona, which had been greatly straitened by the previous operations of Eroles, was relieved. Yet the defence of Vich was not secured, for on the 3d of November one division of the French forced the main body of the Spaniards under Lacy and Milans, at the passes of Puig Gracioso and Congosto; and though the other divisions were less successful against Eroles and Manso at St. Filieu de Codenas, Decaen reached Vich on the 4th. The Catalans, who had lost all together above five hundred men, then separated: Lacy went to the hills near Momblanch, Milans and Rovira towards Olot, Manso to Montserrat.

Eroles returned to Reus, and was like to have surprised the Col de Balaguer; for he sent a detachment under Villamil, dressed in Italian uniforms, which had been taken by Rovira in Figueras, and his men were actually admitted within the palisade of the fort before the garrison perceived the deceit. A lieutenant with sixteen men, placed outside, were taken, and this loss was magnified so much to Eroles, that he ordered Villamil to make a more regular attack. To aid him, Codrington brought up the Blake and landed some marines; yet no impression was made on the garrison, and the allies retired on the 17th at the approach of two thousand men sent from Tortosa. Eroles and Manso then vainly united near Manresa to oppose Decaen, who, coming down from Vich, forced his way to Reus, seized a vast quantity of corn, supplied Tarragona, and then marched to Barcelona.

These operations indisputably proved that there was no real power of resistance in the Catalan army. But an absurd notion prevailed that Soult, Suchet, and Joseph were retiring with their armies in one body to France by Catalonia; and Lacy, to cover his inactivity, pretended a design to raise a large force in Aragon, with which to watch this retreat, and act as a flanking corps to Wellington, who was believed to be then approaching Zaragoza.* Such rumors served to amuse the Catalans for a short time, but the sense of their real weakness soon returned. In December, Bertoletti, the governor of Tarragona, marched upon Reus, and defeated some hundred men who had re-assembled there; and at the same time a French convoy for Barcelona, escorted by three thousand men, passed safely in the face of six thousand soldiers desirous to attack, yet prevented by Lacy. On this occasion the anger of the people and of the troops was loudly expressed; he was accused of treachery, and soon after recalled. Eroles, who had come to Cape Salou to obtain succor from the squadron for his suffering soldiers, now acknowledged that the resources of Catalonia were worn out, the spirit of the people broken by Lacy's misconduct, and the army, reduced to less than seven thousand men, was naked and famishing. Affairs were indeed so bad that he was reluctant to accept the office of Captain-General, and the regular warfare was in fact extinguished, for Sarsfield was now acting as a partisan on the Ebro. But at this time the French were greatly dismayed at the disasters in Russia; their force was weakened by drafts to fill up the ranks of Napoleon's new army, and the partida warfare continued; especially along the banks of the Ebro, where Sarsfield, at the head of Eroles' ancient division, acted in concert with Mina, Duran, Villa Campa, the Frayle, Pendencia, and other chiefs, who were busy upon Suchet's communication between Tortosa and Valencia.

As Aragon was now unquiet, Navarre and Biscay in a state of insurrection, the French in the interior of Spain were absolutely invested. Their front was opposed by regular armies, their flanks annoyed by the British squadrons, their rear, from the Bay of Biscay to the Mediterranean, plagued and stung by partidas and insurrections. And England was the cause of all this. England was the real deliverer of the Peninsula. It was her succors thrown into Biscay that had excited the new insurrection in the northern provinces, and enabled Mina and the other chiefs to enter Aragon, while Wellington drew the great masses of the French towards Portugal. It was that insurrection, so forced on, which, notwithstanding the cessation of the regular warfare in Catalonia, gave life and activity to the partidas of the south. It

* Codrington, MSS.

was the army from Sicily which induced Suchet to keep his forces together, instead of hunting down the bands on his communications. In fine, it was the troops of England who had shocked the enemy's front of battle, the fleets of England which had menaced his flanks with disembarkations, the money and stores of England which had supported the partidas. Every part of the Peninsula was pervaded by her influence or her warriors, and a trembling sense of insecurity was communicated to the French wherever their armies were not united in masses.

Such, then, were the various military events of the year 1812, and the English General, taking a view of the whole, judged that however anxious the French might be to invade Portugal, they would be content during the winter to gather provisions and wait for reinforcements from France wherewith to strike a decisive blow at his army. But these reinforcements never came. Napoleon, unconquered of man, had been vanquished by the elements. The fires and the snows of Moscow combined had shattered his strength, and in confessed madness nations and rulers rejoiced that an enterprise, at once the grandest and most provident, the most beneficial ever attempted by a warrior-statesman, had been foiled—they rejoiced that Napoleon had failed to re-establish unhappy Poland as a barrier against the most formidable and brutal, the most swinish tyranny that has ever menaced and disgraced European civilization.

CHAPTER VII.

General observations—Wellington reproaches the army—His censures indiscriminate—Analysis of his campaign—Criticisms of Jomini and others examined—Errors of execution—The French operations analyzed—Sir John Moore's retreat compared with Lord Wellington's.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

WHEN the campaign terminated, Wellington, exasperated by the conduct of the army, and the many crossings he had experienced during the campaign, gave vent to his indignation in a circular letter, addressed to the superior officers, which, being ill-received by the army at the time, has been frequently referred to since with angry denunciations of its injustice. In substance it declared, "*that discipline had deteriorated during the campaign in a greater degree than he had ever witnessed or ever read of in any army,*

and this without any disaster, any unusual privation or hardship, save that of inclement weather,—that the officers had lost all command over their men, and excesses, outrages of all kinds, and inexcusable losses had occurred,—that no army had ever made shorter marches in retreat or had longer rests,—no army had ever been so little pressed by a pursuing enemy, and this unhappy state of affairs was to be traced to the habitual neglect of duty by the regimental officers."

These severe reproaches were partially unjust, and the statements on which they were founded were in some particulars inaccurate, especially as regarded the retreat from Salamanca. The marches, though short as to distance after quitting the Tormes, were long as to time; and it is the time an English soldier bears his burthen, for like the ancient Roman he carries the load of an ass, that crushes his strength. Some regiments had come from Cadiz without halting; and as long garrison duty had weakened their bodies, their constitutions and inexperience were too heavily taxed. The line of march from Salamanca was through a flooded clayey country, not much easier to the allies than the marshes of the Arnus were to Hannibal's army; and mounted officers, as that great man well knew, when he placed the Carthaginian cavalry to keep up the Gallic rear, never judge correctly of a foot-soldier's exertions; they measure his strength by their horses' powers. On this occasion, the troops, stepping ankle-deep in clay, mid-leg in water, lost their shoes, and with strained sinews heavily made their way, and withal they had but two rations in five days. Their General thought otherwise. He knew not that the commissariat stores which he had ordered up did not arrive regularly, because of the extreme fatigue of the animals who carried them; and those that did arrive were not available for the troops, because, as the rear of an army, and especially a retreating army, is at once the birth-place and the recipient of false reports, the subordinate commissaries and conductors of the temporary dépôts were alarmed with rumors that the enemy's cavalry had carried off or destroyed the field-stores; the soldiers were actually feeding on acorns when supposed to have good rations!

The destruction of the swine may be thus in some measure palliated, but there is neither palliation nor excuse to be offered for the excesses and outrages committed on the inhabitants, nor for many officers' habitual inattention to their duty. Intolerable disorders had marked the retreat, and great part of the sufferings arose from these and previous disorders; for it is too common with soldiers to break up the arrangements of their general by want of discipline, and then complain of the misery which those arrange-

ments were designed to obviate. Nevertheless, this circular was not strictly just, because it excepted none from blame, though in conversation Wellington admitted the reproach did not apply to the light division, nor to the guards. With respect to the former, indeed, the proof of its discipline was easy, though so much had not been said; for how could those troops be upbraided, who held together so closely with their colors that, exclusive of the killed in action, they did not leave thirty men behind? Never did the extraordinary vigor and excellence of their discipline merit praise more than in this retreat. But it seems to be a drawback to the greatness of Lord Wellington's character, that while capable of repressing insubordination by firmness or dexterity, as the case may require; capable also of magnanimously disregarding or dangerously resenting injuries, his praises and his censures are yet bestowed indiscriminately, or so directed as to acquire partisans and personal friends rather than the attachment of the multitude. He did not make the hard-working military crowd feel that their honest, unobtrusive exertions were appreciated. In this he differs not from many other great generals and statesmen, but he thereby failed to influence masses, and his genius falls short of that sublime flight by which Hannibal in ancient, and Napoleon in modern times, commanded the admiration of the world. But it is only by such great men that he can be measured, nor will any slight examination of his exploits suffice to convey a true notion of his intellectual power and resources. Let this campaign be taken as an example.

It has been by English writers called his easy and triumphant march to Madrid, yet nothing happened according to the original plan; the operations were one continual struggle to overcome obstacles occasioned by the enemy's numbers, the insubordination of the troops, the slowness, incapacity, and unfaithful conduct of the Spanish commanders, the want of money, and the active folly of the different governments. For first, the design was to menace the French in Spain, so as to bring their forces from other parts, and then retire into Portugal, again to issue forth when want should cause them to disperse. Wellington was not without hope indeed to strike a decisive blow, yet he was content, if the occasion came not, to wear out the French by continual marching, and trusted the frequent opportunities thus given to the Spaniards would finally urge them to a general effort. But he found his enemy from the first too powerful for him, even without drawing succor from distant parts, and he would have fallen back at once were it not for Marmont's rashness. Nor would the victory of the Arapiles itself have produced any proportionate effect but for the

errors of the King, and his rejection of Soult's advice. Those errors caused the evacuation of Andalusia, but only to concentrate an overwhelming force, with which the French finally drove the victors back to Portugal.

Wellington designed to finish his campaign in the southern provinces, and circumstances compelled him to remain in the northern provinces. He would have taken Burgos, and he could not; he would have rested longer on the Carrion, and his flanks were turned by the bridges of Palencia and Baños; he would have rested behind the Duero, to profit of his central position, but the bridge at Tordesillas was ravished from him, and the sudden reparation of that at Toro forced him to retire. He would have united with Hill on the Adaja, and he could only unite with him behind the Tormes; and on this last river also he desired either to take his winter quarters or to deliver a great battle, with a view to regain Madrid, and he could do neither. Finally, he endeavored to make an orderly and easy retreat to Rodrigo, but his army was like to have dissolved altogether. And yet in all these varying circumstances, his sagacity as to the general course of the war, his promptness in taking advantage of particular opportunities, were conspicuous. These are the distinguishing characteristics of real genius.

Passing over that master-stroke, the battle of Salamanca, the reader would do well to mark how this great commander after that event separated the King's army from Marmont's, forcing the one to retreat upon Burgos, and driving the other from Madrid,—how he thus broke up the French combinations, which it required many weeks to restore,—how he posted Clinton's division and the Gallicians to repress any light excursion by the beaten army of Portugal,—how, foreseeing Soult's plan to establish a new base of operations in Andalusia, he was prepared to drive Soult himself from that province,—how promptly, when the siege of Burgos failed, and his combinations were ruined by the fault of others, he commenced his retreat, sacrificing all his high-wrought expectation of triumph in a campaign which he burned to finish, and otherwise would have finished even with more splendor than it had commenced.

If Burgos, a mean fortress of the lowest order, had fallen early, the world would have seen a noble stroke. For the Gallicians, aided by a weak English division and the reinforcements making up from Coruña, would, covered by Burgos, have sufficed to keep the army of Portugal in cheek, and Popham's armament would have fomented a general insurrection of the northern provinces. Meanwhile Wellington, gathering forty-five thousand Anglo-Portuguese and fifteen thousand Spaniards on the Tagus, would have

marched towards Murcia ; Ballesteros' army, and the sixteen thousand men composing the Alicant army, could there have joined him ; and then with a hundred thousand soldiers he would have given such a battle to the united French armies, if indeed they could have united, as would have shaken all Europe with the martial clangor. To exchange this glorious vision for the cold desolate reality of a dangerous winter retreat, was for Wellington but a momentary mental struggle ; and it was simultaneous with that daring conception, the passage of the bridge of Burgos under the fire of the castle.

Let him be traced then in retreat. Pursued by a superior army and seeing his cavalry defeated, he turned as a savage lion at the Carrion ; nor would he have removed so quickly from that lair, if the bridges at Palencia and Baños had been destroyed according to his order. Neither is his cool self-possession to be overlooked ; for when both his flanks were thus exposed, instead of falling back in a hurried manner to the Duero, he judged exactly the value of the rugged ground on the left bank of the Pisuerga, in opposition to the double advantage obtained by the enemy at Palencia and Baños ; nor did the difficulty which Souham and Caffarelli, independent commanders and neither of them accustomed to move large armies, would find in suddenly changing their line of operations, escape him. His march to Cabeçon and his position on the left of the Pisuerga was not a retreat, it was the shift of a practised captain.

When forced to withdraw Hill from the Tagus, he on the instant formed a new combination to fight that great battle on the Adaja which he had intended to deliver near the Guadalaviar ; and though the splendid exploit of Captain Guingret at Tordesillas baffled this intent, he in return baffled Souham by that ready stroke of generalship, the posting of his whole army in front of Rueda, thus forbidding a passage by the restored bridge. Finally, if he could not maintain the line of the Duero nor that of the Tormes, it was because rivers can never be permanently defended against superior forces ; and yet he did not quit the last without a splendid tactical illustration, namely, the movement from the Arapiles to the Valmusa—a movement made not in confusion and half flight, but in close order of battle, the columns ready for action, the artillery and cavalry skirmishing, passing the Junguen without disorder, filing along the front of and winding into the rear of a French force the largest ever collected in one mass in the Peninsula, an army having twice as many guns as the allies, and twelve thousand able horsemen to boot ! And all these great and skilful actions were executed with an army composed of different nations ; soldiers, fierce indeed

and valiant, terrible in battle, but characterized by himself as more deficient in good discipline than any army of which he had ever read!

Men engaged only in civil affairs, especially book-men, are apt to undervalue military genius, talking as if simple bravery were the highest qualification of a general; and they have another mode of appeasing an inward sense of inferiority, namely, to attribute the successes of a great captain to the prudence of some discreet adviser, who in secret rules the general, amends his errors, and leaves him all the glory. Thus Napoleon had Berthier, Wellington Sir George Murray! but in this, the most skilful if not the most glorious of Wellington's campaigns, Murray was not present, and the staff of the army was governed by three young lieutenant-colonels, namely, Lord Fitzroy Somerset, Waters, and Delancey; for though Sir Willoughby Gordon joined the army as Quarter-master-General after the battle of Salamanca, he was inexperienced, and some bodily sufferings impeded his personal exertions.

Such then were the principal points of skill displayed; yet so vast and intricate an art is war, that the apothegm of Turenne will always be found applicable: "*He who has made no mistakes in war, has seldom made war.*" Some military writers, amongst them the celebrated Jomini, blame the English General, that with a conquering army and an insurgent nation at his back he should in three months after his victory have attempted nothing more than the unsuccessful siege of Burgos. This censure is not entirely unfounded; the King certainly escaped very easily from Madrid; yet there are many points to be argued ere the question can be decided. The want of money, progressively increasing, had become almost intolerable. The army was partly fed from Rodrigo, partly from the valley of the Pisuerga; Hill's troops were fed from Lisbon, the Portuguese in their own country; the Spaniards always lived like the French by requisition; the British professed to avoid that mode, and made it a national boast; the movements were therefore subservient to this principle, and must be judged accordingly: want of money was want of motion.

Now four modes of operation were open.

1. *After the victory of Salamanca to follow the King to Valencia, and unite with the Alicant army, then, having separated Soult from Joseph and Suchet, to act according to events.*

To have thus moved without money into Valencia or Murcia, new countries where he had no assured connections and which were scarcely able to feed the French armies, would have exposed him to great difficulties; and he must have made extensive arrangements with the fleet ere he could have acted vigorously, if, as was

probable, the French concentrated all their forces behind the Guadalaviar. Then the distance between him and the troops left in the north being considered, the latter must have been strengthened at the expense of those in the south, unless the army of Portugal joined the King, whereby the allies would have been overmatched in Valencia; that is, if Soult also joined the King, and if not he would have placed the army between two fires. If a force was not left in the north, the army of Portugal could march to the King's assistance by Zaragoza, or relieve Astorga, seize Salamanca, recover the prisoners and trophies of the Arapiles, and destroy all the great line of magazines and dépôts even to the Tagus. Moreover the yellow fever raged in Murcia, and this would have compelled the English General to depend upon the contracted base of operations offered by Alicant; because Clausel could have rendered it impossible to keep it on the Tagus. Time therefore was required to arrange the means of operating in this manner, and meanwhile the army was not unwisely turned another way.

2. *To march directly against Soult in Andalusia.*

This project Wellington was prepared to execute when the King's orders rendered it unnecessary; but if Joseph had adopted Soult's plan, a grand field for the display of military art would have been opened. The King going by the Despeñas Perros, and having the advantage of time in the march, could have joined Soult with the army of the centre before the English General could have joined Hill. The sixty thousand combatants thus united could have kept the field until Suchet had also joined; but they could scarcely have maintained the blockade of Cadiz also; and hence the error of Wellington seems to have been that he did not make an effort to overtake the King either upon or beyond the Tagus—for the army of the centre would certainly have joined Soult by the Despeñas Perros if Maitland had not at the moment landed at Alicant.

3. *To follow the army of Portugal after the victory of Salamanca.*

The reasons for moving upon Madrid instead of adopting this line of operations need not be here repeated; yet it may be added, that the destruction of the great arsenal and dépôt of the Retiro was no small object with reference to the safety of Portugal.

4. *The plan actually followed.*

The English General's stay in the capital was unavoidable, seeing that to observe the development of the French operations in the south was of such importance. It only remains therefore to trace him after he quitted Madrid. The choice of the line by Valladolid appears common-place and deficient in vigor, but was probably

decided by the want of money and means of transport; to which may be added the desire to bring the Gallicians forward, which he could only attain by putting himself in actual military communication with them and covering their advance. Yet this will not excuse the feeble pursuit of Clausel's retreating army up the valley of the Pisuerga. The Spaniards would not the less have come up if that General had been defeated, nor would the want of their assistance have been much felt in the action. Considerable loss would no doubt have been suffered by the Anglo-Portuguese, and they could ill bear it, but the result of a victory would have amply repaid the damage received; for the time gained by Clausel was employed by Caffarelli to strengthen the castle of Burgos, which contained the greatest French dépôt in this part of Spain. A victory therefore would have entirely disarranged the enemy's means of defence in the north, and would have sent the twice-broken and defeated army of Portugal behind the Ebro; then neither the conscript reinforcements nor the junction of Caffarelli's troops would have enabled Clausel to re-appear in the field before Burgos would have fallen. But that fortress would probably have yielded at once, and the English General might have returned to the Tagus, perhaps in time to meet Soult as he issued forth from the mountains in his march from Andalusia.

It may be objected, that as Burgos did not yield, it would not have yielded under any circumstances without a vigorous defence. This is not so certain: the effect of a defeat would have been very different from the effect of such a splendid operation as Clausel's retreat; and the prolonged defence of the castle was due to some errors of detail in the attack as well as to want of sufficient artillery means. In respect of the great features of the campaign, it may be assumed that Wellington's judgment on the spot, and with a full knowledge both of his own and his adversaries' situation, is of more weight than Jomini's, however able and acute, for he knew nothing of the difficulties.

In the details of the siege there was something of error exceedingly strange. It is said Sir Howard Douglas, on being consulted, objected to the proceeding by gallery and mine against an outward, a middle and an inward line of defence, as likely to involve a succession of tedious and difficult enterprises, which even if successful would still leave the White Church and the upper castle to be carried;—that this castle, besides other artillery armament, was surmounted by a powerful battery of heavy guns, bearing directly upon the face of the horn-work of San Michael, the only point from which it could be breached; and until it was breached the governor, a gallant man, would certainly not surren-

der. It could not however be breached without a larger battering-train than the allies possessed, and would not, as he supposed, be effected by mines; wherefore, proposing to take the guns from two frigates then lying at Santander, he proffered to bring them up in time. In this reasoning Wellington partly acquiesced, but he expected success from the scarcity of water in the castle, and the facility of burning the provision magazines; nor was he without hope from his fortune. Towards the end of the siege he too late got the guns from Santander; but while Douglas counselled him on the spot, Sir Edward Pakenham, then in Madrid, assured the author of this history that he also, foreseeing the artillery means were too scanty, had proposed to send by the Somosierra twelve fine Russian battering-guns from the Retiro, pledging himself to procure, by an appeal to the officers in the capital, animals sufficient to transport them and their ammunition to Burgos in a few days. The offer was not accepted.

Something also may be objected to the field operations; for it is the rule, although not an absolute one, that the enemy's active army should first be beaten or driven beyond some strong line, such as a river or chain of mountains, before a siege is commenced. Now if Wellington had masked the castle after the horn-work was carried on the 19th, and had then followed Clausel, the French generals admitted they would have gone over the Ebro, perhaps even to Pampeluna and St. Sebastian.* Then all the minor dépôts must have been broken up, and the re-organization of the army of Portugal retarded at least a month, during which the guns from Santander would have arrived and the castle of Burgos have fallen. In Souham's secret despatches, it is said, of course on the authority of spies, that Castaños urged an advance beyond Burgos instead of a siege; and it is not unlikely, because to advance continually and surround an enemy constituted with Spanish generals the whole art of war. Howbeit, on this occasion the advice if given was not unreasonable; and it needed scarcely even to delay the siege while the covering army advanced, because one division of infantry might have come up from Madrid, still leaving two of the finest in the army and a brigade of cavalry at that capital, which was sufficient, because Hill was coming to Toledo, Ballesteros' disobedience was unknown, and the King in no condition to advance before Soult arrived.

A last error was stopping too long on the Tormes in hopes of fighting in the position of the Arapiles. It was a stirring thought indeed for a great mind, and the error was brilliantly redeemed;

* General Souham, MSS.

but the remedy does not efface the original fault; and this subject leads to a consideration of some speculative interest, namely, why Wellington, desirous as he was to keep the line of the Tormes, and knowing with what difficulty the French fed their large army, did not order everything in his rear to take refuge in Rodrigo and Almeida, and intrench himself on St. Christoval and in Salamanca. Thus posted, and having a bridge-head on the left bank by which to operate on either side, he might have waited until famine compelled the enemy to separate, which would have been in a very few days: perhaps the answer would be that the Spaniards had left Rodrigo in a defenceless state.

Turning now to the French side, they also will be found in error.

Souham's pursuit after the cavalry combat at Venta de Pozo was feeble. Wellington, speaking of his own army, said, "no troops were ever less pressed by an enemy." The King's orders were however positive not to fight, and as the English General continually offered Souham battle in strong positions, the man had no power to do mischief. Soult's too cautious pursuit of Hill had other motives. He was not desirous of a battle, and until the Guadarama was passed Hill had the larger force, for then only was the whole French army united. Soult wished to march in one great mass through La Mancha, leaving only a small corps or a detachment of Suchet's army on the Cuença road; but the King united the whole of the army of the centre, his own guards, and seven thousand men of the army of the south, on the Cuença line, and there were no good cross communications except by Tarancon. Soult therefore advanced towards the Tagus with only thirty-five thousand men, and from commissariat difficulties and other obstacles was compelled to move by successive divisions, at considerable distances; when his advanced guard was at Valdemoro his rear-guard was two marches distant. Hill might then have turned and driven him over the Tagus; or, after leaving a small corps on the upper Tagus to watch the King, have passed that river at Toledo, and without abandoning his line by the valley of the Tagus have attacked Soult while on the march towards Ocaña: the latter, in despite of his numerous cavalry, must then have fallen back to concentrate his forces, and this would have deranged the whole campaign.

Soult, thinking Ballesteros was with Hill, naturally feared to press his adversary under such a vicious disposition of the French army; neither could that disposition be changed during the operation, because of the want of good cross roads, and because Souham

had been told that the King would meet him on the side of Guadalaxara. In fine, Soult had learned to respect his adversaries, and with the prudence of a man whose mental grasp embraced all the machinery of the war, he avoided a doubtful battle when a defeat would from the unsettled state of the French affairs have lost the whole Peninsula. The allies had Portugal to fall back upon, the French armies must have gone behind the Ebro.

These seem to be the leading points of interest in this campaign, but it will not be uninteresting to mark the close affinities between Wellington's retreat and that of Sir John Moore. This last-named General marched to the north of Spain with the political object of saving Andalusia by drawing on himself the French power; having beforehand declared that he expected to be overwhelmed. Wellington moved into the same country to deliver Andalusia, and thus drew on himself the whole power of the enemy; like Moore declaring also beforehand that the political object being gained, his own military position would be endangered. Both succeeded, and both were, as they had foretold, overwhelmed by superior forces. Moore was to have been aided by Romana's Spanish army, and he found it a burthen; Wellington was impeded, not assisted, by the Gallicians, and both generals were without money.

Moore, having approached Soult and menaced Burgos, was forced to retreat, because Napoleon moved from Madrid on his right flank and towards his rear. Wellington, having actually besieged Burgos, was compelled to raise the siege and retire, lest the King, coming through Madrid, should pass his right flank and get into his rear. Moore was only followed by Soult to the Esla, Wellington was only followed by Souham to the Duero. The first General looked to the mountains of Galicia for positions which he could maintain; but the apathy of the Spanish people in the south permitted Napoleon to bring up an overwhelming force so rapidly that this plan could not be sustained. Wellington had the same notion with respect to the Duero, and the defection of Ballesteros enabled the King to bring up such a power that further retreat became necessary.

Moore's soldiers at the commencement of the operation evinced want of discipline; they committed great excesses at Valderas and disgraced themselves by their inebriety at Bembibre and Villa Franca. In like manner Wellington's soldiers broke the bonds of discipline, disgraced themselves by drunkenness at Torquemada, and on the retreat from the Puente Larga to Madrid, and committed excesses everywhere. Moore stopped behind the Esla to check the enemy, restore order, and enable his commissariat to

remove the stores; Wellington stopped behind the Carrion for exactly the same purposes. The one General was immediately turned on his left because the bridge of Mancilla was abandoned unbroken to Franceschi; the other General was also turned on his left because the bridge of Palencia was abandoned unbroken to Foy. Moore's retreat was little short of three hundred miles; Wellington's was nearly as long, and both were in the winter season. The first halted at Benevente, at Villa Franca, and at Lugo; the last halted at Duenas, at Cabeçon, Tordesillas, and Salamanca. The principal loss sustained by the one was in the last marches between Lugo and Coruña; so also the principal loss sustained by the other was in the last marches between the Tormes and the Agueda. Some of Moore's generals murmured against his proceedings, some of Wellington's generals, as we have seen, went further: the first were checked by a reprimand, the second were humbled by a sarcasm. Finally, both Generals reproached their armies with want of discipline, both attributed it to the negligence of the officers generally, and in both cases the justice of the reproaches was proved by the exceptions. The reserve and the foot-guards in Moore's campaign, the light division and the foot-guards in Wellington's, gave signal proof that it was negligence of discipline, not hardships, though the latter were severe in both armies, that caused the losses. Not that it can be said, only those regiments preserved order; many others were eminently well conducted, but those were the troops named as exceptions at the time, and two regiments of the light division had been of Moore's reserve.

Such were the resemblances of these two retreats. The differences were, that Moore had only twenty-three thousand men in the first part of his retreat, and nineteen thousand in the latter part, having detached four thousand to Vigo. Wellington had thirty-three thousand in the first part of his retreat, sixty-eight thousand in the latter part. Moore's army were all of one nation, and young soldiers; Wellington's were of different nations, but veterans. The first marched through mountains, where the weather was infinitely more inclement than in the plains over which the second moved; and, until he reached the Esla, Moore's flank was quite exposed, whereas Wellington's flank was covered by Hill's army until he gained the Tormes. Wellington, with veteran troops, was opposed to Souham, to Soult, to the King, and to Jourdan, men not agreeing in their views; and their whole army when united did not exceed the allies by more than twenty thousand men. Moore, with young soldiers, was at first opposed to four times, and latterly to three times his own numbers; for it is

remarkable, that the French army assembled at Astorga was above eighty thousand, including ten thousand cavalry, which is nearly the same as the number assembled against Wellington on the Tormes; but Moore had little more than twenty thousand men to oppose to this overwhelming mass, and Wellington had nearly seventy thousand. The partidas, abounding at the time of Wellington's retreat, were unknown in the time of Moore; and this General was confronted by Napoleon, who, despotic in command, was also unrivalled in skill, in genius, and in vigor. Wellington was not pressed by the enemy, and he made short marches; yet he lost more stragglers than Moore, who was vigorously pressed, made long marches, and could only secure an embarkation by delivering a battle, in which he died most honorably. His character was immediately vilified. Wellington was relieved from his pursuers by the operation of famine, and had therefore no occasion to deliver a battle; but he also was vilified at the time with equal injustice; and if he had then died it would have been with equal malice. His subsequent successes, his great name and power, have imposed silence upon his detractors, or converted censure into praise; for it is the nature of mankind, especially of the ignorant, to cling to fortune.

Moore attributed his difficulties to the apathy of the Spaniards; his friends charged them on the incapacity of the British government. Wellington attributed his ultimate failure to the defection of Ballesteros; his brother, in the House of Lords, charged it on the previous contracted policy of Perceval's government, which had crippled the General's means; and certainly Wellington's reasoning relative to Ballesteros was not quite sound. That General, he said, might have forced Soult to take the circuitous route of Valencia, Requena, and Cuenca, or leave a strong corps in observation, and then Hill might have detached men to the north. He even calculated upon Ballesteros being able to stop both Soult and Souham altogether; for as the latter's operations were prescribed by the King, and dependent upon his proceedings, Wellington thought he would have remained tranquil if Joseph had not advanced. This was the error. Souham's despatches clearly show, that the King's instructions checked instead of forwarding his movements; that it was his intention to have delivered battle at the end of four days, without regard to Joseph's orders;* and, so great was his force, Wellington admitted his own inability to keep the field. Ballesteros' defection therefore cannot be pleaded in bar of all further investigation. But whatever failures there

* Appendix, No. 8, A.

were, and however imposing the height to which the English General's reputation has since attained, this campaign—including the sieges of Rodrigo, Badajos, the forts of Salamanca and of Burgos, the assault of Almaraz and the fight of Salamanca—will probably be considered his finest illustration of the art of war. Waterloo may be called a more glorious exploit, because of the great man who was there vanquished; Assaye may be deemed a more wonderful action—one indeed to be compared with the victory which Lucullus gained over Tygranes—but Salamanca will always be referred to as the most skilful of Wellington's battles.

BOOK XX.

CHAPTER I.

Political affairs—Their influence on the war—Napoleon's invasion of Russia—Its influence on the contest in the Peninsula—State of feeling in England—Lord Wellesley charges the ministers and especially Mr. Perceval with imbecility—His proofs thereof—Ability and zeal of Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart shown—Absurd plans of the Count of Funchal—Mr. Villiers and Mr. Vansittart—The English ministers propose to sell the Portuguese crown and church lands—The folly and injustice of these, and other schemes, exposed by Lord Wellington—He goes to Cadiz—His reception there—New organization of the Spanish armies—Wellington goes to Lisbon, where he is enthusiastically received—His departure from Cadiz the signal for renewed dissensions—Carlotta's intrigues—Decree to abolish the Inquisition opposed by the clergy—The Regency aid the clergy—Are displaced by the Cortes—New Regency appointed—The American party in the Cortes adopt Carlotta's cause—Fail from fear of the people—Many bishops and church dignitaries are arrested, and others fly into Portugal—The Pope's nuncio Gravina opposes the Cortes—His benefices sequestered—He flies to Portugal—His intrigues there—Secret overtures made to Joseph by some of the Spanish armies.

WHILE the armies were striving, the political affairs continued complicated and unsteady. The evils of bad government in England, Spain and Portugal, the incongruous alliance of bigoted aristocracy with awakened democracy, and the inevitable growth of national jealousies as external danger seemed to recede, were becoming so powerful, that if relief had not been obtained from extraneous events, even the vigor of Wellington must have sunk under the pressure. The secret causes of disturbance shall now be laid bare, and it will then be seen that the catastrophe of Napoleon's Russian campaign was absolutely necessary to the final success of the British arms in the Peninsula. I speak not of the physical power which, if his host had not withered on the snowy wastes of Muscovy, the Emperor could have poured into Spain, but of those innumerable moral diseases which corrupted the very life-blood of the contest in the Peninsula. If Russia owed her safety in some degree to that contest, the fate of the Peninsula was in return decided on the plains of Russia; for had the French veterans who there perished returned victorious, the war could

have been maintained for years in Spain with all its waste of treasures and of blood, to the absolute ruin of England even though her army had been victorious in every battle. Yet who shall say with certainty what termination any war will ever have? Who shall prophesy of an art always varying, and of such intricacy that its secrets seem beyond the reach of human intellect? What vast preparations, what astonishing combinations were involved in the plan, what vigor and ability displayed in the execution of Napoleon's march to Moscow! Yet when the winter came, only four days sooner than he expected, the giant's scheme became a theme for children's laughter!

Nevertheless the political grandeur of that expedition will not be hereafter judged from the wild triumph of his enemies, nor its military merits from the declamation hitherto passed off as the history of that wondrous though unfortunate enterprise. It will not be the puerilities of Labaume, of Segur, and their imitators, nor even that splendid military and political essay of Jomini, called the "*Life of Napoleon*," which posterity will accept as the measure of a general who carried four hundred thousand soldiers across the Niemen, and a hundred and sixty thousand to Moscow. And with such a military providence, with such a vigilance, so disposing his reserves, so guarding his flanks, so guiding his masses, that while constantly victorious in front no post was lost in his rear, no convoy failed, no courier was stopped, not even a letter was missing: the communication with his capital was as regular and certain as if that immense march had been but a summer excursion of pleasure! However, it failed, and its failure was the safety of the Peninsula.

In England the retreat from Burgos was viewed with the angry fear which always accompanies the disappointment of high-raised public expectation; the people, taught to believe the French weak and dispirited, saw them so strong and daring that even victory had not enabled the allies to make a permanent stand beyond the frontiers of Portugal. Hence a growing distrust as to the ultimate result, which would not have failed to overturn the war faction, if the retreat of the French from Moscow, the defection of Prussia, and the strange unlooked-for spectacle of Napoleon vanquished, had not come in happy time as a counterpoise. And when the Parliament met Lord Wellesley did very distinctly show, that if the successes in the early part of the year had not been pushed to the extent expected, and had been followed by important reverses, the causes were clearly to be traced to the imbecile administration of Perceval and his coadjutors, whose policy he truly characterized as having in it "*nothing regular but confusion*." With accurate know-

ledge of facts he discussed the military question, and maintained that twelve thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry added to the army in the beginning of the year, would have rendered the campaign decisive; because the Russian contest, the incapacity of Joseph, and the dissensions of the French generals in Spain, had produced the most favorable crisis for striking a vital blow at the enemy's power. The cabinet, he said, knew this and in good time, but though there were abundance of soldiers idling at home when for the nation's welfare they should have been in the Peninsula, though the ministers had actually sent within five thousand as many men as were necessary, they had, with an imbecility marking all their proceedings, so contrived, that few or none should reach the theatre of war until the time for success had passed away. Then touching upon the financial question, with a rude hand he tore Perceval's pitiful pretexts, that the want of specie had necessarily put bounds to their efforts, and that the General himself did not complain. "No!" exclaimed Lord Wellesley, "he does not complain, because it is the sacred duty of a soldier not to complain. But he does not say that with greater means he could not do greater things, and his country will not be satisfied if these means are withheld by men who, having assumed the direction of affairs in such a crisis, have only incapacity to plead in extenuation of their failures."

This stern accuser, fresh from the ministry, versed in state matters and of unquestionable talent, was well acquainted with the actual resources and difficulties of the moment and sincere in his opinions, because he had abandoned office rather than be a party to such a miserable mismanagement of England's power. He was no mean authority against his former colleagues, even though the facts had not so clearly borne out his views, yet they did to the letter. That England possessed the troops, and that they were wanted by Wellington, is undeniable. Even in September, there were still between fifty and sixty thousand soldiers present under arms at home, and additional forces could certainly have been fed in Portugal, because the reserve magazines contained provisions for one hundred thousand men for nine months.* The only question was the procuring specie to purchase supplies which could not be had on credit. Wellington had made the campaign almost without specie, and a small additional force would not have overwhelmed his resources; but what efforts, what ability, what order, what arrangements were made by the government to overcome the difficulties of the time? Was there less extravagance in public offices, public works, public salaries, public contracts? The snuff-boxes

* Wellington, MSS.

and services of plate given to diplomatists, the gorgeous furniture of palaces, the gaudy trappings wasted on Whittingham's, Roche's, and Downie's divisions, would almost have furnished the wants of the additional troops. Where were the millions lavished in subsidies to the Spaniards? where the millions which South America had transmitted to Cadiz? where the sums spent by the soldiers during the war? Real money had nearly disappeared from England, and a base paper had usurped its place; but gold had not disappeared from the world, and an able ministry would have found it. Those men only knew how to squander.

The subsidy granted to Portugal was paid by the commercial speculations of Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart, speculations which also fed the army, saved the whole population of Portugal from famine, and prevented the war from stopping in 1811; and so little could the ministers comprehend, much less make such arrangements, that they now rebuked their General for having adopted them, and after their own imbecile manner insisted upon a new mode of providing supplies.* On every side they gave proof of incapacity. Lord William Bentinck was allowed to plan an invasion of Italy when additional troops were wanted in Portugal; and suffered to bid in the money-market against Wellington and sweep away four millions of dollars at an exorbitant premium for a chimera, when the war in the Peninsula was nearly stopped in default of that very money which Wellington could have otherwise procured, nay, had actually been promised at a reasonable cost. Nor was this the full measure of their folly.

Lord Wellesley affirmed, and they were unable to deny the fact, that dollars might have been obtained from South America to any amount, if the government would have consented to pay the market-price for them; they would not do it, and yet afterwards sought to purchase the same dollars at a higher rate in the European markets! He told them, and they could not deny it, that they had empowered five different agents to purchase dollars for five different services, without any controlling head; that they were bidding against each other in every money-market, and the restrictions as to the price were exactly in the inverse proportion to the importance of the service: the agent for the troops in Malta was permitted to offer the highest price, Lord Wellington was restricted to the lowest! And besides this folly, he showed that they had, under their licensing system, permitted French vessels to bring French goods, silks and gloves, to England, and to carry bullion away in return. Napoleon thus paid his army in Spain with the very coin which should have subsisted the English troops.

* Mr. Stuart, MSS.

But incapable as the ministers were of making the simplest arrangements, and neglecting the most obvious means of supplying the army; incapable even of sending out a few bales of clothing and arms for the Spaniards without producing the utmost confusion, they were heedless of their General's counsels, prompt to listen to every intriguing adviser, and to plunge into absurd complicated measures to relieve that distress which their own imbecility had produced. When the war with the United States broke out, a war provoked by themselves, they suffered the Admiralty, contrary to the wishes of Mr. Stuart, to reduce the naval force at Lisbon, and neglect Wellington's express recommendations for the protection of the merchantmen bringing flour and stores to Portugal.* Then the American privateers, being unmolested, ran down the coast of Africa, intercepted the provision trade from the Brazils, one of the principal resources of the army, and emboldened by impunity infested the coast of Portugal, captured fourteen ships loaded with flour off the Douro, and a large vessel in the very mouth of the Tagus. These things happened when the ministers were censuring and interfering with the General's commercial transactions, and seeking to throw the feeding of his soldiers into the hands of British speculators; as if the supply of an army was like that of a common market! never considering that it would be the merchant's interest to starve the troops for the increase of profit; never considering that the commerce they would stop had paid the Portuguese subsidy for them, and had furnished the military chest with specie when their administrative capacity was unequal to the task.

Never was a government better served than the British government was by Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart. With abilities, vigilance, and industry seldom equalled, they had made themselves masters of the Portuguese policy, foreign, domestic, military, civil, and judicial; they knew all the causes of mischief, and faithfully represented them to the Portuguese and British governments, and had devised effectual remedies. By the former they were met with vexatious opposition; the latter, neglecting their advice, lent themselves to those foolish financial schemes before touched upon as emanating from Villiers, Vansittart, and the Count of Funchal; the first deficient as an ambassador and statesman, the second universally derided as a financier, the third, from his long residence in London, knowing little of Portugal, deriving that little from his brother the restless Principal, and in all his schemes having reference to his own intrigues in the Brazils. Their plans were necessarily absurd. Funchal revived the old project of an English loan, and in concert with his coadjutors desired to establish a bank after

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MS.

the English manner, advancing several minor details and propositions, most of them suggested before by Principal Souza, but rejected by Wellington, and all designed to evade, not to remedy the evils. Finally they devised, and the English Cabinet actually entertained the plan, of selling the crown and church property of Portugal; and this spoliation of the Catholic Church was to be effected by commissioners, one of them to be Mr. Sydenham, an Englishman and a Protestant! Thinking, however, that the Pope would not readily yield consent, they resolved to apply to his nuncio, whom being in their power they expected to find more pliable.*

Having thus provided, in their way, for financial difficulties, the ministers concocted, for the supply of the army, what they called a modified system of requisitions, after the manner of the French! Their speeches, their manifestoes, their whole scheme of policy, which in the working had nearly crushed the liberties of England, and had plunged the whole world into war; that policy whose aim and scope was, they said, to support established religion, the rights of monarchs, and the independence of nations, was thus cast aside. Yea, these men, to remove difficulties caused by their own incapacity and negligence, were ready to adopt all they had before condemned and reviled in the French; they were eager to meddle in the most offensive manner with the Catholic religion, by getting from the nuncio, who was in their power, what they could not get from the Pope voluntarily; they were ready to interfere with the rights of the Portuguese crown by selling its property, and desired to adopt the very system of requisitions which they had so often denounced as rendering the name of France abhorrent to the world!

All these schemes were duly transmitted to Wellington and Mr. Stuart, and the former had in the field to unravel the intricacies, detect the fallacies, and combat the wild speculations of men who were giving a loose to their imaginations on such complicated questions of state. It was while preparing to fight Marmont he had to expose the futility of a loan,—it was on the heights of San Cristoval, on the field of battle itself, that he demonstrated the absurdity of attempting to form a Portuguese bank,—it was in the trenches of Burgos he dissected Funchal's and Villiers's schemes of finance, and exposed the folly of attempting the sale of church property,—it was at the termination of the retreat, that with a mixture of rebuke and reasoning, he quelled the proposal to live by forced requisitions; and on each occasion he showed himself as well acquainted with these subjects as he was with the mechanism of

* Mr. Sydenham, Mr. Stuart, MSS.

armies. Reform abuses, raise your actual taxes with vigor and impartiality, pay your present debt before you contract a new one, was his constant reply to the propositions for loans. And when the English ministers pressed the other plans, which, besides the bank, included a re-coinage of dollars into cruzados, in other words, the depreciation of the silver standard, he, with an unsparing hand, laid their folly bare. The military and political state of Portugal, he said, was such that no man in his senses, native or foreigner, would place his capital where he could not withdraw it at a moment's notice. When Massena invaded that country, unreasonable despondency had prevailed amongst the ministers, now they seemed to have a confidence as wild as their former fear; but he who knew the real state of affairs, he who knew the persons who were expected to advance money, he who knew the relative forces of the contending armies, the advantages and disadvantages attending each, he who knew the absolute weakness of the Portuguese frontier as a line of defence, could only laugh at the notion that the capitalists would take gold out of their own chests to lodge it in the chests of the bank, and eventually in those of the Portuguese treasury, a treasury deservedly without credit. The French armies opposed to him in the field (he was then on San Christoval) were just double his own strength, and a serious accident to Ballesteros, a rash General with a bad army, would compel the Anglo-Portuguese force to retire into Portugal, and the prospects of the campaign would vanish; and this argument left out of the question any accident which might happen to himself or General Hill. Portugal would, he hoped, be saved, but its security was not such as these visionaries would represent it.

They had proposed also a British security in jewels for the capital of their bank, and their reasonings on this head were equally fallacious. This security was to be strengthened by collecting the duties on wines exported from Portugal to England, and they had not even ascertained whether those duties were conformable to the treaty with England. Then came the former question. Would Great Britain guarantee the capital of the subscribers whether Portugal was lost or saved? If the country should be lost, the new possessors would understand the levying of duties upon wines as well as the old; would England make her port-drinkers pay two duties, one for the benefit of the bank capitalists, another for the benefit of French conquerors? If all these difficulties could be got over, a bank would be the most efficacious mode in which England could use her credit for the benefit of Portugal; but all the other plans proposed were mere spendthrift schemes to defray the expenses of the war, and if the English

government could descend to entertain them, they would fail, because the real obstacle, scarcity of specie, would remain.

A nation desirous of establishing public credit should begin, he said, by acquiring a revenue equal to its fixed expenditure, and must manifest an inclination to be honest by performing its engagements with respect to public debts. This maxim he had constantly enforced to the Portuguese government, and had they minded it instead of trusting to the fallacious hope of getting loans in England, the deficiency of their revenue would have been made up without imposing new taxes, and even with the repeal of many which were oppressive and unjust. The fair and honest collection of taxes which ought to exist would have been sufficient. For after protracted and unsparing exertions, and by refusing to accept their paper money on any other condition in his commissariat transactions, he had at last forced the Portuguese authorities to pay the interest of that paper and of their exchequer bills, called "*Apolicies grandes*;" and the effect had been to increase the resources of the government, though the government had even in the execution evinced its corruption. Then showing in detail how this benefit had been produced, he traced the mischief created by men whom he called the *sharks* of Lisbon and other great towns, meaning speculators, principally Englishmen, whose nefarious cupidity led them to cry down the credit of the army-bills and then purchase them, to the injury of the public and of the poor people who furnished the supplies.

A plan to re-coin Spanish dollars and gain eight in the hundred of pure silver, which they contained above the Portuguese cruzado, he treated as a useless fraud. In Lisbon, where the cruzado was current, some gain might perhaps be made; but it was not certain, and foreigners, Englishmen and Americans, from whom the great supplies were purchased, would immediately add to their prices as the coin deteriorated. The operations and expenditure of the army were not confined to Lisbon, nor even to Portugal, and the cruzado would not pass for its nominal value in Spain; thus the greatest inconvenience would result from a scheme at the best unworthy of the British government. In fine, the reform of abuses, the discontinuance of useless expenses, economy and energy, were the only remedies.

Such was his reasoning, yet it had little effect on his persecutors; for when his best men were falling by hundreds, his brightest visions of glory fading on the smoky walls of Burgos, he was again forced to examine and refute anew voluminous plans of Portuguese finance, concocted by Funchal and Villiers, with notes by Vansittart. And these projects were accompanied with com-

plaints that frauds had been practised on the custom-house, and violence used towards the inhabitants by the British commissaries, whose misconduct was the real cause of the financial distresses of Portugal. The patient industry of genius was never more severely taxed!

Wellington repelled the charge of exactions and frauds as applied to the army; he showed that to reform the custom-house so as to prevent frauds, had been his unceasing recommendation to the Portuguese government; that he had in detail taught that government how to remedy the evils they complained of; how to increase their customs, how to levy their taxes, and arrange their whole financial system in a manner to render their revenues equal to their expenses, without that oppression and injustice which they were in the habit of practising: for the extortions and violence complained of, were perpetrated by the Portuguese commissariat, and yet the troops of that nation were starving. Having exposed Funchal's ignorance of financial facts in detail, and challenged him to prove his charges against the British army, he discussed the great question of selling the crown and church lands, proposed as a substitute for that economy and reform of abuses which he so long, so often, and so vainly had pressed upon the Regency. The proposal was not quite new. "I have already," he observed, "had before me a proposition for the sale, or rather transfer, of crown lands to the creditors of the Junta de Viveres; but these were the uncultivated lands in Alemtejo, and I pointed out the improbability that anybody would take such lands in payment, and the injury to the public credit by making the scheme public if not likely to be successful. My opinion is, that there is nobody in Portugal possessed of capital who entertains, or who ought to entertain, such an opinion of the state of affairs in the Peninsula, as to lay out his money in the purchase of crown lands. The loss of a battle, not in the Peninsula even, but elsewhere, would expose his estate to confiscation, or at all events to ruin, by a fresh incursion of the enemy. Even if any man could believe that Portugal is secure against the invasion of the enemy, and his estate and person against the '*violence, exactions, and frauds*' (these were Funchal's words respecting the allied army) of the enemy, he is not, during the existence of the war, according to the Conde de Funchal's notion, exempt from those evils from his own countrymen and their allies. Try this experiment; offer the estates of the crown for sale, and it will be seen whether I have formed a correct judgment on this subject." Then running with a rapid hand over many minor though intricate fallacies for raising the value of the Portu-

guese paper-money, he thus treated the great question of the church lands.

First, as in the case of crown lands, there would be no purchasers; nothing could render it palatable to the clergy, and the influence of the church would be exerted against the allies, instead of being as hitherto strongly exerted in their favor. It would be useless if the experiment of the crown lands succeeded, and if that failed, this sale could not succeed; but the attempt would alienate a powerful party in Spain as well as in Portugal. Moreover, if it should succeed and be honestly carried into execution, it would entail a burthen on the finances of five in the hundred on the purchase-money for the support of the ecclesiastical owners of the estates. The best mode of obtaining for the state eventually the benefit of the church property would be to prevent the monasteries and nunneries from receiving novices, because, in course of time, the Pope might consent to the sale of the estates, or the nation might assume possession when the ecclesiastical corporations became extinct. It was no disadvantage to Spain or Portugal that large portions of land should be held by the church. The bishops and monks were the only proprietors who lived on their estates, and spent the revenues amongst the laborers; until the habits of the new landed proprietors changed, the transfer of landed property from the clergy to the laymen would be a misfortune.

This memoir, sent from the trenches of Burgos, quashed Funchal's projects; but that intriguer's object was to get rid of his brother's opponents in the Regency by exciting powerful interests against them; wherefore, failing in this proposal, he ordered Redondo, now Marquis of Borba and Minister of Finance, to repair to the Brazils, intending to supply his place with one of his own faction. Wellington and Stuart were at this time doggedly opposed by Borba, but as the credit of the Portuguese treasury was supported by his character for probity, they forbade him to obey the order, and represented the matter so forcibly to the Prince Regent, that Funchal was severely reprimanded for his audacity. And it was amidst these vexations that Wellington retreated, and in such destitution, that he declared all former distress for money had been slight in comparison of his present misery!* British naval stores had been trucked for corn in Egypt; and the British ministers, finding Russia was gathering specie from all quarters, desired Mr. Stuart to prevent English and American merchant captains carrying coin away from Lisbon; a remedial measure, indicating their total ignorance of the nature of commerce. It was not attempted to be enforced; but then it was they transmitted their plan of supplying

* Correspondence with Mr. Stuart, MS.

the army by requisitions, the particulars of which ~~may~~ be best gathered from the answers to it.

Mr. Stuart, firm in opposition, shortly observed, that it was by avoiding and reprobating such a system, although pursued alike by the natives and by the enemy, that the British character and credit had been established so firmly as to be of the greatest use in the operations of the war. Wellington entered more deeply into the subject.

Nothing, he said, could be procured from the country in the mode proposed by the ministers' memoir, unless resort was also had to the French mode of enforcing their requisitions. The proceedings of the French armies were misunderstood. It was not true that the French never paid for supplies. They levied contributions where money was to be had, and with this paid for provisions in other parts; and when requisitions for money or clothing were made, they were taken on account of the regular contributions due to the government. Heavier indeed they were than even a usurping government was entitled to demand; yet it was a regular government account, and the British could not adopt a similar plan without depriving their allies of their own legitimate resources. Requisitions were enforced by terror. A magistrate was ordered to provide for the troops, who would, in case of failure, take the provisions, and punish the village or district in a variety of ways. Were it expedient to follow this mode of requisition, there must be two armies, one to fight the enemy, one to enforce the requisitions; for the Spaniards would never submit quietly to such proceedings. The conscription gave the French a more moral description of soldiers; and if this second army was provided, the British troops could not be trusted to inflict an exact measure of punishment on a disobedient village; they would plunder it as well as the others, but their principal object would be to get at and drink as much liquor as they could, and then destroy all property falling in their way; the objects of their mission, the bringing supplies to the army, and inflicting an exact measure of punishment on the magistrates or district, would not be accomplished at all. Moreover the holders of supplies in Spain, being unused to commercial habits, would regard payment for these requisitions by bills of any description to be rather worse than the mode of contribution followed by the French, and would resist it as forcibly. And upon such a nice point did the contest hang, that if they accepted the bills, and discovered how to get cash for them by discounting high, it would be the most fatal blow possible to the credit and resources of the British army in the Peninsula. The war would then soon cease.

The memoir asserted, that though Sir John Moore had been well furnished with money, the Spaniards would not give him provisions; and this was urged as an argument for enforcing requisitions. But to say Moore was furnished with money, itself the index to the ministers' incapacity, Wellington told them was not true. "Moore had been even worse furnished than himself. That General had borrowed a little, a very little, money at Salamanca, but had no regular supply for the military chest until the army had nearly reached Coruña; and the Spaniards were not very wrong in their reluctance to meet his wants, for the debts of his army were still unpaid in the latter end of 1812." In fine, supplies could only be procured from the country by payment on the spot, or soon after the transaction, unless the Spanish government would yield a part of the government contributions, and the revenues of the royal domains, to be received from the people in kind at a reasonable rate. This he had obtained in the province of Salamanca, and the system might be extended to other provinces, as the legitimate government was re-established. But this only partially met the evil: it would give some supplies cheaper than they could otherwise be procured, but they must afterwards be paid for at Cadiz in specie, and less money would come into the military chest, which, as before noticed, was only supported by mercantile speculations.

Such were the discussions forced upon Wellington when all his faculties were wanted on the field of battle, and such was the hardiness of his intellect to sustain the additional labor: such also were the men, calling themselves statesmen, who then wielded the vast resources of Great Britain. The expenditure of that country for the year 1812 was above one hundred millions; the ministers who controlled it were yet so ignorant of the elementary principles of finance, as to throw upon their General, amidst the clangor and tumult of battle, the task of exposing such fallacies. And to reduce these persons from the magnitude of statesmen to their natural smallness of intriguing debaters, is called political prejudice! But though power may enable men to trample upon reason for a time, they cannot escape ultimate retribution; she re-assumes her sway, and history delivers them to the justice of posterity. Perverse, however, as the English ministers were, the Portuguese and Spanish governments were more so; and the temper of the Spanish rulers was at this time of even greater importance, because of Napoleon's misfortunes. The opportunity given to strike a decisive blow at his power in the Peninsula demanded an early and vigorous campaign, and the experience of 1812 had taught Wellington no aid could be had from Spain, unless a change was

made in the military system. Hence when assured the French armies had taken winter quarters, he resolved in person to urge the Cortes to give him the real, as well as nominal, command of their troops.

During the past campaign, and especially after Abisbal had resigned, the weakness of the Spanish government became more deplorable; nothing was done to ameliorate the military system; an extreme jealousy actuated the Cortes and the Regency, and when the former offered Wellington the command of their armies, Mr. Wellesley advised him to accept it, were it only to give a point upon which Spaniards true to the English alliance and the aristocratic cause might rally in case of reverse. The disobedience of Ballesteros had been indeed promptly punished, but the vigor of the Cortes was the result of offended pride, not of sound policy, and the retreat of the allies was the signal for a renewal of those dangerous intrigues which the battle of Salamanca had arrested without crushing.

Lord Wellington reached Cadiz the 24th of December. He was received without enthusiasm, yet with honor, and his presence seemed agreeable to the Cortes and the people; party passions subsided, and his ascendancy of mind procured patient hearing, even when in private he urged the leading men to turn their attention to the war, to place in abeyance their factious disputes, and above all things to uphold the Inquisition, lest they should drive the church party into the arms of the enemy. His exhortations had no effect, save to encourage the serviles to look more to England; yet they did not prevent the Cortes yielding to him the entire control of fifty thousand men, to be paid from the English subsidy, with an engagement that he should have power of dismissal and the right to recommend for promotion; that no general should be appointed without his knowledge and consent, and that all orders and reports should pass through him.

At his recommendation also the Spanish forces were reorganized in four numbered active armies and two reserves. The Catalans were to form the first army. Elio's troops, including the divisions of Sarsfield, Duran, Bassecour, the Empecinado, Roche, and Villa Campa, received the name of the second army. The forces in the Morena, formerly under Ballesteros, constituted the third army, under Del Parque. The troops of Estremadura, Leon, Galicia, and the Asturias, including Morillo's, Penne Villemur's, Downie's and Carlos d'España's separate divisions, were called the fourth army, and given to Castaños, whose appointment to Catalonia was cancelled, and his former dignity of Captain-General in Estremadura and Galicia restored. The partidas of Longa, Mina, Porlier,

and the other chiefs in the northern provinces, were afterwards united to this army as separate divisions.

Abispa, made Captain-General of Andalusia, commanded the first reserve, and Lacy, replaced in Catalonia by Copons, was ordered to form a second reserve in the neighborhood of San Roque. Such were the new dispositions; but when Wellington had completed this important negotiation, some inactivity was for the first time discovered in his own proceedings. His stay was prolonged without apparent reason, and it was whispered that if he resembled Cæsar, Cadiz had provided him with a Cleopatra; yet he soon returned to the army by Lisbon, where he was greeted with very great honors and the most unbounded enthusiasm, especially by the people. His departure from Cadiz revived all the political dissensions. The liberals and serviles became more rancorous, and the executive was always on the side of the latter, the majority of the Cortes on the side of the former; neither enjoyed the confidence of the people nor of the allies, and the intrigues of Carlotta advanced: a desire to make her sole Regent was manifested, and Sir Henry Wellesley, tired of fruitless opposition, remained neuter. One cause of this feeling was her vehemence against the insurgents at Buenos Ayres, another the disgust given to the merchants of Cadiz by the diplomatic proceedings, or rather intrigues, of Lord Strangford with that revolted state. The Princess denounced England as pursuing a smuggling policy, and not without truth, for Wellington's counsels had been unheeded. Lord Castlereagh offered indeed a new mediation, the old commission being to proceed under the restriction of not touching at Mexico, whither a new mission, composed entirely of Spaniards, was to proceed, accompanied by an English agent without an ostensible character. This proposal ended as the others had done, and jealousy of England increased.

Early in 1813, Carlotta, diligently served by Pedro Souza, had gained adherents amongst the liberals of the Cortes, for she was ready to sacrifice even the rights of her posterity; and as she promised to maintain all ancient abuses, the clergy and serviles were not averse to her. The decree to abolish the Inquisition, now the test of political party, passed on the 7th of March, and the Regency were ordered to have it read in the churches. The clergy of Cadiz resisted the order. They intimated their refusal through the medium of a public letter, and the Regency encouraged them by removing the Governor of Cadiz, Admiral Valdez, a known liberal and opponent of the Inquisition, appointing in his stead Alos, a warm advocate for that horrid institution. But in the vindication of official power the Spaniards are prompt and decided. Augustin

Arguelles moved, and it was instantly carried, that the sessions of the extraordinary Cortes should be declared permanent, with a view to measures worthy of the nation and to prevent the evils with which the state was menaced by the opposition of the Regency and the clergy to the Cortes. A decree was then proposed for suppressing the actual Regency and replacing it with a provisional government, to be composed of the three eldest councillors of state. This being conformable to the constitution was carried by a majority of eighty-six to fifty-eight, while another proposition, that two members of the Cortes publicly elected should be added to the Regency, was rejected as an innovation by seventy-two against sixty-six. The Councillors Pedro Agar, Gabriel Ciscar, and the Cardinal Bourbon, Archbishop of Toledo, were then installed as Regents.

A committee, appointed to consider how a government felt by all parties to be imperfect could be improved, now recommended that the Cardinal Archbishop, who was of the blood-royal, should be President of the Regency, leaving Carlotta's claims unnoticed; and as Ciscar and Agar had been formerly removed from the Regency for incapacity, it was generally supposed the intention was virtually to make the Archbishop sole Regent. Soon, however, Carlotta's influence was again felt; for a dispute arising in the Cortes between what were called the Americans and the Liberals about the annual Acapulco ship, twenty of the former joined her party, and it was resolved that Ruiz Pedron, a distinguished opponent of the Inquisition, should propose her as the head of the Regency. When almost sure of a majority the scheme was detected, and the people, who liked her not, became so furious that her partisans were silenced. The opposite side proposed on the instant that the provisional Regency should be made permanent, which was carried; and thus, chance rather than choice ruling, an old prelate and two imbecile councillors were intrusted with the government, and factious intrigues and rancor exploded more frequently as the pressure from above became slight.

More than all others the clergy were violent and daring, yet the Cortes was not to be frightened. Four canons of cathedrals were arrested in May, and orders were issued to arrest the Archbishop of St. Jago and many bishops, because of a pastoral letter published against the abolition of the Inquisition; for according to the habits of their craft of all sects, they deemed religion trampled under foot when the power of levying money and spilling blood was denied to ministers professing the faith of Christ. Nor did the English influence fail to suffer; the democratic spirit advanced hastily, the Cadiz press teemed with writings to excite the people

against the designs of the English Cabinet, and to raise a hatred of the British General and his troops. They were not all falsehoods, nor unsuccessful, because the desire to preserve the Inquisition displayed by Wellington and his brother, although arising from military considerations, accorded too much with the known tendency of the English Cabinet's policy not to excite the suspicions of the whole liberal party. The Bishops of Logroño, Mondonedo, Astorga, Lugo and Salamanca, and the Archbishop of St. Jago were arrested; several other bishops fled to Portugal, and were there protected as martyrs in the cause of legitimacy and despotism. The Bishop of Orense and the ex-Regent Lardizabal had before this escaped to Algarve and the *Tras os Montes*, and from the latter the prelate kept up an active intercourse with Galicia, where the Cortez were far from popular; indeed the flight of the bishops created general anger, for the liberal party was stronger in the *Isla* than in other parts, and by a curious anomaly the military were generally their partisans while the people were partisans of the clergy. Nevertheless the seeds of freedom, though carelessly sown by the French on one side and the Cortes on the other, took deep root, and have since sprung up into strong plants in due time to burgeon and bear fruit.

When the bishops fled from Spain, Gravina, the Pope's nuncio, assumed such a tone that the good offices of Sir Henry Wellesley could only for a time screen him from the vengeance of the Cortes, and finally the latter, encouraged by the English newspapers, dismissed him and sequestered his benefices. He also took refuge in Portugal, and with the expelled clergy sought to render the Cortes odious in Spain. He formed a strict alliance with the Portuguese nuncio, Vicente Machiechi, and they interfered, not with the concerns of Spain only, but with the Catholics in the British army, and even extended their intrigues to Ireland; whereupon, as justice was never the English policy towards that country, alarm pervaded the Cabinet, and the nuncio, protected when opposed to the Cortes, was considered troublesome and indiscreet regarding the Irish.

This state of feud led to a crisis of a formidable and decisive nature. Many persons in the Cortes held secret intercourse with Joseph, being desirous to acknowledge his dynasty if he would accede to the general policy of the Cortes in civil government. He had, as already shown, organized a large native force, and the coasts of Spain and Portugal swarmed with French privateers manned with Spanish seamen; the victory at Salamanca withered these resources for the moment, but Wellington's failure at Burgos and retreat revived them and gave a heavy shock to public confidence in the power of England; a shock which the misfortunes of Napoleon

in Russia only could have prevented from being fatal. That wonderful man had indeed, with the activity and energy which made him the foremost hero of the world, raised a fresh army to march into the heart of Germany; but for this he was forced to withdraw so many old soldiers from Spain, that the French could no longer act on the offensive. This stayed the Peninsular cause on the brink of a precipice, for in that curious and authentic work called "*Bourrienne and his Errors*," it appears that early in 1813, the ever-factious Conde de Montijo, then a general in Elio's army, secretly made proposals to pass over with his forces to the King; and soon afterwards the whole army of Del Parque, then advancing into La Mancha, made offers of a like nature.

They were negotiating with Joseph when the Emperor's orders compelled him to take up the line of the Duero; but being thus advertised of French weakness, feared to continue their negotiations; Wellington then advanced, and as this feeling for the intrusive monarch was not general, resistance revived with the British successes. But if Napoleon, victorious in Russia, had strengthened his army, this defection would have taken place and have been followed by others; the King at the head of a Spanish army would have reconquered Andalusia, Wellington would have been confined to the defence of Portugal, and England would not have purchased the independence of that country with her own permanent ruin. This conspiracy is not, however, related with entire confidence, because no trace of it is to be found in the King's papers taken at Vittoria. Nevertheless there are abundant proofs that the work called "*Bourrienne and his Errors*," inasmuch as it relates to Joseph's transactions in Spain, was compiled from his correspondence; many documents also taken at Vittoria were lost at the time, and in a case involving lives he would probably have destroyed the proofs of a treason which had failed. Napoleon in his memoirs speaks of secret negotiations with the Cortes about this time, and he is corroborated by the correspondence of the British embassy at Cadiz and by the intrigues against British influence.

CHAPTER II.

Political state of Portugal—Wellington's difficulties—Improper conduct of some English ships of war—Piratical violence of a Scotch merchantman—Disorders in the military system—Irritation of the people—Misconduct of the magistrates—Wellington and Stuart grapple with the disorders of the administration—The latter calls for the interference of the British government—Wellington writes a remarkable letter to the Prince Regent and requests him to return to Portugal—Partial amendment—The efficiency of the army restored, but the country remains in an unsettled state—The Prince unable to quit the Brazils—Carlotta prepares to come alone—Is stopped by the interference of the British government—An auxiliary Russian force is offered to Lord Wellington by Admiral Greig—The Russian Ambassador in London disavows the offer—The Emperor Alexander proposes to mediate between England and America—The Emperor of Austria offers to mediate for a general peace—Both offers are refused.

IN Portugal the English General desired to apply all resources to the war; but he had to run counter to the habits of the people and the government, to detect the intrigues of subordinates and of higher powers, to oppose factious men in the local government, to stimulate the sluggish apathy, and combat the often honest obstinacy of those who were not factious. And all this without power of recompensing or chastising, and even while forced to support those who merited rebuke against the more formidable intriguers of the court of Brazil; for the best men of Portugal were in the local government, and he was not foiled so much by them as by the sluggish national system, dull for good purposes, but vivacious for mischief. And at Rio Janeiro the personal intrigues fostered by the peculiarly scheming disposition of the English envoy, Lord Strangford,—the weak yet dogged habits of the Prince,—and the meddling nature and violence of Carlotta, stifled all great national views. There also the Souzas, a family deficient neither in activity nor talent, were predominant, and the object of all was to stimulate the government in Portugal against the General's military policy. To this had been opposed the influence of the English government, but that resource was dangerous, and only to be resorted to in extremities. When to all these things is added a continual struggle with the knavery of merchants of all nations, his difficulties must be admitted, his indomitable vigor, his patience, and his extraordinary mental resources admired. An instructive lesson in the study of nations is thus presented. Wellington was not simply a general who with greater or less means was to plan military operations, leaving to others the settling of political difficulties. He had also to regenerate a people, and force them against the current of their prejudices and usages in a

dangerous and painful course; to teach at once the populace and the government; to infuse spirit and order without the aid of rewards or punishments, and to excite enthusiasm through the medium of corrupt oppressive institutions, while he suppressed all tendency towards revolution. Thus only could he maintain the war, and as it was beyond the power of man to continue such a struggle for any length of time, he was more than ever anxious to gather strength for a decisive blow, which the enemy's situation now rendered possible. It may indeed be wondered at that he so long supported the pressure, and more than once he was like to yield, and would have yielded if fortune had not offered him certain happy military chances, yet such as few but himself could have profited from. In 1810, on the Busaco mountain, and in the lines, the military success was rather over the Portuguese government than the enemy; at Santarem, in 1811, the glory of arms scarcely compensated for the destitution of the troops; at Fuentes Onoro, and on the Caya, after the second unsuccessful siege of Badajos, the Portuguese army had nearly dissolved; and the astonishing sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, in 1812, were necessary to save the cause from dying of inanition. Even then the early deliverance of Andalusia was frustrated, and time, more valuable than gold or life in war, was lost; the enemy became the strongest in the field, and despite the victory of Salamanca, the political evils were felt in the repulse from Burgos, and the double retreat from that place and Madrid. Accumulated mischiefs were now to be encountered in Portugal.

It has been shown how obstinately the Regency opposed the plans of financial reform; for thinking Portugal out of danger, and tired of their British allies, they had no desire to aid, nor indeed any wish to see Spain delivered from her difficulties.* To harass the English General, and drive him away, or force him, and through him his government, to grant them loans or new subsidies, was their object. But Wellington knew that Portugal could, and was resolved it should, find resources within itself. Wherefore, after the battle of Salamanca, when a fresh subsidy was demanded, he would not listen; and when that scheme, already exposed, of feeding, or rather starving their troops, through the medium of a treaty with the Spanish government, was proposed, he checked the shameful and absurd plan by applying a part of the money in the chest of aids, intended for the civil service, to the relief of the Portuguese troops. Yet the Regency did not entirely fail in their aim; many persons dependent upon the subsidy were thus deprived of their payments, their complaints hurt the British credit, and

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MS.

the British influence with the people, whose faithful attachment to the alliance no intrigues had hitherto been able to shake, was reduced.*

Into every branch of government the Regency then infused their own captious spirit. They complained falsely that General Campbell had insulted the nation by turning some Portuguese residents publicly out of Gibraltar in company with Jews and Moors; they refused the wheat delivered to them in lieu of their subsidy, saying it was not fit for food, though the English troops were then living on the same grain, though their own troops were glad to get it, and no other was to be had. When a wooden jetty was to be thrown in the Tagus for the convenience of landing stores, they supported one Caldas, a rich proprietor, in his refusal to permit the trees wanted to be felled, alleging the rights of property, although he was to be paid largely, and they had themselves, then and always, disregarded the rights of property—especially when poor men were concerned—seizing upon whatever was required for the public service or the support of their own irregularities, without payment, and in shameful violation of law and humanity.†

The commercial treaty, and the proceedings of the Oporto Wine Company, an oppressive corporation, unfair in all its dealings, irresponsible, established in violation of that treaty, and supported without regard either to the interests of the Prince Regent or his British allies, furnished them also with continual subjects for disputes, and nothing was too absurd or too gross for their interference. Under the management of Mr. Stuart, who had vigorously enforced Wellington's plans, their paper money had obtained a reasonable and increasing circulation, their custom-house resources had increased, the expenses of their navy and arsenal had been reduced, and it was evident that an extensive vigorous application of the same principles would overcome all financial difficulties; but there were too many personal interests, too much shameful profit made to permit such a reform. The naval establishment, instead of being entirely transferred to the Brazils, was continued in the Tagus, and with it the arsenal, as its natural appendage; and though the infamous Junta de Viveres had been suppressed by the Prince Regent, the government, under pretext of paying its debts, still disbursed ten thousand pounds a month in salaries to men whose offices had been formally abolished.

About this time also the opening of the Spanish ports in those provinces from whence the enemy had been driven, deprived Lis-

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MS.

† Wellington's Correspondence, MS.

bon of a monopoly of trade enjoyed for the last three years. Then the Regency, feeling the consequent diminution of revenue, with inexpressible effrontery insisted that the grain imported by Wellington, which had saved their army and nation from famine, and furnished their own subsidy, should enter the public warehouses under specific regulations, and pay duty for so doing. And so tenacious were they, that he was forced to menace a formal appeal to the English Cabinet; for he knew the subordinate officers, knavish in the extreme, would have sold the secrets of the army magazines to the speculators. And the latter, in whose hands the furnishing of the army would under the new plan of the English ministers be placed, being thus accurately instructed of its resources, would have regulated their supplies with great nicety, so as to have famished the soldiers and paralyzed the operations at the greatest possible expense. But the supply of the army under any system was now extremely precarious; for besides the activity of the American privateers, English ships of war used to capture vessels secretly employed in bringing provision, under licenses from Mr. Stuart and Mr. Forster. The captain of a Scotch merchant vessel, engaged in the same trade, and having no letter of marque, had the piratical insolence to seize in the very mouth of the Tagus an American vessel sailing under a license from Mr. Forster; thus violating at once the license of the English minister, the independence of Portugal, and the general law of nations.* The American traders were dismayed, the Portuguese government justly indignant, and the matter altogether embarrassing, because no measure of punishment could be inflicted without exposing the secret system which had been the principal support of the army. Congress, however, soon passed an act, forbidding neutrals to ship flour in the American ports; and this blow, chiefly aimed at the Portuguese ships, following upon the non-importation act, and coupled with the illegal violence of the English vessels, nearly dried up the source of supply, and threw the army principally upon the Brazil trade; which by the negligence of the Admiralty was, as before noticed, exposed to the enterprise of the United States privateers.

During Wellington's campaign in Spain, the military administration of Portugal was in the hands of the Regency, and all the ancient abuses revived. The army in the field received no succors, the field artillery disappeared, the cavalry was in the worst condition, the infantry reduced in numbers, the equipments scarcely fit for service, the spirit of the men waning to despondency; there was no money in the military chest, no recruits in the dépôts, and

* Mr. Stuart, MSS.

the transport service was neglected altogether. Beresford's severity did not stop desertion, because want, the parent of crimes, had proved too strong for fear; the country swarmed with robbers, no fault was punished by the Regency, and everywhere knaves triumphed. All persons whose indolence or timidity led them to fly from the defence of their country to the Brazils, were there received and cherished as martyrs to their personal affections for the Prince; they were lauded, and called victims to the injustice of Beresford and the encroachments of the English officers. The Prince also permitted officers possessing family interest to retire from service, retaining their pay and rank; thus offering a premium for bad men to enter the army, with intent to quit it in this disgraceful manner. Multitudes did so; promotion came too quickly, and the nobility, whose influence over the poorer classes was great, and might have been beneficially employed to keep up the zeal of the men, disappeared rapidly from the regiments; the foul stream of knaves and cowards thus continually pouring through the military ranks, destroyed all cohesion, and tainted everything as it passed.

Interests of the same nature polluted the civil administration. Rich people, especially those of great cities, evaded taxes and disobeyed regulations for the military service, and during Wellington's absence, English under-commissaries, and that retinue of villains which invariably gather on the rear of armies, being in some measure freed from the dread of his vigilance and vigor, violated orders in a daring manner. The husbandmen were cruelly oppressed, their farming animals were carried off to supply food for the army, and agriculture was thus stricken at the root; the breeds of horned cattle and of horses rapidly and alarmingly decreased, and butchers' meat was scarcely to be procured even for the troops who remained in Portugal.

These irregularities, joined to the gross misconduct of the military detachments and convoys of sick men on all the lines of communication, produced great irritation, and enabled factious persons to declaim with effect; writings and stories were circulated against the troops, the real outrages were exaggerated, others were invented, and the drift of all was to render the English odious to the nation at large. Nor was this confined to Portugal. Agents were busy to the same purpose in London, and when the enthusiasm which Wellington's presence at Lisbon had created amongst the people was known at Cadiz, the press there teemed with abuse. Divers agents of the democratic party in Spain came to Lisbon to aid the Portuguese malcontents, libels accusing Wellington of a design to subjugate the Peninsula for his own ambitious views were published; and as consistency is never regarded on

such occasions, it was insinuated that he encouraged the excesses of his troops, out of personal hatred to the Portuguese people. The old baseness of sending virulent anonymous letters to him was also revived. In fine, the republican spirit had got beyond Spain, and the Portuguese Regency, terrified at its approach, appealed to Mr. Stuart for the assistance of England to check its formidable progress. They forbade Portuguese newspapers to admit observations on the political events in Spain, they checked the introduction of Spanish democratic publications, they ordered their diplomatists at Cadiz to encourage writings of an opposite tendency, and support the election of deputies known for their love of despotism. This last measure was, however, baffled by the motion of Arguelles, which rendered the old Cortes permanent. And Mr. Stuart, judging the time unfavorable, advised reserve in the exertion of power against democrats, until military successes, which the state of the continent and the weakness of the French troops in Spain promised, should enable the victors to put down such doctrines with effect; advice which was not unmeaning, as shall be hereafter shown.

All these malignant efforts Wellington viewed with indifference. "Every leading man," he said, "was sure to be accused of criminal personal ambition, and if he was conscious of the charge being false, it did no harm." His position was however rendered more difficult, and other mischiefs existed of long standing, and springing from a different source, but of a more serious character; for the spirit of captious discontent had reached the inferior magistracy, who endeavored to excite the people against the military generally. Complaints came in from all quarters of outrages on the part of the troops, some too true, many false or frivolous; and when courts-martial for the trial of the accused were assembled, the magistrates refused to attend as witnesses, because Portuguese custom rendered such an attendance degrading, and by Portuguese law a magistrate's written testimony was efficient in courts-martial. In vain they were told the English law would not punish men upon such testimony; in vain it was pointed out that the country would be ravaged if the soldiers discovered they might do evil with impunity. It was offered to send in each case lists of Portuguese witnesses to be summoned by the native authorities; but the magistrates answered that this method was insolent, and with sullen malignity continued to accumulate charges against the troops, to refuse attendance in the courts, and to call the soldiers, their own as well as the British, "licensed spoliators of the community."

For a time the generous nature of the poor people resisted these

combining causes of discontent ; neither real injuries nor exaggerations, nor the falsehood of those who attempted to stir up wrath, produced any visible effect upon the great bulk of the population ; yet by degrees affection for the British cooled, and Wellington expressed his fears that a civil war would commence between the Portuguese people on the one hand, and the troops of both nations on the other. Wherefore his activity was redoubled to draw, while he could still control affairs, all the military strength to a head, and make such an irruption into Spain as would establish a new base of operations beyond the power of fatal dissensions. But what made him tremble was the course which the misconduct of the Portuguese government and the incapacity of the English Cabinet forced upon the native furnishers of supplies.

Those persons coming in winter to Lisbon to have bills paid, could get no money, and in their distress sold the bills to speculators ; the Portuguese holders at a discount of fifteen, the Spanish holders at a discount of forty in the hundred. The credit of the chest immediately fell, prices rose in proportion, and as no military enterprise could carry the army beyond the flight of this harpy, and no revenues could satisfy its craving, the contest must have ceased if Mr. Stuart had not found a momentary partial remedy, by publicly guaranteeing the payment of the bills, and granting interest until they could be taken up. The expense was thus augmented, yet the increase fell short of the enhanced cost of supplies which this restricted practice of the bill-holders caused, and of two evils the least was chosen. It may seem strange that such transactions should belong to the history of the military operations in the Peninsula, that it should be the General's instead of the Minister's task to encounter such evils, and to find the remedy. It was so however, and no adequate notion of Wellington's herculean labors can be formed without an intimate knowledge of his financial and political difficulties.

The Portuguese military disorders had brought Beresford to Lisbon while the siege of Burgos was still in progress, and now, under Wellington's direction, he strained every nerve to restore the army to its former efficient state. To recruit the regiments of the line, he disbanded all the militiamen fit for service, replacing them with fathers of families ; to restore the field artillery, he embodied all the garrison artillerymen, calling out the ordenança gunners to man the fortresses and the coast batteries ; the worst cavalry regiments he reduced to render the best more efficient, but this arm never attained any excellence in Portugal. Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart at the same time grappled with the civil administration, and their efforts produced a considerable im-

crease of revenue. The Regency could not deny this beneficial effect, nor the existence of the evils they were urged to remedy; they admitted that their custom-house system was incomplete, that their useless navy consumed large sums wanted for the army; and that the taxes, especially the "*Decima*," were partially collected and unproductive, because the rich people in the great towns, who had benefited largely by the war, escaped the imposts which the poor people in the country, who had suffered most from the war, paid. They acknowledged also that while the soldiers' hire was in arrears, the transport service neglected, and all persons having just claims upon the government suffered severe privations, the tax-gatherers were allowed to keep a month's tribute in their hands, even in the districts close to the enemy; but they would not alter their system, and Borba, the Minister of Finance, combated Wellington's plans in detail with such unusual obstinacy, that it became evident nothing could be obtained save by external pressure. Wherefore, as the season for military operations approached, Mr. Stuart called upon Lord Castlereagh to bring the power of England to bear at once upon the court of Rio Janeiro; and Wellington, driven to extremity, sent the Portuguese Prince Regent one of those clear, powerful and nervous statements, which left those to whom they were addressed no alternative but submission, or an acknowledgment that sense and justice were to be disregarded.

"I call your Highness's attention," he said, "to the state of your troops and of all your establishments; the army of operations has been unpaid since September, the garrisons since June, the militia since February, 1812. The transport service has never been regularly paid, and has received nothing since June. To these evils I have in vain called the attention of the local government, and I am now going to open a new campaign with troops to whom greater arrears are due than when the last campaign terminated, although the subsidy from Great Britain, granted especially for the maintenance of those troops, has been regularly and exactly furnished; and although it has been proved that the revenue for the last three months has exceeded by a third any former quarter. The honor of your Highness's arms and the cause of your allies are thus seriously affected; the uniform refusal of the governors of the kingdom to attend to any one of the measures which I have recommended, either for permanent or temporary relief, has at last obliged me to go as a complainant into your Royal Highness's presence, for here I cannot prevail against the influence of the chief of the treasury.

"I have recommended the entire reform of the customs system,

and it has only been partially carried into effect. I have advised a method of really collecting the taxes, and of making the rich merchants and capitalists pay the tenth of their annual profits as an extraordinary contribution for the war. I declare that no person knows better than I do the sacrifices and the sufferings of your people, for there is no one for the last four years has lived so much amongst those people; but it is a fact, sir, that the great cities, and even some of the smallest places have gained by the war, and the mercantile class has enriched itself; there are divers persons in Lisbon and Oporto who have amassed immense sums. Now your government is, both from remote and recent circumstances, unable to draw resources from the capitalists by loans; it can only draw upon them by taxes. It is not denied that the regular tributes nor the extraordinary imposts on the mercantile profits are evaded; it is not denied that the measures I have proposed, vigorously carried into execution, would furnish the government with pecuniary resources; and it remains for that government to inform your Highness why they have neither enforced my plans, nor any others which the necessity of the times calls for. They fear to become unpopular, but such is the knowledge I have of the people's good sense and loyalty, such my zeal for the cause, that I have offered to become responsible for the happy issue, and to take upon myself all the odium of enforcing my own measures. I have offered in vain!

"Never was a sovereign in the world so ill served as your Highness has been by the Junta de Viveres, and I zealously forwarded your interests when I obtained its abolition; and yet, under a false pretext of debt, the government still disburse fifty millions of reis monthly, on account of that board. It has left a debt undoubtedly, and it is of importance to pay it, although not at this moment; but let the government state in detail how these fifty millions granted monthly have been applied; let them say if all the accounts have been called in and liquidated? who has enforced the operation? to what does the debt amount? has it been classified? how much is really still due to those who have received instalments? finally, have these millions been applied to the payment of salaries instead of debt? But were it convenient now to pay the debt, it cannot be denied that to pay the army which is to defend the country, to protect it from the sweeping destructive hand of the enemy, is of more pressing importance. The troops will be neither able nor willing to fight if they are not paid."

Then touching upon the abuse of permitting the tax-gatherers to hold a month's taxes in their hands, and upon the opposition he met with from the Regency, he continued:—

"I assure your Royal Highness I give my advice to the governors of the kingdom, actuated solely by an earnest zeal for your service, without any personal interest. I can have none relative to Portugal, and none with regard to individuals, for I have no private relation with and scarcely am acquainted with those who direct or would wish to direct your affairs. Those reforms recommended by me, and which have at last been partially effected in the custom-house and the arsenal, in the navy, the payment of the interest of the national debt, and the formation of a military chest, have succeeded, and I may therefore say that the other measures I propose would have similar results. I am ready to allow that I may deceive myself on this point, but certainly they are suggested by a desire for the good of your service; hence in the most earnest and decided manner I express my ardent wish, and it is common to all your faithful servants, that you will return to the kingdom and take charge yourself of the government."

These vigorous measures to bring the Regency to terms succeeded only partially. In May they promulgated a new system for the collection of taxes which relieved the financial pressure on the army for the moment, but did not content Wellington, because it was made to square with old habits and prejudices, and thus left the roots of all the evils alive and vigorous. Every moment furnished new proofs of the hopelessness of regenerating a nation through the medium of a corrupted government; and a variety of circumstances more or less serious continued to embarrass the march of public affairs. In the *Madeiras* the authorities vexatiously prevented the English money agents from exporting specie, and their conduct was approved of at Rio Janeiro. At *Bisao*, in Africa, the troops mutinied for want of pay, and in the *Cape de Verde Islands* disturbances arose from the over-exaction of taxes; for when the people were weak the Regency was vigorous, pliant only to the powerful. These commotions were trifling and soon ended, yet expeditions were sent against the offenders in both places, and the troops thus employed immediately committed far worse excesses and did more mischief than that which they were sent to suppress. At the same time several French frigates, finding the coast of Africa unguarded, cruised successfully against the Brazil trade, and aided the American privateers to contract the already too straitened resources of the army.

Notwithstanding these difficulties the exertions of the British officers had restored the numbers, discipline and spirit of the Portuguese army. Twenty-seven thousand excellent soldiers were again under arms and ready to commence the campaign, although the national discontent was daily increasing; and indeed the very

feeling of security created by the appearance of such an army rendered the citizens at large less willing to bear the inconveniences of the war. Distant danger never affects the multitude, and the billeting of troops, who from long habits of war little regarded the rights of the citizens in comparison with their own necessities, being combined with requisitions and with a recruiting system becoming every year more irksome, formed an aggregate of inconveniences intolerable to men who desired ease, and no longer dreaded to find an enemy on their hearthstones. The powerful were more affected than the poorer classes, because of their indolent habits; but their impatience was aggravated by being debarred of the highest situations, or supplanted by British interference; and, unlike those of Spain, the Portuguese nobles had lost little of their hereditary influence. Discontent was thus extended widely, dread of French power was gone, unlimited confidence in the strength and resources of England had succeeded; and this confidence, to use the words of Mr. Stuart, "being opposed to the irregularities which have been practised by individuals, and to the difference of manners and of religion, placed the British in the singular position of a class whose exertions were necessary for the country, but who for the above reasons were in every other respect as distinct from the natives as persons with whom, from some criminal cause, it was necessary to suspend communication." Hence he judged that the return of the Prince Regent would be a proper epoch for the British to retire from all situations in Portugal not strictly military; for if anything should delay that event, the time was approaching when the success of the army and the tranquillity of the country would render it necessary to yield to the first manifestations of national feeling. In fine, notwithstanding the great benefits conferred upon the Portuguese by the British, the latter were, and it will always be so on like occasions, regarded by the upper classes as a captain regards galley slaves: their strength was required to speed the vessel, but they were feared and hated.

To Portugal the Prince would not return, but Carlotta being resolute to come, her apartments were finished, and her valuable effects actually arrived. Ill health was the pretext, the real object to be near Spain; for indefatigable, and of a violence approaching insanity, she had sold even her plate and jewels to raise money wherewith to corrupt the leading members of the Cortes; and if that should not promise success, she proposed to distribute the money amongst the Spanish partidas, to obtain military support for her schemes. Fortunately the Prince, dreading the intriguing advisers of his wife, would not suffer her to quit Rio Janeiro until the wish of the British Cabinet upon the subject was known; and that was

so decidedly adverse, it was thought better to do without the Prince himself, than to have him accompanied by Carlotta: so both remained in the Brazils, and this formidable cloud passed away, yet left no sunshine on the land.

It was at this period that the offer of a Russian auxiliary force, before alluded to, was made to Wellington by Admiral Greig, and accepted by him to the amount of fifteen thousand men; yet it led to no result, because the Russian ambassador in London declared the Emperor knew nothing of it! Alexander then proposed to mediate in the dispute between Great Britain and America, but the English ministers, while lauding him as a paragon of magnanimity and justice in regard to the war against Napoleon, remembered the armed neutrality and quadruple alliance, and wisely declined trusting England's maritime pretensions to his faithless, grasping policy. Neither would they listen to Austria, who at this time, probably as a cloak, desired to mediate a general peace. Amidst this political confusion the progress of the military preparations was visible; and, contemporary with the Portuguese, the Spanish troops, under Wellington's influence and providence, acquired more consistence than they had ever before possessed: a mighty power was in arms. But the flood of war which the English General finally poured into Spain, and the channels by which he directed the overwhelming torrent, cannot be described until the political situation of Joseph, and that secondary warfare which occupied the French armies while Wellington was re-organizing his power, are related.

CHAPTER III.

Napoleon's embarrassed position—His wonderful activity—His designs explained—The war in Spain becomes secondary—Many thousand old soldiers withdrawn from the armies—The partidas become more disciplined and dangerous—New bands are raised in Biscay and Guipuscoa, and the insurrection of the northern provinces creeps on—Napoleon orders the King to fix his quarters at Valladolid, to menace Portugal, and to reinforce the army of the north—Joseph complains of his generals, and especially of Soult—Napoleon's magnanimity—Joseph's complaints not altogether without foundation.

IN war it is not so much positive strength as relative situations which gives the victory. Joseph's position thus judged was weak; he could not combine the materials at his disposal, nor wield them when combined by others. France had been suddenly thrown into a new and embarrassing attitude, more embarrassing even than it

appeared to her enemies, or than her robust, warlike proportions, nourished by twelve years of victory, indicated. Napoleon, the most indefatigable and active of mankind, turned his enemy's ignorance on this head to profit; for scarcely was it known that he had reached Paris by that wise, that rapid journey from Smorghoni, which baffled his enemies' hopes and left them only the power of foolish abuse—scarcely was his arrival at Paris known to the world, when a new and enormous army, the constituent parts of which he had with his usual foresight created while yet in the midst of victory, was in march from all parts to unite in the heart of Germany. On this magical rapidity he rested his hopes to support the tottering fabric of his empire; but his design was, while presenting a menacing front on every side, so to conduct his operations, that, if he failed in his first stroke, he might still contract his system without violent concussion. His military power was rather broken and divided than lessened, for the number of men employed in 1813 was greater than in 1812; in the latter four hundred thousand, in the former more than seven hundred thousand, and twelve hundred field-pieces, were engaged on different points, exclusive of the armies in Spain.* On the Vistula, the Oder, the Elbe, he had powerful fortresses and garrisons, or rather armies, of strength and goodness to re-establish his ascendancy in Europe, if he could re-unite them into one system by placing a new host in the centre of Germany: thus also he could retain those allies who felt the attraction of his enemy's success.

But this was a gigantic contest, for his adversaries, deceiving their subjects with false promises of liberty, had brought whole nations against him. More than eight hundred thousand men were in arms in Germany alone; secret societies were in activity all over the continent; and in France a conspiracy was commenced by men who desired rather to see their country a prey to foreigners and degraded with a Bourbon king, than independent and glorious under Napoleon. Wherefore that great monarch had now to make application on an immense scale, of the maxim which prescribes a skilful offensive as the best defence, and he had to sustain two warfares: the one depending principally upon moral force to hold the vast fabric of his former policy together; the other to meet material exigencies. The first, infinitely the most important, was to influence Germany and France, and the Peninsular contest sunk at once into an accessory. In this state he required constant rapid intelligence from Spain, because the ascendancy he yet maintained over the world by his astounding genius might have been broken in a moment if Wellington suddenly abandoned the Penin-

* Imperial muster rolls, MS.

sula to throw his army or a part of it into France. For then would have been deranged all the Emperor's calculations; then would the defection of all his allies have ensued; then would he have been compelled to concentrate both his new forces and his Spanish troops for defence, abandoning all his fortresses, and his still large, though scattered veteran armies in Germany and Poland. It would have been destructive of his moral power to have commotions raised on his own threshold when he was assuming the front of a conqueror in Germany.

To obviate this danger, or to meet it, alike required that his armies in the Peninsula should adopt a new and vigorous system, under which, relinquishing all real offensive movements, they should yet appear daring and enterprising while preparing to abandon their former conquests. But the Emperor wanted to fortify his young levies with veterans from Spain, and therefore recalled the Young Guard, and with it many thousand men and officers of the line most remarkable for courage and conduct. In lieu the reserve at Bayonne entered Spain, being replaced with another, again to be replaced in May by further levies; and twenty thousand conscripts were appropriated for immediate service. Thus weakened in numbers, considerably so during the transit, the armies were also in quality deteriorated at a critical moment, for Wellington was being powerfully reinforced, and the partidas, augmented by English supplies liberally and now usefully dealt out, were in the northern parts acting in concert with the naval squadrons; during the operations of the French on the Tormes, they had revived insurrection in Navarre and Biscay, where recent gross abuses of military authority had been perpetrated by some of the local commanders.

The French troops were indeed only relieved from the crushing pressure of Wellington's operations to struggle in the meshes of the guerilla and insurrectional warfare. Nor was its importance now to be measured by former efforts. The chiefs, more docile to the suggestions of the British chief, possessed fortified posts and harbors, their bands were swelling to the size of armies, their military knowledge of the country, and of the French system of invasion, was more matured, their dépôts better hidden, and they could at times bear the shock of battle on nearly equal terms.* New and large bands of a far more respectable and influential kind were also formed or forming in Navarre and Biscay; where insurrectional juntas were organized of men from the best families voluntarily enrolled, and not obnoxious, like the partidas, for rapine and violence. In Biscay alone several battalions, each mustering a

* Duke of Feltre's Official Correspondence, MS.

thousand men, were in the field, and the communication with France was so intercepted, that the Minister of War only heard of Joseph receiving his despatches of the 4th of January on the 18th of March, and then through the medium of Suchet! The contributions could no longer be collected, the magazines could not be filled, the fortresses were endangered, the armies had no base of operations, the insurrection was spreading through Aragon, and the bands of the interior were also increasing in numbers and activity. The troops, sorely pressed for provisions, were widely disseminated and everywhere occupied, and each general was averse to concentrate his own forces or aid his neighbor. In fine, the problem was become extremely complicated, and Napoleon only seems to have seized the true solution.

When informed by Caffarelli of the state of affairs in the north, he thus wrote to the King: "Hold Madrid only as a point of observation; fix your quarters, not as monarch, but as general of the French forces, at Valladolid; concentrate the armies of the south, of the centre, and of Portugal; the allies will not, and indeed cannot make any serious offensive movement for several months,—wherefore it is your business to profit from their forced inactivity, to put down the insurrection in the northern provinces, to free the communication with France, and re-establish a good base of operations before the commencement of another campaign, that the French army may be in condition to fight the allies if the latter advance towards France." Very important indeed did Napoleon deem this object, and so earnest was he to have constant and rapid intelligence, that couriers and their escorts were to be despatched twice a week, travelling day and night at the rate of a league an hour. Caffarelli also was to be reinforced, even by the whole army of Portugal, if it was necessary, to effect the immediate pacification of Biscay and Navarre; and while this pacification was in progress Joseph was to hold the rest of his forces in a position offensive towards Portugal, making Wellington feel that his whole power was required on the frontier; that neither his main body, nor any considerable detachment, could safely embark to disturb France, and that he must cover Lisbon strongly on the frontier, or expect to see the French army menacing that capital. These instructions, well understood and vigorously executed, would certainly have put down the insurrection in the rear of the King's position. And the spring would then have seen that monarch at the head of ninety thousand men, having their retreat upon France clear of all impediments, and consequently free to fight the allies on the Tormes, the Duero, the Pisuerga, and the Ebro.

Joseph, unable to view the matter thus, would not make his

kingly notions subservient to military science, nor his military movements to an enlarged policy. Neither did he perceive that his beneficent notions of government were misplaced amidst the din of arms. Napoleon's orders were imperative, but the principle of them escaped Joseph; he was not even acquainted with the true state of the northern provinces, nor would he at first credit it when told to him; hence while his thoughts were intent upon his Spanish political projects, and the secret negotiations with Del Parque's army, the *partidas* and insurgents became masters of all his lines of communication in the north.* The Emperor's orders, despatched early in January, and reiterated week after week, only arrived the end of February, and their execution did not take place until the end of March, and then imperfectly; the time thus lost was irreparable; and yet, as Napoleon reproachfully observed, the bulletin which revealed the extent of his disasters in Russia might alone have taught the King what to do. But Joseph was nearly as immovable in his resolutions as Napoleon; the firmness of the one being, however, founded upon extraordinary sagacity, while the other's rested on the want of that quality; regarding opposition as a disloyal malevolence, he judged the refractory generals to be enemies to the Emperor and to himself. Reille, Caffarelli, Suchet, alike incurred his displeasure, and the Minister of War also, because of a letter in which he rebuked the King for having removed Souham from command.

Feltre's style, as towards a monarch, was offensive. Joseph attributed it to the influence of Soult, and complaining to the Emperor, said—"The Duke of Dalmatia or himself must quit Spain. At Valencia he had forgotten his injuries, suppressed his just indignation, and instead of sending Soult to France had given him the direction of the operations, hoping shame for the past, combined with his avidity for glory, would urge him to extraordinary exertions; nothing of the kind had happened. Soult was not to be trusted. Restless, intriguing, ambitious, he would sacrifice everything to his own advancement, and possessed that sort of talent which would lead him to mount a scaffold when he thought he was ascending a throne, because he would want courage to strike when the crisis arrived." Then, with a coarse sarcasm, he acquitted him "of treachery at the passage of the Tormes, because there fear alone operated to prevent him from bringing the allies to a decisive action; but he was treacherous, and probably connected with the conspiracy of Malet at Paris."

It was with such language Joseph assailed one of the greatest commanders and most faithful servants of his brother; and thus

* King's Correspondence; MS.

greeted that brother on his arrival at Paris after the disasters of Russia. In the most calm and prosperous state these charges might have excited jealous wrath in the strongest mind; but when the Emperor had just lost his great army, and found the smoking embers of an extinguished conspiracy at his palace gates; when his friends were failing, his enemies accumulating, it seemed scarcely possible these accusations should not have ruined Soult; yet they did not even ruffle the temper of Napoleon. Magnanimous as sagacious, he smiled at Joseph's anger, removing Soult from Spain because, thus at feud with the King, he could not act beneficially; but he made him commander of the Imperial Guard, and afterwards selected him from all his generals to retrieve affairs when Joseph was driven from the Peninsula.

It has been shown that when Wellington took winter quarters, the French occupied a line stretching from Valencia to the foot of the Gallician mountains. Suchet, on the extreme left, was opposed by the allies at Alicant. Soult, commanding the centre, had his head-quarters at Toledo, having a detachment near the Sierra Morena watching Del Parque and two others in the valley of the Tagus. Of these last one was at Talavera, one on the Tietar; the first observed Morillo and Penne Villemur, who from Estremadura menaced the bridges on the Tagus; the second watched Hill at Coria. From the Tietar the French communicated by the Gredos mountains with Avila, where Foy's division of the army of Portugal was posted, partly for the sake of food, partly to watch Bejar and the upper Tormes; because the allies, possessing the pass of Bejar, might have suddenly united north of the mountains, and, breaking the French line, have fallen on Madrid. On the right of Foy, Reille's army occupied Salamanca, Ledesma, and Alba, on the Lower Tormes—Valladolid, Toro, and Tordesillas, on the Duero—Benevente, Leon, and other points, on the Esla. Behind the right of this great line, Caffarelli's army had retaken its old positions; and the army of the centre was fixed as before in and around Madrid, its operations being bounded north of the Tagus by the mountains which invest that capital, and south of that river by the districts of Aranjuez, Tarancon, and Cuença.

Joseph issued a royal regulation, marking the extent of country which each army was to forage, and ordered a certain and considerable revenue to be collected by the civil authorities for the support of his court. The subsistence of the French armies was thus made secondary to the revenue of the crown, and soldiers, in a time of insurrectional war, were to obey Spanish civilians; an absurdity heightened by the peculiarly active, vigorous, and prompt military method of the French, as contrasted with the dilatory,

improvident, promise-breaking, and visionary system of the Spaniards. Hence, scarcely was the royal regulation issued, when the generals broke through it in a variety of ways, and the King, as usual, became involved in very acrimonious disputes. If he ordered one to detach troops in aid of another, he was told he should rather send additional troops to the first. If he reprimanded a general for raising contributions contrary to the regulations, he was answered that the soldiers must be fed; and always the authority of the prefects and intendants was disregarded, in pursuance of Napoleon's orders. For that monarch continually reminded his brother, that as the war was carried on by the French armies, their interests were paramount; that the King of Spain could have no authority over them, and must never use his military authority as lieutenant of the empire in aid of his kingly views; for with those the French soldiers could have nothing to do—their welfare could not be confided to Spanish ministers, whose capacity was by no means apparent, and whose fidelity was not certain.*

In reply, Joseph again pleaded his duties towards his subjects, and his sentiments, explained with feeling and great beneficence of design, were worthy of all praise abstractedly, but totally inapplicable, because the Spaniards were not his subjects; they were his inveterate enemies, and it was impossible to unite the vigor of war with the benevolence of a paternal monarch. All his policy was vitiated by this fundamental error, which arose from inability to view any subject largely, for his military operations had a like defect; and though he was acute, courageous, and industrious in details, he never grasped the whole at once. Men of this character, conscious of labor and good intentions, are commonly obstinate; but their qualities, useful under the direction of an able chief, lead to mischief when they become chiefs themselves; for in matters of great moment, and in war especially, it is not the actual but the comparative importance of operations which should determine the choice of measures; and, when all are important, judgment of the highest kind is required; judgment which no man ever possessed more largely than Napoleon, and which Joseph did not possess at all. He neither comprehended his brother, nor would accept advice from those whose capacity approached that of the Emperor. When every general complained of insufficient means, instead of combining their forces to press in mass against the decisive point, he disputed with each, and demanded additional succors for all; at the same time repeating and urging his own schemes upon Napoleon, whose intellect was so immeasurably greater than

* King's Correspondence, MS.

his own. The insurrection in the northern provinces he treated as a political question, attributing it to the people's anger at seeing the ancient supreme council of Navarre dismissed, and some members imprisoned by a French general: a cause very inadequate to the effect. Nor was his judgment truer with respect to time. He proposed, if a continuation of the Russian war should prevent the Emperor from sending more men to Spain, to make Burgos the royal residence, to transport there the archives, and all that constituted a capital; then to have the provinces behind the Ebro, Catalonia excepted, governed by himself, through the medium of his Spanish ministers, and as a country at peace, while those beyond the Ebro should be given up to the generals as a country at war.

In this state his civil administration would, he said, remedy the evils inflicted by the armies, would conciliate the people by keeping all the Spanish families and authorities in safety and comfort, would draw all those who favored his cause from all parts of Spain, and would encourage that attachment to his person which he believed many Spaniards to entertain. And while he declared the violence and injustice of the French armies to be the sole cause of the protracted resistance of the Spaniards—a declaration false in fact, that violence being only one of many causes—he continually urged the necessity of beating the English before pacifying the people. As if it were possible, off-hand, to beat Wellington and his veterans, imbedded as they were in the strong country of Portugal, while British fleets, with troops and succors of all kinds, hovering on both flanks of the French, were feeding and sustaining the insurrection of the Spaniards in their rear. Napoleon was willing enough to drive the English from the Peninsula, and tranquillize the people by a regular government; but with profound knowledge of war, of politics, and of human nature, he judged the first could only be done by a methodical combination, in unison with that rule of art which prescribes the establishment and security of the base of operations; security which could not be obtained if the benevolent visions of the King were to supersede military vigor. He laughed in scorn when his brother assured him that the Peninsulars, with all their fiery passions, their fanaticism, and their ignorance, would receive an equable government as a benefit from the hands of an intrusive monarch, before they had lost all hope of resistance by arms.

Joseph was not however totally devoid of grounds for his opinions. He was deeply affected by the misery he witnessed; his Spanish ministers were earnest and importunate, and many French generals gave him too much reason to complain of their violence.

The length and mutations of the war had created a large party willing enough to obtain tranquillity at the price of submission, while others were, as we have seen, not indisposed—if he would hold the crown on their terms—to accept his dynasty, as one essentially springing from democracy, in preference to the despotic, base, and superstitious family which the nation was called upon to uphold. It was not unnatural therefore for him to desire to retain his capital while the negotiations with Del Parque's army were still in existence; it was not strange that he should be displeased with Soult after reading that Marshal's honest but offensive letter; and certainly it was highly creditable to his character as a man and as a king, that he would not silently suffer his subjects to be oppressed by the generals.

“I am in distress for money,” he often exclaimed to Napoleon, “such distress as no king ever endured before; my plate is sold, and on state occasions the appearance of magnificence is supported by false metal. My ministers and household are actually starving, misery is on every face, and men, otherwise willing, are thus deterred from joining a king so little able to support them. My revenue is seized by the generals for the supply of their troops, and I cannot as a King of Spain, without dishonor, partake of the resources thus torn by rapine from subjects whom I have sworn to protect; I cannot be King of Spain and General of the French; let me resign both, and live peaceably in France. Your Majesty does not know what scenes are enacted; you will shudder to hear that men, formerly rich and devoted to our cause, have been driven out of Zaragoza, and denied even a ration of food. The Marquis Cavallero, a councillor of state, minister of justice, and known personally to your Majesty, has been thus used. He has been seen actually begging for a piece of bread!”

If this Cavallero was the old minister of Charles the 4th, no misery was too great a punishment for his tyrannical rule under that monarch; yet it was not from the French it should have come; and Joseph's distress must have been severe, because that brave and honest man, Jourdan, a Marshal of France, Major-General of the armies, and a personal favorite of the King, complained that the non-payment of his appointments had reduced him to absolute penury, and after borrowing till his credit was exhausted, he could with difficulty procure subsistence.* It is now time to continue the secondary warfare, which being spread over two-thirds of Spain, and simultaneous, must be classed under two heads; namely, the operations north, and the operations south of the Tagus.

* Jourdan's Correspondence, MS.

CHAPTER IV.

Operations south of the Tagus—Eroles and Codrington seek to entrap the Governor of Tarragona—They fail—Sarsfield and Villa Campa unite, but disperse at the approach of Pannetier and Severoli—Suchet's position—Great force of the allies in his front—The younger Soult engages the Spanish cavalry in La Mancha—General Daricau marches with a column towards Valencia—Receives a large convoy and returns to La Mancha—Absurd rumors about the English army rife in the French camp—Some of Lord Wellington's spies detected—Soult is recalled—Gazan assumes the command of the army of the south—Suchet's position described—Sir John Murray takes the command of the Anglo-Sicilian troops at Alicante—Attacks the French post at Aleo—His want of vigor—He projects a maritime attack on the city of Valencia, but drops the design because Lord William Bentinck recalls some of his troops—Remarks upon his proceedings—Suchet surprises a Spanish division at Yecla, and then advances against Murray—Takes a thousand Spanish prisoners in Villena—Murray takes a position at Castalla—His advanced guard driven from Biar—Second battle of Castalla—Remarks.

OPERATIONS SOUTH OF THE TAGUS.

In December, 1812, Copons became Captain-General of Catalonia instead of Eroles, but his arrival being delayed, the province was not relieved from Lacy's mischievous sway until February, 1813, when Eroles, taking the temporary command, re-established the head-quarters at Vich. The French, being then unmolested save by the English ships, passed an enormous convoy to France, but Eroles was not long idle. Through a double spy he sent a forged letter to the governor of Tarragona, desiring him to detach men with carts to transport stores from Sitjes; at the same time pretending a design to invade the Cerdaña, which brought a movable column to that quarter, he, with Manso and Villamil, by forced marches reached Torre dem barra, and met the British squadron. The intention was to cut off the French detachment on its march to Villa Nueva, and then to attack Tarragona; but fortune rules in war: the governor received a letter from Maurice Mathieu of a different tenor from the forged letter, and, with all haste regaining his fortress, balked this well-contrived plan.

Sarsfield, at enmity with Eroles, was then combining his operations with Villa Campa, and they menaced Alcanitz in Aragon; but Pannetier, who was at Teruel to watch Villa Campa and protect Suchet's communications, immediately marched to Daroca, Severoli came from Zaragoza to the same point, and the Spaniards, alarmed by their junction, dispersed. Sarsfield then returned to Catalonia, Bassecour and the Empecinado remained near Cuença, and Villa Campa, as usual, hung upon the northern skirts of the Albaracin mountain, ready to pounce on the Ebro or the Guadal-

quiver, as advantage might offer. Suchet was disquieted. He could not draw reinforcements from Catalonia, because Napoleon, true to his principle of securing the base of operations, forbade him to weaken the army there, and Montmarie's brigade was detached from Valencia to preserve the communication between Saguntum and Tortosa. Aragon, his place of arms and principal magazine, being infested by Mina, Duran, Villa Campa, the Empecinado, and Sarsfield, was becoming daily more unquiet, wherefore Pannetier's brigade remained between Segorbé and Daroca, to aid Severoli. Thus, although the armies of Aragon and Catalonia mustered more than seventy thousand men—that of Aragon alone having forty thousand, with fifty field pieces—Suchet could not fight with more than sixteen thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and perhaps thirty guns, beyond the Xucar. His right flank was always liable to be turned by Requeña, his left by the sea, and his front was menaced by fifty thousand men, of which three thousand were cavalry, with fifty pieces of artillery.

The component parts of this force were the Anglo-Sicilian army, eighteen thousand, including Whittingham's and Roche's divisions, Elio's army, twelve thousand, exclusive of the divisions of Bassecour, Villa Campa, and the Empecinado, which, though detached, belonged to him, Del Parque's army, reinforced by new levies from Andalusia, on paper twenty thousand. Numerically this was a formidable power, if it had been directed in mass against Suchet; but on his right Soult, from Toledo, watched Del Parque, and the defection of the latter was then being negotiated with the King. A column from Madrid was also sent to Cuença, which drew off Bassecour and the Empecinado, and those chiefs harassed Joseph's positions. Early in January, Soult's brother, seeking to open a communication with Suchet by Albacete, defeated some of Elio's cavalry with the loss of fifty men, and pursued them until they rallied on their main body under Freyre, and offered battle with nine hundred horsemen in front of the defile leading to Albacete. Soult, disliking their appearance, then turned off to the right and joined a French post established in Valdapeña, at the foot of the Morena, where some skirmishes had also taken place with Del Parque's cavalry. The elder Soult thus learned that Freyre, with two thousand five hundred horsemen, covered all the roads leading from La Mancha to Valencia and Murcia; that Elio's infantry was at Tobarra and Hellin, Del Parque's head-quarters at Jaen; that the passes of the Morena were guarded, and magazines formed at Andujar, Linares, and Cordoba, while on the other side of La Mancha, the Empecinado had come to Hinojoso with fifteen hundred

horsemen, and the column sent from the army of the centre was afraid to encounter him.

These dispositions, and the strength of the Spaniards, not only prevented the younger Soult from penetrating into Murcia, but delayed the march of a column under Daricau, destined to communicate with Suchet, and bring up the detachments, baggage, and stores which the armies of the south and centre had left at Valencia. The scouting parties of both sides, however, met at different points, and on the 27th of January, a sharp cavalry fight happened at El Corral, in which the French commander was killed, and the Spaniards, though far the most numerous, were defeated. Meanwhile Daricau, whose column had been reinforced, reached Utiel, opened the communication with Suchet by Requena, cut off some small parties of the enemy, and then continuing his march, received a great convoy, consisting of two thousand fighting men, six hundred travellers, and the stores and baggage belonging to Soult's and the King's armies. This convoy had marched for Madrid by the way of Zaragoza, but was recalled when Daricau arrived; and under his escort, aided by a detachment of Suchet's army, placed at Yniesta, it reached Toledo the latter end of February safely, though Villa Campa came down to the Cabriel river to trouble the march.

During these different operations, numerous absurd reports, principally originating in the Spanish and English newspapers, obtained credit in the French armies; such as, that Sir Henry Wellesley and Infantado had seized the government at Cadiz—that Clinton had, by an intrigue, got possession of Alicante—that Ballesteros had shown Wellington secret orders from the Cortes not to acknowledge him as generalissimo, or even as a grandee—that the Cortes had removed the Regency because the latter permitted Wellington to appoint intendants and other officers to the Spanish provinces—that Hill had devastated the frontier and retired to Lisbon, though forcibly opposed by Morillo—that a nephew of Ballesteros had raised the standard of revolt—that Wellington was advancing, and troops had been embarked at Lisbon for a maritime expedition, with other stories of a like nature, which seem to have disturbed all the French generals save Soult, whose information as to the real state of affairs continued to be sure and accurate. He also detected four or five of Wellington's emissaries, one, a Portuguese officer on his own staff; another, called Piloti, who served and betrayed both sides; and an amazon called Francisca de la Fuerte, who, though only twenty-two years old, had already commanded a partida of sixty men with some success, and was now a spy. But in the latter end of February he was

recalled, and his command fell to Gazan, whose movements belong rather to the operations north of the Tagus. Wherefore, returning to Suchet, an exact notion of his resources and of the nature of the country shall be given.

Valencia, though nominally his stronghold, was not really so. All the defences constructed by the Spaniards were razed, and only the old walls and a small fortified post within the town, sufficient to resist a sudden attack, and capable of keeping the population in awe, were preserved; the place of arms was Saguntum, and between that and Tortosa he had two fortresses, Oropesa and Peniscola. Another line of communication, but for infantry only, was through Morella, a fortified post, to Mequinenza; and there were roads from Valencia and Saguntum, leading through Segorbé to Teruel, a fortified post, and from thence to Zaragoza by Daroca, another fortified post: these roads were eastward of the Guadalaviar.* Westward of that river Suchet had a line from Valencia to Madrid by Requena, which was also fortified. Now if the whole command be looked to, the forces were very numerous, but that command was wide, and in the field his army was not very numerous. Valencia was merely a point on hostile ground, maintained with a view of imposing upon the allies and drawing forth the resources of the country as long as circumstances would permit.

The proper line for covering the city and the rich country immediately around it, was on the Xucar, or rather beyond it, at San Felipe de Xativa and Moxente; where a double range of mountains afforded strong defensive positions, barring the principal roads leading to Valencia.† There Suchet had formed an intrenched camp, much talked of at the time, yet slighter than fame represented it; the real strength was in the natural formation of the ground, which was very rugged. In front of his left flank the coast road was blocked by the castle of Denia, but his right could be turned from Yecla and Almanza, through Cofrentes and Requena; and he was forced to keep strict watch and strong detachments always towards the defile of Almanza, lest Elio's army and Del Parque's should march that way. His intrenched camp was the permanent position of defence, but he sought to keep his troops more advanced; because the country in front was full of fertile valleys, or rather coves within the hills, which run in nearly parallel ranges and are remarkably rocky and precipitous, like walls. It was of great importance to command these coves, and as the principal point in front was the flourishing town of Alcoy, he occupied it, and from thence threw off smaller bodies to Biar, Castalla,

* Plan 6.

† Plan 5.

Ibi, and Onil, which were on the same strong ridge as the position covering the cove of Alcoy. On his right there was another plain, in which Fuente La Higuera, Villena and Yecla were delineated at opposite points of a triangle; and as this plain and the smaller valleys ministered to Suchet's wants, because of his superior cavalry, the subsistence of the French troops was eased, while the cantonments and foraging districts of the Sicilian army were contracted: the outposts of the allied army were, in fact, confined to a fourth and fifth parallel range of mountains, covering the towns of Eldar, Tibi, Nixona, and Villa Joyosa, on the sea-coast.

Suchet thus assumed an insulting superiority over an army apparently more numerous than his own. But outward appearances are deceitful in war; he was really the strongest, because want, ignorance, dissension and even treachery, were in his adversary's camps. Del Parque's army remained behind the Morena, Elio's was at Tobarra and Hellin, and of the Anglo-Sicilian army, the British only were available in the hour of danger. When Campbell quarrelled with Elio, the latter retired for a time towards Murcia, but after Wellington's journey to Cadiz, he again came forward; his cavalry entering La Mancha, skirmished with the younger Soult, and communicating with Bassecour and the Empecinado, delayed the progress of Daricau towards Valencia. Campbell then remained quiet, in expectation that Lord William would come with more troops; but in February, fresh troubles broke out in Sicily, and in the latter end of that month, Sir John Murray assumed the command at Alicant. Thus in a few months, five chiefs, with different views and prejudices, had successively arrived, and the army was still unorganized and unequipped for vigorous service. The Sicilians, Calabrese, and French belonging to it were eager to desert; one Italian regiment had been broken for misconduct by Maitland, the British and Germans were humiliated in spirit by inactivity; and the Spaniards under Whittingham and Roche were starving; for Wellington, knowing how the Spanish government, though receiving a subsidy, would, if permitted, throw off the feeding of their troops, forbade their being supplied from the British stores, and the Spanish intendants neglected them.*

Murray improved the equipment of the troops, and with the aid of Elio, put them in better condition. The two armies together furnished thirty thousand effective men, of which three thousand were cavalry, and they had thirty-seven guns; yet very inadequately horsed, and Whittingham's and Elio's cavalry were, from want of forage, nearly unfit for duty. The transport mules were hired at the enormous rate of one hundred and thirty thousand

* Appendixes 16, 17.

pounds annually; and yet the supply was bad, for here, as in all other parts of Spain, corruption and misuse of authority prevailed.* The rich sent their fine animals to Alicant for sanctuary, and bribed the alcaldes; the mules of the poor alone were pressed, the army was ill provided, and the country was harassed. But the troops of Whittingham and Roche could not be relieved, save by enlarging their cantonments; wherefore Murray, after some hesitation, resolved to drive the French from the mountains in his front, and following the plan of his Quartermaster-General, Donkin, designed, as the first step, to surprise fifteen hundred men which they had placed in Alcoy.

Five roads led towards the French positions. 1st. On the left the great road from Alicant, passing through Montforte, Elda, Sax, Villena, and Fuente de la Higuera, where it joins the royal road from Valencia to Madrid, which runs through Almanza. This way turned both the ridges occupied by the armies. 2d. A good road leading by Tibi to Castalla, from whence it sent off two branches on the left hand, one leading to Sax, the other through the pass of Biar to Villena; two other branches on the right hand went, the one through Ibi to Alcoy, the other through Onil to the same place. 3d. The road from Alicant to Xixona, a bad road leading over a steep rugged ridge of that name to Alcoy. At Xixona also there was a narrow way on the right hand through the mountains to Alcoy, which was followed by Roche when he attacked that place in the first battle of Castalla. 4th. A carriage-road running along the sea-coast as far as Villa Joyosa, from whence a narrow mountain-way leads to the village of Consentayna, situated in the cove of Alcoy, and behind that town.

On the 6th of March, the allied troops moved in four columns. On the left, one moved by Elda to watch the great Madrid road; on the right, one composed of Spanish troops moved under Colonel Campbell from Villa Joyosa to get to Consentayna, behind Alcoy; a third, under Lord Frederick Bentinck, issuing by Ibi, was to turn the French right; the fourth was to march from Xixona straight against Alcoy, and pursue the remainder of Habert's division, which was behind the town. Lord Frederick attacked in due time, but as Campbell did not appear the surprise failed; and when the French saw the main body winding down the Sierra in front of Alcoy, they retired, pursued by Donkin with the second battalion of the twenty-seventh regiment. The head of Lord Frederick's column was already engaged, the rear had not arrived, and the whole of Habert's division being concentrated a mile beyond Alcoy, offered battle; Murray, instead of pushing briskly forward, halted:

* General Donkin's papers.

and it was not until several demands for support had reached him that he detached the fifty-eighth to the assistance of the troops engaged, who had lost about forty men, chiefly of the twenty-seventh. Habert, fearing to be cut off by Consentayna, and seeing the fifty-eighth coming on, then retreated, and the allies occupied Alcoy. Murray's want of vigor did not escape the notice of the troops.

After this affair the armies remained quiet until the 15th, when Whittingham forced the French posts with some loss from Albayda; and Donkin, taking two battalions and some dragoons from Ibi, drove back their outposts from Rocayrente and Alsafara, villages situated beyond the range bounding the cove of Alcoy.* He re-passed the hills higher up with the dragoons and a company of grenadiers of the twenty-seventh under Captain Waldron, and returned by the main road to Alcoy, having in his course met a French battalion, through which the gallant Waldron broke with his grenadiers. Then Murray, after much vacillation, at one time resolving to advance, at another to retreat; thinking it impossible to force Suchet's intrenched camp and his second line behind the Xucar, a difficult river with muddy banks, believing also that the principal French magazines were at Valencia, he conceived the idea of seizing the latter by a maritime expedition. He thought the garrison, estimated at eight hundred infantry and one thousand cavalry, would be unable to resist, and that the inhabitants would rise; Suchet could not then detach men enough to quell them without exposing himself to defeat on the Xucar, and if he moved with all his force he could be closely followed by the allies and driven upon Requena.

On the 18th, Roche's division, reinforced by some troops from Elio's army, and a British grenadier battalion, was selected for the maritime attack; the rest of the army was concentrated at Castalla, with the exception of Whittingham's troops, who remained at Alcoy, for Suchet was said to be advancing, and Murray resolved to fight him. But to form a plan, and to execute it vigorously, were with Murray very different things. An able officer in the cabinet, he had no quality of a general in the field. His indecision was remarkable. On the morning of the 18th he resolved to fight in front of Castalla, in the evening he assumed a weaker position behind that town, abandoning the command of a road running from Ibi, in rear of Alcoy, by which Whittingham might have been cut off: when the strong remonstrances of his Quartermaster-General induced him to relinquish this ground, he adopted a third position, neither so strong as the first nor so defective as the last. In this manner affairs wore on until the 26th, when Roche's division and the grenadier battalion marched to Alicant to embark, with orders

* Plan 5.

if they failed at Valencia, to seize and fortify Cullera, at the mouth of the Xucar; and if this also failed, to besiege Denia. But now the foolish ministerial arrangements about the Sicilian army worked out their natural results. Wellington, though permitted to retain the Anglo-Sicilian army in Spain beyond the period assigned by Lord William, had not the full command; he was clogged with reference to the state of Sicily until the middle of March; then he became master, but this was still unknown to Lord William and to Murray. Thus there were three commanding officers—Wellington for the general, Murray for the particular operations, and Lord William was empowered to increase or diminish the troops, and even upon emergency to withdraw the whole. And now continued dissensions in Sicily, the King having suddenly resumed the government, made him recall two thousand of the best troops, and amongst them the grenadier battalion designed to attack Valencia, wherefore that enterprise fell to the ground.

Treating of this event, Murray, or some person writing under his authority, makes the following observations: "The most careful combination could not have selected a moment when the danger of such authority was more clearly demonstrated, more severely felt. Had these orders been received a very short time before, the allied army would not have been committed in active operations; had they reached Sir John Murray a week later, there is every reason to believe that the whole country from Alicant to Valencia would have passed under the authority of the allied army; and that Marshal Suchet, cut off from his magazines in that province and in Aragon, would have been compelled to retire through a mountainous and barren country on Madrid. But the order of Lord William Bentinck was peremptory, and the allied army, which even before was scarcely balanced, was now so inferior to the enemy that it became an indispensable necessity to adopt a system strongly defensive, and all hope of a brilliant commencement of the campaign vanished."*

Upon this curious passage it is necessary to remark: 1st. That Suchet's great magazines were not at Valencia, but at Saguntum; 2d. That from the castle of Denia the fleet would have been despatched, and the strong garrison of Saguntum could have reinforced the troops in Valencia; Montmarie's brigade, also, would soon have come up from Oropesa. These were doubtless contingencies not much to be regarded in bar of such an enterprise; but Suchet would not have been forced to retire by Requena upon Madrid; he would have retired to Liria, the road to which steered more than five miles clear of Valencia. He could have kept that

* Philippart's Military Calendar.

city in check while passing, in despite of Murray; and at Liria he would have been in his natural position, that is to say, in full command of his principal lines of communication. Moreover, however disagreeable to Suchet personally it might have been to be forced back upon Madrid, that event would have been extremely detrimental to the general cause, as tending to reinforce the King against Wellington. But the singular part of the passage quoted, is the assertion that the delay of a week in Lord William's order would have insured such a noble stroke against the French army. Lord William only required the troops to proceed in the first instance to Mahon. What a dull flagging spirit then was his, who dared not delay obedience to such an order even for a week!

The recalled troops embarked for Sicily the 5th of April, and Suchet, alarmed at the offensive position of the allies, which he attributed to the general state of affairs, because the King's march to Castile permitted all the Spanish armies of Andalusia to reinforce Elio, resolved to strike first; and with the greater avidity, because the Spanish General, Mijares, had been pushed with an advanced guard of three or four thousand men to Yecla, and was quite unsupported. This movement had been concerted in March with Murray, who was to occupy Villena, and be prepared to fall upon the French left if Mijares was attacked at Yecla; in return, the Spaniards were to fall on the French right if Murray was attacked.* Elio neglected to strengthen his division at Yecla with cavalry, which he had promised to do, nor did Murray occupy Villena in force; nevertheless Mijares remained at Yecla, Elio, with the main body, occupied Hellin, and the cavalry were posted on the side of Albacete until the departure of the troops for Sicily; Roche then joined the army at Castalla, and Elio's main body occupied Elda and Sax, to cover the main road from Madrid to Alicante. Wherefore on the night of the 11th, Suchet suddenly assembled sixteen battalions of infantry, ten squadrons of cavalry, and twelve pieces of artillery, at Fuente la Higuera, and marched straight upon Caudete, while Harispe's division, by a cross road, endeavored to surprise the Spaniards at Yecla. The latter retired fighting towards Jumilla, by the hills, but the French artillery and skirmishers followed close, and the Spaniards were pierced in the centre; one part broke and fled, the other part surrendered. Two hundred were killed, and fifteen hundred, including wounded, fell into the hands of the victors, who lost eighty men and officers.

Suchet's movement was known on the night of the 10th at

* Donkin, MSS.

Castalla. All the Anglo-Sicilian army was in position, because Whittingham had come from Alcoy, leaving only a detachment on that side; and while Harispe was defeating Mijares at Yecla, Suchet remained at Caudete with two divisions and the heavy cavalry, in order of battle, lest Murray should advance by Biar and Villena. The latter town, possessing an old wall and a castle, was occupied by the regiment of Velez-Malaga, a thousand strong, and in the course of the day Murray also came up with the allied cavalry and a brigade of infantry. Here he was joined by Elio without troops, and when towards evening, Harispe's fight being over, and the prisoners secured, Suchet advanced, Murray retired with the cavalry through the pass of Biar, leaving his infantry, under Colonel Adam, in front of that defile. He wished also to draw the Spanish garrison from Villena, but Elio would not suffer it, and yet during the night, repenting of his obstinacy, came to Castalla, entreating Murray to carry off that battalion. It was too late; Suchet had broken the gates of the town the evening before, and the castle, with the best equipped and finest regiment in the Spanish army, had already surrendered.

Sir John Murray's final position was about three miles from the pass of Biar. His left, entirely composed of Whittingham's Spaniards, was intrenched on a rugged sierra, ending abruptly above Castalla, which, with its old castle crowning an isolated sugar-loaf hill, closed the right of that wing, and was occupied in strength by General Mackenzie's division.

A space between Whittingham's troops and the town was left on the sierra for the advanced guard, then in the pass of Biar. Castalla itself, covered by the castle, was prepared for defence, and the principal approaches were commanded by strong batteries, for Murray had concentrated nearly all his guns at this point. The cavalry was partly behind, partly in front of the town, on an extensive plain which was interspersed with olive plantations.

The right wing, composed of Clinton's division and Roche's Spaniards, was on comparatively low ground, and extended to the rear at right angles with the centre, but well covered by a "*bar-ranco*" or bed of a torrent, the precipitous sides of which were in some places one hundred feet deep.

Suchet could approach this position through the pass of Biar, or turn that defile by the way of Sax; but he supposed Elio to be on the last road, which was also uninviting because it involved a flank march along the front of Murray's position; and that General, possessing the defiles of Biar and Alcoy, might have safely pushed to the Xucar by Fuentes la Higuera or by Alcoy, seeing that Alicante was secure and that Elio could easily have escaped. The allies

were far too inactive to take the initial, yet Suchet advanced cautiously, for the ground offered many means to strike a decisive blow. Murray had no such thought, his advanced guard remained on the defensive in the pass of Biar, being composed of two Italian regiments, and a battalion of the twenty-seventh, two companies of German riflemen, a troop of foreign hussars and six guns, four being mountain-pieces; it occupied strong ground, but at two o'clock in the afternoon of the 12th, the French skirmishers swarmed up the steep rocks on either flank with surprising vigor and agility, and when they had gained the summit the supporting columns advanced. The allies fought with resolution for two hours and then abandoned the pass with the loss of two guns and thirty prisoners, retreating however in good order to the main position, for they were not followed beyond the mouth of the defile. Next day about one o'clock, the French cavalry issued cautiously from the pass extending to their left in the plain as far as Onil, and they were followed by the infantry, who immediately occupied a low ridge about a mile in front of the allies' left; the cavalry then gained ground to the front, skirted the right of the allies and menaced the road to Ibi and Alcoy.

Murray had only occupied his ground during the night, but he had previously studied and intrenched it in parts. His right wing was quite refused, and so protected by the barranco that nearly all the troops could have been employed as a reserve to the left wing; which was also strongly posted and presented a front about two miles in extent. But notwithstanding the strength of his position he shrunk from the contest, and while the head of the French column was advancing from the defile of Biar, he thrice gave Donkin orders to put the army in retreat; twice that officer remonstrated, but the last command was so peremptory that obedience must have followed, if at that moment the firing between the piquets and the French light troops had not begun.

BATTLE OF CASTALLA.

Suchet's dispositions were slowly made, as if he also was indisposed to fight; and as a crooked jut of the sierra hid all the British troops and two-thirds of the whole army, his first measure was to send a column to turn it and discover the conditions of the position. Two other heavy columns were formed opposite the left wing, and his strong cavalry gradually closed on the barranco. The right of the allies was impregnable, and Suchet, keeping his reserve in the plain and the exploring column near Castalla to protect his left from a sally, opened his guns against the centre and right, while several columns of attack assailed their left on both sides of the

jut before mentioned. Whittingham's ground being rough and steep the battle there resolved itself into a skirmish of light troops; but though the summit was intrenched and the Spaniards fought not amiss, their left was beaten from the mountain. Meanwhile on the other side of the jut the French ascended slowly, yet so firmly that it was evident good fighting only would send them down again. Their skirmishers, spreading over the mountains and here and there attaining the summit, were partially driven down again, but where the main body met the second battalion of the twenty-seventh there was a terrible crash. The ground had an abrupt declination which enabled the French to form line under cover, close to the British, who were lying down in wait for the movement of charging; a grenadier officer seized the occasion to advance and challenge Waldron, also captain of grenadiers, to a duel. That agile vigorous Irishman instantly leaped forward, the hostile lines looked on, the swords of the champions glittered in the sun, the Frenchman's head was cleft in twain, and the twenty-seventh, rising up with a deafening shout, fired a deadly volley and charged with such a shock that, maugre their bravery and numbers, Suchet's men were overthrown, and the side of the sierra was covered with killed and wounded. Murray erroneously attributed this brilliant exploit to Colonel Adam; it was both the design and work of Colonel Reeves.

When this column was overthrown, two secondary attacks were made to cover its retreat, but they also failed, and the French army was thus separated in three parts; namely, the beaten troops who were in disorder, the reserve in the plains, the cavalry far on the left, fended off by the bed of the torrent, the only bridge over which was commanded by the allies. A vigorous sally from Castalla, and a general counter-attack, would have driven the French infantry upon the defile of Biar before their cavalry could have aided them; but Murray, who had remained during the action behind Castalla, gave them full time to rally and retire in order; for filing by the right through that town, and there changing his front with tedious pedantry, he formed two lines across the valley covered by his cavalry. Mackenzie only, breaking out by the left of Castalla, with three British and one German battalion, and eight guns, followed the enemy briskly. Meanwhile, Suchet plunged into the pass, infantry, cavalry, and tumbrils, in one mass, leaving only a rear-guard of three battalions with eight guns to cover the passage. Answering gun for gun they stood their ground, the clatter of musketry commenced, and one vigorous charge would have dashed them upon the army then wedged in the defile: but Mackenzie's advance had been ordered by Donkin without Mur-

ray's knowledge, and the latter, instead of supporting it, sent repeated orders to withdraw, and despite of all remonstrance compelled the troops to come back. Suchet, thus relieved, took a position across the defile, with his flanks on the heights; and though Murray sent some companies to menace his left, he retained his ground and in the night retreated to Fuente de la Higuera, first blowing up the castle of Villena. The 14th Murray marched to Alcoy, where some of Whittingham's force had remained to watch a French detachment holding the pass of Albayda, by which he proposed to intercept Suchet's retreat; but his movements were slow, his arrangements bad, the troops got into confusion, he halted the 15th at Alcoy, and a feeble demonstration towards Albayda terminated his operations.

In the battle the allies, including Roche's division, had seventeen thousand combatants; the French had fifteen thousand, if a detachment left beyond Biar to watch the Spaniards at Sax be reckoned. Suchet says, the action was forced on by the light troops against his wish, and that he lost only eight hundred men.* This statement is confirmed by the historian Vacani; but Murray called it a pitched battle, and said the French lost three thousand; the reader may choose: but in favor of Suchet's version, neither the time nor the mode of attack was conformable to his talent and experience if he had designed a pitched battle. And though the action was strongly contested at the principal point, it is scarcely possible that so many as three thousand men could have been killed and wounded. Yet eight hundred seems too few, because the loss of the victorious troops with all advantages of ground was more than six hundred. If Suchet had lost three thousand men, that is to say a fourth of his infantry, he must have been so crippled, that what with the narrow defile of Biar in the rear and the distance of his cavalry in the plain, to have escaped at all was extremely discreditable to Murray's generalship. An able commander having a superior force, and the allies were certainly the most numerous, would never have suffered the pass of Biar to be forced on the 12th; or if it were forced he would have had his army well in hand behind it, ready to fall upon the head of the French column as it issued into the low ground. But so little vigor had Murray that he resolved if the French again advanced to abandon the field and retire to Alicant!

Suchet violated several maxims of art. For without an adequate object he fought a battle, having a defile in his rear and on ground where his cavalry, in which he was superior, could not act. Neither the general state of the French affairs nor the particular

* Suchet to the King, MS.

circumstances invited a decisive offensive movement at the time: wherefore he should have been contented with his first successes against the Spaniards and against Colonel Adam, unless some palpable advantage had been offered to him by Murray. But the latter's position was very strong indeed, and the French army was cooped up between the pass of Biar and the allied troops. Had Elio executed a movement which Murray proposed in the night of the 12th, namely, to push troops into the mountains from Sax to strengthen Whittingham's left and menace the right flank of the enemy, Suchet's position would have been very dangerous; Elio, however, kept his army aloof and acted without concert though only a few miles distant. This might have been avoided if the castle and town of Villena had been in a good state of defence and the pass of Biar occupied in force behind it: the two armies would then have been secure of a junction in advance, and the plain of Villena would have been commanded. To the courage of the troops therefore belongs all the merit of the success obtained, for there was no generalship, and though much blood was spilt no profit was derived from victory.

CHAPTER V.

Operations north of the Tagus—Position of the French armies—Palombini marches from Madrid to join the army of the North—Various combats take place with the partidas—Foy fails to surprise the British post at Bejar—Caffarelli demands reinforcements—Joseph misconceives the Emperor's plans—Wellington's plans vindicated against French writers—Soult advises Joseph to hold Madrid and the mountains of Avila—Indecision of the King—He goes to Valladolid—Concentrates the French armies in Old Castile—A division under Leval remains at Madrid—Reille sends reinforcements to the army of the north—Various skirmishes with the partidas—Leval deceived by false rumors at Madrid—Joseph wishes to abandon that capital—Northern insurrection—Operations of Caffarelli, Palombini, Mendizabel, Longa, and Mina—Napoleon recalls Caffarelli—Clausel takes the command of the army of the north—Assaults Castro, but fails—Palombini skirmishes with Mendizabel—Introduces a convoy into Santona—Marches to succor Bilbao—His operations in Guipuscoa—The insurrection gains strength—Clausel marches into Navarre—Defeats Mina in the valley of Roncal and pursues him into Aragon—Foy acts on the coast—Takes Castro—Returns to Bilbao—Defeats the Biscayan volunteers under Mugarategui at Villaro, and those of Guipuscoa under Artola at Lequitio—The insurrectional Junta flies—Bermeo and Isaro are taken—Operations of the partidas on the great line of communication.

OPERATIONS NORTH OF THE TAGUS.

ON this side, as in the south, one part of the French fronted Wellington's forces, while the rest warred with the partidas, watched the English fleets on the coast, and endeavored to maintain a free intercourse with France; but the extent of country was greater, the lines of communication longer, the war altogether more difficult, and the various operations more dissevered.

Four distinct bodies acted north of the Tagus.

1. The army of Portugal, six divisions under Reille, observed the allies from behind the Tormes, the Gallicians from behind the Esla.

2. That part of the army of the south which observed Hill from behind the Tietar, and the Spaniards of Estremadura from behind the Tagus.

3. The army of the north under Caffarelli, whose business was to watch the English squadrons in the Bay of Biscay, to scour the great line of communication with France, and protect the fortresses of Navarre and Biscay.

4. The army of the centre under Drouet, whose task was to fight the partidas in the central part of Spain, to cover Madrid, and connect the other armies by means of movable columns radiating from that capital. If the operations of these armies be followed in the order of their importance, and their bearing on the main action of the campaign marked, it will gradually be understood how it was,

that in 1813, the French, although apparently in their full strength, were suddenly, irremediably, and, as it were by a whirlwind, swept from the Peninsula.

D'Armagnac's and Barrois' French divisions, Palombini's Italians, Casa Palacio's Spaniards, Trielhard's dragoons, and Joseph's French guards, formed the army of the centre; which, in returning from the Tormes, had one hundred and fifty men, from the rash use of alcohol, frozen to death in the Guadarama pass.* Palombini had been at first detached to forage the country towards Guadalaxara, and he brought abundance of provisions to the capital; he would then have gone to Zaragoza to receive recruits and stores just arrived from Italy, but the army of the north was so pressed that he finally marched to its succor; moving, however, by the circuitous route of Valladolid and Burgos to scour the country. The King's guards replaced his division at Alcala, and sharp excursions were made on every side against the partidas, who, being now recruited and taught by French deserters, were very wary, and fought obstinately.

On the 8th of January Espert, governor of Segovia, beat Saornil not far from Cuellar. On the 3d of February, General Vichery, marching upon Medina Celi, routed a regiment of horse called the volunteers of Madrid, and took six hundred prisoners. The Empeinado, with two thousand infantry and a thousand cavalry, intercepted him on his return, but Vichery beat him with considerable slaughter, and made the retreat good with a loss only of seventy men. The guerilla chief was then reinforced by Saornil and Abril in the hills about Guadalaxara; and when Drouet sent fresh troops against him, he attacked a detachment under Colonel Prieur, killed twenty men, took the baggage, and recovered a heavy contribution. The French were also continually harassed in the valley of the Tagus, notably so by a chief called Cuesta, who was sometimes in the Guadalupe mountains, sometimes on the Tietar, sometimes in the Vera de Placentia, and was supported at times on the side of the Guadalupe by Morillo and Penne Villemur. Hill's vicinity, however, disquieted them most on that side; his enterprises had made a profound impression, and the slightest change of his quarters, even the appearance of an English uniform beyond the line of cantonments, caused a concentration of troops to meet one of his sudden blows.

Nor was the army of Portugal tranquil. The Gallicians menaced it from Puebla Senabria and the gorges of the Bierzo—Silveira from the Tras os Montes—the mountains separating Leon from the Asturias were full of bands—Wellington was on the Agueda, and Hill,

* Vacani.

moving from Coria by the pass of Bejar, might make a sudden incursion towards Avila. Finally, the communication with the army of the north was to be kept up, and on every side the partidas were enterprising, especially the horsemen in the plains of Leon: Reille, however, warred down these last.

Early in January Foy, returning from Astorga to relieve Leval, then at Avila, killed some of Marquinez' cavalry in San Pedro, and more of them at Mota la Toro; and on the 15th of that month, Captain Mathis killed or took four hundred of the same partida, at Valderas. A convoy of guerilla stores coming from the Asturias, was intercepted by Boyer's detachments; and one Florian, a celebrated Spanish partisan in the French service, destroyed the band of Garido in the Avila district. The same Florian on the 1st of February defeated the Medico and another inferior chief, and soon after passing the Tormes captured some Spanish dragoons who had come out of Ciudad Rodrigo. On the 1st of March he crushed the band of Tonto, and at the same time Mathis, acting on the side of the Carrion river, again surprised Marquinez' band at Melgar Abaxo, which was thus reduced to two hundred men, and ceased to be formidable. Previous to this, some Gallician troops at Castro Gonzalo, on the Esla, were attacked by Boyer, who beat them through Benevente with the loss of one hundred and fifty men, and then driving the Spanish garrison from Puebla Senabria, raised contributions with a rigor and ferocity said to be habitual to him. His detachments afterwards penetrated into the Asturias, menaced Oviedo, and vexed the country in despite of Porlier and Barceña, who were in that province. Foy also, being at Avila, and uneasy about Hill, endeavored on the 20th of February to surprise Bejar with the view of ascertaining if any large body was collected behind it, but he was vigorously repulsed by the fiftieth regiment and sixth caçadores. This attack, and the movements of Florian behind the Tormes, induced Wellington to bring up another division to the Agueda, which by a reaction made the French believe the allies were ready to advance.

As Caffarelli could not induce Reille to send him reinforcements, the insurrection in the north gained strength, and the communications were entirely intercepted until Palombini, driving away Mendizabel and Longa from Burgos, enabled the great convoy, and all Napoleon's despatches, which had been long accumulating there, to reach Madrid in the latter end of February. Joseph then reluctantly prepared to abandon his capital and concentrate the armies in Castille, but he neglected those essential ingredients of the Emperor's plan, rapidity and boldness. By the first, Napoleon proposed to gain time for the suppression of the insurrection in the

northern provinces; by the second, to impose upon Wellington and keep him on the defensive. Joseph did neither, he was slow, and assumed the defensive himself. He and the other French generals expected to be attacked, for they had not fathomed the English General's political difficulties; and French writers since, misconceiving the character of his warfare, have attributed to slowness in the man what was really the long-reaching policy of a great commander. The allied army was not so lithe as the French army. The latter carried on occasion ten days' provisions on the soldiers' backs, or it lived upon the country, and was in respect of its organization and customs a superior military machine; the former never carried more than three days' provisions, never lived upon the country, avoided the principle of making the war support the war, paid or promised to pay for everything, and often carried in its marches even the corn for its cavalry. The difference of this organization, resulting from the difference of policy between the two nations, was a complete bar to any great and sudden excursion on the part of the British General, and must always be considered in judging his operations.

If Wellington had passed the upper Tormes with a considerable force, drawing Hill to him through Bejar, and moving rapidly by Avila, he might have broken in upon the defensive system of the King, and beat his armies in detail; and much the French feared such a blow, which would have been quite in the manner of Napoleon. But his views were directed by other than mere military principles. Thus striking, he was not certain his blow would be decisive, his Portuguese forces would have been ruined, his British soldiers seriously injured by the attempt; and the resources of France would have repaired the loss of the enemy sooner than he could have recovered the weakness which must necessarily have followed such an unseasonable exertion. His plan was to bring a great and enduring power early into the field, for, like Phocion, he desired to have an army fitted for a long race, and would not start on the short course.

Joseph conceived and dreaded such a sudden attack, but could not conceive the spirit of his brother's plans. It was in vain Napoleon, while admitting the bad moral effect of abandoning the capital, pointed out the difference between flying from it and making a forward movement at the head of an army; the King maintained that Madrid was a better military centre of operations than Valladolid, because it had lines of communication by Segovia, Aranda de Duero and Zaragoza. Nothing could be more unmilitary than this view, unless he was prepared to march direct upon Lisbon if the allies marched upon the Duero. His extreme reluctance to quit

Madrid induced slowness, and the actual position of his troops at the moment likewise presented obstacles to the immediate execution of the Emperor's orders; for as Daricau's division had not returned from Valencia, the French outposts towards the Morena could not be withdrawn, nor could the army of the centre march upon Valladolid until the army of the south relieved it at Madrid. Moreover Soult's counsels troubled the King's judgment; for that Marshal, agreeing that to abandon Madrid was to abandon Spain, endeavored to reconcile possession of the capital with the Emperor's views.

He proposed to place the army of Portugal and the army of the south in position along the slopes of the Avila mountains and on the upper Tormes, menacing Rodrigo, while the King with the army of the centre remained at Madrid in reserve. In this situation they would be an overmatch for any force the allies could bring into the field, and the latter could not move by the valley of the Tagus or upon the Duero without danger of a flank attack. Joseph, deceived by his Spanish ministers, said that the feeding of such a force would ruin his people; but the comfortable state of the houses and the great plains of standing corn seen by the allies in their after march from the Esla to the Carrion proved that the people were not much impoverished. Soult, well acquainted with the resources of that country and a more practised master of such operations, looked to the military question rather than a conciliatory policy, and positively affirmed the armies could be subsisted; yet he does not appear to have considered how the insurrection in the northern provinces was to be suppressed, which was the principal object of Napoleon's plan. He no doubt expected the Emperor would send troops for that purpose, but Napoleon knew that all the resources of France would be required in another quarter.

Hatred and suspicion would have made Joseph reject any plan suggested by Soult, and he was galled that the Marshal should declare the troops could exist without money from France; yet his mind was unsettled by the proposal and the coincidence of ideas as to holding Madrid; for even when the armies were in movement he vacillated, at one time thinking to stay at Madrid, at another to march with the army of the centre to Burgos instead of Valladolid.* However, upon the 18th of March he quitted the capital, leaving the Spanish ministers Angulo and Almenara to govern there in conjunction with Gazan. The army of the south then moved in two columns, one under Conroux across the Gredos mountains to Avila, the other under Gazan upon Madrid to relieve the army of the centre, which immediately marched to Aranda de

Marshal Jourdan's Official Correspondence, MS.

Duero and Lerma with orders to settle at Burgos. Villatte's division and all the outposts withdrawn from La Mancha remained on the Alberche, and the movements north of the Tagus were only molested by the bands. In La Mancha the retiring troops were followed by Del Parque's advanced guard under Cruz Murgeon, but the French cavalry checked it roughly at the bridge of Algorbar. Cruz Murgeon then retired, and the Empecinado was defeated on the side of Cuenca in an attempt to cut off some cavalry who were escorting the Marquis of Salices to collect his rents previous to quitting Madrid. When the stores were removed from Madrid, Villatte marched on Salamanca, Gazan entered Arevalo, and the army of the south was cantoned between the Tormes, the Duero, and the Adaja, with exception of ten thousand chosen men left to hold Madrid under Leval. His orders were to keep guards at Toledo and on the Alberche, lest the allies should suddenly turn the left; and as roads beyond the Alberche led over the Gredos mountains in rear of the French advanced posts on the upper Tormes, these last were withdrawn from Pedrahita and Puente Congosto.

Reille now gradually reinforced Caffarelli, and concentrated his remaining force about Medina de Rio Seco with cavalry posts on the Esla; but the men recalled by the Emperor were then in march, the French were in confusion, and the people instigated by Wellington's emissaries and expecting great events, withheld provisions. The partida warfare also became as lively in the interior as on the coast, but with worse fortune. Captain Giordano, a Spaniard of Joseph's guard, killed one hundred and fifty of Saornil's people near Arevalo, and the indefatigable Florian, defeating Morale's band, seized a dépôt in the valley of the Tietar and beat the Medico; then crossing the Gredos mountains he destroyed near Segovia the band of Purchas: the King's Spanish guards also crushed some smaller partidas, and Renovales with his whole staff was captured at Carvajales and carried to Valladolid. The Empecinado coming to the hills above Sepulveda joined Merino and compelled the people of the Segovia district to abandon their houses; but being menaced by the French those chiefs regained their ancient haunts and Drouet then removed his head-quarters to Cuellar.

In April Leval became so uneasy that he gave several false alarms, which caused an unreasonable concentration of the troops at Valladolid, and Drouet abandoned Cuellar and Sepulveda.* Del Parque and the Empecinado were said to have re-established the bridge of Aranjuez, Elío to be advancing in La Mancha, Hill to be in the valley of the Tagus advancing by Mombeltran to seize

* Joseph's Papers, 205.

the Guadarama. All this was false. The Empecinado, Abuelo, and Del Parque, were indeed at Aranjuez; and Firmin, Cuesta, Rivero, and the Medico were collecting near Arzobispo to mask the march of the Spanish divisions from Estremadura and the reserve from Andalusia. The Prince of Anglona also had entered La Mancha with his cavalry, but it was to cover the movement of Del Parque upon Murcia; and when the true state of affairs became known, Leval drove away the Empecinado, chased Firmin from the valley of the Tagus, and re-established his posts in Toledo and on the Alberche. Joseph was then only restrained from abandoning Madrid altogether by his fear of the Emperor, and his hope of still getting some contributions from thence to support his court. With reluctance also he obeyed Napoleon's reiterated orders to cross the Duero with the army of the centre, and replace the detached divisions of the army of Portugal. He wished Drouet rather than Reille to reinforce the north, and nothing could more clearly show how entirely the subtle spirit of his brother's instructions had escaped his perception. For it was essential to hold Madrid, to watch the valley of the Tagus and enable the French armies to fall back on Zaragoza if the case arose; more essential to give moral effect to the offensive front shown towards the north of Portugal. For the last reason it was proper also that Reille and not Drouet, who was still in Madrid, should reinforce Caffarelli; because the latter's march from that capital would seem a retreat and disclose its object; whereas his movement ought to mask the object and bear the appearance of an offensive one towards Portugal.

In the contracted positions now occupied, the difficulty of subsisting was increased, each general was dissatisfied, disputes multiplied, and the court clashed with the army at every turn. Leval also inveighed against the Spanish ministers and minor authorities left at Madrid; and no doubt justly, since their conduct was precisely like that of the Portuguese and Spanish authorities towards the allies. Joseph's letters to his brother became daily more bitter. Napoleon's regulations for the troops' subsistence clashed with his, and though his budget showed a deficit of many millions, the Emperor, disregarding it, reduced the French subsidy to two millions per month, and forbade its application to any purpose save the pay of the soldiers. When Joseph asked how he was then to find resources? he was, with a just sarcasm on his political and military blindness, desired to seek what he wanted in the north which was rich enough to nourish the partidas and insurrectional juntas. Thus pushed to the wall, Joseph prevailed on Gazan secretly to lend him fifty thousand francs from the military chest; but with the other generals

he could not agree, and for the vigor necessary to meet the coming campaign discord was substituted.

All the movements for concentration displeased the Emperor. He condemned the army of the centre for stealing out of Madrid by the road of Lerma, as only calculated to expose the real views, and draw the allies on before the communications with France were restored. The manner in which the King held the armies on the defensive in his new position discontented him still more. The allies he said were thus told they might without fear for Portugal embark troops to invade France; whereas by a confident offensive movement backed with the formation of a battering-train at Burgos, indicating the siege of Rodrigo, Wellington would have been alarmed, France secured from the danger of insult, and the measures for suppressing the insurrection in the northern provinces have been masked. To quell that insurrection was of vital importance, yet it had now existed for seven months, in five of which the King, having ninety thousand men, was unmolested by Wellington, and had only chased some inferior bands of the interior while this warfare was consolidating in his rear, and his great adversary was organizing the most powerful army which had yet taken the field in his front. It is thus kingdoms are lost. The progress of this northern insurrection shall now be shown. Neglected by the King, it was to the last misunderstood by him; for when Wellington was actually in movement, when the dispersed French armies were crowding to the rear to avoid the ponderous mass the English general was pushing forward,—even then the King, who had done everything to render defeat certain, was urging upon Napoleon the propriety of first beating the allies and afterwards reducing the insurrection by the establishment of a Spanish civil government beyond the Ebro!

NORTHERN INSURRECTION.

In the latter end of 1812 all the French littoral posts, Santona and Gueteria excepted, had been taken by the Spaniards, and Mendizabel attacked Bilbao the 6th of January; being repulsed by Rouget, he rejoined Longa and reduced the little fort of Salinas de Anara near the Ebro, and that of Cuba in the Bureba, while bands from Logroño invested Domingo Calçada in the Rioja. On the 26th of January, Caffarelli detached Vandermaesen and Dubreton to drive the Spaniards from Santander; they seized many stores there, yet neglected to make any movement in aid of Santona which was again blockaded by the partidas. Meanwhile the convoy with the Emperor's despatches was stopped at Burgos until Palombini re-opened the communications. But he

had not more than three thousand men, and as the detachments belonging to the different armies were then in march to the interior, and the regiments recalled to France were also in movement, together with many convoys and escorts for marshals and generals quitting the Peninsula, the army of the north was reduced as its duties increased, and the young French soldiers died fast of a peculiar malady which especially attacked them in small garrisons. The Spaniards' forces increased, and in February Mendizabel and Longa were again in the Bureba, intercepting the communication between Burgos and Bilbao, and menacing Pancorbo and Briviesca. This brought Caffarelli from Vittoria and Palombini from Burgos. The latter, although surprised by Longa near Poza de Sal and only saving himself by his courage and firmness, finally drove the Spaniards away; but then Mina, returning from Aragon after his unsuccessful action near Huesca, surprised and burned the castle of Fuenterrabia in a daring manner; after which, assembling five thousand men in Guipuscoa he obtained guns from the English fleet at Motrico, invested Villa Real within a few leagues of Vittoria, and repulsed six hundred men who came to its succour. This brought Caffarelli from Pancorbo. Mina then raised the siege and Palombini drove the partidas towards Soria. The communication with Logroño being thus re-opened the Italians marched by Vittoria towards Bilbao, where they arrived the 21st of February; but Caffarelli returned with gens-d'armes and imperial guards to France, leaving the Spanish chiefs masters of Navarre and Biscay. The people now refused war contributions in money or kind, the harvest was not ripe and the French were sorely distressed, because the weather enabled the English ships to hug the coast and intercept supplies from France by sea. The communications were all broken; in front by Longa who was again at the defile of Pancorbo; in rear by Mina who was in the hills of Arlaban; on the left by a collection of bands at Caroncal in Navarre. Abbé, Governor of Pampeluna, severely checked these last, but Mina soon restored affairs; for leaving the volunteers of Guipuscoa to watch the defiles of Arlaban he assembled all the bands in Navarre, destroyed the bridges leading to Taffalla from Pampeluna and from Puente la Reyna, and though Abbé twice attacked him he got stronger, and bringing up two English guns from the coast besieged Taffalla.

Napoleon, discontented with Caffarelli, gave Clausel the command in the north with discretionary power to draw troops from the army of Portugal as he judged fitting. He was to correspond directly with the Emperor to avoid loss of time, but was to obey the King in all things not clashing with Napoleon's orders, which

contained a complete review of what had passed and what was fitting to be done. "The partidas," the Emperor said, "were strong, organized, exercised and seconded by the exaltation of spirit which the battle of Salamanca had produced. The insurrectional juntas had been revived, the posts on the coast, abandoned by the French and seized by the Spaniards, gave free intercourse with the English; the bands enjoyed all the resources of the country and the system of warfare had hitherto favored their progress. Instead of forestalling their enterprises the French awaited their attacks, and were always behind the event; they obeyed the enemy's impulsion and the troops were fatigued without gaining their object. Clausel must attack suddenly, pursue rapidly, and combine his movements with reference to the features of the country. A few good strokes against the Spaniards' magazines, hospitals or dépôts of arms would inevitably trouble their operations; and after one or two military successes political measures would suffice to disperse the authorities, disorganize the insurrection and bring the young men who had been enrolled by force back to their homes. Block-houses were to be constructed on well-chosen points, especially where many roads met; the forests would furnish the materials cheaply, and these posts should support each other and form chains of communication. With respect to the greater fortresses, Pampeluna and Santona were the most important and the enemy knew it; for Mina was intent to furnish the first and the English squadron to get hold of the second. To supply Pampeluna it needed only to clear the communications as the country around was rich and fertile. Santona required combinations. The Emperor wished to supply it by sea from Bayonne and St. Sebastian, but the French marine officers would never attempt the passage even with favorable winds, and when the English squadron were away, unless all the intermediate ports were occupied by the land forces.

"Six months before these ports had been French, Caffarelli had lightly abandoned them while he marched with Souham against Wellington. Since that period the English and Spaniards held them. For four months the Emperor had unceasingly ordered the retaking of Bermeo and Castro; but whether from the difficulty of the operation or the necessity of answering more pressing calls, no effort had been made to obey and the fine season now permitted the English ships to aid in the defence. Castro was said to be strongly fortified by the English, no wonder, Caffarelli had given them sufficient time and they knew its value. In one month every post on the coast from the mouth of the Bidassoa to St. Ander should be again re-occupied, and St. Ander garrisoned strongly.

Simultaneous with the coast operations should be Clausel's attack on Mina, and the chasing of the *partidas* in the interior of Biscay. The administration of the country also demanded reform, still more did the organization and discipline of the army. The north was the pith of the French power, all would fail if that failed, whereas if it were strong, its administration sound, its fortresses well furnished, its state tranquil, no irreparable misfortune could happen in other parts."

Clausel assumed command the 22d of February, Abbé was then confined to Pampeluna, Mina, master of Navarre, was besieging Taffalla; Pastor, Longa, Campillo, Merino and others ranged through Biscay and Castille unmolested; and the spirit of the country was so changed, that fathers sent their sons to join *partidas* hitherto composed of robbers and deserters. Clausel demanded twenty thousand men from Reille, but Joseph, who was then in Madrid, proposed to send Drouet with the army of the centre instead. Clausel would not accede; twenty thousand troops were, he said, wanted beyond the Ebro; two independent chiefs could not act together; and if Drouet was only to remain at Burgos he would devour the resources without aiding the operations in the north. The King might choose another commander but the troops must be sent. Joseph yielded, yet it was the end of March before Reille's divisions moved, three upon Navarre and one upon Burgos. Meanwhile Clausel repaired to Bilbao, where Rouget had eight hundred men in garrison besides Palombini's Italians.

This place was blockaded by the *partidas*. The Pastor with three thousand men was in the hills of Guernica and Navarnis, between Bilbao and the fort of Bermeo; and Mendizabel having eight or ten thousand men in the mountains menaced Santoña and Bilbao and protected Castro. However the French garrison in Durango was strong, new works round Bilbao were in progress, and on the 22d Clausel moved with the Italians and a French regiment to assault Castro. Campillo and Mendizabel came to its succor and the garrison made a sally, but the former after some sharp fighting regained the high valleys in disorder. The escalade of Castro would then have ensued, if Mendizabel had not come to Trucios, only seven miles from the French camp, and the Pastor with the volunteers of Biscay and Guipuscoa menaced Bilbao. Clausel marched with his French regiments to the latter place, leaving Palombini to oppose Mendizabel, but finding Bilbao in safety he sent Rouget with two battalions to reinforce the Italians, who then drove Mendizabel from Trucios into the hills about Valmaceda.

Castro was now to be attacked in form. Palombini occupied the

heights of Ojeba and Ramales, from whence he communicated with the garrison of Santoña, introduced a convoy of money and fresh provisions there, received ammunition in return, and directed the Governor Lameth to prepare a battering-train of six pieces for the siege. But then he returned hastily to Bilbao which was menaced by El Pastor, whom he thought too strong to be meddled with until promised a reinforcement from Durango, when he gave battle and was defeated with a loss of eighty men. Two days after the reinforcement joined and he beat the Pastor, whose men dispersed, some to collect again on Palombini's rear while others went to the interior. One column however retired by the coast on the side of St. Sebastian, and Palombini pursued it, expecting troops from the fortress to line the Deba and bar retreat, but an English squadron carried the Spaniards off from Lequitio. Meanwhile El Pastor, having rallied, descended the Deba and drove the French back to St. Sebastian; Palombini was thus compelled to make for Bergara, on the Vittoria road, where he left his wounded men and a garrison, and on the 9th fell on the volunteers of Guipuscoa at Ascoytia, but was repulsed and fell back to Bergara.

Next day he took charge of an artillery convoy going from St. Sebastian for the siege of Castro; yet he left Bilbao in great danger, for the Biscayan volunteers made on the 10th a false attack at a bridge above the entrenched camp, while Tapia, Dos Pelos, and Campillo fell on seriously from the side of Valmaceda. However, Mendizabel who commanded the whole made such bad dispositions that he was repulsed by Rouget, and then Palombini, who heard the firing, hastily deposited his convoy and returning followed the Biscayan volunteers to Guernica driving them upon Bermeo, where they also got on board the English ships.

During these events Clausel remained at Vittoria to arrange the general plan, and Mina on the 1st of April defeated one of his columns near Lerim with a loss of six hundred men; he was also disappointed about his reinforcements; for though four of Reille's divisions and some unattached regiments joined him, they only supplied seventeen instead of twenty thousand men; and as the regiments merely replaced men which had marched to rejoin their own armies in front, this succor dwindled to thirteen thousand. Hence, notwithstanding Palombini's activity the insurrection was in April more formidable than ever; the line of correspondence from Torquemada to Burgos was quite unprotected for want of troops, and the line from Burgos to Irun was not so well guarded that couriers could pass without powerful escorts, nor always then. The fortifications of Burgos were to have been improved but there was no money to pay for the works; the French could not collect

provisions for magazines ordered by the King, and two generals, La Martiniere and Rey, were disputing for the command. Forty thousand Spanish partisans were in action, Taffalla surrendered to Mina, and he and Duran, Amor, Tabueca and the militia of Logroño, holding both sides on the Ebro between Calahorra, Logroño, and Guardia, could in one day unite eighteen thousand foot and a thousand horsemen. Mendizabel, Longa, Campillo, Herrera, El Pastor, and the volunteers of Biscay, Guipuscoa, and Alava, in all sixteen thousand, were on the coast acting in conjunction with the English squadrons; Santander, Castro, and Bermeo were still in their hands, and maritime expeditions were preparing at Coruña and in the Asturias.

This partisan war thus presented three distinct branches, that of Navarre, that of the coast, and that on the lines of communication. The last alone occupied above fifteen thousand French; namely, ten thousand from Irun to Burgos, fifteen hundred to restore the line of correspondence between Tolosa and Pampeluna, which had been destroyed; and four thousand between Mondragon and Bilbao, the garrison of the latter place included. Nearly all the army of the north was appropriated to the garrisons and lines of communication; but the divisions of Abbé and Vandermaesen could be used on the side of Pampeluna, and there were disposable, Palombini's Italians and the divisions sent by Reille. But one of these, Sarrut's, was still in march, and all the sick of the armies in Castile were now pouring into Navarre, where, from the loss of the contributions there was no money to provide for them. Clausel had however ameliorated the civil and military administrations, improved the works of Gueteria, commenced block-houses between Irun and Vittoria, and shaken the bands about Bilbao. Now dividing his forces he sent Palombini to besiege Castro, and directed Foy and Sarrut to cover the operation and oppose disembarkations.

This field force and the troops in Bilbao furnished ten thousand men, and in the middle of April Clausel beat Mina from Taffalla and Estella and assembled at Puente de la Reyna in Navarre the remainder of the active army, composed of Taupin's and Barbout's divisions of the army of Portugal, Vandermaesen's and Abbé's divisions of the army of the north, in all thirteen thousand men. He urged L'Huillier, who commanded the reserve at Bayonne, to reinforce St. Sebastian and Gueteria and push troops of observation into the valley of Bastan; and he also warned the commander of Zaragoza to watch Mina on that side. From Puente la Reyna he made some excursions, but lost men uselessly, for the Spaniards would only fight at advantage; and to hunt Mina without first barring all his passages of flight was to destroy the French soldiers

by fatigue. Here the King's dilatory warfare was seriously felt, because the winter season, when the tops of the mountains being covered with snow, the *partidas* could only move along the ordinary roads, was most favorable for the French operations and it passed away; Clausel now despaired to effect anything, and was even going to separate his forces and march to the coast when, in May, Mina took post in the valley of Ronçal. The French general instantly sent Abbé's and Vandermaesen's divisions and the cavalry against him at once by the upper and lower parts. Suddenly closing upon the guerilla chief they killed or wounded a thousand of his men and dispersed the rest; one part fled from the mountains on the side of Sanguessa with the wounded, whom they dropped at different places in care of the country people, but Chaplangarra, Cruchaga, and Carena, Mina's lieutenants, going off, each with a column, in the opposite direction and by different routes to the valley of the Aragon, passed that river at St. Gilla and made their way towards the sacred mountain of La Peña near Jaca. The French cavalry following them by Villa Real, entered that town the 14th on one side while Mina with twelve men entered it on the other; yet he escaped to Martes where another ineffectual attempt was made to surprise him. Abbé's columns then descended the smaller valleys leading towards the upper valley of the Aragon, while Vandermaesen's infantry and the cavalry entered the lower part of the same valley, and the former approaching Jaca sent his wounded men there and got fresh ammunition.

Mina and the insurgent junta trying to regain Navarre by the left of the Aragon river were like to have been taken, but again escaped towards the valley of the Gallego, whither also the greater part of their troops now sought refuge. Clausel forbore to force them over that river, lest they should remain there and intercept the communication from Zaragoza by Jaca, the only free line the French now possessed and too distant to be watched. Abbé therefore returned to Ronçal in search of the Spanish dépôts, and Vandermaesen entered Sos at one end as Mina, who had now one hundred and fifty horsemen and was always intent upon regaining Navarre, passed out at the other. The light cavalry overtook him at Sos Fuentes and he fled to Carcastillo; but there, unexpectedly meeting some of his own squadrons which had wandered over the mountains after the action at Ronçal, he gave battle, was defeated with the loss of fifty men and fled once more to Aragon, whereupon the insurrectional junta dispersed and dissensions arose between Mina and the minor chiefs under his command. Clausel, anxious to increase this discord, sent troops into all the valleys to seek out the Spanish dépôts and attack their scattered men; and he was

well served by the Aragonese, for Suchet's wise administration was still proof against the insurreccional juntas.

During these events four battalions left by Mina in the Amescoas were chased by Taupin, who had remained at Estella when the other divisions marched up the valley of Ronçal. Soon however Mina re-assembled at Barbastro in Aragon a strong column, crowds of deserters from the other Spanish armies augmented his force; and so completely had he organized Navarre, that the presence of a single soldier of his in a village sufficed to have any courier without a strong escort stopped. Many bands also were still in the Rioja, and two French battalions rashly foraging towards Lerim were nearly all destroyed. In fine the losses were well balanced, and Clausel demanded more troops, especially cavalry, to scour the Rioja. Nevertheless the dispersion of Mina's troops lowered his reputation, and the French general so improved this advantage by address, that many townships withdrew from the insurrection and recalling their young men from the bands commenced the formation of eight free Spanish companies to serve on the French side. Corps of this sort were raised with so much facility in every part of Spain that it would seem nations as well as individuals have an idiosyncrasy, and in these changeable warriors we again see the Mandonius and Indibilis of ancient days.

Joseph, urged by Clausel, now sent Maucune's division and some light cavalry of the army of Portugal to occupy Pampliega, Burgos, and Briviesca, and to protect the great communication, which the diverging direction of the operations had again exposed to the partidas. But the French had not been less successful in Biscay than in Navarre. Foy reached Bilbao the 24th of April, and finding all things ready for the siege of Castro marched to Santona to hasten the preparations at that place; he attempted also to surprise Campillo and Herrera in the hills above Santona, but was worsted in the combat. The two battering-trains then endeavored to proceed from Bilbao to Santona by sea to Castro; the English vessels, coming to the mouth of the Durango, stopped those at Bilbao and compelled them to proceed by land, but thus gave an opportunity for those at Santona to make the sea-run in safety.

SIEGE OF CASTRO.

This place, situated on a promontory, was garrisoned by twelve hundred men under the command of Pedro Alvarez; three English sloops of war commanded by the Captains Bloye, Bremen, and Tayler, were at hand, some gun-boats were in the harbor, and twenty-seven guns were mounted on the works. An outward wall with towers extended from sea to sea on the low neck which con-

nected the promontory with the mainland, and this line of defence was strengthened by some fortified convents; then came the town, and behind the town at the extremity of the promontory stood the castle.

On the 4th of May, Foy, Sarrut and Palombini took post at different points to cover the siege; the Italian general St. Paul invested the place; the engineer Vacani conducted the works, having twelve guns at his disposal. The defence was lively and vigorous, and Captain Tayler with great labor landed a heavy ship-gun on a rocky island to the right of the town, looking from the sea, which he worked with effect against the French counter-batteries. On the 11th a second gun was mounted on this island; but that day the breaching-batteries were opened and in a few hours broke the wall, while the counter-batteries set fire to some houses with shells. The English guns were then removed from the island and the assault was ordered, but was delayed because a foraging party sent into the hills came flying back, pursued by a column of Spaniards which had passed unperceived through the positions of the French. This threw the besiegers into confusion as thinking the covering army had been beaten, yet they soon recovered and the assault and escalade took place in the night.

The attack was rapid and fierce, the walls were carried and the garrison driven through the town to the castle, which was maintained by two companies while the flying troops got on board the English vessels; finally the Italians stormed the castle, but every gun had been destroyed and the two companies safely rejoined their countrymen on board the ships. The English had ten seamen wounded, the Spaniards lost a hundred and eighty, and the remainder were immediately conveyed to Bermeo from whence they marched inland to join Longa. The besiegers lost only fifty killed and wounded, and the Italian soldiers committed great excesses, setting fire to the town in many places. Foy and Sarrut marched after the siege, the former through the district of Incartaciones to Bilbao defeating a battalion of Biscay volunteers on his route; the latter to Orduño with the design of destroying Longa; but that chief crossed the Ebro at Puente Lara, and finding the troops sent by Joseph were beginning to arrive at Burgos, recrossed the river and after a long chase escaped in the mountains of Espinosa. Sarrut, having captured a few gun-carriages and one of Longa's forest dépôts of ammunition, returned towards Bilbao, and Foy immediately marched from that place against the two remaining battalions of Biscay volunteers, which under their chiefs Mugartegui and Artola were at Villaro and Guernica.

These battalions, each of thousand strong, raised by conscription

and officered from the best families, were the champions of Biscay ; but though brave and well-equipped the difficulty of crushing them and the volunteers of Guipuscoa was not great, because neither would leave their own peculiar provinces. The third battalion had been already dispersed in the district of Incartaciones, and Foy, having in the night of the 29th combined the march of several columns to surround Villaro, fell at daybreak upon Mugartegui's battalion and dispersed it with the loss of all its baggage. Two hundred returned to their homes, and the French general then moved rapidly against Artola, who was at Guernica. The Italians being still at Bilbao were directed to flank that chief on the west by Mungia, while a French column flanked him on the east by Marquinez. Artola fled to Lequitio, but the column from Marquinez, coming over the mountain, fell upon his right just as he was defiling on a narrow way along the sea coast; he escaped himself, yet two hundred Biscayans were killed or drowned, three hundred with twenty-seven officers taken. A rear-guard of two companies got off in the mountains, some few gained an English vessel, and this success which did not cost the French a man was attributed to Guingret, the daring officer who won the passage of the Duero at Tordesillas during Wellington's retreat.

The volunteer battalions of Biscay being thus disposed of, all their magazines, hospitals and dépôts fell into Foy's hands, the junta dispersed, the privateers quitted the coast for Santander, Pastor abandoned Guipuscoa, and the Italians recovered Bermeo from which the garrison fled to the English ships. They also destroyed the works of the little island of Isaro, which, situated three thousand yards from the shore and having no access to the summit save by a staircase cut in the rock, was deemed impregnable and used as a dépôt for the English stores. This was the last memorable exploit of Palombini's division in the north. That general himself had already gone to Italy to join Napoleon's reserves, and his troops being ordered to march by Aragon to join Suchet, were actually in movement when new events caused them to remain in Guipuscoa. They were reputed brave and active soldiers, but in devastating ferocity differed little from their Roman ancestors.

During these double operations of the French on the coast and in Navarre the partidas had fallen upon the line of communication with France ; thus working out the third branch of the insurrectional warfare ; and their success went nigh to balance all their losses on each flank. Mendizabel was with Longa's partida upon the line between Burgos and Miranda de Ebro ; the volunteers of Alava and Biscay and part of Pastor's band were concentrated on

the mountains of Arlaban above the defiles of Salinas and Descarga; Merino and Salazar came up from the country between the Ebro and the Duero; and the three battalions left by Mina in the Amescoas, after escaping from Taupin, re-assembled close to Vittoria. Every convoy, every courier's escort was attacked at one or other of these points, and Mendizabel also made sudden descents towards the coast. On the 25th of April, Longa, who had four thousand men and several guns, was repulsed at Armiñon between Miranda and Trevino, by some of the drafted men going to France; but on the 3d of May he compelled a large convoy coming from Castile with an escort of eight hundred men to return to Miranda, and even cannonaded that place on the 5th. Thouvenot, commandant of the government, immediately detached twelve hundred men and three guns from Vittoria to relieve the convoy; but then Mina's battalions endeavored to escalate Salvatierra, and they were repulsed with difficulty. The volunteers of Alava gathered above the pass of Salinas to intercept the rescued convoy, but finding the latter would not stir from Vittoria, went on the 10th to aid in a fresh attack on Salvatierra; being again repulsed, they returned to Arlaban and captured a courier with a strong escort in the pass of Descarga near Villa Real. A French regiment sent to succor Salvatierra finally drove these volunteers towards Bilbao, where, as already shown, Foy routed them; but Longa continued to infest the post of Armiñon until Sarrut arriving from the siege of Castro chased him also.

Notwithstanding these successes Clausel, whose troops were worn out with fatigue, declared it would require fifty thousand men and three months' time to quell the insurrection entirely. And Napoleon more discontented than ever with the King, complained that the successes of Clausel, Foy, Sarrut, and Palombini had brought no safety to his couriers and convoys; that his orders about posts and infantry escorts had been neglected; that the reinforcements sent to the north from Castile had gone slowly and in succession instead of at once; finally that the cautious movement of concentration by the other armies was inexcusable; since the inaction of the allies, their distance, their want of transport, their ordinary and even timid circumspection, in any operation out of the ordinary course, enabled the French to act in the most convenient manner. The growing dissensions between the English and the Spaniards, the journey of Wellington to Cadiz, the changes in his army were, he said, all favorable circumstances for the French, but the King had taken no advantage of them: the insurrection continued and the object of interest was now changed. Joseph defended himself with more vehemence than reason against these charges, but Wel-

lington soon vindicated Napoleon's judgment and the voice of controversy was smothered by the din of battle; for the English general was again abroad in his strength and the clang of his arms resounded through the Peninsula.

CHAPTER VI.

Wellington restores the discipline of the allied army—Relative strength of the belligerent forces—Wellington's plans described—Lord W. Bentinck again proposes to invade Italy—Wellington opposes it—The opening of the campaign delayed by the weather—State of the French army—Its movements previous to the opening of the campaign.

WHILE the French power was being disorganized in the manner just related, Wellington re-organized the allied army with greater strength than before. Large reinforcements, especially of cavalry, had come out from England, the efficiency of the Portuguese was restored in a surprising manner, and discipline had been vindicated in both services with a rough but salutary hand. Rank had not screened offenders; some had been arrested, some tried, some dismissed for breach of duty; the negligent were terrified, the zealous encouraged; every department was reformed, and it was full time. Confidential officers commissioned to detect abuses in the general hospitals and dépôts, those asylums for malingerers, discovered and drove so many skulkers to their duty, that the second division alone recovered six hundred bayonets in one month; and this scouring was rendered more efficient by the establishment of permanent and ambulatory regimental hospitals; a wise measure founded on a principle which cannot be too widely extended; for as the character of a battalion depends on its fitness for service, a moral force will always bear upon the execution of orders under regimental control which it is in vain to look for elsewhere.

The Douro had been rendered navigable as high as Castillo de Alva above the confluence of the Agueda; a pontoon-train of thirty-five pieces had been formed; carts of a peculiar construction had been built to repair the great loss of mules during the retreat from Burgos; and a recruit of these animals was also obtained by emissaries, who purchased them with English merchandise even at Madrid under the beard of the enemy, and when Clausel was unable for want of transport to fill the magazines of Burgos! The ponderous iron camp-kettles of the soldiers had been laid aside for lighter vessels carried by men, the mules being destined to carry tents instead; it is however doubtful if these tents were really use-

ful in wet weather, because when soaked they became too heavy for the animal and seldom arrived in time at the end of a march: their greatest advantage was when the soldiers halted for a few days. Many other changes and improvements had taken place, and the Anglo-Portuguese troops, conscious of a superior organization, were more proudly confident than ever, while the French were again depressed by intelligence of the defection of the Prussians, following on the disasters in Russia. Nor had the English general failed to amend the condition of those Spanish troops which the Cortes had placed at his disposal. By a strict and jealous watch over the application of the subsidy he kept them clothed and fed during the winter, and now had several powerful bodies fit to act in conjunction with his own forces.

Thus prepared he was anxious to strike, anxious to forestall the effects of his Portuguese political difficulties as well as to keep pace with Napoleon's efforts in Germany, and his army was ready to take the field in April; but he could not concentrate before the green forage was fit for use and deferred the execution of his plan until May. It was a wide plan. The relative strength for battle was no longer in favor of the French; their force had been reduced by losses in the secondary warfare, and by drafts since Wellington's retreat,* from two hundred and sixty to two hundred and thirty thousand. Of the last number thirty thousand were in hospital, and only one hundred and ninety-seven thousand men, including the reserve at Bayonne, were present with the eagles. Sixty-eight thousand, including sick, were in Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia; the remainder, with the exception of the ten thousand left at Madrid, were distributed on the northern line of communication from the Tormes to Bayonne: it has been shown how scattered and how occupied.

Wellington was somewhat thwarted by the Duke of York, with whom he was not on very cordial terms; instead of receiving remounts for the cavalry, four of his regiments were withdrawn because of their loss of horses, leaving him weaker by twelve hundred than he ought to have been. But he had prepared two hundred thousand allied troops for the campaign; and on each flank there was a British fleet, now a very effective aid, because the French lines of retreat run parallel to and near the sea-coast on each side of Spain, and every port opened by the advance of the allies would form a dépôt for subsistence.

This mass of troops was organized in the following manner south of the Tagus. The first army under Copons, nominally ten thousand, was in Catalonia. The second army under Elio in Murcia

* Appendix 18.

twenty thousand, including the divisions of Villa Campa, Bassecour, Duran, and Empecinado. The Anglo-Sicilian army under Murray near Alicant, sixteen thousand. The third army under Del Parque in the Morena, twelve thousand. The first army of reserve under Abispa in Andalusia, fifteen thousand.

In the north, the fourth army under Castaños included the Spanish divisions in Estremadura, Julian Sanchez' partida the Gallicians under Giron, the Asturians under Polier and Barceña, the partidas of Longa and Mina. It was computed at forty thousand, to which may be added minor bands and volunteers in various parts. Then came the noble Anglo-Portuguese army, seventy thousand fighting men with ninety pieces of artillery. And the real difference between the French and the allies was greater than it appeared. The French returns included officers, serjeants, drummers, artillerymen, engineers, and wagoners, whereas the Anglo-Portuguese were all sabres and bayonets. Moreover this return of the French number was dated the 15th of March; and as there were drafts made after that period, and Clausel and Foy's losses and the reserve at Bayonne are to be deducted, the number of sabres and bayonets in June was probably not more than one hundred and sixty thousand, one hundred and ten thousand being on the northern line.

The campaign of 1812 had shown how strong the French lines of defence were, especially on the Duero, which they had since entrenched in different parts, and most of the bridges over it had been destroyed in the retreat. But it was not advisable to operate in the central provinces of Spain. The country there was exhausted, the lines of supply would be longer and more exposed, the army further removed from the sea, the Gallicians could not be easily brought down to co-operate, the services of the northern partidas would not be so advantageous, and the ultimate result would be less decisive than operations against the great line of communication with France. Wherefore on the northern line the operations were to run, and those defences which could scarcely be forced were to be evaded.* On the lower Duero, the French army could be turned by a wide movement across the upper Tormes, and from thence, skirting the mountains, towards the upper Duero; but that line although most consonant to the rules of art because the army would thus be kept in one mass, led through a difficult and wasted country, the direct aid of the Gallicians would be lost, and it was there the French looked for the attack. Wellington therefore resolved to operate by his left, and so disposed his troops and spread such reports, and made such false movements as to

* Plan 6, p. 253.

mask his real design. For the gathering of partidas at Arzobispo, the demonstrations in Estremadura and La Mancha, the positions of Hill at Coria, and the pass of Bejar, and the magazines formed there, were all of his ordering and indicated a move by the Tagus or by Avila. The greater magazines at Celorico, Viseu, Penamacor, Almeida and Rodrigo in no manner belied this; but half the army widely cantoned in Portugal, apparently for health, was really on the true line of operations which was to run through the Tras of Montes.

It was also designed to pass the Duero on the Portuguese frontier, and Wellington would have done so with the whole army in mass, if the necessity of keeping his right so far advanced in Spain during the winter had not barred that measure; for a concentration on the left would have exposed the country on his right to incursions, and disclosed his real design. Wherefore with a modified project he proposed to operate with his left, ascending the right of the Duero to the Esla, crossing that river to unite with the Gallicians, while the rest of the army advancing from the Agueda should force the passage of the Tormes. By this combination, which he hoped to effect so suddenly that the King should not have time to concentrate in opposition, the front of the allies would be changed to their right, the Duero and Carrion turned and the enemy thrown in confusion over the Pisuerga. Then moving forward in mass, the English general could fight or turn any position taken by the King; gaining at each step more force by the junction of the Spanish irregulars until he reached the insurgents of Biscay; gaining also new communications with the fleet, and consequently new dépôts at every port opened.

In the first movement the army would be divided into three parts, each too weak to meet the whole French force; and the Tras os Montes operation, upon the nice execution of which the whole depended, would be in a difficult mountainous country. Hence exact and extensive combinations were essential to success, but failure would not be dangerous because each corps had a strong country to retire upon; the worst effect would be loss of time and the opening of other operations, when the harvest would allow the French to act in masses. The problem was to be solved by hiding the project and gaining time for the Tras os Montes march; and to do this, minor combinations and resources for keeping the French armies scattered and employed were to be freely used. In that view, the bridge equipage was secretly prepared in Abrantes, and the bullock carts to draw it came from Spain by Lamego. The improved navigation of the Douro seemed more conducive to subsist a movement by the right, and yet furnished large boats by

which to pass the left over that river; the wide-spread cantonments permitted changes of quarters under pretence of sickness, and thus the troops were gradually closed upon the Douro without suspicion. Hill and the Spaniards in Estremadura and Andalusia always menaced the valley of the Tagus, and contributed to draw attention from the true point; but more than any other thing the vigorous excitement of and sustenance of the northern insurrection occupied the enemy, scattered his forces, and rendered the success of the project nearly certain.

Neither did Wellington fail to give ample employment to Suchet's forces; for his wings were spread for a long flight, even to the Pyrenees, and he had no desire to find that marshal's army joined with the other French forces on the Ebro. The lynx eyes of Napoleon had scanned this point of war also, and both the King and Clausel had received orders to establish the shortest and most certain line of correspondence possible with Suchet, because the Emperor's plan contemplated the arrival of that marshal's troops in the north; but Wellington found another task for it. For after the fight of Castalla, Freyre's cavalry joined the Andalusian reserve under Abispa, and Elio who remained near Alicant was to be joined by Del Parque. These and the Anglo-Sicilian troops furnished more than fifty thousand men, including the divisions of Duran, Villa Campa, the Empecinado and other partisans, who were always lying on Suchet's right flank and rear. With such a force, or even half, if of good troops, the simplest plan would have been to turn Suchet's right flank and bring him to action with his back to the sea; but the Spanish armies were not efficient for such work and their instructions were adapted to circumstances. To win the open part of the kingdom, to obtain a permanent footing on the coast beyond the Ebro, to force the enemy from the lower line of that river by acting in conjunction with the Catalans,—these were the three objects in view, and to attain them Wellington desired Murray to sail against Taragona. Suchet must, he said, decrease his Valencian force to save it; Elio and Del Parque might then seize that kingdom; if Taragona fell it would be good, if it was too strong Murray could return by sea and secure the country gained by the Spanish generals.

Elio and Del Parque were however enjoined to keep strictly on the defensive until Murray's operations drew Suchet away; they were not able to fight alone and their defeat would enable the French marshal to aid the King in the north. Ten thousand men were judged sufficient to reduce Taragona, but if Murray could not embark that number there was another mode of operating. Some Spanish battalions sent by sea would enable Copons to hold

the country between Taragona, Lerida and Tortosa; meanwhile Murray and Elio were to menace Suchet in front, and Del Parque in conjunction with the partidas was to turn his right by Requena; this operation was to be repeated until Del Parque gained a connection with Copons by the left, and the partidas had cut off Suchet's intercourse with the northern provinces: either of these plans would entirely occupy that Marshal and keep him in the south.

Wellington was not aware that Reille's divisions were beyond the Ebro; the spies, deceived by the multitude of detachments passing in and out of the Peninsula, supposed the troops which reinforced Clausel to be fresh conscripts from France; the arrangements for the opening of the campaign were therefore made in the expectation of meeting a very powerful force in Leon. Hence Freyre's cavalry and the Andalusian reserve received orders to march upon Almaraz, to pass the Tagus there by a pontoon-bridge established for them, and then crossing the Gredos by Bejar or Mombeltran, to march upon Valladolid while the partidas of that quarter should harass the march of Leval from Madrid. The Spanish troops in Estremadura were to join those forces on the Agueda which were destined to make the passage of the Tormes; and the Gallicians were to come down on the Esla to unite with the *Tras os Montes* corps. Thus seventy thousand Anglo-Portuguese, eight thousand Spaniards from Estremadura, and twelve thousand Gallicians, in all ninety thousand fighting men, would be suddenly placed on a new front and marching abreast would drive the surprised and separated masses of the enemy reflux to the Pyrenees. A grand design and grandly it was executed! For high in heart and strong of hand, Wellington's veterans marched to the encounter, the glories of twelve victories played about their bayonets, and he their leader was so proud and confident, that in passing the stream which marks the frontier of Spain, he rose in his stirrups and waving his hand, cried out "Farewell Portugal!"

But while straining every nerve and eager to strike, eager also to escape Portuguese politics and keep pace with Napoleon, he was called upon to discuss again the policy of a descent on Italy, and a new ministerial project for withdrawing his German troops to act in Germany!! Lord William Bentinck had before relinquished his views with reluctance, but now, thinking affairs favorable, again proposed to land at Naples and put forward the Duke of Orleans or the Archduke Francis. He urged the weak state of Murat's kingdom, the favorable disposition of the inhabitants, the offer of fifteen thousand auxiliary Russians made by Admiral Grieg, the

shock of Napoleon's power and the effectual diversion in favor of Spain. He supported his opinion by an intercepted letter of the Queen of Naples to Napoleon, and by other authentic documents ; and thus at the moment of execution Wellington's vast plans were to be disarranged to meet new schemes of war, one of which he had already discussed and disapproved of ; and however promising in itself, it would inevitably have divided the power of England and weakened the operations in both countries.

His reply was decisive. To withdraw the Germans would only lead to mischief, and his opinion as to Sicily was not changed by Murat's letters, as that monarch evidently thought himself strong enough to invade the island. Lord William should not land in Italy with less than forty thousand men well equipped, since it must overcome all opposition before the people would join or even cease to oppose. It was stated that the people looked to be protected from the French and preferred England to Austria. No doubt of that. The Austrians would demand provisions and money and insist upon governing them in return ; the English would as elsewhere, defray their own expenses and probably give a subsidy in addition. The south of Italy was possibly the best place next to the Spanish Peninsula for the operations of a British army, and it remained for the government to choose whether they would adopt an attack on the former upon such a scale as he had alluded to. But of one thing they might be certain ; if it were commenced on a smaller scale, or with any other intention than to persevere to the last and by raising, feeding and clothing armies of the natives, the plan would fail and the troops would re-embark with loss and disgrace. This remonstrance fixed the vacillating ministers, and Wellington was allowed to proceed with his own plans.

Designing to open the campaign the beginning of May, and the green forage being well advanced the 21st of April, he directed Murray, Del Parque, Elio, and Copons to commence their operations on the eastern coast ; Abispa and Freyre were expected at Almaraz the 24th ; the Estremaduran divisions had reached the Coa, and the Anglo-Portuguese force was gradually closing to the front. But heavy rains broke up the roads, and the cumbrous pontoon-train being damaged on its way did not reach Sabugal before the 13th, and was not repaired before the 15th. Thus the opening of the campaign was delayed, yet the check proved of little consequence, for on the French side nothing was prepared to meet the danger. Napoleon had urged the King to send his heavy baggage and stores to the rear, to fix his hospitals and dépôts at Burgos, Vittoria, Pampeluna, Tolosa, and San Sebastian ; Joseph allowed the impediments to remain with the armies, and the sick,

poured along the communications, were thrown upon Clausel at the moment when that general was scarcely able to make head against the northern insurrection.

Napoleon had early and clearly fixed the king's authority as generalissimo, and forbad him to exercise his monarchical authority towards the French armies, yet Joseph was at this moment in high dispute with all his generals upon those very points.

Napoleon had directed the king to enlarge and strengthen the works of Burgos, and form magazines there and at Santona for the armies in the field. At this time no magazines had been formed at either place, and although a commencement had been made to strengthen Burgos, it was not capable of sustaining four hours' bombardment and offered no support for the armies.

Napoleon had desired a more secure and shorter line of correspondence than that by Zaragoza should be established with Suchet; for his plan embraced, though it did not prescribe, the march of that general upon Zaragoza, and he had repeatedly warned the king how dangerous it would be to have Suchet isolated and unconnected with the northern operations. Nevertheless the line of correspondence remained the same, and the allies could excise Suchet's army from the north.

Napoleon had long and earnestly urged the king to put down the northern insurrection in time to make head against the allies on the Tormes. Now, when the English general was ready to act that insurrection was in full activity; and all the army of the north and great part of the army of Portugal were employed to suppress it, instead of being on the lower Duero.


Napoleon had clearly explained to the king the necessity of keeping his troops concentrated towards the Tormes in an offensive position, and desired him to hold Madrid so as that it could be abandoned in a moment. The campaign was now being opened, the French armies were scattered, Leval was encumbered at Madrid with a part of the civil administration, with large stores, parks of artillery, and the care of families attached to Joseph's court; while the other generals were stretching their imaginations to devise which of the several projects open to him Wellington would adopt. Would he force the passage of the Tormes and the Duero with his whole army and thus turn the French right? Would he march straight upon Madrid either by the district of Avila or by the valley of the Tagus, or by both; and would he then operate against the north or upon Zaragoza, or towards the south in co-operation with the Anglo-Sicilians? Everything was vague, uncertain, confused.

All the generals complained that the king's conduct was not

military, and Napoleon told him if he would command an army he must give himself up entirely to it, thinking of nothing else ; but Joseph was always demanding gold when he should have trusted to iron. His skill was unequal to the arrangements and combinations for taking an initiatory and offensive position, and he could neither discover nor force his adversary to show his real design. The French being thrown upon a timid defensive system, every movement of the allies produced alarm and the dislocation of troops without an object. Del Parque's march towards Alcaraz, and that of the Spanish divisions from Estremadura in the latter end of April, were viewed as the commencement of a general movement against Madrid ; because the first was covered by the advance of some cavalry into La Mancha, and the second by the concentration of the partidas in the valley of the Tagus ; the whole French army was thus shaken by the demonstration of a few horsemen ; for when Leval took the alarm, Gazan marched towards the Guadarama with three divisions, and Drouet gathered the army of the centre around Segovia.

Early in May a fifth division of Reille's troops was employed on the line of communication at Pampliega, Burgos, and Briviesca, and he remained at Valladolid with only one division of infantry and his guns, his cavalry being on the Esla. Drouet was then at Segovia, Gazan at Arevalo ; Conroux was at Avila, Leval at Madrid with outposts at Toledo. The King who was at Valladolid could not therefore concentrate more than thirty-five thousand infantry on the Duero. He had indeed nine thousand excellent cavalry, and more than one hundred pieces of artillery ; but with such dispositions, to concentrate for a battle in advance was not to be thought of, and the first decided movement of the allies was sure to roll his scattered forces back in confusion. Thus the lines of the Tormes and the Duero were effaced from the system of operations !

About the middle of May, D'Armagnac's division came to Valladolid, Villatte's division, reinforced by some cavalry, took the line of the Tormes from Alba to Ledesma ; three divisions were at Zamora, Toro and other places on both sides of the Duero, and Reille's cavalry was still on the Esla. The front of the French was therefore defined by those rivers, for the left was covered by the Tormes, the centre by the Duero, the right by the Esla. Gazan's head-quarters were at Arevalo, Drouet's at Segovia, and the point of concentration was at Valladolid ; but Conroux at Avila, and Leval at Madrid, were thrown entirely out of the circle of operations. It was at this moment that Wellington entered upon what has been in England called, not very appropriately, the



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Drawn by G. S. Sayer

march to Vittoria, that march being but one portion of the action. The concentration of the army on the banks of the Duero was the commencement, the movement towards the Ebro and the passage of that river was the middle, the battle of Vittoria was the catastrophe, and the crowning of the Pyrenees the end of the splendid drama.

CHAPTER VII.

Dangerous discontent of the Portuguese army—Allayed by Wellington—Noble conduct of the soldiers—The left wing of the allies under General Graham marches through the Trás os Montes to the Esla—The right wing under Wellington advances against Salamanca—Combat there—The allies pass the Tormes—Wellington goes in person to the Esla—Passage of that river—Cavalry combat at Morales—The two wings of the allied army unite at Toro on the Duero—Remarks on that event—Wellington marches in advance—Previous movements of the French described—They pass the Carrion and Pisuerga in retreat—The allies pass the Carrion in pursuit—Joseph takes post in front of Burgos—Wellington turns the Pisuerga with his left wing and attacks the enemy with his right wing—Combat on the Hormaza—The French retreat behind Pancorbo and blow up the castle of Burgos—Wellington crosses the upper Ebro and turns the French line of defence—Santander is adopted as a dépôt station and the military establishments in Portugal are broken up—Joseph changes his dispositions of defence—The allies advance—Combat of Osma—Combat of St. Millan—Combat of Subijana Morillas—The French armies concentrate in the basin of Vittoria behind the Zadora.

IN the latter end of April the Estremaduran troops were assembled on the Tormes, Carlos d'España had moved on Miranda del Castanar, and the campaign was going to open when a formidable obstacle menacing utter ruin arose. Some specie sent from England discharged the British soldier's arrears to November, 1812; but the men whose period of service had expired and who had re-enlisted, were entitled to bounty amounting to eight hundred thousand dollars, and as death was so rife they desired to have it. But far from being able to meet this demand Wellington could not pay his muleteers, on whom his operations depended, their arrears, many had deserted in consequence and it was feared others would follow. The Portuguese troops also, being still neglected by their government, and seeing the English soldiers partially paid, thought a systematic difference was going to be established between them, and thousands whose term of service was expired murmured for their discharge, which could not be legally refused. Wellington instantly threatened to apply the subsidy to paying the troops, which brought the regency to rights, and then he appealed to the honor and patriotism of the Portuguese soldiers whose term had

expired. Such an appeal is never made in vain to the poorer classes of any nation, and, one and all, those brave men remained with their colors notwithstanding the shameful treatment they had endured from their government. This noble emotion would prove that Beresford, whose system of military reform was chiefly founded upon severity, might have better attained his object in another manner; but harshness is the essence of the aristocratic principle of government, and the marshal only moved in the straight path marked out for him by the policy of the day.

When this dangerous affair was terminated Castaños returned to Galicia, and the British cavalry of the left wing, which had wintered about Mondego, crossed the Duero, some at Oporto, some near Lamego, and entered the Trás os Montes.* The Portuguese cavalry had been quartered all the winter in that province, and the enemy supposed that Silveira would as formerly advance from Braganza to connect Galicia with the allies. But Silveira was then commanding an infantry division on the Agueda, and a very different power was menacing the French on the side of Braganza. For about the middle of May the cavalry were followed by many divisions of infantry and by the pontoon equipage, thus forming with the horsemen and artillery a mass of more than forty thousand men under Graham. The infantry and guns, rapidly placed on the right of the Duero by means of large boats assembled between Lamego and Castello de Alva, marched in several columns towards the lower Esla, one column however having with it two brigades of cavalry, went by Braganza. On the 20th Hill came to Bejar, and the 22nd Graham being well advanced, Wellington quitted Freneda and put his right wing in motion towards the Tormes. It consisted of five divisions of Anglo-Portuguese and Spanish infantry, five brigades of cavalry, including Julian Sanchez' horsemen, presenting with the artillery a mass of thirty thousand men. Being divided, one part under Hill moved from Bejar upon Alba de Tormes, the other under Wellington upon Salamanca.

On the 24th Villatte withdrew his detachment from Ledesma, and the 26th, at ten o'clock in the morning, the heads of the allied columns appeared with admirable concert on all the different routes leading to the Tormes. Morillo's division and Long's cavalry menaced Alba, Hill coming from Tamames, bent towards the fords above Salamanca, and Wellington coming from Matilla, marched straight against that city.

Villatte, a good officer, barricaded the bridge and the streets, sent his baggage to the rear, called in his detachment from Alba, and being resolved to discover the real force of his enemy waited for

* French Reports, MSS. Plan 6, p. 284.

their approaching masses on the heights above the ford of Santa Marta. Too long he waited, for the ground on the left bank enabled Wellington to conceal the movements, and already Fane's horsemen with six guns were passing the ford at Santa Marta in the French rear, while Victor Alten's cavalry removed the barricades on the bridge and pushed through the town to attack in front. Villatte thus suddenly assailed marched towards Babila Fuente and gained the heights of Cabrerizos before Fane got over the river; but ere the defiles of Aldea Lengua could be reached he was overtaken by both columns of cavalry. The guns opened upon his squares and killed about forty men, the horsemen charged but were repulsed; then the French infantry again fell fast before the round shot, and nearly a hundred died from the intolerable heat; yet with unequalled courage the dauntless survivors won their way in the face of thirty thousand enemies! At Babila Fuente they were joined by the troops from Alba and the pursuit was abandoned by their admiring and applauding adversaries; but two hundred had fallen dead in the ranks, as many more unable to keep up were made prisoners, and one gun being overturned in the Aldea Lengua defile, retarded six others, which were captured with their tumbrils.

On the 27th and 28th the left of the allies approached Zamora, the right approached Taro; the latter thus covered the line of Rodrigo, the former neared the point of the Duero where a bridge of communication was to be thrown. Wellington then left Hill in command and went off suddenly, being disquieted for his combination on the Esla. The 29th he passed the Duero at Miranda in a basket slung on a rope stretched from rock to rock, the river foaming hundreds of feet below—the 30th he reached Carvajales, and joined Graham who had overcome many obstacles in his passage through the *Tras os Montes*. His troops, extended from Carvajales to Tabara, were on the left in communication with the Gallicians, but the operations were disarranged by the difficulty of crossing the Esla. That river should have been passed the 29th, at which time the right wing should have been close to Zamora and the passage of the Duero insured; the French would thus have been surprised, separated, and beaten in detail. They were indeed still ignorant that an army was on the Esla; but that river was guarded by their piquets, the stream was full and rapid, the banks steep, the fords hard to find, deep and with stony footing, and the alarm had spread from the *Tormes* through all the cantonments.

At daybreak on the 31st, English hussars, having infantry holding by their stirrups, entered the stream at the ford of Almendra and Graham approached the right bank with all his forces. A

French piquet of thirty men was surprised in the village of Villa Perdrices by the hussars, the pontoons were immediately laid down, and the columns commenced passing, but several men even of the cavalry had been drowned at the fords. Next day the head of the allies entered Zamora, which the French evacuated after destroying the bridge. They retired upon Toro, destroyed the bridge there also and again fell back, but their rear-guard was overtaken near the village of Morales by the hussar brigade under Colonel Grant. Their horsemen immediately passed a bridge and swamp under a cannonade, and then facing about in two lines gave battle; whereupon Major Robarts with the tenth hussars flanked by a squadron of the eighteenth under Major Hughes, the rest of that regiment being in reserve, broke both the lines at one charge, pursued for two miles and made two hundred prisoners, yet the French finally rallied on their infantry.

This secured the junction of the wings, for the Duero was fordable, and Wellington, anticipating failure at one point, had prepared to throw a boat-bridge at Espadacinta below the confluence of the Esla; he could also lay his pontoons just above Toro, because Julian Sanchez had surprised a cavalry piquet and driven the outposts from the fords of Pollos. The French columns were now concentrating, it might be for battle, and the left wing of the allies halted the 3d, to let the Gallicians come into line and to close up their own rear. The right wing passed the Duero, the artillery and baggage by a ford, the infantry at the bridge of Toro, ingeniously repaired by the Lieutenant of engineers Pringle, who dropped ladders at each side of the broken arch and laid planks across just above the water level. Thus the line of the Duero was mastered, and those who understand war may say if it was an effort worthy of the man and his army. Trace the combinations, follow Graham's columns, some of which marched a hundred and fifty, some two hundred and fifty miles through the wild *Tras os Montes*. Through those regions held to be nearly impracticable even for small corps, forty thousand men, infantry, cavalry, artillery, and pontoons, had been carried and placed as if by a supernatural power upon the Esla before the enemy knew even that they were in movement! Was it fortune or skill that presided? Not fortune, for the difficulties were such that Graham crossed the Esla later than Wellington intended, and yet so soon that the enemy could make no advantage of the delay. Had the French even been concentrated the 31st behind the Esla, the Gallicians were then at Benevente reinforced by Penne Villemur's cavalry which had marched with Graham; and the Asturians were at Leon where the Esla was fordable, and the passage of that river could have been effected by

similar combinations on a smaller scale; for the French had not numbers simultaneously to defend the Duero against Hill, the lower Esla against Graham, and the upper Esla against the Spaniards. Wellington had also, as we have seen, prepared means to bring Hill over the Duero below the confluence of the Esla: and all these surprising exertions had been made merely to gain a fair field of battle!

But if Napoleon's instructions had been worked out by the King during the winter, this great movement could not have succeeded; for the insurrection in the north would have been crushed, or so far quelled, that sixty thousand French infantry and ten thousand cavalry with one hundred and twenty pieces of artillery would have been disposable. Such a force held in an offensive position on the Tormes would have compelled Wellington to adopt a different plan of campaign. If concentrated between the Duero and the Esla it would have baffled him on those rivers, because operations effectual against thirty-five thousand infantry would have been powerless against sixty-thousand. Joseph said he could not put down the insurrection, he could not feed such large armies; a thousand obstacles arose on every side which he could not overcome; in fine he could not execute his brother's instructions. They could have been executed notwithstanding. Activity, the taking time by the forelock, would have quelled the insurrection; and for the feeding of the troops, the boundless Tierras de Campos where the armies were now operating were covered with the ripening harvest; the only difficulty was to subsist the French who were not engaged in the northern provinces during the winter. Joseph could not find the means though Soult told him they were at hand, because difficulties overpowered him; they would not have overpowered Napoleon; but the difference between a common general and a great captain is immense, the one is victorious when the other is defeated.

Now was the field clear for the shock of battle. Wellington had ninety thousand men, with more than a hundred pieces of artillery. Twelve thousand were cavalry, and the British and Portuguese present with the colors were, including serjeants and drummers, above seventy thousand sabres and bayonets: the rest of the army was Spanish. But on the wings hovered the irregulars. Sanchez' horsemen, a thousand strong, were on the right beyond the Duero; Porlier, Barcena, Salazar and Manzo on the left, between the upper Esla and the Carrion. Saornil moved upon Avila, the Empecinado menaced Leval. Finally the reserve of Andalusia had crossed the Tagus at Almaraz on the 30th, and numerous minor bands swarmed around as it advanced. The French could collect

nine or ten thousand horsemen and one hundred guns, but their infantry was only thirty-five thousand strong exclusive of Leval: hence the way to victory was open, and on the 4th Wellington marched forward with a conquering violence.

Joseph could not stem or evade a torrent of war the depth and violence of which he was even now ignorant of; and a slight sketch of his previous operations will show that all his dispositions were made in the dark and only calculated to bring him into trouble.* Early in May he would have marched the army of the centre to the upper Duero, when Leval's reports checked the movement. On the 15th of that month, a spy sent to Bejar by Drouet, now Count D'Erlon, brought intelligence, that a great number of country carts had been collected there and at Placentia to follow the troops in a march upon Talavera, but after two days were sent back to their villages,—that fifty mules had been purchased at Bejar and sent to Ciudad Rodrigo, and the first and fourth divisions and German cavalry had moved from the interior towards the frontier, saying they were going, the first to Zamora, the last to Fuente Guinaldo,—that many troops were gathered at Ciudad Rodrigo under Wellington and Castaños,—the divisions at Coria and Placentia were expected there, the reserves of Andalusia were in movement, the pass of Baños, before retrenched and broken up, was repaired,—that the English soldiers were paid their arrears, and everybody said a grand movement would commence on the 12th. All this was accurate, but, with exception of the march to Zamora which seemed only a blind, indicated a movement against the Tormes and threw no light upon the real design.

On the other flank, Reille's cavalry under Boyer, having made an exploring sweep round by Astorga, La Baneza and Benevente, brought intelligence that a Gallician expedition was embarking for America, another was to follow, and English divisions were also embarking in Portugal. The 23d of May a report from the same quarter gave notice that Salazar and Manzo were with seven hundred horsemen on the upper Esla, that Porlier was coming from the Asturias to join them with two thousand five hundred men, and Giron with six thousand Gallicians had reached Astorga,—but it was uncertain if Silveira's cavalry would come from Braganza to connect the left of the English with the Gallicians as it had done the year before.

Thus on the 24th of May the French were still ignorant of Graham's movement, and although it was known the 26th at Valladolid, that Wellington had troops in the country beyond the Esla, it was not considered a decisive movement because the head-quar-

* French correspondence, MSS.

ters were still at Freneda. On the 29th Reille united his cavalry at Valderas, passed the Esla, entered Benevente and sent patrols towards Tobarra and Carvajales; from their reports and other sources he understood the whole allied army was on the Esla; and as his detachments were closely followed by British scouting parties he recrossed the Esla and broke the bridge of Castro Gonzalo, leaving his light horsemen to watch it. But the delay in the passage of the Esla, after Graham had reached Carvajales, made Reille doubt both the strength of the allies and their inclination to cross that river. He expected the main attack on the Tormes, and proposed to unite with Daricau's infantry and Digeon's dragoons, then at Toro and Zamora, to defend the Duero and lower Esla, leaving the Gallicians, whose force he despised, to pass the upper Esla at their peril.

D'Armagnac's division was at Rio Seco, and Maucune's division, which had been spread along the road to Burgos, was ordered to concentrate at Palencia on the Carrion; but Gazan on the other flank was equally deceived by the allies' movements. The 7th of May he heard from the Tormes that the preparations indicated a movement towards that river. Leval wrote from Madrid that he had abandoned Toledo because fifteen thousand English and ten thousand Spaniards were to advance by the valley of the Tagus; that rations had been ordered at Escalona for Long's cavalry, and magazines were formed at Bejar: and from a third quarter came news, that three divisions would pass the Duero to join the Gallicians and march upon Valladolid.

Gazan rightly thinking the magazines at Bejar were to supply Hill and the Spaniards in their movement to join Wellington, expected at first the whole would operate by the Esla, but on the 14th fresh reports changed this opinion; he then judged Hill would advance by the Puente Congosto upon Avila, to cut Leval off while Wellington attacked Salamanca. On the 24th his doubts vanished. Villatte told him Wellington was over the Agueda, Graham over the lower Douro; and at the same time Daricau, writing from Zamora, told him Graham's cavalry was only one march from the Esla. Conroux was instantly directed to march from Avila to Arevalo, Tilly to move with the cavalry of the army of the south from Madrigal towards the Trabancos, Daricau to send a brigade to Toro, Leval to come over the Guadarama pass and join D'Erlon at Segovia.

On the 26th, Gazan thinking Wellington slow and crediting a report that he was sick and travelling in a carriage, relapsed into doubt. He now judged the passage of the Agueda a feint, thought the allies' operations would be in mass towards the Esla, and was positively assured by his emissaries that Hill would move by the

Puente Congosto against Segovia. The 27th he heard of the passage of the Tormes and Villatte's retreat, whereupon evacuating Arevalo he fixed his head-quarters at Rueda, and directed Conroux, who was marching upon Arevalo and so hastily that he left a movable column behind him on the upper Tormes, to come to the Trabancos.

Gazan at first designed to take post behind that river, but there was no good position, and the 28th he rallied Conroux's, Rey's and Villatte's infantry and Tilly's cavalry behind the Zapardiel. Darciau meanwhile concentrated at Toro, Digeon at Zamora; a bridge-head was commenced at Tordesillas as the point of retreat, and guards were placed at Pollos, where the fords of the Duero were very low though as yet impracticable. These movements were unmolested; Hill had no desire to drive the French over the Duero and increase the number of their troops on the Esla. The 30th Gazan, hearing that Hill was advancing and the troops on the Esla likely to attempt the passage of that river, crossed the Duero in the night and took post at Tordesillas, intending to concentrate the whole army of the south on the right of that river; but Leval, though he had quitted Madrid on the 27th, was not yet arrived; and a large artillery convoy, the ministers and Spanish families, and the pictures from the palace of Madrid were likewise moving by the Segovia passes.

At this time the army of Portugal and D'Armagnac's division were extended from the Esla to the Carrion, the king's guards were at Valladolid, D'Erlon was in march to the Puente Duero from Segovia and Sepulveda, yet slowly and apparently not aware of the crisis. Meanwhile the passage of the Esla had been effected, and if that river had been crossed as fore-calculated by Wellington, and a push made upon Placentia and Valladolid while Hill marched upon Rueda, the whole French army might have been caught in what Napoleon calls '*flagrante delicto*' and destroyed. And even now it would seem Wellington could have profited more by marching than halting at Toro the 3d; for though Leval and part of D'Erlon's army were then between the Puente Duero and Valladolid, a large division was at Tudela de Duero to protect the convoy from Madrid; another great convoy was still on the left bank of the lower Pisuerga, and Reille and Gazan's parcs were waiting on the right bank of that river until the first convoy had passed over the Carrion. Nevertheless it was prudent to gather well to a head first, and the general combinations had been so profoundly made, that the evil day for the French was only deferred.

On the 30th, Joseph designed to oppose Wellington's main body with the army of the south, while the army of the centre held the

rest in check; the army of Portugal being to aid either as the case might be. And such was his infatuation, that besides pressing on Napoleon the immediate establishment of a civil Spanish administration for the provinces behind the Ebro, he demanded an order to draw Clausel's troops away from the Ebro, that he might drive the allies back to the Coa, and take the long-urged offensive position towards Portugal: Napoleon being then at Dresden, and Wellington on the Duero!

On the 2d, the king, who expected the allies at Toro, the 1st, disquieted that his front was unmolested, concluded, as he had received no letter from Reille, that Wellington had turned his right and was marching towards the Carrion. On the evening of the 2d, he heard from Reille, who had retired to Rio Seco and there rallied D'Armagnac's troops; but Maucune's division was still in march from different parts to concentrate at Palencia. The halt of the 3d was therefore to the profit of the French, for during that time they received the Madrid convoy, insured the concentration of all their troops, and recovered Conroux's movable column which joined Leval near Olmedo. They also destroyed the bridges of Tudela and Puente Duero on the Duero, those of Simancas and Cabeçon on the Pisuerga, and passed their convoys over the Carrion, directing them under escort of Casa Palacios' Spanish division upon Burgos.

Gazan now moved upon Torrelobaton and Penaflor, D'Erlon upon Duenas, Reille upon Palencia; and the spirits of all were raised by intelligence of the emperor's victory at Lutzen, and by a report that the Toulon fleet had made a successful descent on Sicily. It would appear that Napoleon certainly contemplated an attack upon that island, and Lord William Bentinck thought it would be successful; it was prevented by Murat's discontent; instead of attacking he fell off from Napoleon and opened a negotiation with the British.

Wellington advanced on the 4th, his bridge of communication was established at Pollos, stores of ammunition were formed at Valladolid, some had also been taken at Zamora, and the cavalry flankers captured large magazines of grain at Arevalo. Towards the Carrion the march was rapid, by parallel roads and in compact order, the Gallicians on the extreme left, Morillo and Julian Sanchez on the extreme right, and the enemy was expected to defend the river; but the report of prisoners and the hasty movements of the French soon showed that they were in full retreat for Burgos. On the 6th, their forces were over the Carrion; Reille had even reached Palencia the 4th, and there rallied Maucune's division and a brigade of light cavalry employed on the communica-

tions. The king had now fifty-five thousand fighting men, exclusive of his Spanish division which was escorting the convoys and baggage; but he did not judge the Carrion a good position and retired behind the upper Pisuerga, desiring if possible to give battle there. He sent Jourdan to examine the state of Burgos, and expedited fresh letters, for he had already written from Valladolid on the 27th and 30th of May, to Foy, Sarrut, and Clausel, calling them towards the plains of Burgos. Suchet also he directed to march upon Zaragoza, hoping he was already on his way; but Suchet was then engaged in Catalonia, Clausel's troops were on the borders of Aragon, Foy and Palombini's Italians were on the coast of Guipuscoa, and Sarraut's division was pursuing Longa in the Montaña.

Higher than seventy or eighty thousand Joseph did not estimate the allied forces, and he was desirous of fighting them on the elevated plains of Burgos. But more than one hundred thousand men were before and around him. For all the partidas of the Asturias and the Montaña were drawing together on his right, Julian Sanchez and the partidas of Castile were closing on his left, Abispal with the reserve and Freyre's cavalry had passed the Gredos mountains and was making for Valladolid. Nevertheless Joseph was sanguine of success if he could rally Clausel's and Foy's divisions, and his despatches to the former were frequent and urgent. Come with the infantry of the army of Portugal! Come with the army of the north and we shall drive the allies over the Duero! Such was his cry to Clausel, and again he urged his political schemes upon his brother; but he was not a statesman to advise Napoleon, nor a general to contend with Wellington; his was not the military genius, nor were his the arrangements that could recover the initiatory movement at such a crisis and against such an adversary. While still on the Pisuerga he received Jourdan's report. Burgos was untenable, there were no provisions, the new works were unfinished, they commanded the old which were unable to hold out a day: of Clausel's and Foy's divisions nothing had been heard. It was then resolved to retire beyond the Ebro. All the French outposts in the Bureba and Montaña were immediately withdrawn, and the great dépôt of Burgos was evacuated upon Vittoria, which was thus encumbered with the artillery dépôts of Madrid, of Valladolid, and of Burgos, and with the baggage and stores of so many armies and so many fugitive families; and at this moment also arrived from France a convoy of treasure which had long waited for escort at Bayonne.

Meanwhile the tide of war flowed onwards with terrible power. The allies crossed the Carrion the 7th, Joseph retired by the high

road to Burgos with Gazan's and D'Erlon's troops, Reille moved by Castro Xerez. Wellington followed hard, and conducting his operations continually on the same principle, and pushing his left wing and the Gallicians along bye-roads passed the upper Pisuerga on the 8th, 9th, and 10th. Having thus turned the line of that river entirely, and outflanked Reille, he made a short journey the 11th and halted the 12th with his left wing; for he had outmarched his supplies, and had to arrange the feeding of his troops in a country wide of his line of communication. Nevertheless he pushed his right wing under Hill along the main road to Burgos, resolved to make the French yield the castle or fight for the possession; and meanwhile Julian Sanchez acting beyond the Arlanzan cut off small posts and straggling detachments.

Reille regained the great road to Burgos the 9th, and took ground behind the Hormaza, his right near Hormillas, his left on the Arlanzan, barring the way to Burgos; the other armies were in reserve behind Estepar, and in this situation remained for three days, and were again cheered by intelligence of Napoleon's victory at Bautzen and the consequent armistice. But on the 12th Wellington's columns came up. The light division, Grant's hussars and Ponsonby's dragoons, immediately turned the French right, while the rest of the troops attacked the whole range of heights from Hormillas to Estepar. Reille, who only desired to ascertain their numbers, seeing the horsemen in rear of his right and his front so strongly menaced, then made for the bridge of Baniel on the Arlanzan. During this movement Gardiner's horse-artillery raked his columns, and Captain Milles of the fourteenth dragoons took several prisoners and a gun which had been disabled; and it was said the 18th hussars having outflanked a body of French cavalry might have charged with great effect but were withheld by Colonel Grant. The allies now pressed forward towards the bridge of Baniel, endeavoring to cut off the retreat; yet the French repelled the minor attacks with the utmost firmness, bore the fire of the artillery without shrinking, and evading the more serious attacks by their rapid yet orderly movement, finally passed the river with a loss of only thirty men killed and a few taken.

Being now covered by the Urbel and Arlanzan rivers, both flooded, they could not be easily attacked, and the stores of Burgos were removed; yet in the night Joseph again retreated along the high road by Briviesca to Pancorbo, into which place he threw a garrison of six hundred men. The castle of Burgos was mined, but from hurry, or negligence, or want of skill, the explosion was outwards at the moment a column of infantry was defiling beneath. Several streets were laid in ruins, thousands of shells and other

combustibles left in the place, were ignited and driven upwards with a horrible crash, the hills rocked above the devoted column, and a shower of iron timber and stony fragments falling on it in an instant destroyed more than three hundred men! Fewer deaths might have sufficed to determine the crisis of a great battle!

But such an art is war! So fearful is the consequence of error, so terrible the responsibility of a general. Strongly and wisely did Napoleon speak when he told Joseph he must give himself up entirely to the business, laboring day and night, thinking of nothing else. Here was a noble army driven like sheep before prowling wolves, yet in every action the inferior generals had been prompt and skilful, the soldiers brave, ready and daring, firm and obedient in the most trying circumstances of battle. Infantry, artillery and cavalry, all were excellent and numerous, and the country strong and favorable for defence; but that soul of armies, the mind of a great commander was wanting, and the Esla, the Tormes, the Duero, the Carrion, the Pisuerga, the Arlanzan, seemed to be dried up, the rocks, the mountains, the deep ravines, to be levelled; Clausel's strong positions, Dubreton's thundering castle had disappeared like a dream, and sixty thousand veteran soldiers though willing to fight at every step, were hurried with all the tumult and confusion of defeat across the Ebro. Nor was that barrier found of more avail to mitigate the rushing violence of their formidable enemy.

Joseph having possession of the impregnable rocks, the defile and forts of Pancorbo, now thought he could safely await for his reinforcements, and extended his wings for the sake of subsistence. On the 16th D'Erlon marched to Aro on the left, leaving small posts of communication between that place and Miranda, and sending detachments towards Domingo Calçada to watch the road leading from Burgos to Logroño. Gazan remained in the centre with a strong advanced guard beyond Pancorbo; for as the King's hope was to retake the offensive he retained the power of issuing beyond the defiles, and his scouting parties were pushed forward towards Briviesca in front, to Zerezo on the left, to Poya do Sal on the right. The rest of Gazan's remaining troops were cantoned by divisions as far as Armiñon behind the Ebro, and Reille marched to Espejo, also behind the Ebro and on the great road to Bilbao. Being there joined by Sarrut from Orduña he took a position, placing Maucune at Frias, Sarrut at Osma, and La Martiniere at Espejo; guarding also the Puente Lara, and sending strong scouting parties towards Medina de Pomar and Villarcayo on one side, and towards Orduña on the other.

All the encumbrances of the armies were now assembled in the

basin of Vittoria, and the small garrisons of the army of the north came in; for Clausel having received the King's first letter on the 15th of June, had stopped the pursuit of Mina, and proceeded to gather up his scattered columns, intending to move by Logroño to the Ebro. He had with him Taupin's and Barbout's divisions of Reille's army; but after providing garrisons, only five thousand of his own army were disposable, and he could not bring more than fourteen thousand men to aid the King; nevertheless the latter confident in the strength of his front was still buoyant with the hope of assembling a force powerful enough to retake the offensive. His dream was short-lived.

While the echoes of the explosion at Burgos were still ringing in the hills, Wellington was in motion by his left towards the sources of the Ebro. The Gallicians moved from Aguilar de Campo high up on the Pisuerga, Graham moved from Villa Diego and in one march passed the Ebro at the bridges of Rocamunde and San Martin. The centre of the army followed on the 15th, and the same day the right wing under Hill marched through the Bureba and crossed at the Puente Arenas. This general movement was masked by the cavalry and the Spanish irregulars, who infested the French rear on the roads to Briviesca and Domingo Calçada; the allies were thus suddenly placed between the sources of the Ebro and the great mountains of Reynosa, and cut the French entirely off from the sea-coast. All the ports except Santona and Bilbao were immediately evacuated by the enemy; Santona was invested by Mendizabel, Porlier, Barcena, and Campillo; and English vessels entered Santander, where a dépôt and hospital station were established, because the royal road from thence through Reynosa to Burgos furnished a free communication with the forces. This single blow severed the long connexion of the English troops with Portugal, which was thus cast off by the army as a heavy tender is cast from its towing rope: all the British military establishments were broken up and transferred by sea to the coast of Biscay.

Now the English general could march boldly down the left bank of the Ebro, and fall upon the enemy wherever he met with them; or, still turning the King's right, place the army in Guipuscoa on the great communication with France, while the fleet keeping pace with this movement furnished fresh dépôts at Bilbao and other ports. The first plan was a delicate and uncertain operation, because narrow and dangerous defiles were to be passed; the second, scarcely to be contravened, was secure even if the first should fail; both were compatible to a certain point, inasmuch as to gain the great road leading from Burgos by Orduña to Bilbao was a good

step for either; and failing in that the road leading by Valmaceda to Bilbao was still in reserve. Wherefore with an eagle's sweep Wellington brought his left wing round, and pouring his numerous columns through all the deep valleys and defiles descended towards the great road of Bilbao between Frias and Orduña. At Modina de Pinar, a central point, he left the sixth division to guard his stores and supplies, but the march of the other divisions was unmitigated; neither the winter gullies nor the ravines, nor the precipitate passes amongst the rocks, retarded even the march of the artillery; where horses could not draw men hauled, when the wheels would not roll the guns were let down or lifted up with ropes; and strongly did the rough veteran infantry work their way through those wild but beautiful regions; six days they toiled unceasingly; on the seventh, swelled by the junction of Longa's division and all the smaller bands which came trickling from the mountains, they burst like raging streams from every defile and went foaming into the basin of Vittoria.

Many reports reached the French, some absurdly exaggerated, as that Wellington had one hundred and ninety thousand men; but all indicating more or less distinctly the true line and direction of his march.* As early as the 15th Jourdan warned Joseph that the allies would probably turn his right;† and as Maucune's scouts told of the presence of the English troops that day on the side of Puenet Arenas, he pressed the King to send Reille to Valmaceda and close the other armies towards the same quarter. Joseph yielded so far that Reille was ordered to concentrate his troops at Osma on the morning of the 18th, with the view of gaining Valmaceda by Orduña if it was still possible; if not he was to descend rapidly from Lodio upon Bilbao and rally Foy's division and the garrisons of Biscay. Gazan was directed to send a division of infantry and a regiment of dragoons to relieve Reille at Puente Lara and Espejo, but no decided dispositions were made.

Reille ordered Maucune to quit Frias and join him at Osma, but having some fears for his safety gave him the choice of coming by the direct road across the hills, or the circuitous route of Puente Lara. Maucune started late in the night of the 17th by the direct road, and when Reille reached Osma with La Martiniere's and Sarrut's divisions on the morning of the 18th, he found a strong English column issuing from the defiles in his front, and the head of it was already at Barbarcena on the high road to Orduña. This was Graham with the first, third and fifth divisions, and a considerable body of cavalry. Reille, who had eight thousand infantry and fourteen guns, made a demonstration in the view of forcing

* General Thouvenot, MSS.

† Marshal Jourdan, MSS.

the British to show their whole force, and a sharp skirmish and heavy cannonade ensued, wherein fifty men fell on the side of the allies, a hundred on that of the enemy.* But at half-past two o'clock Maucune had not arrived, and beyond the mountains, on the left of the French, the sound of a battle arose which seemed to advance along the valley of Boveda into the rear of Osma. Reille, suspecting what had happened, instantly retired fighting towards Espejo where the mouths of the valleys opened on each other, and there suddenly from Boveda and the hills on the left Maucune's troops rushed forth, begrimed with dust and powder, breathless and broken into confused masses.

Proverbially daring, he had marched over the Araçena ridge instead of going by the Puente Lara, and his leading brigade, after clearing the defiles, halted on the bank of a rivulet near the village of San Millan in the valley of Boveda. There, without planting piquets, they waited for their other brigade and the baggage, when suddenly the light division, moving on a line parallel with Graham's march, appeared on some rising ground in their front; the surprise was equal on both sides, but the British riflemen dashed down the hill with loud cries and a bickering fire, the fifty-second followed in support and the French retreated fighting as they best could. The rest of the English were in reserve and watching this combat, thinking all their enemies were before them, when the second French brigade, followed by its baggage, came hastily out from a narrow cleft in some perpendicular rocks on the right hand. A confused action ensued, for the reserve scrambled over some rough intervening ground to attack this new enemy, and the French to avoid them made for a hill a little way in their front; whereupon the fifty-second, whose rear was thus menaced, wheeled round and running at full speed up the hill met them on the summit. However, the French soldiers, without losing their presence of mind, threw off their packs and half-flying half-fighting, escaped along the side of the mountains towards Miranda, while the first brigade, still retreating on the road towards Espejo, were pursued by the riflemen. Meanwhile the sumpter animals run wildly about the rocks with a wonderful clamor; and though the escort huddled together and fought desperately, all the baggage became the spoil of the victors, and four hundred of the French fell or were taken; the rest, thanks to their unyielding resolution and activity, escaped, though pursued through the mountains by some Spanish irregulars. Reille being still pressed by Graham then retreated behind Salinas de Añara.

A knowledge of these events reached the King that night, yet

* Official Journal of General Boyer, Chief of the Staff, MSS.

neither Reille nor the few prisoners he had made could account for more than six Anglo-Portuguese divisions at the defiles. No troops had been felt on the great road from Burgos, and Hill was judged to be marching with the others by Valmaceda into Guipuscoa. It was however clear that six divisions were concentrated on the right and rear of the French, and no time was to be lost; wherefore Gazan and D'Erlon marched in the night to unite at Armiñon, a central point behind the Zadora river, up the left bank of which it was necessary to file in order to gain the basin of Vittoria. But it could only be entered at that side through the pass of Puebla de Arganzan, which was two miles long and so narrow as scarcely to furnish room for the road. To cover this dangerous movement Reille fell back in the night to the Bayas river, where he was to dispute the ground vigorously; for by that line Wellington could enter the basin before Gazan and D'Erlon could thread the pass of Puebla; he could also send a corps from Frias to attack their rear on the Miranda side while they were engaged in the defile. And one of these things he should have endeavored to accomplish, but the troops had made very long marches on the 18th, and it was dark before the fourth division reached Espejo. D'Erlon and Gazan therefore united at Armiñon without difficulty about ten o'clock in the morning of the 19th, and immediately commenced the passage of the defile of Puebla; the head of their column appeared on the other side at the moment when Wellington was driving Reille back upon the Zadora.

Reaching Bayas before mid-day the 19th, the allies, if they could have forced the passage at once would have cut off D'Erlon and Gazan from Vittoria; but Reille was strongly posted, his front covered by the river, his right by Subijana de Morillas which was occupied as a bridge-head, the left secured by very rugged heights opposite the village of Pobes. This position was however turned by the light division while the fourth division attacked it in front, and after a skirmish in which eighty of the French fell, Reille was forced over the Zadora; but D'Erlon had then passed the defile of Puebla and was in position, Gazan was coming rapidly into second line, the crises had passed, the combat ceased, and the allies pitched their tents on the Bayas. The French armies now formed three lines behind the Zadora, and the King hearing that Clausel was at Logroño, eleven leagues distant, expedited orders to him to march upon Vittoria; Foy also, who was in march for Bilbao, was directed to halt at Durango, to rally the garrisons of Biscay and Guipuscoa and come down on Vittoria. All these orders were received too late.

CHAPTER VIII.

Confused state of the French in the basin of Vittoria—Two convoys are sent to the rear—The King takes up a new order of battle—The Gallicians march to seize Orduña but are recalled—Graham marches across the hills to Murguia—Relative strength and position of the hostile armies—Battle of Vittoria—Joseph retreats by Salvatierra—Wellington pursues him up the Borundia and Araquil valleys—Sends Longa and Giron into Guipuscoa—Joseph halts at Yrursun—Detaches the army of Portugal to the Bidassoa—Retreats with the army of the centre and the army of the south to Pampeluna—Wellington detaches Graham through the mountains by the pass of St. Adrian into Guipuscoa and marches himself to Pampeluna—Combat with the French rear-guard—Joseph retreats up the valley of Roncevalles—General Foy rallies the French troops in Guipuscoa and fights the Spaniards at Montdragon—Retreats to Bergara and Villa Franca—Graham enters Guipuscoa—Combat on the Orreaga river—Foy retires to Tolosa—Combat there—The French posts on the sea-coast abandoned with exception of Santona and St. Sebastian—Foy retires behind the Bidassoa—Chausel advances towards Vittoria—Retires to Logroña—Wellington endeavors to surround him—He makes a forced march to Tudela—Is in great danger—Escapes to Zaragoza—Halts there—Is deceived by Mina and finally marches to Jaca—Gazan re-enters Spain and occupies the valley of Bastan—O'Donnell reduces the forts of Pancorbo—Hill drives Gazan from the valley of Bastan—Observations.

THE basin into which all the French troops, paces, convoys and encumbrances were thus poured, was about eight miles broad by ten in length, Vittoria being at the further end. The river Zadora, narrow and with rugged banks, after passing very near that town runs towards the Ebro with many windings and divides the basin unequally, the largest portion being on the right bank. A traveller coming from Miranda by the royal Madrid road, would enter the basin by the pass of Puebla, through which the Zadora flows between two very high and rough mountain ridges, the one on his right called the heights of Puebla, that on his left the heights of Morillas. The road leads up the left bank of the Zadora, and on emerging from the pass, six miles to the left would be seen the village of Subijana de Morillas, furnishing that opening into the basin which Reille defended while the other armies passed the defile of Puebla. The spires of Vittoria would appear eight miles distant; and from that town the road to Logroño goes off on the right hand, the road to Bilbao by Murguia and Orduña on the left hand, crossing the Zadora at a bridge near the village of Ariaga; further on, the roads to Estella and to Pampeluna branch off on the right, a road to Durango on the left; and between them the royal causeway leads over the great Arlaban ridge into the mountains of Guipuscoa by the formidable defiles of Salinas. But of all

these roads, though several were practicable for guns, especially that to Pampeluna, the royal causeway alone could suffice for the retreat of such an encumbered army. And as the allies were behind the hills edging the basin on the right of the Zadora, their line was parallel to the great causeway, and by prolonging their left they could infallibly cut off the French from that route.

Joseph felt the danger, and first thought to march by Salinas to Durango, with a view to cover his communications with France and join Foy and the garrisons. But in that rough country neither his artillery nor his cavalry, on which he greatly depended, though the cavalry and artillery of the allies were scarcely less powerful, could act or subsist; he would have had to send them into France; then pressed in front and surrounded by bands in a mountainous region he could not long have remained in Spain. Another project was, if forced from the basin of Vittoria, to retire by Salvatierra to Pampeluna and bring Suchet's army up to Zaragoza; but Joseph feared thus to lose the great communication with France; because the Spanish regular army and the bands could seize Tolosa while Wellington operated against him on the side of Navarre. It was replied that troops detached from Clausel's and Reille's armies might oppose them; the King however hesitated; for though the road to Pampeluna was practicable for wheels, it required something more for the enormous mass of guns and carriages of all kinds now heaped around Vittoria. One large convoy had marched on the 19th by the royal causeway for France, another, still larger, was to move the 21st under escort of Maucune's division; the fighting men in front of the enemy were thus diminished; yet the plain was still covered with artillery parks and equipages of all kinds, and Joseph, infirm of purpose, continued to waste time in vain conjectures about his adversary's movements.

On the 19th nothing was done, but the 20th some of Reille's troops passed the Zadora to feel for the allies towards Murguia, and being encountered by Longa's Spaniards at the distance of six miles, after some successful skirmishing recrossed the Zadora. The 21st at three o'clock in the morning Maucune's division, three thousand good soldiers, marched with the second convoy, and the King took up a new line of battle. Reille, then reinforced by a Franco-Spanish brigade of infantry and Digeon's dragoons, formed the extreme right, having to defend the Zadora where the Bilbao and Durango roads crossed it by the bridges of Gamara Mayor and Ariaga. The French division defended the bridge, the Franco-Spanish brigade was pushed to Durana on the royal road,* and supported by a French battalion and a brigade of light horsemen;

* Plan 7, p. 270.

Digeon's dragoons and a second brigade of light cavalry were in reserve near Zuazo de Alava and Hermandad. The King's centre, distant six or eight miles from Gamara following the course of the Zadora, was on another front, because the stream, turning suddenly to the left round the heights of Margarita, descends to the defile of Puebla nearly at right angles with its previous course. Here covered by the river and on an easy range of heights, Gazan's right extended from the royal road to an isolated hill in front of the village of Margarita. His centre was astride the royal road in front of the village of Arinez; his left occupied rugged ground behind Subijana de Alava on the roots of the Puebla mountain facing the defile; and to cover this wing Maransin was posted with a brigade on the mountain. D'Erlon's army was in second line. The principal mass of the cavalry with many guns and the King's guards formed a reserve behind the centre near the village of Gomecha; and fifty pieces of artillery were massed in front, pointing to the bridges of Mendoza, Tres Puentes, Villodas, and Nanclores.

While the King was making conjectures, Wellington made dispositions for the different operations which might occur. He knew the Andalusian reserve would be at Burgos in a few days, and thinking Joseph would not fight on the Zadora, detached Giron with the Gallicians on the 19th to seize Orduña. Graham's corps was destined to follow Giron, but finally penetrated through difficult mountain ways to Murguia, thus cutting the enemy off from Bilbao and menacing his communications with France. However, the rear of the army had been so much scattered that Wellington halted the 20th to rally his columns, and taking that opportunity to examine the position of the French armies, observed that they seemed steadfast to fight; whereupon changing his own dispositions, he gave Graham fresh orders and hastily recalled Giron from Orduña.

The long-expected battle was now at hand, and on neither side were the numbers and courage of the troops of mean account. The allies had lost two hundred killed and wounded in the previous operations; the sixth division, six thousand five hundred strong, was left at Medina de Pomar; and only sixty thousand Anglo-Portuguese sabres and bayonets, with ninety pieces of cannon, were actually in the field. The Spanish auxiliaries were above twenty thousand, and the whole army, including serjeants and artillerymen, exceeded eighty thousand combatants. The French muster-roll of troops was lost with the battle and an approximation to their strength must suffice. The number killed and taken in different combats was about two thousand men, and some five thou-

sand had marched to France with the two convoys; but Sarrut's division, the garrison of Vittoria, and many smaller posts had joined, and hence, by comparison with former returns about seventy thousand men were present. Wherefore deducting the officers, artillerymen, sappers, miners, and non-combatants, always borne on the French muster-rolls, the sabres and bayonets would scarcely reach sixty thousand, but in the number and size of their guns the French had the advantage.

All the defects in the King's position were apparent. His best line of retreat was on the prolongation of his right flank, which being at Gamara Mayor, was too distant to be supported by the main body of the army; yet the safety of the latter depended upon that point. Many thousand carriages and impediments of all kinds were heaped about Vittoria, blocking all the roads and creating confusion amongst the artillery parks; and Maransin, placed on the Puebla mountain, was isolated and weak to hold that ground. The centre indeed occupied an easy range of hills, its front was open with a slope to the river, and powerful batteries seemed to bar all access by the bridges; but many of the guns, being pushed with an advanced post into a deep loop of the Zadora, were within musket-shot of a wood on the right bank which was steep and rugged, giving the allies good cover close to the river. There were seven bridges within the scheme of the operations, namely, the bridge of La Puebla on the French left beyond the defile; the bridge of Nanclares, facing Subijana de Alava and the French end of the defile of Puebla; and three other bridges placed around the deep loop before mentioned opened upon the right of the French centre, that of Mendoza being highest up the stream, Vellodas lowest, Tres Puentes in the centre; lastly the bridges of Gamara Mayor and Ariaga on the upper Zadora, guarded by Reille, completed the number, and none of the seven were either broken or entrenched.



Wellington observing these things, formed his army for three distinct battles.

Graham, advancing from Murguia by the Bilbao road, was to fall on Reille and attempt the passage at Gamara Mayor and Ariaga; by this movement the French would be completely turned and great part shut up between the Puebla mountain on one side and the Zadora on the other. The first and fifth Anglo-Portuguese divisions, Bradford's and Pack's independent Portuguese brigades, Longa's Spanish division, and Anson's and Bock's cavalry, in all twenty thousand men with eighteen pieces of cannon, were destined for this attack, and Giron's Galicians came up by a forced march in support.

Campus.coa

The Action

French



Hill was to attack the enemy's left. His corps, twenty thousand strong, was composed of Morillo's Spaniards, Silveira's Portuguese and the second British division, with some cavalry and guns. Collected on the southern slope of the Morillas between the Bayas and lower Zadora, and pointing to the village of Puebla, it was destined to force a passage at that point, to assail Maransin, thread the defile of La Puebla and so enter the basin of Vittoria, turning and menacing all the French left and securing the passage of the Zadora at the bridge of Nanclores.

In the centre Wellington personally directed the third, fourth, seventh, and light divisions of infantry, the great mass of the artillery, the heavy cavalry and D'Urban's Portuguese horsemen, in all thirty thousand combatants. Encamped along the Bayas from Subijana Morillas to Ulivarre, they had only to march across the ridges which formed the basin of Vittoria on that side, to come down to their different points of attack on the Zadora at the bridges of Mendoza, Tres Puentes, Villodas and Nanclores. But so rugged was the country and the communications between the different columns so difficult, that no exact concert could be expected, and each general of division was in some degree master of his movements.

BATTLE OF VITTORIA.

At daybreak the 21st, the weather being rainy with a thick vapor, the troops moved from their camps on the Bayas, and the centre of the army advancing by columns from the right and left of the line passed the ridges in front and slowly approached the Zadora. The left column pointed to Mendoza, the right column skirted the Morillas ridge, on the other side of which Hill was marching. That general seized the village of Puebla about ten o'clock and commenced the passage. Morillo leading with his first brigade on a bye-way assailed the mountain of La Puebla, where the ascent was so steep the soldiers seemed to climb rather than walk, and the second brigade, being to connect the first with the British troops below, only ascended half way. No opposition was made until the first brigade was near the summit, but then a sharp skirmishing commenced, Morillo was wounded, his second brigade joined, and the French feeling the importance of the height, reinforced Maransin with a fresh regiment. Hill succored Morillo with the seventy-first regiment and a battalion of light infantry, both under Colonel Cadogan; yet the fight was doubtful, for though the British secured the summit and gained ground along the side of the mountain, Cadogan, a brave officer and of high promise, fell, and Gazan sent Villatte's division to succor his side. Strongly

did these troops fight and the battle remained stationary, the allies being scarcely able to hold their ground. Hill however sent fresh troops, and with the remainder of his corps, threading the long defile of Puebla, fiercely issued forth on the other side and won the village of Subijana de Alava in front of Gazan's line: he thus connected his own right with the troops on the mountain, and maintained this forward position in despite of the enemy.

Wellington had meanwhile brought the fourth and light divisions, the heavy cavalry, the hussars and D'Urban's Portuguese horsemen, from Subijana, Morillas and Montevite, down by Olabarre to the Zadora. The fourth division was placed opposite the bridge of Nanclares, the light division opposite that of Villodas; both were covered by rugged ground and woods, and the light division was so close to the water that their skirmishers could with ease have killed the French gunners in the loop of the river at Villodas. The day was now clear, and when Hill's battle began the riflemen of the light division spread along the bank and exchanged a biting fire with the enemy's skirmishers. No serious effort was at first made, because the third and seventh divisions having rough ground to traverse, were not up; and to have pushed the fourth division and the cavalry over the bridge of Nanclares, would have imprudently crowded the space in front of the Puebla defile before the other divisions were ready to attack. But while thus waiting, a Spanish peasant told Wellington the bridge of Tres Puentes on the left of the light division was unguarded, and offered to guide the troops over it. Kempt's brigade was instantly directed towards this point, and being concealed by some rocks from the French and well led by the brave peasant, they passed the narrow bridge at a running pace, mounted a steep curving rise of ground and halted close under the crest on the enemy's side of the river; being then actually behind the King's advanced post and within a few hundred yards of his line of battle. Some French cavalry now approached and two round shots were fired by the enemy, one of which killed the poor peasant to whose courage and intelligence the allies were so much indebted; but as no movement of attack was made, Kempt called the fifteenth hussars over the river; and they came at a gallop, crossing the narrow bridge one by one, horseman after horseman, yet still the French remained torpid: there was an army there, but no general.

It was now one o'clock, Hill's assault on the village of Subijana de Alava was developed, and a curling smoke, faintly seen far up the Zadora on the enemy's extreme right and followed by the dull sound of distant guns showed that Graham was at work. Then the King finding his flanks in danger, caused the reserve about

Gomecha to file off towards Vittoria, and gave Gazan orders to retire by successive masses. But at that moment the third and seventh divisions being descried in rapid movement towards the bridge of Mendoza, the French guns opened upon them, a body of cavalry drew near the bridge, and the numerous light troops commenced a vigorous musketry. Some British guns replied to the French cannon from the opposite bank, and the value of Kempt's forward position was instantly made manifest; for Andrew Barnard, springing forward, led the riflemen of the light division in the most daring manner between the French cavalry and the river, taking their light troops and gunners in flank, and engaging them so closely that the English artillery-men, thinking his darkly clothed troops were enemies, played upon both alike. This singular attack enabled a brigade of the third division to pass the bridge of Mendoza without opposition; the other brigade forded the river higher up, and the seventh division and Vandeleur's brigade of the light division followed; the French then abandoned the ground in front of Villodas, and the battle which had before somewhat slackened revived with extreme violence. Hill pressed the enemy harder, the fourth division passed the bridge of Nanclares, the smoke and sound of Graham's attack became more distinct, and the banks of the Zadora presented a continuous line of fire. The French, weakened in the centre by the absence of Villatte and dispirited by the order to retreat, were perplexed, and no regular retrograde movement could be made, the allies were too close.

Now also the seventh division and Colville's brigade of the third division forded the river on the left, and were immediately and severely engaged with the French right in front of Margarita and Hermandad; and almost at the same time Wellington, seeing the hill in front of Arinez nearly denuded of troops by the withdrawal of Villatte's troops, carried Picton and the rest of the third division in close columns of regiments at a running pace diagonally across the front of both armies towards that central point. This attack was headed by Barnard's riflemen and followed by the remainder of Kempt's brigade and the hussars, but the other brigade of the light division acted in support of the seventh division. Cole advanced from the bridge of Nanclares, and the heavy cavalry, a splendid body, passing the river, galloped up, squadron after squadron, into the plain ground between Cole's right and Hill's left. The French thus caught in the midst of their dispositions for retreat, threw out a prodigious number of skirmishers, while fifty pieces of artillery played with astonishing activity; this fire was answered by many British guns, and both sides were shrouded by a dense cloud of smoke and dust, under cover of which the French

retired by degrees to the range of heights in front of Gomecha on which their reserve had been posted. They however continued to hold the village of Arinez on the main road, and Picton's troops, still headed by Barnard's riflemen, plunged into the streets amidst a heavy fire; in an instant three guns were captured, but the post was important, more French troops came in, and for a time the smoke and dust and clamor, the flashing of fire-arms and the shouts and cries of the combatants mixed with the thundering of the guns were terrible; yet finally the British troops issued forth victorious on the further side. During this conflict the seventh division, reinforced by Vandeleur's brigade, was heavily raked by a battery at the village of Margarita, until the fifty-second regiment, led by Colonel Gibbs, with an impetuous charge drove the French guns away and carried the village: at the same time the eighty seventh under Colonel Gough won the village of Hermandad. Then all on Picton's left advanced fighting, and on his right the fourth division also made way, though more slowly because of the rugged ground.

When Picton and Kempt's brigades had carried the village of Arinez and gained the main road, the French troops near Subijana de Alava were turned; and being hard-pressed on their front and left flank by Hill and the troops on the Puebla mountain, fell back for two miles in a disordered mass, striving to regain the great line of retreat to Vittoria. Some cavalry launched at the moment would have totally disorganized the French battle and secured several thousand prisoners, but it was not tried, and the confused multitude shot ahead of the British lines and recovered order. The ground was exceedingly diversified, in some places wooded in others open, here covered with high corn, there broken by ditches, vineyards and hamlets, and the action resolved itself into a running fight and cannonade for six miles, the dust and smoke and tumult of which filled all the basin, passing onwards towards Vittoria as the allies advanced, taking gun after gun in their victorious progress.

At six o'clock the French reached the last defensible height one mile in front of Vittoria. Behind them was the plain in which the city stood, and beyond the city thousands of carriages and animals and non-combatants, men women and children, were crowding together in all the madness of terror; and as the English shot went booming over head, the vast crowd started and swerved with a convulsive movement, while a dull and horrid sound of distress arose, but there was no hope, no stay for army or multitude, it was the wreck of a nation! Still the courage of the French soldier was unequalled. Reille, on whom every thing now depended,

maintained the upper Zadora, and the armies of the south and centre drawing up on their last heights, between the villages of Ali and Armentia, made their muskets flash like lightning, while more than eighty pieces of artillery, massed together, pealed with such a horrid uproar that the hills labored and shook and streamed with fire and smoke, amidst which the dark figures of the French gunners were seen bounding with frantic energy. This terrible cannonade and musketry kept the allies in check, and scarcely could the third division, which bore the brunt of this storm, maintain its advanced position. Again the battle became stationary, and the French endeavored to draw off their infantry in succession from the right wing; but suddenly the fourth division rushing forward carried a hill on their left and the heights were at once abandoned. Joseph, finding the royal road so completely blocked by carriages that the artillery could not pass, then indicated the road of Salvatierra as the line of retreat, and the army went off in a confused yet compact body on that side, leaving Vittoria on its left: the British infantry followed hard, and the light cavalry galloped through the town to intercept the new line of retreat which was through a marsh and the road also was choked with carriages and fugitive people, while on each side there were deep drains. Thus all became disorder and mischief, the guns were left on the edge of the marsh, the artillerymen and drivers fled with the horses, and the vanquished infantry breaking through the miserable multitude, went off by Metauco towards Salvatierra: the cavalry however still covered the retreat, and many of the generous horsemen were seen taking up children and women to carry off from the dreadful scene.

Reille, of whose battle it is time to treat, was now in great danger. Sarrut, posted by him at the village of Aranguis, had also occupied a height which covered the bridges of Ariaga and Gamara Mayor, but he had been driven from village and height a little after twelve o'clock by General Oswald, who commanded the fifth division Longa's Spaniards and Pack's Portuguese. Longa then seized Gamara Menor on the Durango road, while another detachment gained the royal causeway still further on the left, and forced the Franco-Spaniards to retire from Durana. Thus the first blow on this side deprived the King of his best line of retreat and confined him to the road of Pampeluna. However, Sarrut recrossed the river in good order and a new disposition was made by Reille. One of Sarrut's brigades defended the bridge of Ariaga and the village of Abechuco beyond it; the other was in reserve supporting the first and also La Martiniere, who defended the bridge of Gamara Mayor and the village of that name beyond the

river. Digeon's dragoons were behind the village of Ariaga, and Reille's own dragoons took post behind the bridge of Gamara; a brigade of light cavalry on the extreme right sustained the Franco-Spanish troops, which were now on the upper Zadora in front of Betonio; the remainder of the light cavalry under Curto was on the French left extending down the Zadora between Ariaga and Govea.

Oswald attacked Gamara with some guns and Robinson's brigade of the fifth division. Longa's Spaniards were to have led, and at an early hour when Gamara was feebly occupied, but they did not stir and the village was reinforced. Robinson's brigade formed in three columns then made the assault at a running pace, yet the fire of artillery and musketry was so heavy the troops stopped and commenced firing; then the columns got intermixed, but encouraged by their officers and the example of General Robinson, an inexperienced man but of a high and daring spirit, they renewed the charge, broke through the village and even crossed the bridge. One gun was captured and the passage seemed to be won, when Reille turned twelve pieces upon the village, and La Martiniere, rallying his division under cover of this cannonade, retook the bridge, and it was with difficulty the allied troops could hold the village. However a second British brigade came down and the bridge was again carried and again lost, and thus the passage remained forbidden. Graham attacked the village of Abachuco which covered the bridge of Ariaga, and it was carried at once by Halket's Germans, supported by Bradford's Portuguese and by the fire of twelve guns; yet here as at Gamara the French maintained the brigade itself; and at both places the troops on each side remained stationary under a reciprocal fire of artillery and small arms.

Reille, though inferior in numbers, continued to interdict the passage of the river until the tumult of Wellington's battle, coming up the Zadora, reached Vittoria itself, and a part of the British horsemen rode out of that city upon Sarrut's rear. Digeon's dragoons kept this cavalry in check for the moment, and Reille had previously formed a reserve of infantry under General Fririon at Betonio which now proved his safety. For Sarrut was killed at the bridge of Ariaga, and Menne, the next in command, could scarcely draw off his troops while Digeon's dragoons held the British cavalry at point; yet with the aid of Fririon's reserve Reille finally secured the movement and rallied all his troops at Betonio. He had now to make head on several sides, because the allies were coming down from Ariaga, from Durana, and from Vittoria; yet he fought his way to Metauco on the Salvatierra road, covering

the general retreat with some degree of order. Vehemently and closely did the British pursue, and neither the resolute demeanor of the French cavalry, which was strengthened on the flanks by light troops and made several vigorous charges, nor the night, which now fell, could stop their victorious career until the flying masses of the enemy had cleared all obstacles and passing Metauco got beyond the reach of further injury. Then the battle ended. The French escaped with comparatively little loss of men; but to use Gazan's words, "they lost all their equipages, all their guns, all their treasure, all their stores, all their papers; so that no man could prove even how much pay was due to him; generals and subordinate officers alike were reduced to the clothes on their backs, and most of them were bare-footed."

Never was an army more hadly used by its commander, for the soldiers were not half beaten, and yet never was a victory more complete. The trophies were innumerable. The French carried off but two pieces of artillery from the battle. Jourdan's baton of command, a stand of colors, one hundred and forty-three brass pieces, two-thirds of which had been used in the fight, all the *parcs* and *dépôts* from Madrid, Valladolid, and Burgos, carriages, ammunition, treasure, everything fell into the hands of the victors. The loss in men did not however exceed six thousand, including some hundreds of prisoners; the loss of the allies was nearly as great, the gross numbers being five thousand one hundred and seventy-six killed, wounded and missing. Of these one thousand and fifty-nine were Portuguese, and five hundred and fifty Spanish; hence the loss of the English was more than double that of the Portuguese and Spaniards together; and yet both fought well, and especially the Portuguese, but British troops are the soldiers of battle. The spoil was immense, and to such extent was plunder carried, principally by the followers and non-combatants, for with some exceptions the fighting troops may be said to have marched upon gold and silver without stooping to pick it up, that of five millions and a half of dollars indicated by the French accounts to be in the money-chests, a fiftieth part only came to the public. Wellington sent fifteen officers with power to stop and examine all loaded animals passing the Ebro and the Duero in hopes to recover the sums so shamefully carried off; and this disgraceful conduct was not confined to ignorant and vulgar people, some officers were seen mixed up with the mob contending for the disgraceful gain.

On the 22d Giron and Longa entered Guipuscoa by the royal road, in pursuit of the convoy which had moved under Maucune on the morning of the battle; the heavy cavalry and D'Urban's Portuguese remained at Vittoria; but Pakenham with the sixth

division came up from Medina Pomar, and the remainder of the army followed Joseph towards Pampeluna, for he had continued his retreat up the Borundia and Araquil valleys all night. The weather was rainy, the roads heavy, and the French rear-guard, unable to destroy the bridges, set fire to the villages behind them to delay the pursuit. At five o'clock in the morning of that day Reille rallied his two divisions and all his cavalry in front of Salvatierra, halting until assured that all the French had passed, when he marched to Huerta in the valley of Araquil, thirty miles from the field of battle. Joseph reached Yrursun, a town situated behind one of the sources of the Arga from which good roads branched off to Pampeluna on one side, and to Tolosa and St. Esteban on the other. At this place he remained the 23d, sending orders to different points on the French frontier to prepare provisions and succors for his suffering army; he also directed Reille to proceed rapidly to the Bidassoa with his infantry, six hundred select cavalry, his artillerymen and their horses. Gazan and D'Erlon marched upon Pampeluna intending to cross the frontier at St. Jean Pied de Port. Joseph having reached Pampeluna the 24th, the army bivouacked on the glacis of the fortress in such a state of destitution and insubordination that the governor would not suffer them to enter the town; for his magazines were reduced by Mina's long blockade, and some writers say it was proposed to blow up the works and abandon the place: however, by great exertions additional provisions were obtained from the vicinity, the garrison was augmented to three thousand, and the army marched towards France leaving a rear-guard at a strong pass about two leagues off.

Wellington having detached Graham with a corps to Guipuscoa by the pass of Adrian, left the fifth division at Salvatierra and pursued the King with the rest of the army the 23d. On the 24th the light division and Victor Alten's cavalry came up with the French rear-guard, when two battalions of riflemen pushed their infantry through the pass, while Ross's horse artillery galloping forward, killed several men, and dismounted one of the only two pieces of cannon carried off from Vittoria. Next day the French, covered by the fortress of Pampeluna, went up the valley of Roncevalles, followed by the light division which turned the town as far as Vilalba, and they were harassed by the Spanish irregular troops who swarmed on every side.

Foy and Clausel were now in very difficult positions. The former had reached Bergara the 21st, and the garrison of Bilbao and the Italian division of St. Paul, formerly Palombini's, had reached Durango; the first convoy from Vittoria was that day at Bergara, Maucune was with the second at Montdragon. The 22d the gar-

rison of Castro went off to Santona, and the fugitives from the battle spread such an alarm through the country that the forts of Arlaban, Montdragon and Salinas, commanding the passes into Guipuscoa, were abandoned, and Longa and Giron penetrated them without hindrance. Foy had only one battalion in hand, but he rallied the fugitive garrisons, and marching upon Montdragon, made some prisoners and acquired exact intelligence of the battle. Then he ordered the convoy to move day and night, the troops at Durango to march upon Bergara, and those from all the other posts to unite at Tolosa, to which place the artillery, baggage and sick men were now hastening from every side. To cover their concentration, he, having been joined by Maucune, gave battle to Giron and Longa at Montdragon; but the Spaniards, thrice his numbers, had the advantage and he fell back fighting to Bergara with a loss of two hundred and fifty men and six guns.

The 23d he marched to Villa Real de Guipuscoa, but that evening the head of Graham's column, which had crossed the Mutiol mountain by the pass of Adrian, descended upon Segura and was then as near to Tolosa as Foy was. Yet the difficulties of passing the mountain were so great, it was late on the 24th ere Graham, who had then only collected Anson's light cavalry, two Portuguese brigades of infantry and Halket's Germans, could move towards Villa Franca. The Italians and Maucune's divisions, composing the French rear, were just entering that town as the allies came in sight, and to cover it they took post at the village of Veasaya on the right bank of the Orio river. Halket's Germans, aided by Pack's Portuguese, drove Maucune's people from the village with the loss of two hundred men, and Bradford's Portuguese engaged the Italians; but the latter claimed the advantage, and the whole position was so strong that Graham had recourse to flank operations, whereupon Foy retired to Tolosa.* Giron and Longa now came up by the great road, and Mendizabel, having quitted the blockade of Santona, arrived at Aspeytia on the Deba.

On the 25th Foy again offered battle in front of Tolosa, but Graham turned his left with Longa's division, and Mendizabel, turned his right from Aspeytia. While they were in march, Colonel Williams, having the grenadiers of the first regiment and three companies of Pack's Portuguese, dislodged him from an advantageous hill in front and purposely prolonged the fight until six o'clock in the evening, when the Spaniards having reached their destination on the flanks, a general attack was made on all sides. The French, cannonaded at the causeway and strongly pushed in front while Longa drove their left from the heights, were forced

* Boyer's official Journal, MSS.

beyond Tolosa on the flanks; but that town was strongly entrenched as a field-post, and they maintained it until Graham brought up his guns and bursting one of the gates opened a passage for his troops. Foy however, profiting from the darkness, made his retreat good with a loss of only four hundred men killed and wounded, and some prisoners who were taken by Mendizabel and Longa. These actions were very severe; the loss of the Spaniards was not known, but the Anglo-Portuguese had more than four hundred killed and wounded in the two days' operations, and Graham himself was hurt.

He halted the 26th and 27th to hear of Wellington's progress, and the enemy's convoys thus reached France; but Foy occupied a position between Tolosa and Ernani behind the Anezo, his force being increased by the successive arrival of the smaller garrisons to sixteen thousand bayonets, four hundred sabres, and ten pieces of artillery. The 28th he threw a garrison of two thousand six hundred good troops into St. Sebastian and passed the Urumia; the 29th he passed the Oyarsun and halted the 30th, leaving a small garrison at Passages, which however surrendered the next day to Longa.

On the 1st of July the garrison of Gueteria escaped by sea to St. Sebastian and Foy passed the Bidassoa, his rear-guard fighting with Giron's Gallicians; but Reille's troops were now at Vera and Viriatu, they had received ammunition and artillery from Bayonne, and thus twenty-five thousand men occupied a defensive line from Vera to the bridge of Behobie, which was covered by a block-house. Graham immediately invested St. Sebastian, and Giron concentrating the fire of his own artillery and a British battery upon the block-house of Behobie, compelled the French to blow it up and destroy the bridge.

Clausel was in more imminent danger than Foy.* On the evening of the 22d he had approached the field of battle at the head of fourteen thousand men, by a way which falls into the Estella road at Aracete, not far from Salvatierra. Pakenham with the sixth division was then at Vittoria, and the French general learning the state of affairs, retired to Logroño and halted until the evening of the 25th. This delay was like to have proved fatal. Wellington, who thought Clausel was at Tudela, thus discovered his real position, and leaving Hill to invest Pampeluna marched by Tafalla with two brigades of light cavalry and the third, fourth, seventh, and light divisions of infantry. The fifth and sixth divisions, the heavy cavalry and D'Urban's Portuguese marched at the same time from Salvatierra and Vittoria upon Logroño; and Mina

* Plan 7, p. 270.

also, who had now collected all his scattered battalions near Estella, and was there joined by Julian Sanchez' cavalry, followed hard on Clausel's rear. The latter moving by Calahorra reached Tudela on the evening of the 27th, and thinking this forced march of sixty miles in forty hours with scarcely a halt had outstripped all pursuers, would have made for France by Olite and Tafalla. Wellington was however in possession of those places expecting him, when an alcalde gave him notice of the danger, whereupon recrossing the Ebro he marched upon Zaragoza, and arriving at the 1st of July took post on the Gallego, giving out he would there wait until Suchet or the King, if the latter retook the offensive, should come up. Wellington immediately made a flank movement to his own left as far as Caseda, and could still with an exertion have intercepted Clausel by the route of Jaca, but he feared to drive him back upon Suchet and contented himself with letting Mina press him. That chief, acting with great ability, took three hundred prisoners and announcing that the whole allied army was at hand, so imposed on Clausel that he destroyed some of his artillery and heavy baggage, left the rest at Zaragoza and retired to Jaca.

Joseph, not being pressed, had sent Gazan again to Spain to take possession of the valley of Bastan, which was fertile and full of strong positions. But O'Donnel, Count of Abispa, had now reduced the forts at Pancorbo with the Andalusian reserve, partly by capitulation, partly by force, and was marching towards Pampeluna; wherefore Hill, without abandoning the siege of that place, was enabled to move two British and two Portuguese brigades into the valley of Bastan, and on the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th drove Gazan from all his positions, and cleared the valley with a loss of only one hundred and twenty men. The whole line of the Spanish frontier, from Roncevalles to the mouth of the Bidassoa river, was thus occupied by the victorious allies, and Pampeluna and St. Sebastian were invested. Joseph's reign was over, the crown had fallen from his head, and after years of toils and combats which had been rather admired than understood, the English general, emerging from the chaos of the Peninsula struggle, stood on the summit of the Pyrenees a recognized conqueror. From those lofty pinnacles the clangour of his trumpets pealed clear and loud, and the splendor of his genius appeared as a flaming beacon to warring nations.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. In this campaign of six weeks, Wellington marched with one hundred thousand men six hundred miles, passed six great rivers, gained one decisive battle, invested two fortresses, and drove a

hundred and twenty thousand veteran troops from Spain. This immense result could not have been attained if Joseph had followed Napoleon's instructions, Wellington could not then have turned the line of the Duero. It could not have been attained if Joseph had acted with ordinary skill after the line of the Duero was passed. Time was to him most precious, yet when contrary to his expectations he had concentrated his scattered armies behind the Carrion, he made no effort to delay his enemy on that river; he judged it an unfit position, that is, unfit for a great battle; but he could have made Wellington lose a day, perhaps two or three, and behind the upper Pisuerga he might have saved a day or two more. Reille, who was with the army of Portugal on the right of the King, complained that no officers of that army knew the Pisuerga sufficiently to place the troops in position;* the King then had cause to remember Napoleon's dictum, namely, that "to command an army well a general must think of nothing else." For why was the course of the Pisuerga unknown when the King's head-quarters had been for several months within a day's journey of it?

2. The Carrion and the Pisuerga being given up, the country about the Hormaza was occupied and the three French armies were in mass between that stream and Burgos; yet Wellington's right wing only, that is to say, twenty-three thousand infantry and five brigades of cavalry, drove Reille's troops over the Arlanzan, and the castle of Burgos was abandoned. This was on the 12th, the three French armies, not less than fifty thousand fighting men, had been in position since the 9th, and the King's letters prove that he desired to fight in that country, which was favorable for all arms. Nothing then could be more opportune than Wellington's advance on the 12th, because a retrograde defensive system is unsuited to French soldiers, whose impatient courage leads them always to attack; and the news of Napoleon's victory at Bautzen had just arrived to excite their ardor. Wherefore Joseph should have retaken the offensive when Wellington approached the Hormaza; and as the left and centre of the allies were at Villa Diego and Castroxerez, the greatest part at the former, that is to say one march distant, the twenty-six thousand men immediately in front would probably have been forced back over the Pisuerga, and the King have gained time for Sarrut, Foy and Clausel to join him. Did the English general then owe his success to fortune, to his adversary's fault, rather than to his own skill? Not so. He had judged the King's military capacity, he had seen his haste, his confusion, his trouble; and knowing well the moral power of

* King's correspondence, MSS.

rapidity and boldness in such circumstances, had acted daringly, indeed but wisely, for such daring is wisdom, it is the highest part of war.

3. Wellington's mode of turning the line of the Ebro was a fine strategic illustration. It was by no means certain, yet failure would have still left great advantages. It was certain he would gain Santander and fix a new base of operations on the coast; and he would still have had the power of continually turning the King's right by operating between him and the coast: the errors of his adversary only gave him additional advantages which he seized. But if Joseph, instead of spreading his army from Espejo on his right to the Logroño road on his left, had kept only cavalry on the latter route and on the main road in front of Pancorbo,—if he had massed his army to his right, pivoting upon Miranda or Frias, scouring all the roads towards the sources of the Ebro, the allies could never have passed the defiles and descended upon Vittoria. They would have marched then by Valmaceda upon Bilbao; but Joseph could by the road of Orduña have met them there, and with a force increased by Foy's and Sarrut's divisions and the Italians: meanwhile Clausel would have come to Vittoria and the heaped convoys have gained France in safety.

4. When the King resolved to fight at Vittoria, he should, on the 19th and 20th, have broken some of the bridges on the Zadora and covered others with field-works to enable him to sally forth upon the attacking army; he should have entrenched the defile of Puebla and occupied the heights above in strength; his position on the lower Zadora would then have been formidable. But his great fault was the line of operation. His reasons for avoiding Guipuscoa were valid, his true line was down the Ebro; but Zaragoza should have been his base, since Aragon was fertile and more friendly than any other province of Spain. It is true he would thus have abandoned Foy; yet that general, reinforced with the reserve from Bayonne, would have had twenty thousand men and the fortress of St. Sebastian, and a strong corps must have remained to watch him. The King first reinforced by Clausel and ultimately by Suchet, would have had one hundred thousand men to oppose the allies, weakened as they would then be by the detachment watching Foy. And there were political reasons, to be told hereafter, for the reader must not imagine Wellington had got thus far without trammels, which would have probably rendered this plan so efficacious as to compel the British army to abandon Spain altogether. Then new combinations would have been made all over Europe.

5. In the battle the French operations, with exception of Reille's

fight, were a series of errors; the most extraordinary being the suffering Kempt's brigade and the hussars to pass the bridge of Tres Puentes, and establish themselves close to the line of battle, flanking the troops at the bridges of Mendoza and Villodas. This alone proves Joseph meant to retreat when Graham's attack commenced, and his position was therefore in his own view untenable. He should have occupied the Puebla mountain strongly, and have placed the infantry by corps in succession, the right refused, towards Vittoria, while the cavalry and guns watched the bridges and the mouth of the Puebla defile. He could then have succored Reille, or marched to his own front according to circumstances, and his retreat would have been secure.

6. The enormous fault of heaping up the baggage and convoys and parcs behind Vittoria requires no comment; but the King added a more extraordinary error, namely, remaining to the last moment undecided as to his line of retreat. Nothing but misfortunes could attend upon such bad dispositions; and that the catastrophe was not more terrible is owing entirely to an error which Wellington and Graham seem alike to have fallen into; namely, that Reille had two divisions in reserve behind the bridges on the upper Zadora. Not knowing that Maucune's division had marched with the convoy, they thought Clausel had only one division of the army of Portugal with him, whereas he had two, Taupin's and Barbout's; and Reille's reserves were composed, not of divisions but of brigades drawn from La Martiniere's and Sarrut's divisions, which were defending the bridges: his whole force, including the Franco-Spaniards who were driven back from Durana, did not exceed ten thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred cavalry. Graham had, exclusive of Giron's Gallicians, nearly twenty thousand of all arms, and it is said the river might have been passed both above and below the points of attack; it is certain also that Longa's delay gave the French time to occupy Gamara Mayor in force, which was not the case at first. Had the passage been won in time very few of the French army could have escaped from the field, but the truth is Reille fought most vigorously.

7. As the third and seventh divisions did not come to the point of attack in time, the battle was not fought after the original conception; it is likely the real project was to force the passage of the bridges, break the right centre of the enemy from Arinez to Margarita, and then envelope the left centre with the second, fourth, and light divisions and the cavalry, while the third and seventh divisions pursued the others. But notwithstanding the unavoidable delay, which gave the French time to commence their retreat, it is not easy to understand how Gazan's left escaped

from Subijana de Alava; seeing that when Picton broke the centre at Arinez, he was considerably nearer to Vittoria than the French left, which was cut off from the main road and assailed in front by Hill and Cole. The having no cavalry in hand to launch at this time and point of the battle has been already noticed; Wellington says, that the country was generally unfavorable for the action of that arm; neither side indeed used it with much effect at any period of the battle; nevertheless there are always some suitable openings, some happy moments to make a charge, and this seems to have been a neglected one.

8. Picton's sudden rush from the bridge of Tres Puentes to the village of Arinez has been much praised, and nothing could be more prompt and daring; but the merit of the conception belongs to the general in chief who directed it in person. It was suggested to him by the denuded state of the hill in front of that village, and viewed as a stroke for the occasion it is to be admired. Yet it had its disadvantages. For the brigade, thus crossing the front of both armies, not only drew a flank fire from the enemy, but was exposed if the French cavalry had been prompt and daring to a charge; it also prevented the advance of other troops in their proper arrangement, and thus crowded the centre for the rest of the action. However, these sudden movements cannot be judged by rules, they are good or bad according to the result. This was entirely successful, and the hill thus carried was called the Englishmen's hill; not, as some recent writers have supposed, in commemoration of a victory gained by the Black Prince, but because of a disaster which there befel a part of his army. His battle was fought between Navarrette and Najera, many leagues from Vittoria and beyond the Ebro; but on this hill the two gallant knights, Sir Thomas and Sir William Felton, took post with two hundred companions, and being surrounded by Don Tello with six thousand, were all killed or taken after a long and heroic resistance.

9. It has been observed by French writers, and the opinion has been also entertained by many English officers, that after the battle Wellington should have passed the frontier in mass, and marched upon Bayonne instead of chasing Clausel and Foy on the right and left; and if, as the same authors assert, Bayonne was then indefensible, the criticism is just; because the fugitive French army, having lost all its guns and being without musket ammunition, could not have checked its pursuers for a moment. But if Bayonne had resisted, and it was impossible for Wellington to suspect its real condition, much mischief might have accrued from such a hasty advance. Foy and Clausel coming down upon the field of Vittoria would have driven away if they did not destroy the sixth

division; they would have recovered all the trophies; the King's army, returning by Jaca into Aragon, would have re-organized itself from Suchet's dépôts, and that marshal was actually coming up with his army from Valencia. Little would then have been gained by the battle. This question can however be more profitably discussed when the great events which followed the battle of Vittoria have been described.

BOOK XXI.

CHAPTER I.

Lord Wellington blockades Pampeluna, besieges St. Sebastian—Operations on the eastern coast of Spain—General Elio's misconduct—Sir John Murray sails to attack Tarragona—Colonel Prevot takes St. Felipe de Balaguer—Second siege of Tarragona—Suchet and Maurice Mathieu endeavor to relieve the place—Sir John Murray raises the siege—Embarks with the loss of his guns—Disembarks again at St. Felipe de Balaguer—Lord William Bentinck arrives—Sir John Murray's trial—Observations.

ALTHOUGH the fate of Spain was virtually decided at Vittoria, the British warfare was still fierce, dangerous, and uncertain; because on the fields of Lutzen and Bautzen Napoleon's genius had restored the general balance of success, and the negotiations which followed strongly influenced the operations in the Peninsula. Wellington's first intention was to reduce Pampeluna, and the sudden fall of the Pancorbo forts, which opened the great Madrid road was favorable for that project. But Portugal being relinquished as a place of arms, a new base was required, lest a change of fortune should force the allies to return there when the great military establishments were broken up, the opposition of the native government rancorous and the public sentiment averse to English supremacy. The western Pyrenees, in conjunction with the ocean, offered such a base; but the harbors were few, and one convenient for the army was required. Wherefore to reduce San Sebastian was of more immediate importance than to reduce Pampeluna; and it was essential to effect this in the fine season, because the coast was iron-bound and very dangerous in winter.

Pampeluna was strong. It would have taken three weeks to bring up the ordnance stores and a six weeks' attack which required twenty thousand good soldiers. An investment could be maintained with fewer and worse troops, Spaniards and Portuguese; and the magazines were likely to fail sooner under a blockade than the walls were to crumble under fire. Moreover Sir John Murray had just failed at Tarragona, had lost the honored battering-train entrusted to him, and his artillery equipage was supposed to be entirely ruined; hence, as he could make no siege, and could not act seriously without having a place of arms, Suchet

who had numerous fortresses was free to march on Zaragoza, unite with Clausel and Paris, and menace the right flank of the allies. The blockade of Pampeluna and siege of San Sebastian were therefore determined upon by Wellington; the troops returning from the pursuit of Clausel were disposed to form a covering army for both, and peasants were hired to raise the works of investment for the first, which was entrusted to Abispa's Andalusian reserve. Confidently did the English general look for the immediate fall of San Sebastian, and he was intent to have it before the negotiations for the armistice in Germany should terminate; but mighty pains and difficulties awaited him, and ere these can be treated of, the progress of the war in other parts must be noticed.

CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS ON THE EASTERN COAST.

It will be remembered that Del Parque in conjunction with Elio was to act on the Xucar, while Murray sailed to attack Tarragona.* Del Parque received his orders the 24th of April, he had long known of the project and his march was only one of twelve days, yet he did not join Elio until the end of May. This delay resulted partly from the state of his army, partly from his own procrastination, partly from Elio's conduct which created doubts of his fidelity. It has been shown how he withdrew his cavalry when Mijares was at Yecla, whence sprung that general's misfortune—how he placed the regiment of Velez Malaga in Villeña, a helpless prey for Suchet—how he left the Anglo-Sicilian army to fight the battle of Castalla unaided. He now persuaded Del Parque to move towards Utiel, and send a detachment to Requena; thereby threatening Suchet's right, but exposing the Spanish army to a sudden blow, and disobeying his instructions which prescribed a march by Almanza.

This false movement Elio represented as Del Parque's own, but the latter, when Murray remonstrated, quickly approached Castalla by Jumilla, declaring his earnest desire to obey Wellington's orders. The divergence had however already placed him in danger; his left flank was so exposed while coming by Jumilla, that Murray postponed his own embarkation to concert with Elio a combined operation, from Biar and Sax, against Fuente de la Higuera where Suchet's troops were lying in wait. Previous to this epoch Elio had urged Murray to disregard Del Parque and embark at once for Tarragona, undertaking himself to secure the junction with his fellow commander. Now, after agreeing to co-operate with Murray, he secretly withdrew his cavalry from Sax, sent

* Book XXII.

Whittingham in a false direction, placed Roche without support at Alcoy, retired himself to the city of Murcia, and at the same time one of his regiments quartered at Alicante fired upon a British guard. Roche was attacked and lost eighty men, and Del Parque's flank was menaced from Fuente de la Iliguera; but the British cavalry, assembling at Biar, secured his communication with Murray on the 25th, and the 27th the Anglo-Sicilians broke up from their quarters to embark at Alicante.

Suchet was now very strong. Unmolested for forty days after the battle of Castalla, he had improved his defensive works, chased the bands from his rear, called up his reinforcements, re-horsed his cavalry and artillery, and foraged all the fertile districts in front of the Xucar. On the other hand, Lord William Bentinck, alarmed by intelligence of an intended descent upon Sicily, had recalled more British troops; and as Whittingham's cavalry and Roche's entire division were left at Alicante, the force actually embarked to attack Tarragona, including a fresh English regiment from Carthagená, scarcely exceeded fourteen thousand present under arms.* Less than eight thousand were British and German, and the horsemen only seven hundred. Yet the armament was formidable, for the battering-train was complete and powerful, the materials for gabions and fascines previously collected at Ivica, and the naval squadron under Admiral Hallowel consisted of several line-of-battle ships, frigates, bomb-vessels and gun-boats, besides the transports. There was however no cordiality between Generals Clinton and Murray, nor between the latter and his quarter-master-general Donkin, nor between Donkin and the admiral; subordinate officers also, in both services, adopting false notions, some from vanity, some from hearsay, added to the uneasy feeling which prevailed amongst the chiefs. Neither admiral nor general seemed to have had sanguine hopes of success even at the moment of embarkation; and there was in no quarter a clear understanding of Wellington's able plan for the operations.

While Del Parque was yet in march, Suchet, if he had no secret understanding with Elío or any of his officers, must have been doubtful of the allies' intentions, although the strength of the battering-train at Alicante indicated some siege of importance. He however recalled Pannetier's brigade from the frontier of Aragon, and placed it on the road to Tortosa; and knowing Clausel was then warring down the partidas in Navarre, he judged Aragon safe and drew Severoli's Italian brigade from thence, leaving only the garrisons and a few thousand men under Paris as a reserve at Zaragoza: this was the reason the army of Aragon did not co-


* Appendix 28.

operate to crush Mina after his defeat by Clausel in the valley of Ronçal.* Decaen also sent some reinforcements, wherefore, after completing his garrisons, Suchet could furnish the drafts required by Napoleon, and yet bring twenty thousand men into the field. He was however disquieted, and notwithstanding Clausel's operations, feared for his troops in Aragon, where Paris had been attacked by Goyan even in Zaragoza; moreover now, for the first time since its subjugation, an unfriendly feeling was perceptible in Valencia.

On the 31st of May Murray sailed. Suchet immediately ordered Pannetier's brigade to close towards Tortosa, but kept his own positions in front of Valencia until the fleet was seen to pass the Grão with a fair wind. Then feeling assured the expedition aimed at Catalonia, he prepared to aid that principality; but the column of succor being drawn principally from the camp of Xativa, forty miles from Valencia, he could not quit the latter before the 7th of June. Then however he took with him nine thousand select men, leaving Harispe on the Yucar with seven thousand infantry and cavalry, exclusive of Severoli's troops which were in full march from Teruel. But Murray's armament, having very favorable weather, anchored on the evening of the 2d in the bay of Tarragona, whence five ships of war under Captain Adam, and two battalions of infantry with some guns under Colonel Prevot, were detached to attack San Felipe de Balaguer. This important fort, garrisoned by a hundred men, was only sixty feet square; but the site was a steep isolated rock, standing in the very gorge of a pass and blocking the only carriage-way from Tortosa to Tarragona. The mountains on either hand, although commanding the fort, were nearly inaccessible themselves, and great labor was required to form the batteries. Prevot, however, being joined by a brigade of Copon's army and acting in concert with the navy, placed two six-pounders on the heights south of the pass, from whence at six or seven hundred yards distance they threw shrapnel-shells.

On the 4th two twelve-pounders and a howitzer, brought to the same point by the sailors, opened their fire; and at night the seamen with extraordinary exertions dragged up five twenty-four-pounders and their stores. The troops then constructed a battery for two howitzers on the slope of the grand ridge, northward of the pass; and a second for four heavy guns on the fort rock, at a distance of one hundred and fifty yards. Earth was carried from below; everything else, even water, was brought from the ships, though the landing-place was more than a mile-and-a-half off; and as time was valuable favorable terms were offered to the garrison,

* Book XXII.



but the offer was refused. The 5th the fire was continued, yet with slight success, the howitzer-battery on the great ridge was relinquished, and at night a very violent storm retarded the construction of the breaching-batteries.

Previous to this, Prevot had warned Murray that his means were insufficient, and a second Spanish brigade was sent to him, yet the breaching-batteries were still incomplete on the 6th, and out of three guns already mounted one was disabled by a shot from the fort. Meanwhile Suchet, who was making forced marches to Tortosa, had ordered the governor of that place to succor San Felipe; and that officer would undoubtedly have succeeded, if Captain Peyton of the *Thames* frigate had not obtained two eight-inch mortars,* which, being worked by Mr. James of the marine artillery, exploded a small magazine in the fort and caused an early surrender. The besiegers, who had lost about fifty men and officers, then occupied the place.

ENGLISH SIEGE OF TARRAGONA.

Although the fleet cast anchor in the bay on the evening of the 2d, the surf prevented the disembarkation of the troops until the next day. The rampart of the lower town had been destroyed by Suchet, but Fort Royal remained, and though in bad condition, served, together with the ruins of the San Carlos bastion, to cover the western front. The Governor, Bertoletti, was supposed by Murray to be disaffected, yet he proved himself a loyal and energetic officer; and his garrison, sixteen hundred strong, five hundred being privateer seamen and Franco-Spaniards, served him well. The Olivo and Loretto heights were occupied the first day by Clinton's and Whittingham's infantry; the other troops remained on the low ground about the Francoli river, and the town was bombarded during the night by the navy, but the fire was sharply returned and the flotilla suffered most. Next day two batteries were commenced six hundred yards from San Carlos, and nine hundred yards from Fort Royal. They opened the 6th, and being found too distant, a third was commenced six hundred yards from Fort Royal. The 8th a practicable breach was made in that outwork, yet the assault was deferred and some pieces removed to play from the Olivo; whereupon the besieged, finding the fire slacken, repaired the breach at Fort Royal and increased the defences. The subsequent proceedings cannot be understood without an accurate knowledge of the relative positions of the French and allied armies.

* Sir Henry Peyton, MSS.

Tarragona, though situated on one of a cluster of heights which terminate a range descending from the northward to the sea, is, with the exception of that range, surrounded by an open country called the *Campo de Tarragona*, which is again environed by very rugged mountains through which the several roads descend into the plain. Westward there were only two carriage-ways, one direct, by the Col de Balaguer to Tarragona; the other circuitous, leading by Mora, Falcet, Momblanch and Reus. The first was blocked by the taking of San Felipe; the second, although used by Suchet for his convoys during the French siege of Tarragona, was now in bad order and at best only available for small mountain-guns.

Northward there was a carriage-way leading from Lerida, which united with that from Falcet at Momblanch. Eastward there was the royal causeway, coming from Barcelona through Villa Franca, Arbos, Vendrills, and Torredembarra; this road after passing Villa Franca sends off two branches to the right, one passing through the Col de Cristina, the other through Masarbones and Col de Leibra, leading upon Braffin and Valls. It was by the latter branch M'Donald passed to Reus in 1810; he had however no guns or carriages, and his whole army labored to make the way practicable.

Between these various roads the mountains were too rugged to permit direct cross communications; and troops coming from different sides could only unite in the Campo de Tarragona now occupied by the allies. Wherefore, as Murray had fifteen thousand fighting men, and Copons, reinforced with two regiments sent by sea from Coruña, was at Reus with six thousand regulars besides Mansou's division, twenty-five thousand combatants were in possession of the French point of junction.

After Lacy's departure the Catalans with the aid of Captain Adam's ship had destroyed two small forts at Perillo and Ampolla, and Eroles had blockaded San Felipe de Balaguer for thirty-six days; it was then succored by Maurice Mathieu; and the success at Perillo was more than balanced by a check which Sarsfield received on the 3d of April from some of Pannetier's troops. The partidas had however been active in Upper Catalonia, and Copons claimed two considerable victories; one gained by himself the 17th of May at La Bisbal near the Col de Cristina, where he boasted to have beaten six thousand French with half their numbers, and destroyed six hundred as they returned from succoring San Felipe. In the other, won by Colonel Lander near Olot on the 7th of May, it was said twelve hundred of Lamarque's men fell. These exploits are by French writers called skirmishes; and the following description of the Catalan army, given to Murray by Cabanes,

chief of Copons' staff, renders the French version the most creditable.

"We do not," said that officer, *"exceed nine or ten thousand men, extended on different points of a line running from the neighborhood of Reus along the high mountains to the vicinity of Olot. The soldiers are brave but without discipline, without subordination, without clothing, without artillery, without ammunition, without magazines, without money and without means of transport!"*

Copons, when he came down to the Campo, frankly told Murray, that as his troops could only fight in position he would not join in any operation which endangered his retreat in the high mountains. However, with exception of twelve hundred left at Vich under Eroles, all his forces, the best perhaps in Spain, were now at Reus and the Col de Balaguer, ready to intercept the communications of the different French corps, and to harass their marches if they should descend into the Campo. Murray could only calculate upon seven or eight hundred seamen and marines to aid him in pushing on the works of the siege, or in a battle near the shore, and he expected three thousand additional troops from Sicily. Sir Edward Pellew, commanding the great Mediterranean fleet, had promised to divert the attention of the French troops by a descent eastward of Barcelona; and the armies of Del Parque and Elio were to make a like diversion westward of Tortosa. Finally, a general rising of the somatenes might have been effected, and those mountaineers were all at Murray's disposal, to procure intelligence, to give timely notice of the enemy's approach, or to impede his march by breaking up the roads.

On the French side there was greater but more scattered power. Suchet had marched with nine thousand men from Valencia, and what with Pannetier's brigade and some spare troops from Tortosa, eleven or twelve thousand men with artillery might have come to the succor of Tarragona from that side, if the sudden fall of San Felipe de Balaguer had not barred the only carriage way on the westward. A movement by Mora, Falcet and Momblanch, remained open, yet it would have been tedious, and the disposable troops at Lerida were few. To the eastward therefore the garrison looked for the first succor. Maurice Mathieu, reinforced with a brigade from Upper Catalonia, could bring seven thousand men with artillery from Barcelona, Decaen could move from the Ampurdam with an equal number, and hence twenty-five thousand men might finally bear upon the allied army.

But Suchet, measuring from the Xucar, had more than one hundred and sixty miles to march; Maurice Mathieu was to collect his forces from various places and march seventy miles after

Murray had disembarked; nor could he stir at all until Tarragona was actually besieged, lest the allies should reembark and attack Barcelona. Decaen had in like manner to look to the security of the Ampurdam, and he was one hundred and thirty miles distant. Wherefore, however active the French generals might be, the English generals could calculate upon ten days' clear operations after investment, before even the heads of the enemy's columns could issue from the hills bordering the Campo.

Some expectation also he might have, that Suchet would endeavor to cripple Del Parque before he marched to the succor of Tarragona; and it was in his favor that eastward and westward the royal causeway was in places exposed to the fire of the naval squadron. The experience of Codrington during the first siege of Tarragona had proved indeed that an army could not be stopped by this fire; yet it was an impediment not to be left out of the calculation. Thus, the advantage of a central position, the possession of the enemy's point of junction, the initial movement, the good will of the people and the aid of powerful flank diversions belonging to Murray; superior numbers and a better army to the French; for the allies, brave and formidable to fight in a position, were not well constituted to move.

Tarragona, if the resources for an internal defence be disregarded, was a weak place. A simple revetment three feet and a half thick, without ditch or counterscarp, covered it on the west; the two outworks of Fort Royal and San Carlos, slight obstacles at best, were not armed nor even repaired until after the investment; and the garrison, too weak for the extent of rampart, was oppressed with labor. Here then, time being precious to both sides, ordinary rules should have been set aside and daring operations adopted.* Wellington had judged ten thousand men sufficient to take Tarragona. Murray brought seventeen thousand, of which fourteen thousand were effective. To do this he had, he said, so reduced his equipments, stores and means of land transport that his army could not move from the shipping; he was yet so unready for the siege, that Fort Royal was not stormed on the 8th because the engineer was unprepared to profit from a successful assault.

This scarcity of stores was unreal; the equipments left behind were only draft animals and commissariat field-stores; the thing wanting was vigor in the general, and this was made manifest in various ways. Copons was averse to calling out the somatenes and Murray did not press the matter. Suchet had taken San Felipe de Balaguer by escalade; Murray attacked in form and without sufficient means; for if Captain Peyton had not brought up the

* Appendix 1. 28.

mortars, an after-thought extraneous to the general's arrangements, the fort could not have been reduced before succor arrived from Tortosa: indeed the surrender was scarcely creditable to the French commandant, for his works were uninjured and only a small part of his powder destroyed. It was also said, that one of the officers employed to regulate the capitulation had in his pocket an order from Murray to raise the siege and embark, spiking the guns! At Tarragona, the troops on the low ground did not approach so near by three hundred yards as they might have done; and the outworks should have been stormed at once, as Wellington stormed Fort Francisco at the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. Francisco was a good outwork and complete; the outworks of Tarragona were incomplete, ill-flanked, without palisades or casemates, and their fall would have enabled the besiegers to form a parallel against the body of the place as Suchet had done in the former siege: a few hours' firing would then have brought down the wall and a general assault might have been delivered. The French had stormed a similar breach in that front although defended by eight thousand Spanish troops; and the allies, opposed by only sixteen hundred French and Italian soldiers and seamen, were in some measure bound by honor to follow that example, since Skerrett at the former siege, refused to commit twelve hundred British troops in the place, on the special ground that it was indefensible, though so strongly garrisoned. Murray's troops were brave, they had been acting together for nearly a year; and, after the fight at Castalla, had become so eager, that an Italian regiment which at Alicant was ready to go over bodily to the enemy now volunteered to lead the assault on Fort Royal. This confidence was not shared by their general.

Up to the 8th, Murray's proceedings were ill-judged; his after-operations were contemptible. As early as the 5th, false reports had made Suchet reach Tortosa, and put two thousand French in movement from Lerida. Murray then openly avowed his alarm and his regret at having left Alicant; yet he proceeded to construct two heavy counter-batteries near the Olivo, sent a detachment to Valls in observation of the Lerida road, and desired Manso to watch that of Barcelona. On the 9th, his emissaries said the French were coming from the east and from the west; and would when united exceed twenty thousand. Murray immediately sought an interview with the admiral, declaring his intention to raise the siege. His views changed during the conference, but he was discontented; Hallowel refused to join in a summons to the governor and his flotilla again bombarded the place.

On the 10th the spies in Barcelona gave notice that eight or ten thousand French with fourteen guns, would march from that city

the next day. Copons immediately joined Manso. But Murray, as if he now disdained his enemy, continued to disembark stores, landed several mortars, armed the batteries at the Olivo; and on the 11th opened their fire in concert with that from the ships of war. This was the first serious attack, and the English general, professing a wish to fight the column coming from Barcelona, sent the cavalry under Lord Frederick Bentinck to Altafalla, and in person sought a position of battle to the eastward. He left orders to storm the outworks that night, yet returned before the hour appointed, extremely disturbed by intelligence that Maurice Mathieu was at Villa Franca with eight thousand combatants, and Suchet closing upon the Col de Balaguer. His infirmity of mind was apparent to the whole army. At eight o'clock he repeated his order to assault the outworks, and at ten o'clock the storming-party was in the dry bed of the Francoli awaiting the signal, when a countermand arrived; the siege was then to be raised and the guns removed immediately from the Olivo. The commander of the artillery remonstrated, and the general promised to hold the batteries until the next night; but the detachment at Valls and the cavalry at Altafalla were called in without notice to Copons, though he depended on their support.

All the heavy guns of the batteries on the low grounds and the parc were removed to the beach for embarkation on the morning of the 12th, and at 12 o'clock Lord Frederick Bentinck arrived from Altafalla with the cavalry. It is said he was ordered to shoot his horses, but refused to obey and moved towards the Col de Balaguer. The detachment from Valls arrived next and the infantry marched to Cape Salou to embark, but the horsemen followed Lord Frederick, and were themselves followed by fourteen pieces of artillery; each body moved independently, and all was confused, incoherent, afflicting and dishonorable to the British arms. While the seamen were embarking the guns, the quarter-master-general came down to the beach with orders to abandon that business and collect boats for the reception of troops, the enemy being supposed close at hand; and notwithstanding Murray's promise to hold the Olivo until night-fall, fresh directions were given to spike the guns there and burn the carriages. Then loud murmurs arose on every side and from both services; army and navy were alike indignant, and so excited, that it is said personal insult was offered to the general. Three staff-officers repaired in a body to Murray's quarters to offer plans and opinions; but the admiral, who did not object to raising the siege though opposed to the manner of doing it, would not suffer the seamen to discontinue the embarkation of artillery; yet he urged an attack upon the column

coming from Barcelona, and opposed the order to spike the guns at the Olivo, offering to be responsible for carrying all clear off during the night.

Thus pressed, Murray again wavered. Denying that he had ordered the battering pieces to be spiked, he sent counter orders and directed a part of Clinton's troops to advance towards the Gaya river. In a few hours afterwards he reverted to his former idea, and peremptorily renewed the order for the artillery to spike the guns on the Olivo, and burn the carriages. Nor was even this unhappy action performed without confusion. The different orders received by Clinton in the course of the day had indicated the extraordinary vacillation of the commander-in-chief; and Clinton himself, forgetful of his own arrangements, with an obsolete courtesy took off his hat to salute an enemy's battery which had fired upon him; but this waving of his hat from that particular spot was also the conventional signal for the artillery to spike the guns, and they were thus spiked prematurely. The troops were however all embarked in the night of the 12th, and many of the stores and horses were shipped the 13th without the slightest interruption from the enemy; but eighteen or nineteen battering-pieces, whose carriages had been burnt, were, with all the platforms, fascines, gabions and small ammunition, in view of the fleet and army, triumphantly carried into the fortress! Murray seemingly unaffected by this misfortune, shipped himself on the evening of the 12th and took his usual repose in bed!*

While the siege was thus precipitately abandoned, the French, unable to surmount the obstacles opposed to their junction, unable even to communicate by their emissaries, were despairing of Tarragona. Suchet did not reach Tootza before the 10th, but a detachment from the garrison had on the 8th attempted to succor San Felipe, and nearly captured the Naval Captain Adam, Colonel Prevôt, and other officers, who were examining the country. Maurice Mathieu reached Villa Franca early on the 10th,† and deceiving even his own people as to his numbers, gave out that Decaen was close behind with a powerful force. To give effect to this policy, he drove Copons from Arbos the 11th, and his scouting parties entered Vendrills as if he was resolved singly to attack Murray. Pellew had however landed his marines at Rosas which arrested Decaen's march; and Maurice Mathieu, alarmed at the surcease of fire about Tarragona, knowing nothing of Suchet's movements and too weak to fight the allies alone, fell back in the night of the 12th to the Llobregat, his main body never having passed Villa Franca.

* Admiral Hallowell's Evidence.

† Lafaille.

Suchet's operations were even less decisive. His advanced guard under Pannetier, reached Perillo the 10th. The 11th, not hearing from his spies, he caused Pannetier to pass over the mountains through Valdillos to some heights which terminate abruptly on the Campo above Monroig. The 12th that officer reached the extreme verge of the hills, being then twenty-five miles from Tarragona. His patrols descending into the plains met with Lord Frederick Bentinck's troopers, and reported that Murray's whole army was at hand; wherefore he could not enter the Campo, but at night kindled large fires to encourage the garrison. These signals were unobserved, the country people had disappeared, no intelligence could be procured, and Suchet could not with a large force enter those wild hills where there was no water. Thus on both sides of Tarragona the succoring armies were baffled at the moment chosen by Murray for flight.

Suchet now received alarming intelligence from Valencia, yet still anxious for Tarragona, he pushed on the 14th along the coast-road towards Felipe de Balaguer, thinking to find Prevôt's division alone; but the head of his column was suddenly cannonaded by the Thames frigate, and he was wonderfully surprised to see the whole British fleet anchored off San Felipe and disembarking troops. Murray's operations were indeed as irregular as those of a partisan, yet without partisan vigor. Hearing in the night of the 12th, from Prevôt, of Pannetier's march to Monroig, he, to protect the cavalry and guns under Lord Frederick Bentinck, sent Mackenzie's division by sea to Balaguer on the 13th, and followed with the whole army the 14th. Mackenzie drove back the French posts on both sides of the pass, the embarkation of the cavalry and artillery then commenced, and Suchet, still uncertain if Tarragona had fallen, moved towards Valdillos to bring off Pannetier.

At this precise period Murray heard that Maurice Mathieu's column, which he always erroneously supposed to be under Decaen, had retired to the Llobregat, that Copons was again at Reus, and Tarragona had not been reinforced. Elated by this information, he revolved various projects in his mind, at one time thinking to fall upon Suchet, at another to cut off Pannetier; now resolving to march upon Cambrils and even to menace Tarragona again by land, then to send a detachment by sea to surprise the latter; but finally he disembarked his whole force on the 15th, and being ignorant of Suchet's last movement, decided to strike at Pannetier. In this view, he detached Mackenzie by a rugged valley leading from the eastward to Valdillos, and that officer reached it on the 16th; but Suchet had already carried off Pannetier's brigade, and

the next day the British detachment was recalled by Murray, who had determined to re-embark.

This determination was caused by a fresh alarm from the eastward, for Maurice Mathieu, whose whole proceedings evinced both skill and vigor, hearing that the siege of Tarragona was raised and the allies re-landed at the Col de Balaguer, retraced his steps and boldly entered Cambrills the 17th. On that day, however, Mackenzie returned and Murray's whole army was thus concentrated in the pass. Suchet was then behind Perillo, Copons at Reus, having come there at Murray's desire to attack Maurice Mathieu; and the latter would have suffered if the English general had been capable of a vigorous stroke. It was fortunate for Mackenzie that Suchet, too anxious for Valencia, disregarded his movement upon Valldilos; but taught by the disembarkation of the whole English army that the fate of Tarragona whether for good or evil was decided, he had sent an emissary to Maurice Mathieu on the 16th, and then retired to Perillo and Amposta. He reached the latter place the 17th, attentive only to the movement of the fleet, and meanwhile Maurice Mathieu endeavored to surprise the Catalans at Reus.

Copons was led into this danger by Murray, who had desired him to harass Maurice Mathieu's rear with a view to a general attack, and then changed his plan without giving any notice. However, he escaped. The French moved upon Tarragona, and Murray was left free to embark or to remain at the Col de Balaguer. He called a council of war, and it was concluded, as already said, to re-embark, but then Pellew's fleet appeared in the offing, and Hallowel, observing a signal announcing Lord William Bentinck's arrival, answered with more promptitude than propriety, "*we are all delighted.*"

Murray's command having thus terminated, public discontent rendered it impossible to avoid investigation, yet the difficulty of holding a court in Spain and some disposition at home to shield him, caused great delay. He was at last tried in England. Acquitted of two charges, on the third he was declared guilty of an error in judgment and sentenced to be admonished, but even that slight mortification was not inflicted. This decision does not preclude the judgment of history, nor will it sway that of posterity. The court-martial was assembled twenty months after the event, when the war being happily terminated, men's minds were little disposed to treat past failures with severity. There were two distinct prosecutors, having different views; the proceedings were conducted at a distance from the scene of action, defects of memory could not be remedied by reference to localities, which opened a

door for contradiction and doubt upon important points. There was no indication that the members of the court were unanimous in their verdict; they were confined to specific charges, restricted by legal rules of evidence and deprived of the testimony of all the Spanish officers, who were certainly discontented with Murray's conduct and whose absence caused the charge of abandoning Copons' army to be suppressed. Moreover the warmth of temper displayed by the principal prosecutor, Admiral Hallowel, together with his signal on Lord William Bentinck's arrival, whereby, to the detriment of discipline, he manifested his contempt for the general with whom he was acting, gave Murray an advantage which he improved skilfully, for he was a man sufficiently acute and prompt when not at the head of an army. He charged the admiral with deceit, factious dealings, and disregard of the service; described him as being of a passionate overweening busy disposition, troubled with excess of vanity, meddling with everything and thinking himself competent to manage both troops and ships.

Nevertheless Sir John had signally failed both as an independent general and as a lieutenant acting under superior orders. On his trial indeed, blending these different capacities together with expert sophistry, he pleaded his instructions in excuse for his errors as a free commander, and his discretionary power in mitigation of his disobedience as a lieutenant; but his operations were indefensible in both capacities. Wellington's instructions, precise and founded upon the advantages offered by a command of the sea, prescribed an attack upon Tarragona with a definite object, namely, to deliver Valencia.

"*You tell me,*" said he, "*that the line of the Xucar, which covers Valencia, is too strong to force; turn it then by the ocean, assail the rear of the enemy and he will weaken his strong line to protect his communication, or, he will give you an opportunity to establish a new base of operations behind him.*"

This plan demanded promptness and energy, Murray possessed neither. The weather was so favorable, that a voyage which might have consumed nine or ten days was performed in two, the Spanish troops punctually effected their junction, the initial operations were secured, Fort Balaguer fell, the French moved from all sides to the succor of Tarragona, the line of the Xucar was weakened, the diversion was complete. In the night of the 12th the bulk of the army was again afloat, a few hours would have sufficed to embark the cavalry at the Col de Balaguer, and Murray might have sailed for Valencia while Suchet's advanced guard was still on the hills above Monroig, and himself, uncertain as to the

fate of Tarragona, one hundred and fifty miles from the Xucar. Murray had failed to attain the first object pointed out by Wellington's instructions, the second was within his reach; instead of grasping it he loitered about the Col de Balaguer, and gave Suchet time to reach Valencia again, in manifest dereliction of the letter and spirit of Wellington's instructions.

What was his defence? That no specific period being named for his return to Valencia he was entitled to exercise his discretion! Did he then as an independent general perform any useful or brilliant action to justify his delay? His tale was one of loss and dishonor! The improvident arrangements for the siege of San Felipe, and the unexpected fortune which saved him from the shame of abandoning his guns there also, have been noted; and when the gain of time was success he neither urged Copons to break up the roads, nor push the siege of Tarragona with vigor.

The feeble formality of the latter operation has been imputed to the engineer Major Thackary;* unjustly, because that officer had only to furnish a plan of attack agreeable to the rules of art; it might be a cautious one, and many persons did think he treated Tarragona with too much respect; but the general was to decide if the scheme of his operations required a deviation from the regular course; the untrammelled engineer could then have displayed his genius. Murray made no sign. His instructions and his ultimate views were alike withheld from his naval colleague, from his second in command, from his quarter-master-general; and while the last-named functionary was quite shut out from the confidence of his chief, the admiral and many others, both of the army and navy, imagined him to be the secret author of the proceedings which were hourly exciting their indignation. Murray however declared at his trial that he had rejected Donkin's advice; and indeed that officer had vainly urged him to raise the siege on the 9th and told him where four hundred draught bullocks were to be had to transport his heavy artillery. On the 12th also he opposed the spiking of the guns and urged Murray to drag them to Cape Salou, of which place he had given as early as the third day of the siege, a military plan, marking a position, strong in itself, covering several landing places, and capable of being flanked on both sides by the ships of war: it had no drawback save a scarcity of water, yet there were some springs and the fleet would have supplied the deficiency.

It is true that Donkin, unacquainted with Wellington's instructions and having at Castalla seen no reason to rely on Murray's military vigor, was averse to the enterprise against Tarragona.

* Philpart's Military Calendar.

He thought the allies should have worked Suchet out of Valencia by operating on his right flank. And so Wellington would have thought if he had only looked at their numbers and not at their quality; he had even sketched such a plan for Murray if the attack upon Tarragona should be found impracticable. But he knew the Spaniards too well to like such combinations for an army, two-thirds of which were of that nation and not even under one head; an army ill-equipped and with the exception of Del Parque's troops unused to active field operations. Wherefore, calculating their power with remarkable nicety, he preferred the sea-flank and the aid of an English fleet. Here it may be observed, that Napoleon's plan of invasion did not embrace the coast-lines where they could be avoided. It was an obvious disadvantage to give the British navy opportunities of acting against his communications. He indeed seized Santona and Santander in the Bay of Biscay, because, being the only good ports on that coast the English ships were thus in a manner shut out from the north of Spain. He likewise worked the invasion by the Catalonian and Valencian coast, because the only roads practicable for artillery run along that sea-line; but his general scheme was to hold with large masses the interior of the country, and keep the communications aloof from the danger of combined operations by sea and land.

Murray, when tried, grounded his justification on the following points. 1. That he did not know with any certainty until the night of the 11th that Suchet was near. 2. That the fall of Tarragona being the principal object and the drawing of the French from Valencia the accessory, he persisted in the siege because he expected reinforcements from Sicily and desired to profit from the accidents of the war. 3. That looking only to the second object, the diversion would have been incomplete if the siege had been raised sooner or even relaxed; hence the landing of guns and stores after he despaired of success. 4. That he dared not risk a battle to save his battering-train, because Wellington would not pardon a defeat. Now, had he adopted a vigorous plan, or persisted until the danger of losing his army was apparent and then made a quick return to Valencia, this defence would have been plausible though inconclusive. But when every order, every movement, every expression discovered his infirmity of purpose, his pleading can only be regarded as the subtle tale of an advocate. The admiral was right in thinking the fault was not so much in the raising of the siege as the manner of doing it, and in the feebleness of the attack. For first, however numerous the chances of war are, fortresses expecting succor do not surrender without being vigorously assailed; and the arrival of reinforcements from Sicily was uncer-

tain. It was scarcely possible for the governor, while closely invested, to discover that no fresh stores or guns were being landed; still less could he judge so timeously of Murray's final intention by that fact, as to advertise Suchet that Tarragona was in no danger. Neither were the spies, if any were in the allies' camp, more capable of drawing such conclusions, seeing that sufficient artillery and stores for the siege were landed the first week; and the landing of more guns could not have deceived them, when the feeble operations of the general and the universal discontent furnished surer guides for their reports.

Murray designed to raise the siege as early as the 9th, and only deferred it after seeing the admiral from his natural vacillation. It was therefore mere casuistry to say, that he first obtained certain information of Suchet's advance on the night of the 11th. On the 8th and 10th through various channels he knew the French marshal was in march for Tortosa, and his advanced guard menacing the Col de Balaguer; the approach of Maurice Mathieu was also known; he should therefore have been prepared to raise the siege without the loss of guns on the 12th. Why were they lost? They could not be saved he said without risking a battle in a bad position, and Wellington had declared he would not pardon a defeat! This was the after-thought of a sophister, and not warranted by the instructions, which on that head referred only to Del Parque and Elio: but was it necessary to fight a battle to save the guns? all persons admitted they could have been embarked before mid-day on the 13th. Pannetier was then at Monroig, Suchet behind Perillo, Maurice Mathieu falling back from Villa Franca. The French on each side were therefore respectively thirty-six and thirty-four miles distant on the night of the 12th, and their point of junction was Reus. Yet how form that junction? The road from Villa Franca by the Col de Cristina was partially broken up by Copons; the road from Perillo to Reus was always impracticable for artillery, and from the latter place to Tarragona was six miles of very rugged country. The allies were in possession of the point of junction, Maurice Mathieu was retiring, not advancing. And if the French could have marched thirty-four and thirty-six miles through the mountains in one night, and been disposed to attack in the morning without artillery, they must still have ascertained the situation of Murray's army; they must have made arrangements to watch Copons, Manso, and Prevôt, who would have been on their rear and flanks; they must have formed an order of battle and decided upon the mode of attack before they advanced. It is true that their junction at Reus would have forced Murray to suspend his embarkation to fight; but not, as he said,

in a bad position with his back to the beach, where the ships' guns could not aid him and where he might expect a dangerous surf for days. The naval officers denied the surf at that season; and it was not right to destroy guns and stores when the enemy was not even in march for Reus; coolness and consideration would have enabled Murray to see there was no danger. In fact no emissaries escaped from the town, and the enemy had no spies in the camp, since no communication took place between the French columns until the 17th. On the 15th Suchet knew nothing of the fate of Tarragona.

This reasoning leaves out the chance of falling with superior forces upon one of the French columns. It supposes however that accurate information was possessed by the French generals; that Maurice Mathieu was as strong as he pretended to be, Suchet eager and resolute to form a junction with him. Yet in truth Suchet knew not what to do after the fall of Fort Balaguer, Maurice Mathieu had less than seven thousand men of all arms, he was not followed by Decaen, and he imagined the allies to have twenty thousand men, exclusive of the Catalans. The position at Cape Salou was only six miles distant, and Murray might with the aid of the draft bullocks discovered by Donkin have dragged all his heavy guns there, still maintaining the investment; he might have shipped his battering-train, and when the enemy approached Reus, have marched to the Col de Balaguer, where he could, as he afterwards did, embark or disembark in the presence of the enemy. The danger of a flank march, Suchet being at Reus, could not have deterred him, because he did send his cavalry and field artillery by that very road on the 12th, and the French advanced guard from Monroig actually skirmished with Lord Frederick Bentinck. Finally he could have embarked his main body, leaving a small corps with some cavalry to keep the garrison in check and bring off his guns.* Such a detachment, together with the heavy guns, would have been afloat in a couple of hours and on board the ships in four hours; it could have embarked on the open beach, or, if fearful of being molested by the garrison, might have marched to Cape Salou or to the Col de Balaguer; and if the guns had thus been lost, the necessity would have been apparent and the dishonor lessened. It is clear there was no military need to sacrifice the battering-pieces, those honored guns which shook the bloody ramparts of Badajos!

Wellington felt their loss keenly, Murray spoke of them lightly. *"They were of small value, old iron! he attached little importance to the sacrifice of artillery, it was his principle; he had approved*

* Naval evidence on the trial.

of Colonel Adam losing his guns at Biar, and he had also desired Colonel Prevôt, if pressed, to abandon his battering-train before the fort of Balaquer." "Such doctrine might appear strange to a British army, but it was the rule with the continental armies and the French owed much of their successes to the adoption of it."

Strange indeed! Great commanders have risked their own lives and sacrificed their bravest men, charging desperately in person to retrieve even a single piece of cannon in a battle. They knew the value of moral force in war, and that of all the various springs and levers on which it depends, military honor is the most powerful. No! it was not to the adoption of such a doctrine that the French owed their great successes; it was to the care with which Napoleon fostered and cherished a contrary feeling. Sir John Murray's argument would have been more pungent, more complete, if he had lost his colors and pleaded that they were only wooden staves bearing old pieces of silk!

CHAPTER II.

Danger of Sicily—Averted by Murat's secret defection from the Emperor—Lord William Bentinck re-embarks—His design of attacking the city of Valencia frustrated—Del Parque is defeated on the Xucar—The Anglo-Sicilians disembark at Alicante—Suchet prepares to attack the allies—Prevented by the battle of Vittoria—Abandons Valencia—Marches to Zaragoza—Clausel retreats to France—Paris evacuates Zaragoza—Suchet retires to Tarragona— Mines the walls—Lord William Bentinck passes the Ebro—Secures the Col de Balaguer—Invests Tarragona—Partial insurrection in Upper Catalonia—Combat of Salut—Del Parque joins Lord William Bentinck who projects an attack upon Suchet's cantonments—Suchet concentrates his army—Is joined by Decaen—Advances—The allies retreat to the mountains—Del Parque invests Tortosa—His rear-guard attacked by the garrison while passing the Ebro—Suchet blows up the walls of Tarragona—Lord William desires to besiege Tortosa—Hears that Suchet has detached troops—Sends Del Parque's army to join Lord Wellington—Advances to Villa Franca—Combat of Ordal—The allies retreat—Lord Frederick Bentinck fights with the French general Myres and wounds him—Lord Williams returns to Sicily—Observations.

LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK arrived without troops, for having removed the queen from Sicily he feared internal dissension; and Napoleon had directed Murat to invade the island with twenty thousand men, the Toulon squadron being to act in concert; Sir Edward Pellew indeed acknowledged the latter might easily gain twenty-four hours' start of his fleet, and Lord William judged that ten thousand invaders would suffice to conquer. Murat however opened a secret negotiation, and thus, that monarch, Bernadotte

and the Emperor Francis, united to destroy a hero connected with them by marriage and to whom they all owed their crowns either by gift or clemency!* This early defection of Murat is certain, and his declaration that he had instructions to invade Sicily was corroborated by a rumor, rife in the French camps before the battle of Vittoria, that the Toulon fleet had sailed and the descent actually made. Nevertheless there is some obscurity about the matter. The negotiation was never completed, Murat left Italy to command Napoleon's cavalry, and at the battle of Dresden contributed much to the success of that day. It is conceivable that he should mask his plans by joining the grand army, and that his fiery spirit should in the battle forget everything except victory; but to disobey Napoleon as to the invasion of Sicily and dare to face that monarch immediately after, was so unlikely as to indicate rather a paper demonstration to alarm than a real attack. And it would seem from the short observation of Wellington in answer to Lord William's detailed communication on this subject, namely, "*Sicily is in no danger*," that he viewed it so, or thought it put forward by Murat to give more value to his defection. However it sufficed to hinder reinforcements going to Murray.

Lord William on landing was informed that Suchet was at Tortosa with from eight to twelve thousand men, Maurice Mathieu with seven thousand at Cambrils. To drive the latter back and re-invest Tarragona was easy, and the place would have fallen because the garrison had exhausted all their powder in the first siege; but this Lord William did not know, and to renew the attack vigorously was impossible, because all the howitzers and platforms and fascines had been lost; and the animals and general equipment of the army were too much deteriorated by continual embarkations and disembarkations to keep the field in Catalonia. Wherefore he resolved to return to Alicant, not without hope still to fulfil Wellington's instructions by landing at Valencia between Suchet and Harispe. The re-embarkation was unmolested, the fort of Balaguer was destroyed, and one of Whittingham's regiments, destined to reinforce Copons' army, being detached to effect a landing northward of Barcelona, the fleet put to sea. Misfortune still attended this unhappy armament; a violent tempest impeded the voyage, fourteen sail of transports struck upon the sands off the mouth of the Ebro, and the army was not entirely disembarked at Alicant before the 27th. Meanwhile Suchet, seeing the English fleet under sail after destroying the fort of Balaguer, marched with such extraordinary diligence as to reach Valencia from Tortosa

* Appendix 28.

in forty-eight hours, thus frustrating Lord William's project of landing at Valencia.

During his absence Harispe had proved the weakness of the Spanish armies, and demonstrated Wellington's sagacity and prudence. That great man's warning about defeat was distinctly addressed to the Spanish generals, because the chief object of the operations was not to fight Suchet, but to keep him from aiding the French armies in the north; pitched battles were therefore to be avoided, their issue being always doubtful; the presence of a numerous and increasing force on the French front and flank was more sure to succeed. But all Spanish generals desired to fight great battles, soothing their national pride by attributing defeats to want of cavalry; it was at first doubtful if Murray could transport his horsemen to Tarragona, and if left behind they would have been under Elio and Del Parque, whereby those officers would have been encouraged to fight: hence the menacing intimation pleaded by Murray. Wellington also judged, that as Del Parque's troops had been three years active under Ballesteros, they must be more capable than Elio's in the dodging warfare suitable for Spaniards; Elio also best knew the country between the Xucar and Alicant; Del Parque was therefore ordered to turn the enemy's flank by Requena, and Elio to menace the front.

To trust Spanish generals was to trust the winds and clouds. Elio persuaded Del Parque to adopt the front attack, took the flank line himself, and detached Mijares to fall on Requena; and though Suchet had weakened his line the 2d, Del Parque was not ready until the 9th, thus giving the French a week for the succor of Tarragona and the arrival of Severoli at Liria. Harispe had eight thousand men in front of the Xucar; the Spaniards, including Roche's and Mijares' infantry and Whittingham's cavalry, were twenty-five thousand; the Empecinado, Villa Campa, and Frayle Nebot waited in the Cuenca and Albaracyn mountains to operate on the French rear. The disproportion was great, yet the contest was short, and for the Spaniards disastrous. They advanced in three columns. Elio, by the pass of Almanza; Del Parque by Villena and Fuente de la Higuera, menacing Moxente; Roche and the prince of Anglona from Alcoy, by Onteniente and the pass of Albayda, menacing San Felipe de Xativa and turning Moxente. Harispe immediately took the line of the Xucar, occupying the entrenchments in front of his bridges at Alcira and Barca del Rey near Alberique; and during this retrograde movement Mesclop, commanding the rear-guard, when pressed by the Spanish horseman wheeled round and drove them in great confusion upon the infantry.

On the 15th Mijares took the fort of Requena, thus turning the line of the Xucar and securing the defiles of Cabrillas, through which the Cuenca road leads to Valencia; Villa Campa joined him there and so prevented Severoli from uniting with Harispe. Del Parque advanced towards Alcira in two columns, one moving by Cargagente, the other by Gandia. Habert overthrew the first with one shock, took five hundred prisoners and marched to attack the other, but it was already routed by Gudin. After this each side held their respective positions, while Elio joined Mijares at Requena. Villa Campa then descended to Chiva and Harispe's position was becoming critical, when Suchet returned and Del Parque resumed the position of Castalla. Thus everything turned contrary to Wellington's designs. Elio operated by the flank, Del Parque by the front, and the latter was defeated. Murray had failed entirely. His precipitancy at Tarragona and his delays at Balaguer were alike hurtful, and would have caused the destruction of one or both of the Spanish armies but for the battle of Vitoria. For Suchet, detaching Musnier to recover the fort of Requena and drive back Villa Campa, assembled the bulk of his forces in his old positions of San Felipe and Moxente before the return of the Anglo-Sicilian troops; and as Elio, unable to subsist at Utiel, had then returned towards his former quarters the French were on the point of striking a fatal blow against him or Del Parque, or both, when the news of Wellington's victory averted the danger.

Suchet's activity and coolness may be contrasted with the infirmity of purpose displayed by Murray. The last always mistimed his movements; the first doubled his force by rapidity. Suchet was isolated by Wellington's operations, his communication with Aragon was interrupted, that province was placed in imminent danger, and the communication between Valencia and Catalonia was exposed to the attacks of the Anglo-Sicilian army and the fleet;—nearly thirty thousand Spaniards menaced him on the Xucar in front, and Villa Campa, the Frayle and the Empecinado could bring ten thousand men on his right flank; yet he left Harispe with only eight thousand men to oppose the Spaniards while he relieved Tarragona, and yet returned in time to save Valencia.

When Lord William Bentinck brought the Anglo-Sicilian troops back to Alicante, his first care was to re-organize the means of transport. This was a matter of difficulty. Murray, with a mischievous economy, and strange disregard of Wellington's instructions which prescribed active field operations in Valencia if he should be forced to return from Catalonia, had discharged six

hundred mules and two hundred country carts, five-sixths of his field equipment, before he sailed for Tarragona. The army was thus crippled while Suchet gathered strong in front, and Musnier retaking Requeña forced the Spaniards to retire from that quarter. Lord William urged Del Parque to advance from Castalla, but he had not means of carrying even one day's biscuit, and Elio, pressed by famine, went off towards Cuenca. Lord William, however, commanded the Spanish armies as well as his own, and letters passed between him and Wellington relative to further operations. The latter again advised a renewed attack on Tarragona or on Tortosa if the ordnance still in possession of the army would admit of such a measure; but supposing this could not be, he recommended a general advance to seize the open country of Valencia, the British keeping close to the sea and in constant communication with the fleet. Lord William's views were different. He found the Spanish soldiers robust and active, but their regimental officers bad, and their organization generally so deficient they could not stand against even a small French force. The generals pleased him at first, especially Del Parque, that is, like all Spaniards, they had fair words at command, and he thought he could undertake a grand strategic operation in conjunction with them.

To force the line of the Xucar he deemed unadvisable, inasmuch as there were only two carriage roads, both blocked by Suchet's entrenched bridges; and though the river was fordable the enemy's bank was so favorable for defence as to render the passage dangerous.* The Anglo-Sicilians were unaccustomed to great tactical movements, the Spaniards altogether incapable of them. Wherefore, relinquishing a front attack he proposed to turn the enemy's right flank by Utiel and Requeña, or, by a wider march, reaching Cuenca, gain the Madrid road to Zaragoza, communicate with Wellington's army and operate down the Ebro. In either case it was necessary to cross the Albaracyn mountains, and there were no carriage roads save those of Utiel and Cuenca; but the passes near Utiel were strongly fortified by the French, and a movement on that line would necessarily lead to an attack upon Suchet, which was to be avoided. The line of Cuenca was preferable though longer, and by moving in the harvest season provisions would not fail; the allies would thus force Suchet to cross the Ebro, or attack him in a position where Wellington could reinforce them if necessary, and if defeated they could retire upon his army. Wellington told him provisions would fail on the march to Cuenca even in harvest time, and without money he would get

* Lord William Bentinck, MSS.

nothing; moreover by separating himself from the fleet, he would be unable to return suddenly to Sicily if that island should be really exposed to any imminent danger.

While these letters were being exchanged the Anglo-Sicilians had marched towards Villena on Del Parque's left, and Suchet was preparing to attack, when intelligence of the battle of Vittoria, reaching both parties, totally changed the aspect of affairs. The French general instantly abandoned Valencia and Lord William entered that city. Clausel was at Zaragoza and Suchet knew that he desired to hold it as a point for the junction of the army of Aragon with the King, if the latter should re-enter Spain. By relinquishing all the Valencian and some of the Catalan fortresses Suchet could have concentrated thirty thousand men, and Clausel who had carried off some small garrisons, had fifteen thousand; thus forty-five thousand excellent troops would have been established on Wellington's flank when he was hampered with the investment of two fortresses, and liable to be assailed in front by the re-organized and reinforced army of Vittoria. This prospect invited Suchet on one side, but on the other he wished to influence the general negotiation during the armistice in Germany by appearing strong in Spain, and therefore resolved to march on Zaragoza and keep large garrisons in Valencia, a fatal error.

He had thirty-two thousand men, six thousand were in the fortresses of Aragon, twenty-six thousand remained. From these he garrisoned Denia, Saguntum, Peniscola, Morella and Tortosa, which absorbed nearly seven thousand men, above twelve hundred being in Saguntum and five thousand in Tortosa; then destroying the bridges on the Xucar he marched himself by the coast-road on Tortosa while Musnier retired from Requeña. The Valencian people, grateful for good government, were friendly; but ere the army could reach Caspe, the point of concentration, Clausel, deceived by Mina, had fled to Jaca and the effect in Aragon was decisive. The partidas instantly united to menace Zaragoza, and Suchet sent Paris orders to abandon it and retire to Caspe, which Musnier had then reached, having picked up Severoli's brigade and the garrison of Teruel and Alcanitz in passing. On the 12th Suchet was again in military communication with Musnier, yet his army was extended along the Ebro from Caspe to Tortosa, and meanwhile, Mina having seized the Torrero, Paris evacuated Zaragoza in the night of the 9th, leaving five hundred men in the castle with much ordnance. He was encumbered with a great convoy, got entangled in the defiles of Alcubiere, was attacked, lost men, guns and baggage, relinquished Caspe and fled to Huesca, where he rallied the garrison of Ayerbe; then making for Jaca he reached

it on the 14th, at the moment when Clausel after another ineffectual effort to join the King had returned there. Duran then invested the castle of Zaragoza and the fort of Daroca.

This sudden and total loss of Aragon made Suchet resign that province as his field of operations, and he thereby exactly defined his own reputation. A good general not a great commander. About Tortosa, while Aragon was held by the enemy he could not feed, and the allies could land troops to seize the defiles in his rear; wherefore, fixing on the fertile country of Tarragona for a base, he passed the Ebro, sent Isidore Lamarque to fetch off the garrisons of Belchite, Fuentes, Pina, and Bujarola, and moving himself by the coast-road from Tortosa to Tarragona, reached that place with little hurt although cannonaded by the English fleet. In this position having mined the walls for destruction he awaited Lord William Bentinck. He thus established himself well for an isolated campaign, but let the great stream of war flow past unheeded. Had he continued his march on Zaragoza he would have raised the siege of the castle, saved his garrison of Daroca, perhaps have given a blow to Mina, whose orders were to retire on Tudela where Wellington designed to offer battle. But Suchet could have avoided that battle, and his appearance on Wellington's flank for a fortnight would have changed the aspect of the campaign, as shall be hereafter shown. His previous rapidity had left the Valencian allies far behind, they could not have gathered in force time enough to meddle with him; nor was their pursuit so conducted but he might have turned and defeated them.

It was not until four days after Valencia was abandoned that Lord William entered it, and seven days he remained there to establish a place of arms; on the 16th moving by the coast, masking Peniscola and being in communication with the fleet, he approached the Ebro. But Suchet had that day passed that river and might have been close to Zaragoza; Del Parque's army was still near Alicant in a state of disorder; and Elio and Roche found the control of Valencia and the blockade of Saguntum and Denia more than their united forces could effect. On the 20th Lord William entered Vinaros and remained there until the 26th. Suchet might then have been at Tudela or Sanguessa, and it shall be shown that Wellington could not have met him at the former place as he designed.

During this march various reports were received. "*The French had vainly endeavored to regain France by Zaragoza.*" "*Tarragona was destroyed.*" "*The evacuation of Spain was certain.*" "*A large detachment had already quitted Catalonia.*" Lord William, who had little time to spare from Sicilian affairs, then became eager;

he threw a flying-bridge over the Ebro at Amposta, embarked Clinton's division with a view to seize the Col de Balaguer, and followed Suchet with the remainder of his army, which now included Whittingham's cavalry. A detachment from Tortosa menaced his bridge, but the guard was reinforced and the passage of the Ebro completed the 27th. Next day Villa Campa arrived with four thousand men and the Col de Balaguer was secured. The 29th the cavalry was threatened by infantry from Tortosa, near the Col de Alba; but the movements generally were unopposed, and the army got possession of the mountains beyond the Ebro.

Suchet was then inspecting the defences of Lerida and Mequinenza and his escort was necessarily large, because Copons was hanging on his flanks in the mountains about Manresa; yet his position about Villa Franca was exceedingly strong. Tarragona and Tortosa covered the front, Barcelona the rear; the communication with Decaen was secure, and on the right flank stood Lerida, to which the small forts of Mequinenza and Monzon served as outposts. The Anglo-Sicilian troops did not exceed ten thousand effective men, and one division was on board ship from the 22d to the 26th. Elio and Roche were at Valencia, Del Parque's army, thirteen thousand, including Whittingham's infantry, was several marches in rear; it was paid from the British subsidy, but was ill-provided, and the Duke was now disinclined to obedience; Villa Campa did not join until the 20th, and Copons was in the mountains above Vich. Lord William therefore remained with ten thousand men and a large train of carriages, for ten days without any position of battle behind him nearer than the hills about Saguntum; his bridge over the Ebro was thrown within ten miles of Tortosa, whence detachments could approach him unperceived through the rugged mountains, and Suchet was within two marches. That marshal, however, was visiting his fortresses in person, and his troops quartered for the facility of feeding were unprepared to strike a sudden blow; judging his enemy's strength in offence what it might have been rather than what it was, he awaited Decaen's force from Upper Catalonia before he offered battle.

But Decaen was himself pressed. Pellew's fleet, menacing Rosas and Palamos, had encouraged a partial insurrection of the somatenes, which was supported by the divisions of Eroles, Manso, and Villamiel. Minor combats had taken place on the side of Besala and Olot, Eroles invested Bañolas, and though beaten there by Lamarque the 23d of June, the insurrection spread. To quell it Decaen combined a double operation upon Vich. Designing to attack by the south himself he sent Maximilian Lamarque, with

fifteen hundred French troops and some French migueletes, by the mountain paths of San Felice de Pallarols and Amias. On the 8th of July that officer gained the heights of Salud, seized the road from Olot and descended upon Roda and Manlieu, in expectation of Decaen attacking from the other side. He perceived below a heavy body in march, and heard the sound of cannon and musketry about Vich; concluding this was Decaen he advanced confidently, thinking the Catalans were in retreat. They however fought him until dark without advantage on either side, and in the night an officer brought intelligence that Decaen's attack had been relinquished in consequence of Suchet's orders to move to the Llobregat. A previous despatch had been intercepted, all the Catalan force, six or seven thousand, was upon Lamarque's hands, and the firing heard at Vich was for Wellington's victories in Navarre. A retreat commenced, the Spaniards followed, the French got entangled in difficult ground near Salud and were forced to deliver battle; the fight lasted many hours, Lamarque's ammunition was expended, he lost four hundred men, and was upon the brink of destruction, when General Beurmann came to his succor with four fresh battalions and the Catalans were finally defeated with great loss. After this Decaen marched to join Suchet, and the Catalans, moving by the mountains in separate divisions, approached Lord William Bentinck.

When the allies passed the Ebro several officers conceived the siege of Tortosa would be the best operation. Nearly forty thousand men, that is to say, Villa Campa's, Copons', Del Parque's, Whittingham's, some of Elio's forces and the Anglo-Sicilians, could be united; the defiles on the left bank of the Ebro would enable them to bar succor on that side, and force Suchet on to the circuitous route of Lerida. Wellington leaned towards this operation, but Lord William resolved to push for Tarragona, and even looked to assail Barcelona; a rash proceeding, for Suchet awaited his approach with an army every way superior. It does not however follow that to besiege Tortosa would have been advisable. The battering-train, larger than Murray's losses gave reason to expect, was indeed sufficient, yet the operation was a serious one; the vicinity was unhealthy, it would have been difficult to feed the Spaniards, they were inexperienced in sieges, this was sure to be a long one, not sure of success, and Suchet seeing them thus engaged might have marched to Aragon.

Lord William was at this time misled, partly by Catalan reports, partly by Wellington's successes, to believe the French were going to abandon Catalonia. He did not perceive that Suchet, judiciously posted and able to draw reinforcements from Decaen, was stronger

than the allies.* The two armies of Aragon and Catalonia numbered sixty-seven thousand men; twenty-seven thousand, including Paris' division then at Jaca, were in garrison, five thousand were sick, the remainder in the field. In Catalonia the allies were only accessories; they were there to keep Suchet off the flank of the allies in Navarre, and their defeat would have been a great disaster. So entirely was this Wellington's view, that Del Parque was to make forced marches on Tudela if Suchet should move or detach largely towards Aragon. Lord William should therefore have secured the defiles with his own and Villa Campa's troops, that is to say, twenty thousand men including Whittingham's division; he should have insulated the garrison of Tortosa, and made gabions and fascines, which would have placed Suchet in doubt as to his ulterior objects while he awaited the junction of Del Parque's, Copons', and the rest of Elio's troops. Then forty thousand men, three thousand being cavalry and attended by a fleet, could have descended into the Campo, still leaving a detachment to watch Tortosa. If Suchet offered battle, the allies, superior in numbers, could have fought in a position chosen beforehand.

It is indeed doubtful if all these corps would or could have kept together, but Lord William's actual operations were too headlong. He had prepared platforms and fascines for a siege in the island of Yvica, and on the 30th suddenly invested Tarragona with less than six thousand men, occupying ground three hundred yards nearer to the walls the first day than Murray had ever done. He thus prevented the garrison from abandoning the place, if, as was supposed, they had that intention; yet the fortress could not be besieged because of Suchet's vicinity and the dissemination of the allies. The 31st the bridge at Amposta was accidentally broken, three hundred bullocks were drowned, and the head of Del Parque's army, being on the left of the Ebro, fell back a day's march; however, Whittingham's division and the cavalry came up, and on the 3d, the bridge being restored, Del Parque also joined the investing army; Copons promised to bring up his Catalans, Sarsfield's division did arrive, Elio was ordered to reinforce it with three additional battalions, and Villa Campa observed Tortosa. Lord William then seeing Suchet's troops scattered, thought of surprising his posts and seizing the mountain line of the Llobregat; but Elio sent no battalions, Copons, jealous of some communications between the English general and Eroles, was slow, Villa Campa suffered the garrison of Tortosa to burn the bridge at Amposta, and Suchet suddenly returned from Barcelona and concentrated his army.

* Imperial Muster-rolls, MSS.

Up to this time the Spaniards, giving copious but false information to Lord William and no information to Suchet, had induced faults on both sides balancing each other; a thing not uncommon in war, which demands all the faculties of the greatest minds. The Englishman thinking his enemy retreating had pressed rashly forward. The Frenchman, decmng from the other's boldness the whole of the allies were at hand, thought himself weak and awaited the arrival of Decaen, whose junction was retarded by the combined operations of the Catalans and the English fleet. In this state Suchet heard of fresh successes gained by Wellington, one of his Italian battalions was cut off at San Sadurni by Manso, and Lord William took a position of battle beyond the Gaya; his left was covered by Whittingham's division which occupied Braffin, the Col de Liebra, and Col de Cristina, while his right rested on the great coast-road. These were the only carriage ways by which the enemy could approach; but they were ten miles apart, Copons held aloof, and Whittingham shrunk from defending the passes alone. Hence when Suchet, reinforced by Decaen with eight thousand sabres and bayonets, finally advanced, Lord William, who had landed neither guns nor stores, decided to refuse battle. This must have been a painful decision. He had nearly thirty thousand fighting men, including a thousand marines; he had assumed the offensive, invested Tarragona, where the military honor of England had suffered twice before; in fine he had provoked the action which he now declined.

Suchet had equal numbers of a better quality; the banks of the Gaya were rugged to pass in retreat, much must have been left to the general officers at different points, Del Parque was an uneasy coadjutor, and if any part was forced the whole line would have been irretrievably lost. His reluctance was however manifest, for though he expected the enemy on the 9th, he did not send his field artillery and baggage to the rear until the 11th, the day on which Decaen reached Villa Franca. Suchet dreading the fire of the fleet, endeavored by false attacks on the coast road to draw the allies from the defiles beyond Braffin, towards which he finally carried his whole army; and those defiles were indeed abandoned, not as his Memoirs state because of these demonstrations, but because Lord William had previously determined to retreat. On the 16th finding the passes unguarded he poured through and advanced upon Valls, but the allies were then in full retreat towards the mountains, the left wing by Reus, the right wing by Cambrills. Lord Frederick Bentinck with the British and German cavalry covered the former so well that he defeated the fourth French

hussars with a loss of forty or fifty men, and it is said that Habert or Harispe was taken but escaped in the confusion.

Lord William now entrenched himself near the Col de Balaguer, and Del Parque marched with his own and Sarsfield's troops to invest Tortosa, but the garrison fell on his rear while passing the Ebro and inflicted some loss. Nor could Lord William have long held this new position for want of water, if Lieutenant Corbyn of the *Invincible*, uniting intelligence with energy, had not discovered a copious spring and by means of wooden spouts constructed with the slender pine trees of the mountains, conducted the waters across a deep valley and down the side of a steep mountain to the camp, a distance of seven miles. Suchet, contrary to the wishes of his army, then returned to Tarragona and destroyed the ancient walls, which from the hardness of the Roman cement was tedious and difficult: he afterwards resumed his positions on the Llobregat and sent Decaen to Upper Catalonia. The general result of these operations had been favorable to the allies; they had risked much but their enemy did not strike; Suchet was kept from Navarre and had lost Tarragona with its fertile Campo.

It is strange that such a general should have suffered his powerful army to be so paralyzed.* Having twenty-seven thousand men in garrison, and thirty-thousand in hand, he was ostentatiously marching to and fro in Catalonia while the war was being decided in Navarre. Had he been in the latter province before the end of July Wellington would have been overpowered. What was to be feared? That Lord William would follow or attack one of his fortresses! Lord William could not abandon the coast, and if the French were successful in Navarre the loss of a fortress in Catalonia would have been a trifle, and it was not certain that any would have fallen. Suchet pleaded danger to France if he abandoned Catalonia. But to invade France, guarded as she was by her great military reputation, and to do so by land, leaving behind the fortresses of Valencia and Catalonia the latter barring all the carriage roads, was chimerical. Success in Navarre would also have made an invasion by sea pass as a partizan descent. Moreover France, wanting Suchet's troops to defend her in Navarre, was ultimately invaded by Wellington and in a far more formidable manner. This question shall be treated more largely in another place; it is sufficient to observe here, that Clarke, the minister of war, a man without genius or attachment to the emperor's cause, discouraged any great combined plan of action, and Napoleon absorbed by his own immense operations did not interpose.

Lord William, now intent to besiege Tortosa, wished Wellington

* Imperial Muster-rolls MSS.

to attack Mequinenza with a detachment of his army, but this the situation of affairs did not permit; and he soon discovered that to assail Tortosa was beyond his own means. Elio, when desired to assist, demanded three weeks' preparation; all the Spanish troops were in want, Roche's division, blockading Murviedro, although so close to Valencia, was on half rations; and the siege of Tortosa was necessarily relinquished because no great or sustained operation could be conducted in concert with such generals and such armies. Suchet's fear was an illustration of Napoleon's maxim, that war is an affair of discrimination. It is more essential to know the quality than the quantity of enemies. Lord William did not apply his mind vigorously to the campaign he was conducting, because fresh changes injurious to the British policy in Sicily called him to that island, and his thoughts were still running upon the invasion of Italy; but as the Spaniards, deceived by the movements of escorts and convoys, reported that Suchet had marched with twelve thousand men to join Soult, he once more fixed his headquarters at Tarragona, and following Wellington's instructions, detached Del Parque's troops by forced marches upon Tudela.

On the 5th of September the army entered Villa Franca, and the 12th, detachments of Calabrese, Swiss, German and British infantry, a squadron of cavalry and one battery, in all twelve hundred under Colonel Adam, occupied the heights of Ordal. At this place, ten miles in advance of Villa Franca, being joined by three of Sarsfield's battalions and a Spanish squadron, they took position; it then appeared that very few French troops had been detached,—that Suchet had concentrated his whole force on the Llobregat—that his army was superior, because the allies, reduced by the loss of Del Parque's troops, had also left Whittingham's division at Reus and Valls to procure food. Sarsfield's division was feeding on the British supplies, and Lord William again looked to a retreat, yet thinking the enemy disinclined to advance, desired to preserve his forward position as long as possible.

He had only two lines to watch. One menacing his front from Molino del Rey by the main road, which Adam blocked at Ordal; the other from Martorel by San Sadurni, menacing his left; but on this route, a difficult one, he had pushed the Catalans under Eroles and Manso, reinforcing them with some Calabrese: there was indeed a third line by Avionet on his right but it was little better than a goat-path. He had designed to bring his main body up to Ordal the evening of the 12th, yet from some slight reason delayed until next day. He had however viewed the country in advance of the defile without discovering an enemy; his confidential emissaries assured him the French were not going to advance, and he

returned satisfied that Adam's detachment was safe, and so expressed himself to that officer. A report of a contrary tendency was made by Colonel Reeves of the twenty-seventh, on the authority of a Spanish woman who had before proved her accuracy and ability as a spy; she was now however disbelieved, and this incredulity was unfortunate. For Suchet thus braved, and his communication with Lerida threatened by Manso on the side of Martorel, was then in march to attack Ordal with the army of Aragon, while Dacæen and Maurice Mathieu, moving with the army of Catalonia from Martorel by San Sadurni, were turning the left of the allies.

COMBAT OF ORDAL.

(See Plan 8, page 299.)

Adam's position though rugged rose gradually from a magnificent bridge, by which the main road was carried over a deep impracticable ravine. The second battalion of the twenty-seventh was posted on the right,—the Germans, De Roll's Swiss, and the artillery, defended an old Spanish fort commanding the main road,—the Spaniards were in the centre, the Calabrese on the left,—the cavalry were in reserve. A bright moonlight facilitated the movements of the French, and a little before midnight, their leading column under Mesclop passed the bridge without let or hindrance, mounted the heights with a rapid pace and driving back the piquets gave the first alarm: the allied troops lying on their arms in order of battle were however ready, and the fight commenced. The first effort was against the twenty-seventh, then the Germans and the Spanish battalions were vigorously assailed in succession as the French columns got free of the bridge, but the Calabrese were too far on the left to take a share in the action. The combat was fierce and obstinate. Harispe who commanded the French constantly outflanked the right of the allies, and at the same time pressed their centre, where the Spaniards fought gallantly. Adam was wounded early, the command devolved upon Reeves, and that officer seeing his flank turned and his men falling fast; in short, finding himself engaged with a whole army on a position of which Adam had lost the key by neglecting the bridge, resolved to retreat.

He first ordered the guns to fall back, and to cover the movement charged a column of the enemy which was pressing forward on the high road, but he was severely wounded in this attack and there was no recognized commander on the spot to succeed him. Then the affair became confused. For though the order to retreat was given the Spaniards were fighting desperately, the twenty-

seventh thought it a shame to abandon them, the Germans and De Roll's regiment still held the old fort, and the guns came back. Colonel Carey now brought the Calabrese into line from the left, and menaced the right flank of the French, but he was too late,—the Spaniards in the centre were broken, the right was completely turned, the old fort was lost, the enemy's skirmishers got into the allies' rear, and at three o'clock the whole dispersed, the most part in flight: the Spanish cavalry were then overthrown on the main road by the French hussars, and four guns were taken in the tumult.

Captain Waldron with the twenty-seventh, reduced to eighty men, and Captain Müller with about the same number of Germans and Swiss, broke through several small parties of the enemy and effected their retreat in good order by the hills on each side of the road. Colonel Carey endeavored to gain the road of Sadurni on the left, but meeting with Decaen's people, retraced his steps, and crossing the field of battle in the rear of Suchet's columns made for Villa Nueva de Sitjes and embarked without loss save of a few stragglers, who fell into the hands of a flanking battalion of French infantry which had moved through the mountains by Begas and Avionet. The overthrow was complete and the prisoners were at first very numerous; yet the darkness enabled many to escape and two thousand of them reached Manso and Eroles.

Suchet pursuing his march came up with Lord William about eight o'clock. The latter retired skirmishing in excellent order beyond Villa Franca; some of the French horsemen assailed his rear-guard while others edged to their right to secure the communication with Decaen, who was looked for by both parties with great anxiety; but he had been delayed by the resistance of Manso and Eroles in the rugged country between Martorel and San Sadurni. Suchet's cavalry and artillery continued however to infest the rear of the retreating army until it reached a deep baranco, near the Venta de Monjos, where the passage being dangerous and the French horsemen importunate, that brave and honest soldier, Lord Frederick Bentinck, charged their right with the twentieth dragoons, and fighting hand to hand with the enemy's general Meyers wounded him and overthrew his light cavalry; they rallied upon their heavy horsemen, and advanced again, endeavoring to turn the flank, but were stopped by the fire of two guns which Clinton opened upon them. The cuirassiers had mean time pressed the Brunswick hussars on the allies' right and menaced the infantry, yet were checked by the fire of the tenth regiment. This cavalry action was vigorous, the twentieth and the Germans fought desperately and though few in numbers lost more than ninety men. Nevertheless the baranco was safely passed and about three

o'clock the army having reached Arbos, the pursuit ceased: the Catalans retreated towards Igualada and the Anglo-Sicilians retired to Tarragona. It was now thought Suchet would make a movement to carry off the garrisons of Lerida and Tortosa: but this did not happen, and Lord William went to Sicily, leaving the command of the army to Clinton.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. Lord William Bentinck committed errors, yet he has been censured without discrimination. "*He advanced rashly.*" "*He was undecided.*" "*He exposed his advanced guard without support.*" Such were the expressed opinions at the time. Their justness may be disputed. His first object was to retain all the French force in Catalonia; his second, to profit from Suchet's weakness if he detached largely. He could do neither by remaining inactive on the barren hills behind Hospitalet, because the Spaniards would have dispersed for want of provisions, and the siege of Tortosa was impracticable. It was therefore bold and skilful to menace the enemy, if a retreat was secure without danger of dishonor. The position of Villa Franca fulfilled this condition. It was strong in itself and offensive; Pellew's fleet was in movement to create diversions in Upper Catalonia, and all the emissaries and Spanish correspondents concurred in declaring, though falsely, that the French general had detached twelve thousand men. It is indeed one test of a sagacious general to detect false intelligence; yet the greatest are at times deceived, and all must act upon what appears true. Lord William's advance was founded on erroneous data, but his position in front of Villa Franca was well chosen; it enabled him to feed Whittingham's division about Reus and Valls; and there were short and easy communications from Villa Franca to the sea-coast. He could only be seriously assailed on two lines. In front by the main road, which, though broad, was from Molino del Rey to the heights of Ordal one continued defile. On the left by San Sadurni, a road still more rugged and difficult than the other; and the Catalans were launched on this side, because, without quitting the mountains, they protected the left and menaced the enemy's communication with Lerida. Half a march to the rear would bring the army to Vendrills, beyond which the enemy could not follow without getting under the fire of the ships; neither could he forestall this movement by a march through the Liebra and Cristina defiles, because the Catalans falling back on Whittingham's divisions could hold him in check.

2. Ordal and San Sadurni were the keys of the position. The last was well secured, the first not so, and there was the real error.


It was none however to push an advanced guard of three thousand five hundred men, with cavalry and artillery, to a distance of ten miles for a few hours. He had a right to expect the commander would maintain his post until supported, or retreat without disaster; an officer of capacity would have done so; but whoever relies upon the capacity of Sir Frederick Adam in peace or war will surely be disappointed. In 1810 Lord Wellington detached General Craufurd with two or three thousand men to a much greater distance, not for one night but for many weeks. And that excellent officer, though close to Massena's immense army the very cavalry of which doubled his whole numbers; though he had the long line of the Agueda, a fordable river, to guard; though he was in an open country and continually skirmishing, never lost so much as a patrol, and always remained master of his movements, for his combat on the Coa was a studied and wilful error. It was no fault therefore to push Adam's detachment to Ordal, but it was a fault that Lord William, having determined to follow with his whole force, should have delayed for one night, or delaying, that he did not send some supporting troops forward. It was a fault not to do so because there was good reason to do it and to delay was to tempt fortune. Had Lord William been at hand with his main body when the attack on Ordal commenced, the head of Suchet's force, which was kept at bay for three hours by a detachment so ill commanded, would have been driven into the ravine behind, and the victorious allies would still have had time to march against Decaen by the road along which Colonel Carey endeavored to join Manso. In fine, Suchet's dispositions were vicious in principle and ought not to have succeeded. He operated on two distinct lines having no cross communications, and before an enemy in possession of a central position with good communications.

3. It was another fault that Lord William disregarded the Spanish woman's report to Colonel Reeves; his observations made in front of the bridge of Ordal on the evening of the 12th accorded indeed with the reports of his own emissaries, but the safe side should always be the rule. He also, although on the spot, overlooked the unmilitary dispositions of Adam on the heights of Ordal. The summit could not be defended against superior numbers with a small corps; that officer had nevertheless extended the Calabrese so far on the left they could take no share in the action, and yet could not retreat without great difficulty. A commander who understood his business, would have blocked up the bridge in front of the heights and defended it by a strong detachment, supporting that detachment by others placed in succession on the heights behind; keeping his main body always in hand, ready to fall on the

head of the enemy's column of attack or to rally the advanced troops and retreat in order. There were trees and stones to block the bridge, or its own parapet would have supplied materials; and the ravine was so deep and rugged the enemy could not have crossed it on the flanks in the dark. It is no defence to say Adam took ground in the evening after a march,—that he expected the main body up the next morning,—that Lord William assured him he was safe from attack. Every officer is responsible for the security of his post, and Adam placed no infantry piquet on the bridge, nor sent a cavalry patrol beyond it; and I have been informed by a French soldier, one of a party sent to explore the position, that they reached the crest of the heights without opposition and returned safely, whereupon Mesclop's brigade instantly crossed the bridge and attacked.

4. Ordal must be called a surprise, yet the troops were not surprised, they were beaten and dispersed because Adam was unskilful. Suchet's victory was complete; yet he has in his *Memoirs* exaggerated his difficulties and the importance of his success; his private report to the Emperor was more accurate. The *Memoirs* state that the English grenadiers defended certain works which commanded the ascent of the main road; and in the accompanying atlas a perspective view of well conditioned redoubts with colors flying is given. The reader is thus led to imagine these were regular forts defended by select troops; but in the private report they are correctly designated as ancient retrenchments,* being the ruins of old Spanish field-works, and of no more advantage to the allies than any natural inequality of ground. Again in the *Memoirs* the attack of the French cavalry near Villa Franca is represented as quite successful; but the private report only says the rear was harassed by repeated charges, which is true, and moreover those charges were vigorously repulsed. The whole French loss was about three hundred men, that of the allies, heavy at Ordal, was lightened by escape of prisoners during the night, and ultimately did not exceed a thousand men including Spaniards.

* Appendix 27.



ASSAULT on ST SEBASTIAN
August 31st
1813

Drawn by Genl. Napier

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CHAPTER III.

Siege of St. Sebastian—Convent of Bartolomeo stormed—Assault on the place fails—Causes thereof—Siege turned into a blockade, and the guns embarked at Passages—French make a successful sally.

TURNING from Catalonia to Navarre and Guipuscoa, we shall find Wellington's indomitable energy overcoming every difficulty. It has been shown how the Anglo-Portuguese troops were appointed to cover the siege of San Sebastian and the blockade of Pampeluna, while the Spanish divisions attacked Santona on the coast, and the castles of Daroca, Morella, and Zaragoza in the interior. These operations required many men, and Carlos d'España's division, four thousand strong, which had remained at Miranda del Castanar to improve its organization when Wellington advanced to the Ebro, was now coming up. Passages was the only port near the scene of operations suited for the supply of the army, but as it was between the covering and besieging armies, the stores and guns once landed were in danger from every movement of the enemy; the Deba river between San Sebastian and Bilbao, was unfit for large vessels, and no permanent dépôt could be established nearer than Bilbao. At that port therefore, and at St. Ander and Coruña, the great dépôts of the army were fixed, the stores being transported to them from the establishments in Portugal. But the French held Santona, their privateers interrupted the communication along the coast of Spain, and American privateers did the same between Lisbon and Coruña; the intercourse between San Sebastian and the ports of France was scarcely molested; and the most urgent remonstrances failed to procure a sufficient naval force on the coast of Biscay. It was in these circumstances Wellington commenced.

THE SIEGE OF SAN SEBASTIAN.

This place, built on a low sandy isthmus, had the harbor on one side the river Urumea on the other. Behind it rose the Monte Orgullo, a rugged cone four hundred feet high, washed by the ocean, and its southern face covered with batteries and overlooking the town, was cut off from the latter by defensive walls. It was crowned by the small castle of La Mota, which was itself commanded at a distance of thirteen hundred yards by the Monte Olia which rose beyond the Urumea. The land front was three

hundred and fifty yards wide, stretching quite across the isthmus. It consisted of a high curtain or rampart, very solid, strengthened by a lofty casemated flat bastion or cavalier placed in the centre, and by half bastions at either end. A regular horn-work was pushed out from this front; and six hundred yards beyond the horn-work the isthmus was closed by the ridge of San Bartolomeo, at the foot of which stood the suburb of San Martin.

On the opposite side of the Urumea were certain sandy hills called the *Chofres*, through which the road from Passages passed to the wooden bridge over the river, and thence, by the suburb of Santa Catalina, along the top of a sea-wall which formed a *fausse braye* for the horn-work. The flanks of the town were protected by simple ramparts; one washed by the water of the harbor, the other by the Urumea, which at high tide covered four of the twenty-seven feet comprised in its elevation. This was the weak side of the fortress, for though covered by the river there was only a single wall ill-flanked by two old towers and the half-bastion of San Elmo, which was situated at the extremity of the rampart close under the Monte Orgullo. There was no ditch, no counter-scarp, no glacis; the wall could be seen to its base from the Chofre hills, at distances varying from five hundred to a thousand yards; and when the tide was out, the Urumea left a dry strand under the rampart as far as St. Elmo. However the guns from the batteries of Monte Orgullo, especially that called the *Mirador*, could see this strand. The other flank was secured by the harbor, in the mouth of which was a rocky island called Santa Clara, where the French had established a post of twenty-five men.

Before the battle of Vittoria, San Sebastian was nearly dismantled; many of the guns had been removed to form battering-trains or to arm smaller ports on the coast; there were no bomb-proofs, nor palisades, nor out-works; the wells were foul and the place supplied by a single aqueduct. Joseph's defeat restored its importance as a fortress. Emanuel Rey entered it the 22d of June, with the escort of the convoy which quitted Vittoria the day before the battle. The town was thus filled with emigrant Spanish families, with ministers and other persons attached to the court; the population, ordinarily eight thousand, was increased to sixteen thousand and confusion prevailed.* Rey, pushed by necessity, immediately forced all persons not residents to march at once to France, granting them only a guard of one hundred men; the people of quality went by sea, the others by land, and fortunately all arrived, for the *partidas* would have given them no quarter. Foy had while retreating thrown a reinforcement into

* Bellas' Journal of French Sieges in Spain.

the place, and next day Mendizabel's Spaniards appeared on the hills behind the ridge of San Bartolomeo and on Chofres. Rey then burned the wooden bridge and both the suburbs, and commenced fortifying the heights of San Bartolomeo, which the Spaniards slightly attacked the 29th and were repulsed.

On the 1st of July the governor of Gueteria abandoned that place, and with detestable ferocity secretly left a lighted train which exploded the magazine and destroyed many of the inhabitants.* His troops, three hundred, entered San Sebastian, and at the same time a vessel from St. Jean de Luz arrived with fifty-six cannoners and some workmen; the garrison was thus increased to three thousand men, and all persons not able to provide subsistence for themselves in advance were ordered to quit the place. Mendizabel then cut off the aqueduct, made approaches towards the head of the burned bridge on the right of the Urumea, and molested the workmen on the heights of Bartolomeo; and on the 3d, the *Surveillante* frigate, a sloop, and some small craft blockaded the harbor; yet the French vessels from St. Jean de Luz continued to enter by night. The same day the governor made a sally with eleven hundred men to obtain news, and after some hours' skirmishing returned with a few prisoners.

The 6th, French vessels bringing a detachment of troops and a considerable convoy of provisions came from St. Jean de Luz. The 7th, Mendizabel tried, unsuccessfully, to set fire to the convent of San Bartolomeo. The 9th, Graham arrived with a corps of British and Portuguese troops, and the 13th, the Spaniards marched, some to reinforce the force blockading Santona, the remainder to rejoin the fourth army of Bidassoa. At this time Reille held the entrances to the Bastan by Vera and Echallar, but Wellington drove him thence on the 15th, and established the seventh and light divisions there to cover the passes over the Peña de Haya, by which the siege might have been interrupted.

Before Graham arrived the French had constructed a redoubt on the heights of San Bartolomeo, and connected it with the convent of that name which they also fortified. These outworks were supported by posts in the ruined houses of the suburb of San Martin behind, and by a low circular redoubt formed of casks on the main road, half-way between the convent and the horn-work. Hence to reduce the place, working along the isthmus, it was necessary to carry in succession three lines of defence covering the town and a fourth at the foot of Monte Orgullo, before the castle of La Mota could be assailed. These works had seventy-six

* Sir G. Collier's Despatch.

pieces mounted, and others were afterwards obtained from France by sea.

The besieging army consisted of the fifth division under Oswald, the independent Portuguese brigades of J. Wilson and Bradford reinforced by detachments from the first division. Thus, including the artillerymen, some seamen commanded by Lieutenant O'Reilly of the *Surveillante*, and one hundred regular sappers and miners, now for the first time used in the sieges of the Peninsula, nearly ten thousand men were employed. There was also a new battering-train, originally prepared to besiege Burgos, consisting of fourteen iron twenty-four pounders, six eight-inch brass howitzers, four sixty-eight-pound iron carronades, and four iron ten-inch mortars.* To these were added six twenty-four pounders lent by the ships of war, and six eighteen pounders which had moved with the army from Portugal, making altogether forty pieces commanded by Colonel Dickson. The distance from the dépôt of siege at Passages to the Chofres was one mile and a half of good road, and a pontoon-bridge was laid over the Urumea river above these hills; but from thence to the height of Bartolomeo was more than five miles of very bad road.

Early in July the fortress had been twice closely examined by Major Smith, the engineer who had so ably defended Tarifa. He proposed a plan of siege, founded upon the facility furnished by the Chofres to destroy the flanks, rake the principal front and form a breach with the same batteries; the works being at the same time secured, except at low water, by the Urumea. Counter-batteries on the left of that river were to rake the line of defence in which the breach was to be formed; and against the castle and its outworks he relied principally upon vertical fire, instancing the reduction of Fort Bourbon in the West Indies in proof of its efficacy. This plan would probably have reduced San Sebastian in a reasonable time without any remarkable loss of men; Wellington approved of it, though he doubted the efficacy of the vertical fire, and ordered the siege to be commenced. He renewed his approval when he had examined the works in person, and all his orders were in the same spirit; but as neither the plan nor his orders were followed, the siege, which should have been an ordinary event of war, has obtained a mournful celebrity; and Wellington has been unjustly charged with contemning the maxims of the great masters. Anxious as he was to save time, yet he did not urge the engineer beyond the rules. *Take the place in the quickest manner, yet do not from over-speed fail to take it*, was the sense of his instructions; but Graham, one of England's best soldiers, was

* Jones's Sieges.

endowed with a genius more intuitive than reflective; and this joined to his natural modesty and a certain easiness of temper, caused him at times to abandon his own correct conceptions for the less judicious counsels of those who advised deviations from the original plan.

In the night of the 10th two batteries were commenced against the convent and redoubt of San Bartolomeo; and next night four batteries, to contain twenty of the heaviest guns and four eight-inch howitzers, were marked out on the Chofre sand-hills, at distances varying from six hundred to thirteen hundred yards from the eastern rampart of the town. The river was supposed to be unfordable, wherefore no parallel was made, yet good trenches of communications, and subsequently regular approaches were formed. Two attacks were thus established. One on the right bank of the Urumea for the unattached Portuguese brigades; one on the left bank for the fifth division; but most of the troops were at first encamped on the right bank to facilitate a junction with the covering army in the event of a general battle.

On the 14th a French sloop entered the harbor with supplies, and the batteries of the left attack, under the direction of the German Major Hartman, opened against San Bartolomeo, throwing hot shot into that building. The besieged responded with musketry from the redoubt, with heavy guns from the town, and with a field-piece which they had mounted on the belfry of the convent itself. The 15th Sir Richard Fletcher took command of the engineers, but Major Smith retained the direction of the attack from the Chofre hills and Wellington's orders continued to pass through his hands. This day the batteries of the left attack, aided by howitzers from the right of Urumea, set the convent on fire, silenced the musketry of the besieged, and so damaged the defences, that the Portuguese of the fifth division were ordered to feel the enemy: they were however repulsed with great loss, the French sallied, and the firing did not cease until nightfall.

A battery for seven additional guns to play against Bartolomeo was now commenced on the right of the Urumea, and the original batteries set fire to the convent several times, yet the flames were extinguished by the garrison.

In the night of the 16th Rey sounded the Urumea as high as Santa Catalina, designing to pass over and storm the batteries on the Chofres; but the fords discovered were shifting and the difficulty of execution deterred him from this project. The 17th, the convent being nearly in ruins, the assault was ordered without waiting for the effect of the new battery raised on the other side of the Urumea. The storming party was formed in two columns.

Detachments from Wilson's Portuguese, supported by the light company of the ninth British regiment and three companies of the royals under General Hay, were destined to assail the redoubt; General Bradford, leading the other column, composed of Portuguese supported by three companies of the ninth British regiment under Colonel Cameron, was to assail the convent.

ASSAULT OF SAN BARTOLOMEO.

At ten o'clock in the morning two heavy six-pounders opened against the redoubt, and a sharp fire of musketry from the French, who had been reinforced and occupied the suburb of San Martin, announced their resolution to fight. The allied troops were assembled behind the crest of the hill overlooking the convent and the first signal was given; but the Portuguese advanced so slowly at both attacks that the supporting companies of the ninth regiment, passing through them, fell upon the enemy with the usual impetuosity of British soldiers. Cameron leading his grenadiers down hill was exposed to a heavy cannonade from the horn-work, yet he gained the cover of a wall fifty yards from the convent and there awaited the second signal. His rapid advance, which threatened to cut off the garrison from the suburb, joined to the fire of the two six-pounders and some other field-pieces on the farther side of the Urumea, caused the French to abandon the redoubt; Cameron then jumped over the wall and assaulted both the convent and the houses of the suburb. At the latter a fierce struggle ensued and Captain Woodham of the ninth was killed in the upper room of a house to which he fought his way from below; but the grenadiers carried the convent with such rapidity that the French, unable to explode some small mines, hastily joined the troops in the suburbs. There the fighting continued, and the affair was becoming doubtful, when the remaining companies of the ninth regiment arrived and the suburb with much fighting was won. At the right attack the company of the ninth, although retarded by a ravine, a thick hedge, the slowness of the Portuguese and a heavy fire, entered the abandoned redoubt with little loss; but all the troops were then, contrary to Oswald's orders, rashly led against the cask redoubt, and were beaten back by the enemy.

Of the French two hundred and forty men fell. On the British side, the companies of the ninth under Cameron alone lost seven officers and sixty men killed or wounded, and the whole operation although successful, was an error. The battery on the right of the Urumea was not opened, wherefore, either the assault was precipitated or the battery was not necessary; but the loss justified the conception of the battery.

When the action ceased the engineers made a lodgment in the redoubt, and commenced two batteries for eight pieces to rake the horn-work and the eastern rampart of the place. Two other batteries, to contain four sixty-eight pound carronades and four ten-inch mortars, were also commenced on the right bank of the Urumea. The besieged then threw up traverses on the land front to meet the raking fire of the besiegers, and the latter dragged four pieces up the Monte Olia to plunge into the Mirador and other batteries on the Monte Orgullo. In the night a lodgment was made on the ruins of San Martin, the batteries at the right attack were armed, and two additional mortars dragged up the Monte Olia; on the 19th all the batteries at both attacks were armed, and in the night two approaches were commenced from the suburb of San Martin towards the cask redoubt, from whence the French were driven. On the 20th the whole of the batteries opened their fire, the greatest part being directed to form the breach.

Smith's plan was similar to that followed by Marshal Berwick a century before.* He proposed a lodgment on the horn-work before the breach should be assailed; but he had not then read the description of that siege, and therefore unknowingly fixed the breaching-point precisely where the wall had been most strongly rebuilt after Berwick's attack. This was the first fault, yet a slight one, because the wall did not resist the batteries very long; it was a more serious matter that Graham, at the suggestion of the commander of the artillery, began his operations by breaching. Smith was opposed to it, but Fletcher acquiesced reluctantly, on the understanding that the ruining of the defences was only postponed, an understanding afterwards forgotten.

The result of the first day's battery was not satisfactory. The weather was bad, the guns mounted on ship carriages failed, one twenty-four pounder was rendered unserviceable by the enemy, another useless by an accident, a captain of engineers was killed and the besiegers' shot had little effect upon the solid wall. In the night however the ship-guns were mounted on better carriages, and a parallel across the isthmus was projected; but the greatest part of the workmen, to avoid a tempest sought shelter in the suburb of San Martin, and when day broke only one-third of the work was performed.

On the 21st the place was summoned, but the governor refused to receive the letter, and the firing was resumed. The main wall still resisted, yet the parapets and embrasures crumbled away, and the batteries on Monte Olia plunged into the horn-work, with such effect, although at sixteen hundred yards distance, that the be-

* Notes of the Siege by Sir C. Smith, MSS.

sieged having no bomb-proofs were forced to dig trenches to protect themselves. The counter-fire, directed solely against the breaching-batteries, was feeble, but at midnight a shell thrown from the castle into the bay gave the signal for a sally, and during the firing which ensued several French vessels with supplies entered the harbor. This night also the besieged isolated the breach by cuts in the rampart and other defences. On the other hand the besiegers' parallel across the isthmus was completed, and in its progress laid bare the mouth of a drain, four feet high and three feet wide, containing the pipe of the aqueduct cut off by the Spaniards. Through this narrow opening Lieutenant Reid of the engineers, a young and zealous officer, crept even to the counterscarp of the horn-work, and finding the passage there closed by a door, returned without an accident. Thirty barrels of powder were then placed in the drain, and eight feet was stopped with sand-bags, thus forming a globe of compression designed to blow, as through a tube, so much rubbish over the counterscarp as might fill the narrow ditch of the horn-work.

On the 22d the fire from the batteries, unexampled from its rapidity and accuracy, opened what appeared to the besiegers a very practicable breach in the eastern flank wall, between the towers of Los Hornos and Las Mesquitas. The counter-fire of the besieged then slackened, yet the descent into the town from the breach was more than twelve feet perpendicular; and the garrison were seen from Monte Olia diligently working at the interior defences to receive the assault: they added also another gun to the battery of St. Elmo, just under the Mirador battery, to flank the front attack. On the other hand the besiegers had placed four sixty-eight pound carronades in battery to play on the defences of the breach, yet the general fire slackened because the guns were greatly enlarged at the vents with constant practice.

On the 23d, the sea blockade being null, the French vessels returned to France with the badly wounded men; and that day the besiegers, judging the breach between the towers quite practicable, turned the guns, at the suggestion of Oswald, to break the wall on the right of the main breach. Smith opposed this, urging, that no advantage would be gained by making a second opening to get at which the troops must first pass the great breach; that time would be lost to the besiegers, and there was a manifest objection on account of the tide and depth of water at the new point attacked. His counsel was overruled, and in the course of the day, the wall being thin the stroke heavy and quick, a second breach thirty feet wide was rendered practicable. Then the fire of the besieged being much diminished, the ten-inch mortars and sixty-eight pound

carronades were turned upon the defences of the great breach; and upon a stockade which separated the high curtain on the land front from the lower works of the flank against which the attack was conducted. The nearest houses were soon in flames, which spreading rapidly destroyed some of the defences of the besieged and menaced the whole town with destruction, and the assault was ordered for the next morning; but when the troops assembled, the burning houses appeared so formidable that the attack was deferred. The batteries then played again, partly on the second breach, partly on the defences, partly to break the wall in a third place between the half bastion of St. John on the land front and the main breach.

During the night the vigilant governor mounted two field-pieces on the cavalier in the centre of the land front, which being fifteen feet above the other defences commanded the high curtain; and he still had on the horn-work a light piece, and two casemated guns on the flank of the cavalier. Two other field-pieces were mounted on an entrenchment, which, crossing the ditch of the land front, bore on the approaches to the main breach, and a twenty-four pounder looked from the tower of Las Mesquitas between the main breach and where the third opening was being made, flanking both; two four-pounders were in the tower of Hornos, two heavy guns were on the flank of St. Elmo, and two others placed on the right of the Mirador, could play upon the breaches within the fortified line of Monte Orgullo.* Thus fourteen pieces were still available for defence, the retaining sea-wall, or *fausse braye*, which strengthened the Urumea flank of the horn-work and between which and the river the storming parties must necessarily advance, was covered with live shells to roll over on the columns, and behind the flaming houses near the breach other edifices were loop-holed and filled with musketeers. However, the fire, extending rapidly and fiercely, greatly injured the defences, the French withdrew their guns until the moment of attack, and as the British artillery officers declared they could in daylight silence the enemy's fire and keep the parapet clear of men, Graham renewed the order for

THE ASSAULT.

In the night of the 24th two thousand men of the fifth division filed into the trenches on the isthmus. This force was composed of the third battalion of the Royals under Major Frazer, destined to storm the great breach; the thirty-eighth regiment under Colonel Greville, designed to assail the lesser and most distant breach; the ninth regiment under Colonel Cameron, appointed to support the Royals. A detachment selected from the light companies of all

* Bellas.

those battalions was placed in the centre of the Royals, under the command of Lieutenant Campbell of the ninth regiment; he was accompanied by the Engineer Machel and a ladder party, and was to sweep the high curtain after the breach should be won.

From the trenches to the points of attack was more than three hundred yards along the contracted space between the retaining wall of the horn-work and the river—the ground was strewn with rocks covered by slippery sea-weeds—the tide had left large and deep pools of water—the parapet of the horn-work was entire as well as the retaining wall—the parapets of the other works and the two towers, which closely flanked the breach, although injured were far from being ruined, and every place was thickly garnished with musketeers. The difficulties of the attack were obvious, and some Portuguese, placed in a trench beyond the parallel on the isthmus and within sixty yards of the ramparts, were ordered to quell if possible the fire of the horn-work.

While it was still dark the storming columns moved out of the trenches, and the globe of compression in the drain was exploded with great effect against the counterscarp and glacis of the horn-work. The garrison, astonished by this unlooked-for event, abandoned the flanking parapet, and the allies rushed onwards, the stormers for the main breach leading and suffering more from the fire of the batteries on the right of the Urumea than from the enemy. Major Frazer and the Engineer Harry Jones first reached the breach; and as the enemy had fallen back in confusion behind the ruins of the burning houses, those brave officers rushed up expecting that their troops would follow—but not many followed, for it was extremely dark, and the natural difficulties of the way had contracted the front and disordered the column in its whole length; the soldiers, straggling and out of wind, arrived in small disconnected parties at the foot of the breach. The foremost gathered near their gallant leaders, yet the depth of the descent into the town and the volumes of flames and smoke which still issued from the burning houses behind awed the stoutest, and more than two-thirds of the column, irritated by the destructive flank fire, had broken off at the demi-bastion to commence a musketry battle with the enemy on the rampart.

Meanwhile the shells from the Monte Orgullo fell rapidly, the French rallied, and with a smashing musketry from the ruins and loopholed houses smote the head of the stormers, while the men in the towers smote them on the flanks; and from every quarter came showers of grape and hand-grenades tearing the ranks in a dreadful manner. Frazer was killed on the flaming ruins, the intrepid Jones stood there awhile longer amidst a few heroic

soldiers hoping for aid, but none came, and he and those with him were struck down; the Engineer Machel was killed early, and the men bearing ladders fell or were dispersed. Thus the rear of the column had got into confusion before the head was beaten, and it was in vain Greville of the thirty-eighth, Cameron of the ninth, Captain Archimbeau of the Royals, and many other regimental officers attempted to rally their discomfited troops and refill the breach; it was in vain that Lieutenant Campbell, breaking through the tumultuous crowd with the survivors of his chosen detachment, mounted the ruins—twice he ascended, twice he was wounded, and all around him died. The Royals endeavoring to retire, got intermixed with the thirty-eighth and with some of the ninth who had unsuccessfully endeavored to pass them and get to the lesser breach. Then swayed by different impulses, pent up in the narrow way between the horn-work and the river, the mass reeling to and fro could neither advance nor go back until the shells and musketry, constantly plied both in front and flank, had thinned the concourse, and the trenches were regained in confusion. At daylight a truce was agreed to for an hour, during which the French, who had already removed the gallant Jones and some of the wounded men from the breach, now carried off the more distant sufferers lest they should be drowned by the rising of the tide; but during the contest some grenadiers, rushing out on the breach, with an infamous barbarity stabbed several wounded soldiers lying there.*

Five officers of engineers, including Sir Richard Fletcher, and forty-four officers of the line with five hundred and twenty men, had been killed, wounded or made prisoners in this assault, the failure of which was signal, yet the causes were obvious and may be classed thus.

1. Deviation from the original project of siege and from Wellington's instructions.

2. Bad arrangements of detail.

3. Want of vigor in the execution.

Wellington having visited the Chofre trenches on the 22d had confirmed his first approval of Smith's plan, and gave that officer final directions for the attack finishing thus, "*fair daylight must be taken for the assault.*" These instructions and their emphatic termination were repeated by Smith in the proper quarter, and were not followed; no lodgment was made on the horn-work, the defences were nearly entire both in front and flank, and the assault was given in darkness. Smith had ascertained by calculation and consultations with the fishermen, that the ebb of tide would serve exactly at daybreak on the 24th; yet the assault was only made the

* Narrative of his captivity by Colonel Harry Jones.

25th, and before daylight, when the high water, contracting the ground, increased the obstacles and forced the assaulting column to march on a narrow front and a long line, making an uneasy progress and trickling onwards instead of dashing with a broad surge against the breach. The rules of art being thus neglected and no extraordinary resource substituted, the operation failed.

The troops filed out of the long narrow trenches in the night, a tedious operation, and were immediately exposed to a fire of grape from their own batteries on the Chofres:* this fire should have ceased when the globe of compression was sprung; but what with darkness and noise it was neither seen nor heard; and though the explosion drove the enemy from the horn-work and the Portuguese advanced to the ditch, when a vigorous escalade would probably have succeeded, they had no ladders. The stormers of the great breach marched first, filling up the way and rendering the second breach, as Smith had foretold, useless, and the ladder-bearers never got to their destination. In fine the assault was ill-digested.

There was also a neglect of moral influence followed by its natural consequence, want of vigor in execution. Deferring the assault from the 24th to the 25th, expressly because the breach was too difficult, rendered the troops uneasy; they suspected hidden danger, and in this mood emerging from the trenches were struck by the fire of their own batteries; then wading through deep pools of water, or staggering in the dark over slippery rocks and close under the enemy's flanking works whence every shot told with fatal effect, how could they manifest their natural conquering energy? A second and more vigorous assault on the great breach might have been effected by a recognized leader; but no general or staff officer went out of the trenches, and the isolated exertions of regimental officers failed. Nor were there wanting other sinister influences. Oswald had in council earnestly and justly urged the dangers arising from the irregular mode of attack; but this anticipation of ill success, in which other officers of rank joined, was also freely expressed out of council, and it is said even in the hearing of the troops, abating that daring confidence which victory loves.

Wellington repaired immediately to St. Sebastian. The causes of failure were apparent and he would have renewed the attack, but was compelled from want of ammunition to defer it, until powder and additional ordnance, for which he had written to England as early as the 26th of June, should arrive. Next day other events caused him to resort to a blockade, and the battering-train was transported to Passages, two guns and two howitzers

* Sir C. Smith, MSS.

only being retained on the Chofres and Monte Olio. This operation was completed in the night of the 26th, but at daybreak the garrison made a sally from the horn-work, surprised the trenches and swept off two hundred Portuguese and thirty British soldiers. To avoid a repetition of this disaster the guards of the trenches were concentrated in the left parallel, and patrols only were sent out, yet one of those also was cut off on the first of August. Thus terminated the first part of the siege of San Sebastian in which the allies lost thirteen hundred soldiers and seamen, exclusive of Spaniards during Mendizabel's blockade.

CHAPTER IV.

Soult appointed the Emperor's lieutenant—Arrives at Bayonne—Joseph goes to Paris—Sketch of Napoleon's political and military situation—His greatness of mind—Soult's activity—Theatre of operations described—Soult resolves to succor Pampeluna—Relative positions and numbers of the contending armies described.

TEN days after the battle of Vittoria, Marshal Soult, under a decree issued from Dresden, succeeded the King as lieutenant to Napoleon, who thus showed how little he had been biassed by Joseph's accusations. Travelling with surprising expedition, he was enabled on the 12th of July to assume the command of the three beaten armies, now re-organized in one under the title of the "*army of Spain*;" and he had secret orders to put Joseph forcibly aside if necessary, but that monarch willingly retired. At this period General Paris was still at Jaca, but Clausel had entered France, and Soult, reinforced from the interior, had nine divisions of infantry, a reserve, and two divisions of cavalry, besides light horsemen attached to the infantry.* Including garrisons, and twelve Italian and Spanish battalions not included in the organization, he had one hundred and fourteen thousand men; and, as the armies of Aragon and Catalonia had above sixty-six thousand, one hundred and eighty thousand men and twenty-six thousand horses were still menacing Spain. One hundred and fifty-six thousand were present under arms: and in Germany and Poland seven hundred thousand French troops were employed!


Such masses directed by Napoleon seemed sufficient to defy the world; but moral power, defined by himself as three-fourths of military strength; that power which puny essayists, declaiming

* Appendix 30, § 8.


for their hour against the genius of warriors, are unable to comprehend although the most important part of the art they decry, was wanting. One-half of this force, organized in peace and setting forth in hope at the beginning of a war, would have enabled Napoleon to conquer; now, near the close of a terrible struggle, with a declining fate and the national confidence shaken, although his genius was never more surpassingly displayed, his military power was a vast but unsound machine. The public mind was bewildered by combinations the full scope of which he alone could see clearly; generals and ministers doubted and feared when they should have supported him, neglecting their duty or coldly executing when their zeal should have redoubled. The unity of impulse so essential to success was thus lost, and the numerous armies carried not with them proportionate strength. To have struggled with hope under such astounding difficulties was scarcely to be expected from the greatest minds. But like the Emperor to calculate and combine the most stupendous efforts with calmness and accuracy; to seize every favorable chance with unerring rapidity; to sustain every reverse with undisturbed constancy; never urged to rashness by despair yet enterprising to the utmost verge of daring consistent with reason, was a display of intellectual greatness so surpassing, that it is not without justice Napoleon has been called, in reference as well to past ages as to the present, the foremost of mankind.

Sudden and wide was the destruction caused by the snows of Russia; it shattered the emperor's military and political system, and the fragments of the former were useless until he could again bind them together. To effect that he rushed with a raw army into the midst of Germany; for his hope was to obtain by celerity a rallying point for those veterans, who, having survived the Russian winter and the succeeding pestilence, were dispersed all over the continent. His first effort was successful, but without good cavalry victory cannot be pushed far, and the practiced horsemen of France had nearly disappeared: their successors, badly mounted and less skilful, were too few and too weak, and thus extraordinary exertion was required from soldiers whose youth and inexperience rendered them unfit for the ordinary hardships of war. The measure of Wellington's campaign is thus attained; for if Joseph had opposed him with only moderate ability, and avoided a great battle, not less than fifty thousand veterans could have reinforced the young soldiers in Germany. On the side of Spain those veterans were still numerous; but the military spirit of the French people, previously almost worn out by victory was now abashed by defeat; and even the generals who had acquired grandeur and riches beyond their

Souls operations to relieve PAMPELUNA July 1813.



BATTLE OF THE 28th Enlarged.



hopes, were with few exceptions averse to farther toil. Napoleon's astonishing firmness of mind was understood by few in high stations, shared by fewer; and many were the traitors to him and to France, and to the glories of both. However, his power was still enormous, and wherever he led in person, his brave and faithful soldiers, fighting with the true instinct of patriotism, conquered. Where he was not their iron hardihood abated.

Soult was one of the few whose indefatigable energy rendered them worthy lieutenants of the emperor; and with singular zeal and ability he now served. His troops, nominally above one hundred thousand men, ninety-seven thousand being present under arms with eighty-six pieces of artillery, were not all available for field operations. Pampeluna, San Sebastian, Santona, Bayonne, and the foreign battalions had seventeen thousand men; but most of those battalions had orders to regain their own countries with a view to form the new levies. The permanent "*army of Spain*" furnished therefore only seventy-seven thousand five hundred men present under arms, seven thousand of which were cavalry. Its condition was not satisfactory. The people on the frontier were flying from the allies, the military administration was disorganized, the recent disasters had discouraged the soldiers and deteriorated their discipline. Soult was therefore desirous of some delay to secure his base and restore order ere he attempted to regain the offensive, but his instructions on that point were imperatively adverse.

Napoleon's system was perfectly adapted for great efforts, civil or military; yet so rapid had been Wellington's advance, so decided his operations, that the resources of France were in a certain degree paralyzed, and the army still reeled and rocked from the blows it had received. Bayonne, a fortress of no great strength in itself, had been quite neglected, it was now being armed and provisioned; and the restoration of an entrenched camp, originally traced by Vauban to cover Bayonne, followed. Then the enforcement of discipline, the removal of the immense train of Spanish families, civil administrators and other wasteful followers of Joseph's court, the arrangement of a general system for supply of money and provisions, aided by judicious efforts to stimulate the civil authorities and excite the national spirit, indicated that a great commander was in the field. The soldiers' confidence soon revived, and some leading merchants of Bayonne zealously seconded the general; but the people of the south were more inclined to avoid the burthen of defending their country than to answer appeals to their patriotism.

On the 14th Soult examined the line of military positions, and

ordered Reille, then occupying the passes of Vera and Echallar, to prepare pontoons for throwing two bridges over the Bidassoa at Biriadou. That general, as we have seen, was driven from those passes the next day, yet he prepared his bridges; and such was Soult's activity that on the 16th all the combinations for a gigantic offensive movement were digested, the means of executing it rapidly advancing, and orders were issued for the preliminary dispositions.

The army was divided into three corps of battle and a reserve. Clausel had the left wing at St. Jean Pied de Port, and was in communication by the French frontier with Paris at Jaca.* Drouet, Count D'Erlon, occupied with the centre the heights near Espelette and Ainhoa, having an advanced guard near Urdax. Reille was in position with the right on the mountains overlooking Vera from the side of France. The reserve under Villatte, comprising a separate body of light horsemen and the foreign battalions, guarded the banks of the Bidassoa from the mouth upwards to Irun, at which place the stone bridge was destroyed. The two divisions of cavalry under Trielhard and Pierre Soult were on the banks of the Nive and the Adour.

Wellington's counter-dispositions were as follows:

Byng's brigade of British infantry, detached from the second division and reinforced by Morillo's Spaniards, was on the extreme right. These troops had early in June driven the French from the village of Valcarlos in the valley of that name, and had foraged the French territory; but, finding no good permanent position, retreated again to the rocks in front of the passes of Roncesvalles and Ibañeta.

On the left of Byng, Campbell's brigade, detached from Hamilton's Portuguese division, was posted in the Alduides and supported with the fourth division by Cole, who was at Viscayret in the valley of Urroz.

On the left of Campbell, Hill defended the Bastan with the remainder of the second division and Hamilton's Portuguese now commanded by Silveira. Picton, with the third division, was stationed at Olague as a reserve to those troops and to Cole.

On the left of Hill the seventh and light divisions occupied a chain of mountains running by Echallar to Vera, and behind them at the town of San Estevan, was posted the sixth division.

Longa's Spaniards continued the line of defence from Vera to

* Soult, MSS.

Giron's position, which extended along the mountains bordering the Bidassoa to the sea, crossing the great road of Irun.

Behind Giron was the besieging army under Graham, with thirty-six pieces of field artillery; some regiments of British and Portuguese cavalry were with the right wing and centre; but the main body of cavalry and the heavy guns were behind the mountains, chiefly about Tafalla. The great hospitals were in Vittoria, the commissariat dépôts on the coast, and to supply the troops in the mountains was exceedingly difficult and onerous.

O'Donnel blockaded Pampeluna with the Andalusian army of reserve, and Carlos d'España's division was on the march to join him. Mina, Julian Sanchez, Duran, Empecinado, Goyan, and some smaller bands, were on the side of Zaragoza and Daroca, cutting the communication between Soult and Suchet, and the latter as we have seen, was falling back upon Catalonia.

Wellington's army in Navarre and Guipuscoa, was above one hundred thousand men, of which the Anglo-Portuguese furnished fifty-seven thousand present under arms, seven thousand being cavalry;* but the Spanish regulars under Giron, O'Donnel, and Carlos d'España, including Longa's and Mendizabel's men, scarcely amounted to twenty-five thousand.† According to the respective muster-rolls, the troops in line actually under arms and facing each other were, of the allies eighty-two thousand, of the French seventy-eight thousand; but as the rolls of the latter include every man and officer of all arms belonging to the organization, and the British and Portuguese rolls so quoted would furnish between ten and twelve thousand additional combatants, the French force must be reduced, or the allies augmented in that proportion. This surplus was however compensated by the foreign battalions temporarily attached to Soult's army, and by the numerous national guards, fierce warlike mountaineers to fight and very useful as guides. In other respects Wellington stood at a disadvantage.

His theatre of operations was a trapezoid, with sides from forty to sixty miles in length, and having Bayonne, St. Jean Pied de Port, St. Sebastian and Pampeluna, all fortresses in possession of the French, at the angles. The interior, broken and tormented by savage mountains, narrow craggy passes, deep water-courses, precipices and forests, appeared a wilderness which no military combinations could embrace, and susceptible only of irregular and partisan operations. But the great spinal ridge of the Pyrenees furnished a clue to the labyrinth. Running diagonally across the quadrilateral, it separated Bayonne, St. Jean Pied de Port, and San Sebastian from Pampeluna; thus the portion of the allied

* Appendix 81.

† Duke of Wellington, MS3.

army which more especially belonged to the blockade of Pampeluna was in a manner cut off from that which belonged to the siege of San Sebastian. They were distinct armies, each having its particular object, and the only direct communication between them was the great road running behind the mountains from Toloza and Irurzun to Pampeluna. The centre of the allies was indeed an army of succor and connection; but of necessity very much scattered, and with lateral communications so few, difficult, and indirect as to prevent any unity of movement; nor could Hill move at all until an attack was decidedly pronounced against one of the extremities, lest the most direct gun-road to Pampeluna, which he covered, should be unwarily opened to the enemy. The French general, taking the offensive, could therefore by beaten roads concentrate against any part of the English general's line, which, necessarily a passively defensive one, followed an irregular trace of more than fifty miles of mountains.

Wellington having his battering-train and stores about San Sebastian, which was also nearer and more accessible to the enemy than Pampeluna, made his army lean towards that side. His left wing, including the army of siege, was twenty-one thousand, with singularly strong positions of defence; his centre, twenty-four thousand, could in two marches unite with the left wing to cover the siege or fall upon the flanks of an enemy advancing by the high road of Irun; but three days or more were required by those troops to concentrate for the security of the blockade on the right. Soult, however, judged that no decisive result would attend a direct movement upon San Sebastian, because Guipuscoa was exhausted of provisions; and the centre of the allies could fall on his flank before he reached Ernani, which, his attack in front failing, would place him in a dangerous position. Moreover, by means of his sea communication he knew San Sebastian was not in extremity; but he had no communication with Pampeluna and feared its fall. Wherefore he resolved to operate by his left.

Profiting by the French roads leading to St. Jean Pied de Port, covering his movement by the Nivelle and Nive rivers and by the positions of his centre, he hoped to gather on Wellington's right quicker than that general could gather to oppose him; and thus compensating by numbers the disadvantage of assailing mountain positions, force a way to Pampeluna. That fortress once succored, he designed to seize the road of Irurzun, to fall upon the separated divisions of the centre as they descended from the hills, or operate on the rear of the force besieging San Sebastian, while a corps of observation, which he proposed to leave on

the lower Bidassoa, menaced it in front and followed it in retreat. The siege of San Sebastian, the blockade of Pampeluna, and probably that of Santona would be thus raised; the French army, united in an abundant country and its communication with Suchet secured, would be free either to co-operate with that marshal or to press its own attack.

In this view and to mislead Wellington by vexing his right simultaneously with the construction of the bridges against his left, Soult wrote to Paris, desiring him to march when time suited, from Jaca by the higher valleys towards Aviz or Sanguessa, to drive the partisans from that side, and join the left of the army when it should have reached Pampeluna. Clausel was directed to repair the roads in his own front, and push the heads of his columns towards the passes of Roncevalles; then to send a strong detachment into the Val de Baygorry, near the lateral pass of Yspegui, to menace Hill's flank which was at that pass, and the front of Campbell's brigade in the Alduides.

On the 20th Reille's troops on the heights above Vera and Sarre, being cautiously relieved by Villatte, marched through Cambo towards St. Jean Pied de Port. They were to reach the latter early on the 22d, and on that day also the two divisions of cavalry and the parc of artillery were to be concentrated at the same place. D'Erlon with the centre was still to hold his positions at Espelette, Ainboüe or Ainhua and Urdax, thus covering and masking the great movements taking place behind. Villatte who, including the foreign battalions, had fifteen thousand sabres and bayonets, remained in observation on the Bidassoa. If threatened by superior forces he was to retire slowly and in mass upon the entrenched camp commenced at Bayonne; halting in succession on the positions of Bordegain in front of St. Jean de Luz, and on the heights of Bidart in rear of that town. He was especially directed to show only French troops at the advanced posts, and if the assailants made a point with a small corps to drive them vigorously over the Bidassoa again. But if the allies should in consequence of Soult's operations against their right retire, Villatte was to relieve San Sebastian and follow them briskly by Tolosa.

Rapidity was of vital importance to the French, but heavy and continued rains swelled the streams and ruined the roads in the deep country between Bayonne and the hills; the head-quarters, which should have arrived at St. Jean Pied de Port on the 20th, only reached Olhonce, a few miles short of that place, the 21st; and Reille's troops unable to make way at all by Cambo, took the longer road of Bayonne.* The cavalry was retarded in like man-

* Soult, MSS.

ner, and the whole army, men and horses, were worn down by the severity of the marches. Two days were thus lost, but on the 24th more than sixty thousand fighting men, including cavalry, national guards and gens-d'armes, with sixty-six pieces of artillery, were assembled to force the passes of Roncevalles and Maya. The main road leading to the former was repaired, three hundred sets of bullocks were provided to draw the guns up the mountain, and the national guards of the frontier were ordered to assemble in the night on the heights of Yropil; where they were to be reinforced the morning of the 25th by regular troops, being to vex and turn the right of the allies, which extended to the foundry of Orbaiceta. Such were Soult's first dispositions, but as mountain warfare is complicated, the objects of the hostile forces and the nature of the country must be shown.

It has been said the great spine of the hills runs diagonally across the theatre of operations. From this spine huge ridges shot out on either hand, and the communications between the valleys thus formed on both sides of the main chain passed over certain comparatively low places, called "*cols*" by the French and *puertos* by the Spaniards. The Bastan, Val Carlos, and Val de Baygorry the upper part of which is divided into the Alduides and the Val de Ayra, were on the French side of the great chain: on the Spanish side were the valleys of Ahescoa or Orbaiceta, the valley of Iscua or Roncevalles, the valley of Urros, the Val de Zubiri, and the valley of Lanz, the two latter leading down directly upon Pampeluna, which stands within two miles of the junction of their waters. The disposition and force of the armies shall now be traced from left to right of the French, and from right to left of the allies. But first it must be observed, that the main chain, throwing as it were a shoulder forward from Roncevalles towards St. Jean Pied de Port, placed the entrance to the Spanish valley of Ahescoa or Orbaiceta in the power of Soult; who could thus by Yropil turn the extreme right of his adversary with detachments, although not with an army.

Val Carlos.—Two issues led from this valley over the main chain, namely the Ibañeta and Mendichuri passes, and there was also the lateral pass of Atalosti leading into the Alduides; all comprised within a space of two or three miles. The high road from St. Jean Pied de Port to Pampeluna, having ascended by the left-hand ridge of Val Carlos, runs along the crest until it reaches the superior ridge; and then along the summit of that also until it reaches the pass of Ibañeta, whence it descends to Roncevalles. Ibañeta may therefore be called the Spanish end of the pass; but it is also a pass in itself, because a narrow road, leading through Arnegui and the village of Val Carlos, there joins the main road.

Clausel's three divisions of infantry, all the artillery, and the cavalry, were formed in two columns in front of St. Jean Pied de Port. The head of one was placed on some heights above Arnegui, two miles from the village of Val Carlos; the head of the other at the Venta de Orrisson on the main road, two miles from the remarkable rocks of Chateau Piñon; near which one narrow way descends on the right to the village of Val Carlos, another on the left to the foundry of Orbaiceta.

On the right-hand ridge of Val Carlos, near the rock of Ayrola, Reille's divisions were concentrated with orders to ascend at daylight and march by the ridge towards a culminant point of the great chain called the Lindouz, then to push detachments through Ibañeta and Mendichuri to the villages of Roncevalles and Espinal. He was also to seize the passes of Sahorgain and Urtiaga on his right, and approach the distant passes of Renecabal and Bellate; thus closing the issues from the Alduides and menacing those from the Bastan.

Val de Ayra. The Alduides. Val de Baygorry.—The ridge of Ayrola, at the foot of which Reille's troops were posted, separates Val Carlos from the valleys named above, which were designated as the Alduides in the upper part, Val de Baygorry in the lower. The issues from the Alduides over the great chain towards Spain were the passes of Sahorgain and Urtiaga; and there was also a road running from the village of Alduides through the Atalosti pass to Ibañeta, a distance of eight miles, by which Campbell's brigade communicated with and could join Byng and Morillo.

Bastan.—This district, including the valley of Lerins and the Cinco Villas, is separated from the Val de Baygorry by the mountain of La Houssa, on which the national guards of Val de Baygorry and the Alduides were to assemble on the night of the 24th and light fires, to make it appear a great body was menacing the Bastan by that flank. The Bastan however does not belong to the same geographical system as the other valleys. Instead of opening to the French territory it is entirely enclosed with mountains; and while the waters of the Val Carlos, the Alduides, and Val de Baygorry run off northward by the Nive, those of the Bastan run off westward by the Bidassoa; the streams being separated by the Mandale, Commissari, La Rhune, Santa Barbara, Ivantelly, Atchiola and other mountains.

With reference to the French army, the entrances to the Bastan were by the passes of Vera and Echallar on the right, the Col de Maya and Arietta passes in the centre; on the left the lateral passes of Yspegui, Lorrieta, and Berderez, leading from Val de Baygorry and the Alduides. The issues over the principal chain of the Py-

renees in the direct line from the Maya entrances, were the passes of Renecabal and Bellate; the first leading into the valley of Zubiri, the second into the valley of Lanz. There was also the pass of Artesiaga leading into the Val de Zubiri, but it was nearly impracticable; and all the roads through the Bastan were crossed by strong positions dangerous to assail.

Col de Maya comprised several passages in the space of four miles, all of which were menaced by D'Erlon from Espelete and Urdax; and he had twenty-one thousand men, furnishing eighteen thousand bayonets. His communications with Soult were maintained by cavalry posts through Val de Baygorry; and his orders were, to attack the allies when the combinations in Val Carlos and on the Houssa should cause them to abandon the passes at Maya; but he was especially directed to operate by his left, and secure the lateral passes, with a view to the concentration of the whole army. Thus if Hill retreated by Bellate, D'Erlon was to move by Berderez and the Alduides; if Hill retired upon San Estevan, D'Erlon was to move by Bellate. Such being the dispositions of the French general those of the allies shall now be traced.

Byng and Morillo guarded the passes in front of Roncevalles, with sixteen hundred British and three or four thousand Spaniards.* Byng's brigade and two Spanish battalions occupied the rocks of Altobiscar on the high road facing Chateau Piñon; one Spanish battalion was at the foundry of Orbaiceta on their right; Morillo with the remainder occupied the heights of Iroulepe, overlooking the nearest houses of the straggling village of Val Carlos.

These positions, four and five miles from the French columns at Venta de Orrisson and Arnegui, were insecure. They were indeed steep, but too extensive; moreover, although the passes behind them led into the Roncevalles, that valley did not lead direct to Pampeluna; the high road after descending a few miles turned to the right and crossed two ridges and the intervening valley of Urros before it entered the valley of Zubiri, down which it was conducted to Pampeluna: wherefore after passing Ibañeta in retreat, the allies could not avoid lending their flank to Reille's divisions as far as Viscayret in the valley of Urroz. It was partly to obviate this danger, partly to support O'Donnel while Clausel's force was in the vicinity of Jaca, that the fourth division, six thousand strong, occupied Viscayret; six miles from the pass of Ibañeta, ten miles from Morillo's position, and twelve miles from Byng's position. But when Clausel retired to France, Cole was to observe the roads over the main chain from the Alduides, and form a rallying point and reserve for Campbell, Byng, and

* Plaz. 10, page 846.

Morillo ; his instructions being to maintain the Roncevalles passes against a front attack, but to avoid a desperate battle if the flanks were insecure.

On the left of Byng and Morillo, Campbell's Portuguese, two thousand, were encamped above the village of Alduides on a mountain called Mizpira. They watched the national guards of Val de Baygorry, preserved the communication between Byng and Hill, and in some measure covered the right flank of the latter. From the Alduides Campbell could retreat through the pass of Sahorgain upon Viscayret in the valley of Urroz, and through the passes of Urtiaga and Renacabal upon Eugui in the Val de Zubiri ; finally by the lateral pass of Atalosti he could join Byng and the fourth division. The communication between all these posts was maintained by Long's cavalry.

Continuing the line of positions to the left, Hill occupied the Bastan with the second British divisions, Silveira's Portuguese and some squadrons of horse ; but Byng's and Campbell's brigades being detached, he had not more than nine thousand sabres and bayonets. His two British Brigades under William Stewart guarded Col de Maya ; Silveira was at Erazu on the right of Stewart, watching the passes of Arrieta, Yspegui and Elliorita ; the two former being occupied by Brotherton's cavalry and the sixth caçadores. The direct line of retreat and point of concentration for all these troops was Elizondo.

From Elizondo the Pampeluna road over the great chain was by Bellate and the valley of Lanz. The latter running parallel with the valley of Zubiri is separated from it by a wooded and rugged ridge ; and between them there were but three communications—the one high up, leading from Lanz to Eugui, and prolonged from thence to Viscayret in the valley of Urroz—the other two lower down, leading from Ostiz and Olague to the village of Zubiri. At Olague the third division, four thousand three hundred bayonets under Picton, was ready to support Cole or Hill as occasion required.

Continuing the front line from the left of Stewart's position at the Col de Maya, the trace run along the mountains forming the French boundary of the Bastan. There the passes of Echallar and Vera were guarded by the seventh division under Lord Dalhousie ; and the light division under Charles Alten. The former, having four thousand seven hundred bayonets, communicated with Stewart by a narrow road over the Atchiola mountains ; and the eighty-second regiment was encamped at its junction with the Elizondo road, three miles behind the pass of Maya. The light division, four thousand, was at Vera, guarding roads which led

behind the mountains through Sumbilla and San Estevan to Elizondo. These two divisions being only watched by part of Villatte's reserve were available for the succor of either wing; and behind them, at the town of San Estevan, was the sixth division, six thousand bayonets, and now under Pack. This division, equally distant from Vera and Maya, having free communication with both and a direct line of march to Pampeluna over the main chain of the Pyrenees, by the *Puerto de Arriz*, sometimes called the pass of *Doña Maria*, was available for any object.

Around Pampeluna, the point to which all the lines of march converged, O'Donnel's Andalusians maintained the blockade, and being afterwards reinforced by Carlos d'España at a very critical moment numbered eleven thousand, of which seven thousand could act without abandoning the blockade.

Head-quarters were at Lesaca. The line of correspondence with the left wing was over the Peña de Haya; with the right wing by San Estavan, Elizondo and the Alduides; the line between Graham and Pampeluna was by Goizueta and the high road of Irurzun.

As the French were almost in contact with the allies' positions at Roncevalles, the point of defence nearest to Pampeluna, it followed, that on the rapidity or slowness with which Soult overcame resistance in that quarter depended his success; and a comparative estimate of numbers and distances will give the measure of his chances. Clausel had sixteen thousand bayonets, besides cavalry, artillery and national guards, the last menacing the valley of Orbaiceta. Byng and Morillo were therefore, with five thousand infantry to sustain the assault of sixteen thousand until Cole could reinforce them; but Cole, twelve miles off, could not come up under four or five hours. And as Reille's divisions, of equal strength with Clausel's, could before that time seize the Lindouz and turn the left, the allies must finally abandon their ground for a new field, where Picton could join them from Olague and Campbell from the Alduides. Then with seventeen or eighteen thousand bayonets and some guns they might oppose Clausel and Reille's thirty thousand. But Picton at Olague was more than a day's march from Byng at Altobiscar; their junction could only be effected in the Zubiri valley not far from Pampeluna; and they could only be reinforced there by seven thousand Spaniards from the blockade, and three thousand cavalry from the Ebro.

Hill, menaced by D'Erlon with a superior force, and having the pass of Maya, half a day's march further from Pampeluna than the passes of Roncevalles, to defend, could not give ready help. If he retreated rapidly D'Erlon could follow as rapidly; and

though Picton and Cole would thus be reinforced with ten thousand men Soult would gain eighteen thousand ; but Hill could not move until he knew that Byng and Cole were driven from the Roncevalles passes : in fine he could not avoid a dilemma. For if he held Col de Maya and affairs went wrong near Pampeluna his own situation would be imminently dangerous ; if he held Irrueta, his next position, the same danger was to be dreaded ; and Maya once abandoned, D'Erlon, moving by his own left towards the Alduides, could join Soult in the valley of Zubiri before Hill could join Cole and Picton by the valley of Lanz. But if Hill did not maintain the position of Irrueta, D'Erlon could follow and cut the sixth and seventh divisions off from the valley of Lanz. The extent and power of Soult's combinations are thus evinced. Hill, forced to await orders and hampered by D'Erlon, required, it might be three days to get into line near Pampeluna ; but D'Erlon after gaining Maya could in one day and a half, by the passes of Berderez and Urtiaga, join Soult in the Val de Zubiri. Meanwhile Byng, Morillo, Cole, Campbell, and Picton would be exposed to the attack of double their own numbers ; and however firm and able those generals might be, they could not, when thus suddenly brought together, be expected to seize the whole system of operations and act with that nicety of judgment which the occasion demanded. It was clear therefore that Hill must be in some measure paralyzed at first, and finally be thrown, together with the sixth, seventh, and light divisions, upon an external line of operations while the French moved upon internal lines.

On the other hand, Byng, Morillo, Campbell, Cole, Picton and Hill were only pieces of resistance on Wellington's board ; the sixth, seventh, and light divisions were those with which he meant to win his game. There was however a great difference in their value. The light division and the seventh, especially the former, being furthest from Pampeluna, having enemies close in front and points to guard, were, the seventh a day, the light division two days behind the sixth division, which was free, and, the drag of D'Erlon's corps considered, a day nearer to Pampeluna than Hill. Upon the rapid handling of this well-placed body the fate of the allies therefore depended ; if it arrived in time, thirty thousand infantry with sufficient cavalry and artillery would be established under the immediate command of Wellington, on a position of strength, checking the enemy until the rest of the army arrived. Where that position was and how the troops were gathered and there fought shall now be shown.


CHAPTER V.

BATTLES OF THE PYRENEES.


Soult attacks the right of the allies—Combat of Roncevalles—Combat of Linzain—Count D'Erlon attacks the allies' right centre—Combat of Maya—General Hill takes a position at Irusta—Generals Picton and Cole retreat down the Val de Zubiri—They turn at Huarte and offer battle—Lord Wellington arrives—Combat of the 27th—First battle of Sauroren—Various movements—D'Erlon joins Soult, who attacks General Hill—Second battle of Sauroren—Foy is cut off from the main army—Night march of the light division—Soult retreats—Combat of Dona Maria—Dangerous position of the French at San Estevan—Soult marches down the Bidassoa—Forced march of the light division—Terrible scene near the bridge of Yanzi—Combats of Echallar and Ivantelly—Narrow escape of Lord Wellington—Observations.

Combat of Roncevalles.—On the 23d, Soult issued an order of the day remarkable for its force and frankness. Tracing with a rapid pen the leading events of the past campaign, he said the disasters had sprung from the incapacity of the king, not from the weakness of the soldiers, whose military virtue he justly extolled, inflaming their haughty courage by allusions to former glories. This address has been by writers, who disgrace English literature with unfounded aspersions of a courageous enemy, treated as unseemly boasting as to his intended operations; but the calumny is refuted by the following passage from his despatch to the minister at war. "*I shall move directly upon Pampeluna; if I succeed in relieving it I will operate towards my right, to embarrass the enemy's tooops in Guipuscoa, Biscay, and Alava; and to enable the reserve to join me, which will relieve St. Sebastian and Santona. If this should happen I will then consider what is to be done, either to push my own attack or to help the army of Aragon, but to look so far ahead would now be temerity.*" Here he puts every point hypothetically, and though conscious of superior abilities he did not suppress the sentiment of his own worth as a commander and was too proud to depreciate brave adversaries on the eve of battle. "*Let us not,*" he said, "*defraud the enemy of the praise which is due to him. The dispositions of the general have been prompt, skillful, and consecutive; the valor and steadiness of his troops have, been praiseworthy.*" Having thus stimulated the ardor of his troops he put himself at the head of Clausel's divisions at daylight the 25th, and led them up against the rocks of Altobiscar.

Byng, warned the evening before that danger was near and jeal-



**Combat of
RONCESVALLES
July 25th
1813**



ous of some hostile indications towards the village of Val Carlos, had sent the fifty-seventh regiment down there, and gave notice to Cole who had meanwhile made new dispositions. Ross's brigade was now at Espinal, two miles in advance of Viscayret, six miles from the pass of Ibañeta, eleven from Byng's position, and somewhat nearer to Morillo: Anson's brigade was close behind Ross, Stubbs' Portuguese behind Anson, and the artillery was at Linzoain. In this state of affairs Soult, throwing out a multitude of skirmishers and pushing forward his supporting columns and guns as fast as the steepness of the road and difficult nature of the ground would permit, endeavored to force Byng's position; but the latter fought strongly, the French fell fast among the rocks, and their rolling musketry pealed in vain for hours along that cloudy field of battle, elevated five thousand feet above the plains. Their numbers however continually increased in front, and the national guards from Yropil, reinforced by Clausel's detachments, skirmished with the Spanish battalions at the foundry of Orbaiceta and threatened to turn the right: Val Carlos was at the same time menaced from Arnegui, and Reille, ascending the rock of Airola, turned Morillo's left.

About mid-day Cole arrived at Altobiscar, yet his troops were still distant and the French neglected the Val Carlos to gather more thickly on Byng's front; he indeed resisted their efforts, but Reille made progress along the summit of the Airola ridge and Morillo fell back towards Ibañeta. Reille was then nearer to that pass than Byng was, when Ross's brigade, coming up the pass of Mendichuri, suddenly appeared on the Lindouz just as the French were closing up Atalosti and cutting the communication with Campbell. That officer's piquets had been attacked early in the morning by the national guards of Val de Baygorry, but he soon discovered it was only a feint and therefore moved by his right towards Atalosti when he heard the firing on that side. His march was secured by the Val d'Ayra, which separated him from the ridge of Airola along which Reille was advancing; but noting that general's strength, and seeing Ross's brigade laboring up the steeps of Mendichuri, he judged it ignorant of what was going on above. Wherefore sending advice of the enemy's proximity and strength to Cole, he offered to pass the Atalosti and join in the battle if he could be furnished with transport for his sick, and provisions on the new line of operations. But ere this reached Cole, the head of Ross's column, composed of a wing of the twentieth and a company of Brunswickers, was on the summit of the Lindouz, where most unexpectedly it encountered Reille's advanced guard. Ross, an eager hardy soldier, called aloud to charge, and

Captain Tovey of the twentieth running forward with his company, crossed a slight wooded hollow and full against the front of the sixth French light infantry dashed with the bayonet.* Brave men fell on both sides, but numbers prevailing, these daring soldiers were pushed back again by the French. Ross, however, gained his object, the remainder of his brigade had come up and the pass of Atalosti was secured, yet with a loss of one hundred and forty of the twentieth and forty-one Brunswickers.

Previous to this vigorous action, Cole seeing the French in Val Carlos and the valley of Orbaiceta, on both flanks of Byng whose front was not the less pressed, had ordered Anson to reinforce the Spaniards at the foundry, and Stubbs to enter Val Carlos in support of the fifty-seventh. He now recalled Anson to assist in defence of Lindouz, and then learning from Campbell how strong Reille was, caused Byng, with a view to a final retreat, to relinquish his advanced position at Altobiscar and take a second nearer Ibañeta. This movement uncovered the road leading down to the foundry of Orbaiceta, but it concentrated all the troops; and at the same time Campbell, although he could not enter the line of battle because Cole was unable to supply his demands, by a very skilful display of his Portuguese induced Reille to think their numbers considerable.

During these movements the skirmishing of the light troops continued; yet a thick fog coming up the valley prevented Soult from making dispositions for a general attack with his six divisions; and when night fell Cole still held the great chain of the mountains, having had only three hundred and eighty men killed and wounded. His right was, however turned by Orbaiceta, he had but ten or eleven thousand bayonets, to oppose to thirty thousand, and his line of retreat, being for four or five miles down hill and flanked all the way by the Lindouz, was uneasy and unfavorable. Wherefore putting the troops silently in march after dark he threaded the passes and gained the valley of Urros. Anson's brigade followed as a rear-guard in the morning, Campbell retired from the Alduides by the pass of Urtiaga to Eugui in the valley of Zubiri, the Spanish battalion retreated from Orbaiceta by the narrow way of Navala and rejoined Morillo near Espinal. The Magistral ridge was thus abandoned, yet the general result was unsatisfactory to Soult; he acknowledged a loss of four hundred men, he had not gained ten miles, and the distance to Pampeluna was not less than twenty-two with strong defensive positions in the way: and there increasing numbers of intrepid enemies were to be expected.

His combinations, contrived for greater success, had been

* Appendix 25.

thwarted partly by fortune, partly by errors of execution which all generals expect, and the experienced are most resigned as knowing them to be inevitable. Fortune was felt in the fog, which rose before he could thrust forward his heavy masses of troops entire. The failure in execution was Reille's tardy movement; his orders were to gain with all expedition the Lindouz, which tied together the heads of the Alduies, Carlos, Roncevalles, and Urros valleys. There he would have commanded the Mendichuri, Atalosti, Ibañeta and Saborgain passes; and by moving along the Magistral crest could menace the Urtiaga, Renacabal, and Bellate passes, endangering Campbell's and Hill's lines of retreat.* But when he should have ascended the Airola he halted to incorporate two newly arrived conscript battalions and to issue provisions; the hours thus lost would have sufficed to seize the Lindouz before Ross had got through the Mendichuri. The fog would still have stopped the spread of Soult's columns to the extent designed; but fifteen or sixteen thousand men placed on the flank and rear of Byng and Morillo, would have separated them from the fourth division and forced the latter to retreat beyond Viscayret.† Soult thought two British divisions, besides Byng's brigade and Morillo's Spaniards, were opposed to him; he was probably misled by wounded men hastily questioned; who would declare they were of the second and fourth divisions because Byng's brigade belonged to the former; but there were, including the fourth division, only eleven thousand bayonets in the fight.

On the 26th Clausel followed Cole, and Reille was directed to move along the Magistral crest and seize the passes in Hill's rear; who would be thus crushed between him and D'Erlon, or thrown on the side of San Estevan. D'Erlon could then reach the valley of Zubiri, and Reille descending that of Lanz would prevent Picton joining Cole. This would compel those generals to retreat on separate lines, and the whole French army could issue in order of battle from the mouths of the valleys on Pampeluna. All the French columns were in movement at daybreak, but every hour brought its obstacle. The mist still hung heavily on the mountaintops and bewildered Reille's guides, who refused to lead him along the crests; hence at ten o'clock, having no other resource, he moved down the pass of Mendichuri upon Espinal, and fell into the rear of the cavalry and artillery which followed Clausel's divisions. Soult, although retarded also by the fog and the difficulties of the ground, overtook Cole's rear-guard in front of Viscayret; and his leading troops struck hotly on some British light companies incorporated under Colonel Wilson of the forty-eighth.

* Pellot's *Campagne des Pyrénées*.

† Soult's secret despatch, MSS.

One French squadron passing the flank fell on the rear, but Wilson faced about and beat it off, without ceasing to fight the infantry; and thus skirmishing Cole reached the heights of Linzoain one mile beyond Viscayret. There Picton came up without troops, but brought intelligence that Campbell was at Eugui, and the third division at Zubiri, having come over the ridge from Olague. The junction of all these troops was now secure, the loss of the day was less than two hundred, and nothing had been left behind. However, the French continued together in front, and at four o'clock seized some heights on Cole's left; whereupon, retiring to the ridge separating the valley of Urroz from that of Zubiri he offered battle.

Disquieted by intelligence from D'Erlon, by Reille's failure, and by Campbell, who in coming from Eugui made a distant display of his Portuguese on the same ridge, Soult put off his attack until next morning, and in the night a junction of all the allies was effected. This was a great failure on the French side; Cole was unsupported for five hours, his troops had been incessantly marching and fighting for two days and a night; and every action, by augmenting the wounded and causing confusion in the rear would have increased the difficulty of retreat. Reille's false march had marred the primary combinations, the evening reports said D'Erlon had also gone wrong, and it was therefore evident that by rough fighting only could the main object be attained.* Soult felt his error, and it is said his language indicated a secret anticipation of failure: he was yet too steadfast to yield, and next morning resumed his march, having renewed his orders to D'Erlon, whose operations must now be noticed.

That general had three divisions of infantry, furnishing eighteen thousand combatants. On the morning of the 25th he assembled two of them behind some heights near the passes of Maya, having caused the national guards of Baygorry to make previous demonstrations towards the lateral passes of Arriette, Yspeguy, and Lorient. The disposition of Hill's force had not been changed; but Stewart, deceived by the movements of the national guards, looked towards Silveira's post on the right rather than his own front, and his division was not well posted or prepared. The ground to be defended was very strong; yet however rugged a mountain position may be, if it is too extensive and the troops are not disposed with judgment, the inequalities constituting its defensive strength favor an assailant.

There were three passes to defend. Aretesque on the right, Lessessa in the centre, and Maya on the left. From these passes

* La Pene, Campaign 1818, 1814.

two roads led to Elisondo in parallel directions ; one down the valley through the town of Maya, receiving in its course the Erazu road ; the other along the Atchiola mountain. Pringle's brigade was charged to defend the Aretesque, and Cameron's brigade the Maya and Lessessa passes. The Col or neck, broad on the summit, was three miles wide, and on each flank lofty rocks and ridges rose one above another ; those on the right blending with the Goramendi mountains ; those on the left with the Atchiola, near the summit of which the eighty-second regiment belonging to the seventh division was posted.

Cameron's brigade, encamped on the left, had a clear view of troops coming from Urdax ; but at Aretesque a great round hill one mile in front masked the movements of an enemy coming from Espelette. This hill was not occupied at night, and in the day-time only by some Portuguese cavalry videttes. The nearest guard was a picquet of eighty men, posted on the front slope of the Col and with no immediate support ; but four light companies were encamped a mile down the reverse slope, which was more rugged and difficult than that towards the enemy. The rest of Pringle's brigade was disposed at various distances from two to three miles in the rear ; and the signal for assembling on the position was to be the fire of four Portuguese guns from the rocks above the Maya pass. Thus, of six British regiments, furnishing more than three thousand fighting men, half only were in line of battle and chiefly massed on the left of a position, wide open and of an easy ascent from the Aretesque side : they were ill-posted, and their general, Stewart, deceived as to the real state of affairs, was at Elisondo when the attack commenced.

COMBAT OF MAYA.

(Plan 11.)

Captain Moyle Sherer, commanding the picquet at the Aretesque pass, was told by his predecessor that at dawn a glimpse had been obtained of cavalry and infantry in movement along the hills in front : some peasants also announced the approach of the French. At nine o'clock Major Thorne, a staff-officer, having patrolled round the great hill in front of the pass, discovered enough to make him order up the light companies in support of the picquet ; and they had just formed on the neck, with their left at the rock of Aretesque, when D'Armagnac's division coming from Espelette mounted the great hill in front. Abbé followed, and Marasin with a third division advanced from Ainhoa and Urdax against the

Maya pass, designing also to turn it by a narrow way leading up the Atchiola mountain. D'Armagnac's men pushing forward in several columns forced the piquet back with great loss upon the light companies, who sustained his vehement assault with infinite difficulty. The alarm guns were then heard from the Maya pass, and Pringle hastened to the front; but his regiments moving hurriedly from different camps were necessarily brought into action one after the other. The thirty-fourth came up first at a running pace, by companies, not in mass, and breathless from the length and ruggedness of the ascent; the thirty-ninth and twenty-eighth followed, yet not immediately nor together; and meanwhile D'Armagnac, closely supported by Abbé, with domineering numbers and valor combined, maugre the desperate fighting of the piquet of the light companies and of the thirty-fourth, had established his columns on the broad summit of the position.

Cameron sent the fiftieth from the left to the assistance of the over-matched troops, and that fierce and formidable old regiment charging the head of an advancing column drove it clear out of Lessessa in the centre. But the French were so many, that checked at one point they assembled with increased force at another; nor could Pringle restore the battle with the thirty-ninth and twenty-eighth regiments; they were cut off from the others, and though fighting desperately, forced back to a second and lower ridge crossing the main road to Elizondo. D'Armagnac followed them, but Abbé continued to press the fiftieth and thirty-fourth, whose natural line of retreat was towards the Atchiola road on the left, because the position trended backward from Aretesque towards that point and because Cameron's brigade was there. That officer, still holding the pass of Maya with the left wings of the seventy-first and ninety-second, then brought their right wings and the Portuguese guns into action, and thus maintained the fight; but so dreadful was the slaughter, especially of the ninety-second, that it is said the advancing enemy was actually stopped by the heaped mass of dead and dying;* and then the left wing of that noble regiment, coming down from the higher ground, smote wounded friends and exulting foes alike, as mingled together they stood or crawled before its wasting fire.

It was in this state of affairs that General Stewart reached the field of battle. Lessessa and Aretesque were lost, Maya was still held by the left wing of the seventy-first; but seeing Maransin's men gathered on one side and Abbé's on the other he abandoned it to take a position on a rocky ridge covering the lateral road over Atchiola; then he called down the eighty-second from the summit

* Appendix 25.

of that mountain, and sent for aid to the seventh division. He was wounded, yet fought stoutly, for he was a gallant man; but during this retrograde movement Maransin suddenly thrust the head of his division across the front of the British line and connected his left with Abbé, throwing as he passed a destructive fire into the wasted remnant of the ninety-second, which even then gave way but sullenly, for the men fell until two-thirds of the whole had gone to the ground. Still the survivors fought and the left wing of the seventy-first coming from Maya also entered into the action, yet finally, one after the other, all the regiments were forced back, the first position was lost and the Portuguese guns were taken.

Abbé then followed D'Armagnac, leaving Maransin to deal with Stewart, who was pushed back, notwithstanding the strength of his new position until six o'clock, when the remnant of his force was in default of ammunition compelled to defend the highest crags with stones: he was just going to abandon the mountain when a brigade of the seventh division led by General Barnes arrived from Echallar, and charging drove the French back to the Col de Maya.* Stewart thus remained master of Atchiola, and D'Erlon, probably thinking greater reinforcements had come up, recalled D'Armagnac and Abbé and concentrated his forces: he had lost fifteen hundred men and a general, but had taken four guns and killed or wounded fourteen hundred British soldiers.†

This disastrous fight of Maya was exaggerated by French writers, and has been by an English author misrepresented as a surprise caused by the negligence of the cavalry.‡ Stewart was surprised, his troops were not; and never did soldiers fight better, seldom so well; the stern valor of the ninety-second would have graced Thermopylæ. The Portuguese cavalry patrols, if any went out, which is uncertain, might have neglected their duty, and doubtless the front should have been scoured in a more military manner; but the infantry piquets and the light companies so happily ordered up by Thorne were ready; and no man wondered to see the French columns crown the great hill in front of the pass. Stewart, expecting no attack at Maya, had gone to Elisondo, leaving orders for the soldiers to cook; from his erroneous views therefore the misfortune sprung and from no other source.§ Having deceived himself as to the point of attack he did not take military precautions; his position was only half occupied, his troops were brought into action wildly, and he caused the loss of his guns by a misdirection as to the road. He was a brave, energetic, zealous, inde-

* French official Report, MSS.

† British official Return.

‡ Southey.

§ General Stewart's Reports.

fatigable man, and of a magnanimous spirit; but he possessed neither the calm reflective judgment nor the intuitive genius which belongs to nature's generals.

It is difficult to understand why Count D'Erlon, when he had carried the right of the position, followed two weak regiments with two divisions; leaving only one division to attack five regiments posted on the strongest ground and having hopes of succor from Echallar. Certainly if Abbé had acted with Maransin, Stewart, so hardly pressed by the latter alone, must have passed the Echallar road in retreat before Barnes's brigade arrived.* Soult had directed D'Erlon to operate by his left to connect the whole army on the summit of the great chain of the Pyrenees; he should therefore have used his whole force to crush the troops on the Atchiola before they could be succored from Echallar—or, leaving Maransin there, have marched by the Maya road upon Ariscun to cut Silveira's line of retreat—he remained upon the Col de Maya for twenty hours after the battle! and Hill meanwhile concentrated his whole force, now augmented by Barnes' brigade, and would have fallen upon him from the rocks of Atchiola next day, if intelligence of Cole's retreat had not come through the Alduides. This rendered the recovery of the Col de Maya useless, and Hill, withdrawing his troops during the night, posted the British brigades which had been engaged, together with one Portuguese brigade of infantry and a battery on the heights in rear of Irueta, fifteen miles from the scene of action; the other Portuguese brigade remained in front of Elizondo, and thus he covered the road of San Estevan on his left, that of Berderez on his right, and the pass of Vellate in the rear. Such was the commencement of Soult's operations to restore the fortunes of France. Three considerable actions fought on the same day had each been favorable. At St. Sebastian the allies were repulsed; at Roncesvalles they abandoned the passes; at Maya they were defeated; but the decisive blow had not yet been struck.

Wellington heard of the fight at Maya on his way back from St. Sebastian after the assault, with the false addition that D'Erlon was beaten. As early as the 22d he knew Soult was preparing a great offensive movement; yet the immovable attitude of the French centre, the skilful disposition of their reserve, twice as strong as he at first supposed, together with the preparations made to throw bridges over the Bidassoa at Biriattou, were all calculated to mislead and did mislead him. Soult's complicated combinations to bring D'Erlon's divisions finally into line on the crest of the great chain were also impenetrable; the English general could not

* Soult's despatch, MSS.

believe his adversary would throw himself with only thirty thousand men in the valley of the Ebro, unless sure of aid from Suchet; but that general's movements indicated a determination to remain in Catalonia. Soult thought Pampeluna in extremity and knew Sebastian was not so; Wellington knew Pampeluna was not in extremity, and previous to the assault thought Sebastian was; hence the operations against his right, their full scope not known, appeared a feint, and he judged the real effort would be to throw bridges over the Bidassao and raise the siege of San Sebastian. In the night correct intelligence of the Maya and Roncevalles affairs arrived. Soult's project was then developed, and Graham was ordered to turn the siege into a blockade, to embark his guns and stores, be ready to join Giron on a position of battle marked out near the Bidassoa. Cotton was ordered to move the cavalry up to Pampeluna, O'Donnel was to hold his Spanish troops in readiness, and Wellington having arranged fresh lines of correspondence, proceeded to Estevan.

While the embarkation of the guns and stores was going on it was essential to hold the posts at Vera and Echallar; D'Erlon's object was not then pronounced; and once in possession of those places he could approach San Sebastian by the roads leading over the Pena de Haya, a rocky mountain behind Lesaca; or by the defiles of Zubietta and Goyzueta leading round that mountain from the valley of Lerins. Wherefore in passing through Estevan on the morning of the 26th, Wellington directed Pack to guard the bridges over the Bidassoa; but when he reached Irueta, saw the state of Stewart's division and heard that Picton had marched from Olague, he directed all the troops within his reach upon Pampeluna, indicating the valley of Lanz as the general line of movement.* Of Picton's position and intentions nothing positive was known; but Wellington, supposing him to have joined Cole at Linzoain as indeed he had, judged their combined forces would be sufficient to check Soult until assistance came from the centre or from Pampeluna, and he so advised Picton the evening of the 26th.

In consequence of these orders the seventh division abandoned Echallar in the night of the 26th, and the sixth division quitted San Estevan at daylight the 27th. Hill halted on the heights of Irueta until the evening of the 27th, but marched during the night through the pass of Vellate upon the town of Lanz. The light division, quitting Vera also on the 27th, retired by Lesaca to the summit of the Santa Cruz mountain, overlooking the valley of Lerins; there it halted to cover the pass of Zubietta until Longa's Spaniards blocked the roads leading over the Pena de Haya to

* Manuscript notes by the Duke of Wellington.

protect the embarkation of the guns on that flank. That object effected, the division was to thread the passes, reach Lecumberri on the great road of Irurzun, and so connect Graham with the army round Pampeluna; for Wellington designed, if unable to cover that fortress, to throw his army back upon its left on a new line covering the approaches to San Sebastian. These movements spread fear and confusion far and wide. All the narrow valleys and roads were crowded with baggage, commissariat stores, artillery and fugitive families; and reports of the most alarming nature were as usual rife; each division, ignorant of what really happened to the other, dreaded that some of the numerous misfortunes related might be true; none knew what to expect or where they were to meet the enemy, and one universal hubbub filled the wild regions through which the French army was now working its fiery path towards Pampeluna.

D'Erlon's inactivity gave great uneasiness to Soult, who repeated the order to push forward by his left whatever might be the force opposed, and thus stimulated, he advanced to Elizondo on the 27th; but thinking the sixth division was still at San Estevan, again halted. Next day, when Hill retreated, he followed through the pass of Vellate, and his further progress belongs to other combinations.

Picton having assumed command in the Val Zubiri the 26th, retired before dawn the 27th and without the hope or intention of covering Pampeluna. Soult followed in the morning, having first sent scouts towards the ridges where Campbell's troops had appeared the evening before. Reille marched by the left bank of the Guy river, Clausel by the right bank, the cavalry and artillery closed the rear, the whole in compact order: the narrow valley was thus gorged with troops, a hasty bicker of musketry alone marking the separation of the hostile forces. The garrison of Pampeluna made a sally, and O'Donnel in great alarm spiked some of his guns, destroyed his magazines, and would have suffered a disaster if Carlos d'España had not fortunately arrived at the moment and checked the garrison. Great now was the danger. Cole, first emerging from the valley of Zubiri, had passed Villalba, three miles from Pampeluna, in retreat;* Picton was at Huarte, and O'Donnel's Spaniards were in confusion; in fine, Soult was all but successful when Picton suddenly turned on some steep ridges, which, under the names of San Miguel, Mont Escava and San Christoval, crossed the mouths of the Zubiri and Lanz valleys and screened Pampeluna.

Posting his own division on the right of Huarte, he prolonged

* Plan 10, page 346.

his line to the left with Morillo's Spaniards, called upon O'Donnel to support him, and directed Cole to occupy some heights between Oricain and Arletta. But that general having with a surer eye observed a salient hill near Zabaldica, one mile in advance and commanding the road to Huarte, demanded and obtained permission to occupy it instead of the heights first appointed. Two Spanish regiments of the blockading troops were still there, and towards them Cole directed his course. Soult had also marked this hill. A detachment issuing from the mouth of the Val de Zubiri was in full career to seize it, and the hostile masses were rapidly approaching the summit on either side when the Spaniards, seeing the British so close, vindicated their own post by a sudden charge. This was for Soult the stroke of fate. His double columns, just then emerging exultant from the narrow valley, were suddenly stopped by ten thousand men under Cole, who crowded the summit of the mountain in his front; and two miles further back stood Picton with a greater number, for O'Donnel, had now taken post on Morillo's left. To advance by Villalba and Huarte was impossible, to stand still was dangerous; the army, contracted to a span in front and cleft in its whole length by the river Guy, was compressed on each side by the mountains, which in that part narrowed the valley to a quarter of a mile. It was a moment of difficulty, but Soult, like a great and ready commander, instantly shot the head of Clausel's columns to his right across the ridge, separating the Val de Zubiri from the Val de Lanz; and at the same time threw one of Reille's divisions of infantry and a body of cavalry across the mountains on his left, beyond the Guy river, as far as the village of Elcano, to menace Picton's right at Huarte.* His remaining divisions were established at Zabaldica in the Val de Zubiri, close under Cole's right, and Clausel seized Sauroren close under that general's left.

While Soult was thus forming his line of battle, Wellington, who had quitted Hill's quarters in the Bastan early on the 27th, † was descending the valley of Lanz, unable to learn anything of Picton's movements or position; and in this state of uncertainty he reached Ostiz a few miles from Sauroren, where he found Long, with the light cavalry which had furnished the posts of correspondence in the mountains. There learning that Picton had abandoned Linzoain, and was moving on Huarte, he left his quarter-master-general with instructions to stop all the troops coming down the valley of Lanz, until the state of affairs at Huarte should be ascertained. But at racing speed he made for Sauroren himself, and entering that village, saw Clausel coming along the crest of the mountain, and knew

* Soult's Correspondence, MSS.

† Wellington's MSS.

the allied troops in the valley of Lanz were intercepted. Pulling up his horse, he wrote on the parapet of the bridge of Sauroren, fresh instructions to turn everything from that valley on to a road which, through Lizasso and Marcalain, led behind the hills to Oricain in the rear of Cole's position: Lord Fitzroy Somerset, the only staff-officer who had kept up with him, galloped with these orders out of Sauroren by one road, the French light cavalry dashed in by another, and the English general rode alone up the mountain to reach his troops. One of Campbell's Portuguese battalions first described him and raised a joyful cry; then the shrill clamor, caught up by the next regiments, soon swelled as it run along the line into that stern appalling shout which the British soldier is wont to give upon the edge of battle, and which no enemy ever heard unmoved. Suddenly he stopped at a conspicuous point, for he desired both armies should know he was there, and a double spy who was present pointed out Soult, who was so near that his features could be distinguished. Attentively Wellington fixed his eyes upon that formidable man, and as if speaking to himself said, "*Yonder is a great commander, but he is cautious, and will delay his attack to ascertain the cause of these cheers; that will give time for the sixth division to arrive and I shall beat him.*" And the French general made no serious attack that day!

Cole's position was the foremost ridge of a mass of mountains filling the space between the Guy and the Lanz rivers, as far back as Huarte and Villalba. Highest in the centre, it was boldly defined towards the enemy; but the trace was irregular, the right being thrown back towards the village of Arletta so as to flank the road to Huarte; which was also swept by some guns placed on a lower range, connecting the right of Cole with Picton and Morillo. Overlooking Zabaldica and the Guy, was the bulging hill vindicated by the Spaniards; it was on the right of the fourth division and distinct, but connected with the centre of the range and considerably lower. The left of the position was extremely rugged and steep, overlooking the Lanz river and the road to Villalba. Ross's brigade of the fourth division was posted on that side, having in front a Portuguese battalion whose flank rested on a small chapel. Campbell was on the right of Ross. Anson was on the highest ground, partly behind and partly on the right of Campbell. Byng was on a second mass of hills in reserve, and the Spanish hill was reinforced by a battalion of the fourth Portuguese regiment.

This front of battle being less than two miles, was well filled. The Lanz and Guy torrents washed the flanks, and two miles further down broke through the crossing ridges of San Miguel and Christoval to meet behind them and form the Arga river; on the

ridges thus cleft Picton's line was formed, nearly parallel to Cole's, but on a more extended front. His left was at Huarte, his right with a battery, stretched to the village of Goraitz, covering more than a mile of ground on that flank; Morillo prolonged his left along the crest of San Miguel to Villalba, and O'Donnel continued the line to San Christoval. Carlos d'España's division maintained the blockade, and the British cavalry under Cotton, coming up from Tafalla and Olite, took post, the heavy brigades on some open ground behind Picton, the hussar brigade on his right; this second line entirely barred the openings of the two valleys leading down to Pampeluna.

Soult's position was also a mountain filling the space between the two rivers. It was even more rugged than the allies' mountain, and they were only separated by a narrow valley. Clausel's three divisions leaned to the right on the village of Sauroren, which was down in the valley of Lanz, close under the chapel height where the left of the fourth division was posted. His left was prolonged by two of Reille's divisions, who also occupied the village of Zabaldica in the valley of Zubiri under the right of the allies. The remaining division of this wing and a division of cavalry were, as before stated, thrown forward on the mountains at the other side of the Guy river, menacing Picton, and seeking for an opportunity to communicate with the garrison of Pampeluna. Some guns were pushed in front of Zabaldica, but the elevation required to send the shot upward rendered their fire ineffectual, and the greatest part of the artillery remained therefore in the narrow Val de Zubiri.

Combat of the 27th.—Soult's first effort was to gain the Spaniards' hill and establish himself near the centre of the allies' line of battle; this attack though vigorous had been valiantly repulsed about the time Wellington arrived, and he immediately reinforced the post with the fortieth British regiment. There was then a general skirmish along the front, under cover of which Soult carefully examined the whole position, and the firing continued on the mountain side until evening; then a terrible storm, the usual precursor of English battles in the Peninsula, brought on premature darkness and terminated the dispute. This also was the state of affairs at daybreak on the 28th, but a signal alteration took place before the great battle of that day commenced, and the movements of the wandering divisions by which this change was effected must be traced.

The Lanz covered the left of the allies and the right of the French; but the heights occupied by either army were prolonged beyond that river, the continuation of the allies' ridge sweeping forward so as to look into the rear of Sauroren; the continuation of

the French heights retiring more abruptly than the forward inclination of the opposing ridge. They were both steep and high, yet lower and less rugged than the heights on which the armies stood opposed ; for there rocks piled on rocks stood out like castles, difficult to approach, and so dangerous to assail that the hardened veterans of the Peninsula only would have dared the trial. Now the road by which the sixth division moved on the 27th, after threading the Doña Maria pass, sent one branch to Lanz, another by Letassa, to Ostiz, a third by Lizasso to Marcalain where many ways met. The first and second fell into the road which from the Bellate pass descends the Lanz valley to Sauroren ; the third, passing behind the prolongation of the hostile positions, also fell into the valley of Lanz, but near Oricain one mile behind Cole's left.

It was by Marcalain Wellington expected the sixth and seventh divisions, but the rapidity with which Soult seized Sauroren caused a delay of eighteen hours. For the sixth division, having reached Olague in the valley of Lanz at one o'clock on the 27th, halted there until four, and then, following the orders brought by Lord Fitzroy Somerset, marched by Lizasso to gain the Marcalain road ; but the great length of these mountain marches, and the heavy storm which terminated the action at Zabaldica, sweeping with equal violence in this direction prevented the troops from passing Lizasso that night. The march was renewed at daylight, and meanwhile Hill reached the town of Lanz, where he rallied Long's cavalry and his own artillery and moved likewise upon Lizasso. At that place he met the seventh division coming from San Estevan, and having restored Barnes's brigade to Lord Dalhousie, took a position on a ridge covering the road to Marcalain. The seventh division being on his right was then in military communication with the sixth division, and thus Wellington's left covered the great road leading from Pampeluna by Irurzun to Tolosa. These important movements, which were not completed until the evening of the 28th, brought six thousand men into the allies' line of battle, and fifteen thousand more into military communication with their left : yet D'Erlon remained planted in his position of observation near Elizondo without a movement !

Wellington considering the nearness of the sixth division, and the certainty of Hill's junction, imagined Soult would not venture an attack ; and truly that marshal, disquieted about D'Erlon of whom he only knew that he had not followed his instructions, viewed the strong position of his adversary with uneasy anticipations. Again with anxious eyes he took cognizance of all its rugged strength, and seemed dubious and distrustful of his fortune. He could not operate with advantage by his own left beyond the Guy river,

because the mountains there were too rough, and Wellington having shorter lines of movement could meet him with all arms combined; the French artillery also unable to emerge from the Val de Zubiri, would have been exposed to a counter attack. He crossed the Lanz river and ascended the prolongation of the allies' ridge, which, as he had possession of the bridge of Sauroren, was for the moment his own ground. From thence he could see the left and rear of Cole's position, and down the valley as far as Villalba; but the country beyond the ridge towards Marcalain was too broken to discern the march of the sixth division.* He knew however from the deserters that Wellington expected four fresh divisions from that side, that is to say, the second, sixth, and seventh British, and Silveira's Portuguese division, which always marched with Hill. This knowledge and the nature of the ground determined his attack. The valley of Lanz, growing wider as it descended, offered the means of assailing the allies' left in front and rear at one moment; and the same combination would cut off the reinforcements expected from the side of Marcalain. One of Clausel's divisions occupied Sauroren, the other two were on each side of that village; that on the right hand was ordered to throw flankers on the ridge from whence Soult was taking his observations, to move in one body to a convenient distance down the valley, and then, wheeling to its left, assail the rear of the allies' left flank while the other two divisions assailed his front. Cole's left, which did not exceed five thousand men, would thus be enveloped by sixteen thousand, and Soult expected to crush it notwithstanding the strength of the ground. Reille's two divisions advancing on the side of Zabaldica, were each to send a brigade against the Spanish hill now occupied by the fortieth regiment; the right of this attack was to be connected with the left of Clausel; the remaining brigades were closely to support the assailing masses; the divisions beyond the Guy were to keep Picton in check; and Soult, having no time to lose, ordered his lieutenants to throw their troops at once into action.

First battle of Sauroren.—It was fought on the fourth anniversary of the battle of Talavera.

About mid-day the French gathered at the foot of the position, and their skirmishers spread over the face of the mountain working upward like a conflagration; but the columns of attack were not all prepared when Clausel's division, too impatient to await the general signal of battle, threw out its flankers on the ridge beyond the river and pushed down the valley of Lanz in one mass. With a rapid pace it turned Cole's left, and was preparing to wheel up on his rear, when a Portuguese brigade of the sixth division, sud-

* Soult, MSS.

denly appearing on the ridge beyond the river, drove the French flankers back and instantly descended with a rattling fire upon the right and rear of the column in the valley. Nearly at the same instant the main body of the sixth division, emerging from behind the same ridge near the village of Oricain, formed in order of battle across the front. It was the counter-stroke of Salamanca! The French while striving to encompass the left of the allies were themselves encompassed; for two brigades of the fourth division turned and smote them on their left, the Portugese smote them on their right; and while thus scathed on both flanks with fire they were violently shocked and pushed back with a mighty force by the sixth division—not in flight, however, but in fighting fiercely and strewing the ground with their enemies' bodies as well as with their own.

Clausel's second division, seeing this dire conflict, with a hurried movement assailed the chapel height to draw off the fire from the troops in the valley, and gallantly did the French soldiers throng up the craggy steep; but the general unity of the attack was ruined; neither their third division nor Reille's brigades had yet received the signal, and the attacks which should have been simultaneous were made in succession, running from right to left as the necessity of giving aid became apparent. It was however a terrible battle and well fought. One column darting out of the village of Sauroren, silently, sternly, without firing a shot, worked up to the chapel under a tempest of bullets, which swept away whole ranks without abating the speed and power of the mass. The seventh caçadores shrunk abashed and that part of the position was won; but soon they rallied on Ross's brigade, and the whole mass charging the French with a loud shout dashed them down the hill. Heavily stricken they were, yet undismayed, for re-forming below they again ascended to be again broken and cast down. But the other columns of attack were now bearing upwards through the smoke and flame with which the skirmishers had covered the face of the mountain, and the tenth Portuguese regiment, fighting on the right of Ross's brigade yielded to their fury. Thus a column crowned the heights and wheeling against the exposed flank of Ross forced that gallant officer also to go back, and his ground was instantly occupied by those with whom he had been engaged in front. The fight then raged close and desperate on the crest of the position, charge succeeded charge, and each side yielded and rallied by turns; yet this astounding effort of French valor availed not. Wellington brought Byng's brigade forward at a running pace, and sent the twenty-seventh and forty-eighth British, of Anson's brigade, from the higher ground in the centre against

the crowded masses, rolling them backward in disorder, and throwing them one after the other violently down the mountain side; and with no child's play, for the two British regiments fell upon the enemy three separate times with the bayonet, and lost more than half their own number.

During this battle on the mountain top, the British brigades of the sixth division, strengthened by a battery of guns, gained ground in the valley of Lanz and arrived on the same front with the left of the victorious troops about the chapel. Wellington, seeing the momentary disorder of the enemy, then ordered Madden's Portuguese brigade, which had never ceased its fire against the right flank of the French column, to assail the village of Sauroren in the rear; but the state of the action in other parts and the exhaustion of the troops soon induced him to countermand this movement. Meanwhile Reille's brigades, connecting their right with the left of Clausel's third division, had environed the Spanish hill, had ascended it unchecked, and at the moment the fourth division was so hardly pressed made the regiment of El Pravia give way on the left of the fortieth. A Portuguese battalion rushing forward covered the flank of that invincible regiment, which waited in stern silence until the French set their feet upon the broad summit; but then when their glittering arms appeared over the brow of the mountain the charging cry was heard, the crowded mass was broken to pieces, and a tempest of bullets followed its flight. Four times this assault was renewed, and the French officers were seen to pull up their tired men by the belts, so fierce and resolute they were to win; yet it was the labor of Sisyphus, the vehement shout and shock of the British soldier always prevailed; and at last, with thinned ranks, tired limbs, hearts fainting and hopeless from repeated failures, they were so abashed that three British companies sufficed to bear down a whole brigade. And while the battle was thus being fought on the mountain, the French cavalry beyond the Guy river passed a rivulet and with a fire of carbines forced the tenth hussars to yield some rocky ground on Pieton's right; yet the eighteenth hussars, having better fire-arms than the tenth, renewed the combat, killed two officers and drove the French over the rivulet again.

Such were the leading events of this sanguinary struggle, which Wellington, fresh from the fight, with homely emphasis called "*bludgeon work*." Two generals and eighteen hundred men had been killed or wounded on the French side, following their official reports; a number far below the estimate made at the time by the allies, whose loss amounted to two thousand six hundred. But these discrepancies between hostile calculations ever occur, and

there is little wisdom in disputing where proof is unattainable; but the numbers actually engaged were of French twenty-five thousand, of the allies twelve thousand; and if the strength of the latter's position did not save them from the greater loss their steadfast courage is to be the more admired.

On the 29th the armies rested in position without firing a shot, but the wandering divisions on both sides were now entering the line.

Hill, having sent all his baggage artillery and wounded men to Berioplano behind the Christoval ridge, still occupied his strong ground between Lizasso and Arestegui, covering the Marcalain and Irurzun roads and menacing that leading from Lizasso to Olague in rear of Soult's right: this communication with Oricain was maintained by the seventh division, and the light division was approaching his left. On Wellington's side the crisis was over. He had vindicated his position with only sixteen thousand combatants; and now including the troops of blockade he had fifty thousand, twenty thousand being British in close military combination: thirty thousand were in hand, and Hill was well placed for retaking the offensive. Soult's situation was proportionably difficult. He had sent his artillery, part of his cavalry and his wounded men back to France immediately after the battle; the two former to join Villatte on the lower Bidassoa. Thus relieved he awaited D'Erlon's arrival by the valley of Lanz, and that general reached Ostiz a few miles above Sauroren at mid-day on the 29th, bringing intelligence, obtained indirectly during his march, that Graham had retired from the Bidassoa and Villatte had crossed that river. This made Soult think his operations had disengaged St. Sebastian, and he instantly devised a new scheme, dangerous indeed but conformable to the critical state of affairs. Judging it hopeless to renew the battle, he was averse to retire when he had been reinforced with eighteen thousand fresh men; he was yet unable to remain, because his supplies, derived from distant magazines by slow and small convoys, were unequal to the consumption.* Two-thirds of the British troops the greatest part of the Portuguese and all the Spaniards were, he supposed, in his front under Wellington, or on his right flank under Hill, and other reinforcements were probably on the march; wherefore he resolved to prolong his right with D'Erlon's corps, and cautiously drawing off the rest of his army place himself between the allies and the Bastan, in military connexion with his reserve and closer to his frontier magazines. Thus posted and able to combine all his

* Soult, MSS.

troops in one operation, he expected to relieve San Sebastian entirely, and profit from the new state of affairs.

In this view, one division of cavalry passed over the position from the Val de Zubiri to that of Lanz and joined D'Erlon, who was ordered to march early on the 30th by Etulain upon Lizasso, and to send scouting parties towards Letassa and Irurzun, and on all the roads leading upon Pampeluna.* During the night the other division of cavalry and La Martiniere's infantry, both at Elcano on the extreme left of the French army, retired over the mountains by Illurdos to Eugui, in the upper part of the Val de Zubiri, having orders to cross the separating ridge there, to enter the valley of Lanz and join D'Erlon. Reille, marching by the crest of the position from Zabaldica to the village of Sauroren, was gradually to relieve Clausel, who was to assemble his troops behind Sauroren towards Ostiz, thus following D'Erlon and to be himself followed by Reille. Clausel, to cover these movements and maintain his connexion with D'Erlon, placed two regiments on the heights beyond the Lanz river; but he was to hold on to Reille rather than D'Erlon until the former had completed his dangerous flank march across Wellington's front.

In the night Soult heard from deserters, that three divisions were to make an offensive movement towards Lizasso on the 30th, and when daylight came he was convinced the men spoke truly; because from a point beyond Sauroren, he discerned columns descending the ridge of Christoval and the heights above Oricain, others in march on a wide sweep apparently to turn Clausel's right. These were Morillo's Spaniards, Campbell's Portuguese and the seventh division; the former rejoining Hill to whom they belonged, the others adapting themselves to a new line of battle which shall be presently explained.

At six o'clock in the morning, Foy's division of Reille's corps was in march from Zabaldica towards Sauroren, where Maucune had already relieved Conroux; the latter, belonging to Clausel, was moving up the valley of Lanz, and Clausel, with exception of the two flanking regiments before mentioned, had concentrated his remaining divisions between Olabe and Ostiz. In this state of affairs Wellington opened his batteries from the chapel heights and sent down skirmishers against Sauroren. Very soon this bickering of musketry spread towards the right, becoming brisk between Cole and Foy, while it subsided at Sauroren; but Soult relying on the great strength of his position, ordered Reille to maintain it until evening and went off at a gallop to join D'Erlon.† His design was

* Plan 10, page 848.

† Soult's Report, MSS.

to fall with superior numbers upon the divisions he supposed to be turning his right and crush them, a daring project and well conceived; but he had to deal with a man whose rapid perception and rough stroke rendered the game dangerous.

Combat of Buenza.—Soulé found D'Erlon, who had entered the Ulzema valley, making dispositions to attack Hill between Buenza and Arestegui; and the latter having only ten thousand fighting men, including Long's cavalry, occupied a very extensive mountain ridge. His right was strongly posted on rugged ground, but the left prolonged towards Buenza, was insecure; and D'Erlon, who had not less than twenty thousand sabres and bayonets was followed by La Martinière's division of infantry now coming from Lanz: Soulé's combination was therefore extremely powerful. The light troops were already engaged when he arrived, and the same soldiers, on both sides, who had so strenuously combated at Maya the 25th were again opposed in fight. D'Armagnac was to make a false attack upon Hill's right; Abbé, emerging by Lizasso, was to turn the left and gain the summit of the ridge in the direction of Buenza; Maranzin followed Abbé, and the cavalry supported and connected the two attacks. The action was brisk at both points but D'Armagnac, pushing his feint too far, became seriously engaged and was beaten by Da Costa and Ashworth's Portuguese, aided by a part of the twenty-eighth British regiment. Nor were the French at first more successful on the other flank, being repeatedly repulsed; Abbé however finally turned the position, gained the summit of the mountain and rendered it untenable. Hill lost four hundred men and retired to the heights of Yguaras behind Arestegui and Berasin, thus drawing towards Marcalain with his right and throwing back his left. There, uniting with Campbell and Morillo, he again offered battle, but Soulé, whose principal loss was in D'Armagnac's division, had gained his main object; he had turned Hill, obtained a fresh line of retreat, and a shorter communication with Villatte by the pass of Doña Maria; and withal, the great Irurzun road to Tolosa, distant only one league and a half, was in his power.* His first thought was to seize it and march through Lecumberri upon Tolosa, or Andoain and Ernani. There was nothing to oppose him except the light division, whose movements shall be noticed hereafter; but neither he nor Hill knew of its presence; and Soulé thought himself strong enough to force a way to San Sebastian, there to unite with Villatte and the artillery, which was now on the lower Bidassoa.

This project was feasible. La Martinière's division, coming from Lanz, was not far off; Clausel's three divisions were momen-

* Soulé's despatch, MS.

tarily expected, and the rest of Reille's during the night. On the 31st therefore, at least fifty thousand French would have broken into Guipuscoa, thrusting aside the light division in their march and menacing Graham in reverse while Villatte attacked him in front. The country about Lecumberri was however very strong for defence, and Wellington would have followed; yet scarcely in time; for though he foresaw the movement he was ignorant of Soult's strength; he thought D'Erlon's force to be originally two divisions of infantry, and now only reinforced with a third division; whereas it was three divisions originally, and was now reinforced by a fourth division of infantry and two of cavalry. But this error did not prevent him seizing with the rapidity of a great commander the decisive point of operation, and giving a counter-stroke which Soult, trusting to the strength of Reille's position, little expected.

When La Martiniere's division and the cavalry abandoned the mountains above Elcano, Wellington seeing that Zabaldica was also evacuated, ordered Picton, reinforced with two squadrons of cavalry and a battery of artillery, to enter the valley of Zubiri and turn the French left, while the seventh division swept over the hills beyond the Lanz river upon their right. The march of Campbell and Morillo insured the communication with Hill; and that general was to point his columns upon Olague and Lanz, threatening the French rear, but meeting with D'Erlon was forced back to Eguaros. Cole was to assail Foy's position, yet, respecting its great strength, the attack was to be regulated by the effect produced on the flanks. Byng's brigade and the sixth division, the latter having a battery of guns and some squadrons of cavalry attached, were combined to assault Sauroren. O'Donnell's Spaniards followed the sixth division; Fane's horsemen were stationed at Berioplano with an advanced post at Irurzun; the heavy cavalry remained behind Huarte, and Carlos d'España maintained the blockade.

Second battle of Sauroren.—These movements were begun at daylight. Picton's advance on the right was rapid; he gained the Val de Zubiri and threw his skirmishes at once on Foy's flank. At the same time General Inglis, one of those veterans who purchase every step of promotion with their blood, advancing on the left with only five hundred men of the seventh division, broke at one shock the two French regiments covering Clausel's right, and drove them down into the valley of Lanz,—he lost indeed one-third of his own men, but instantly spreading the remainder in skirmishing order along the descent, opened a biting fire upon the flank of Conroux's division, then moving up the valley from Sauroren, and sorely amazed and disordered by this sudden fall of two regi-

ments from the top of the mountain into the midst of the column. Foy was still on the crest of position between Zabaldica and Sauroren at the moment of this attack, but too far off to give aid; his own light troops were engaged with Cole's skirmishers, and Inglis had been so sudden, that before the evil could be well perceived it was past remedy. Wellington instantly pushed the sixth division, now commanded by Pakenham, to the left of Sauroren; and he also shoved Byng's brigade headlong down from the chapel height against that village, which was defended by Maucune. Byng's assault was simultaneously enforced from the opposite direction by Madden's Portuguese; and the chapel battery sent its bullets crashing through the houses, or booming up the valley towards Conroux's column, which Inglis, closely supported by the seventh division, never ceased to vex.

The village and bridge of Sauroren and the strait beyond were now covered with a pall of smoke, the musketry pealed frequent and loud, and the tumult and affray echoing from mountain to mountain filled all the valley. Byng with hard fighting carried Sauroren, fourteen hundred prisoners were made, and the French divisions thus vehemently assailed in front and flank were entirely broken. Part retreated up the valley towards Clausel who was now beyond Ostiz; part fled up the mountain side to seek refuge with Foy, who had remained on the summit a helpless spectator of this rout; and though he rallied the fugitives in great numbers he had soon to look to himself; for his skirmishers were driven up the mountain by Cole's men, and his left was infested by Picton's detachments. Thus pressed, he abandoned his strong position and fell back along the summit of the ridge separating the two valleys, where the woods enabled him to effect his retreat without much loss: yet he dared not descend into either valley, and thinking himself entirely cut off, sent advice of his situation to Soult and retired into the Alduides by the pass of Urtiaga. Meanwhile Wellington, pressing up the valley of Lanz drove Clausel as far as Olague, where he was joined by La Martiniere and took a position in the evening covering the roads of Lans and Lizasso: then the English general, whose pursuit had been damped by hearing of Hill's action, also halted near Ostiz.

The allies lost nineteen hundred men killed and wounded or taken in the two battles of this day; of these nearly twelve hundred were Portuguese, the soldiers of that nation having borne the brunt of both fights. On the French side the loss was enormous. Conroux's and Maucune's divisions were completely disorganized; Foy, augmented to eight thousand men by the fugitives, was entirely separated from the main body; more than

two thousand men had been killed or wounded, many were dispersed in the woods and ravines, and three thousand prisoners were taken. This blow, joined to former losses, reduced Soult's fighting men to thirty-five thousand of which fifteen thousand under Clausel and Reille were dispirited by defeat. Hill's force, increased to fifteen thousand by the junction of Morillo and Campbell, was in his front; thirty thousand were on his rear in the valley of Lanz or on the hills at each side; for Picton, finding no enemies in the Val de Zubiri, had crowned the heights in conjunction with Cole.

Wellington had detached some of O'Donnell's Spaniards to Marcalain when he heard of Hill's action, but he was not yet aware of the true state of affairs on that side. His operations were founded upon the notion that Soult was in retreat towards the Bastan; and he designed to follow closely, pushing his own left forward to support Graham on the Bidassoa—yet, always underrating D'Erlon's force, he thought La Martiniere had retreated by the Roncevalles road; and as Foy's column was numerous and two divisions had been broken at Sauroren, he judged the force immediately under Soult to be weak and made dispositions accordingly. The sixth division and the thirteenth light dragoons were to march by Eugui to join Picton, who was directed upon Linzoain and Roncevalles. Cole was to descend into the valley of Lanz. Hill, supported by the Spaniards at Marcalain, was to press Soult closely, always turning the French right but directing his own march upon Lanz, from whence he was to send Campbell to the Alduides. The seventh division, which had halted on the ridges between Hill and Wellington, was to suffer the former to cross its front and then march for the pass of Doña Maria.

Wellington expecting Soult would rejoin Clausel and make for the Bastan by the pass of Vellatte, intended to confine and press him closely in that district; but the French marshal was in a worse position than his adversary imagined, being too far advanced towards Buena to return to Lanz; in fine he was between two fires and had no retreat save by the pass of Doña Maria. Wherefore calling in Clausel, and giving D'Erlon, whose divisions were in good order and undismayed, the rear-guard, he commenced his march at midnight towards the pass. Mischief was gathering around him. Graham had twenty thousand men ready to move against Villatte, and between him and Hill was the light division under Charles Alten. That general was as before said, on the Santa Cruz mountain the 27th, but had marched in the evening of the 28th to gain Lecumberri on the great Irurzun road; yet from

some error or failure of orders, for the difficulty of communication was great, he commenced his descent into the valley of Lerins too late. His leading brigade got down with some difficulty and reached Leyza beyond the great chain by the pass of Zubieta; but darkness caught the other brigade and the troops were dispersed in that frightful wilderness of woods and precipices. Many made faggot torches and thus moving about, the lights served indeed to assist those who carried them, yet misled and bewildered others who saw them at a distance,—the heights and the ravines were alike studded with these small fires, and the soldiers calling to each other, filled the whole region with their clamor. Thus they continued to rove and shout until morning showed the face of the mountain covered with tired and scattered men and animals, who had not gained half a league of ground beyond their starting-place; and it was many hours ere they could be collected to join the other brigade at Leyza.

Alten, thus isolated for three days, sent officers in all directions to obtain tidings, and in the evening renewed his march to Areysa, where he halted without suffering fires to be lighted lest the enemy should discover him; but at night he moved again and reached Lécumberri on the 30th. At that place the noise of Hill's battle at Buena was heard, and the light division again found itself within the system of operations directed by Wellington in person; if Soult had continued his movement on Irurzun it would have been in great danger; but now, he being in retreat to Doña Maria, the light division was a new and terrible power placed in his adversary's hands.

It has been shown how Foy was cut off and driven to the Aldudes, how the French artillery and part of their cavalry were again on the Bidassoa; whence Villatte had not moved though he had skirmished with Longa on the heights of Lesaca. Soult was thus isolated, without other resources than his own firmness and ability. His retreat by Doña Maria was however open as far as San Estevan, and from thence he could ascend the Bidassoa to Elizondo and gain France by the Col de Maya; or go down the river towards Vera by Sumbilla and Yanzi, from which roads led over the mountains to the passes of Echallar: there was also a third mountain-road leading direct from Estevan to Zagaramurdi and Urdax, but too rugged for wounded men and baggage. The road to Elizondo was good; that down the Bidassoa was a terrible defile, so contracted about the bridges of Yanzi and Sumbilla that a few men only could march abreast. Soult had therefore to dread, that Wellington would by Villatte reach Elizondo before him and block the passage there,—that Graham seizing the rocks at Yanzi, would

bar that passage and by detachments cut off the line of Echallar. Then, confined to the narrow mountain-way from San Estevan to Zagaramurdi, he would be followed hard by Hill, assailed in rear and flank during the march, and perhaps be headed at Urdax by troops moving through Vellate, Elizondo and the Col de Maya.

His object being to gain Doña Maria, he, as before stated, moved in the night of the 30th, while Wellington, not knowing the real state of affairs, halted in the valley of Lanz to let Hill pass his front and re-enter the Bastan, upon which valley Byng had already moved. When Soult's real strength became known, the seventh division was sent to aid Hill; but Wellington followed Byng by the pass of Vellate; and thinking Alten might be at Zubieta, directed him to head the French if possible at San Estevan, at Sumbilla, at any point he could attain. Longa was also ordered to come down to Yanzi in aid of Alten, Graham was warned to hold his corps in hand, and both Picton and Pakenham had their routes changed for a time.

Combat of Doña Maria.—At ten o'clock in the morning Hill overtook Soult's rear-guard, between Lizasso and the Puerto. The seventh division, coming from the hills above Olague, was already ascending the mountain on his right, and the French only gained the wood on the summit of the pass under the fire of Hill's guns: there however they turned and throwing out skirmishers made strong battle. Stewart, leading the second division and now for the third time engaged with D'Erlon's troops, was again wounded and his first brigade was repulsed; Pringle succeeding to the command renewed the fight with the second brigade and broke the enemy; the seventh division did the same on the right and some prisoners were taken: but a thick fog prevented further pursuit and the loss of the French in the action is unknown, probably less than that of the allies, which was short of four hundred men.

The seventh division remained on the mountain, Hill fell back to Lizasso, and then, following his orders, moved by a short rugged way between the passes of Doña Maria and Vellate, over the great chain to Almandoz to join Wellington, who had now descended into the Bastan by Vellate. Byng had previously reached Elizondo, and captured a convoy of provisions and ammunition left there by D'Erlon under guard of a battalion, which he sharply engaged, took several hundred prisoners, and then pushed for the Col de Maya. Wellington now occupied the hills through which the road leads from Elizondo to San Estevan, and was full of hope to strike a terrible blow; for Soult, after passing Doña Maria, had halted in San Estevan, although by his scouts he knew the convoy had been taken at Elizondo. He was in a deep narrow valley,—

three British and one Spanish division were behind the mountains overlooking the town,—the seventh division was at Doña Maria,—the light division and Graham's Spaniards were marching to block the Vera and Echallar exits from the valley,—Byng was at Maya,—Hill was moving by Almandoz. A few hours gained and the French must surrender or disperse. Wellington gave strict orders to prevent the lighting of fires, the straggling of soldiers, or any other indication of the presence of troops; and he placed himself amongst some rocks at a commanding point, from whence he could observe every movement of the enemy. Soult seemed tranquil and four of his *gens-d'armes* were seen to ride up the valley in a careless manner. Some of the staff proposed to cut them off;* the English general, anxious to hide his own presence, forbade this, but the next moment three marauding English soldiers entered the valley and were instantly carried off by the *gen-d'armes*; half an hour afterwards the French drums beat to arms and their columns began to move out of San Estevan towards Sumbilla. Thus the disobedience of three plundering knaves, unworthy of the name of soldiers, deprived one consummate commander of the most splendid success, and saved another from the most terrible disaster.

Soult walked from the prison, but his chains still hung about him. The way was narrow, wounded men borne on their comrades' shoulders and followed by baggage, filed in long procession;† Clausel had the rear-guard, but on the morning of the 1st he was still near San Estevan when Cole's skirmishers and O'Donnell's Spaniards, thronging on the heights along his flank, opened a fire which he could not return. Then troops and baggage got intermingled, many men fled up the hills, and the commanding energy of Soult, whose personal exertions were conspicuous, could scarcely prevent a general dispersion; baggage fell at every step into the hands of the pursuers, the boldest were dismayed, and worse would have awaited them in front, if Wellington had been on other points well seconded by his generals.

Instead of taking the first road leading from Sumbilla to Echallar, the head of the French passed onward towards that leading from the bridge near Yanzi; the valley narrowed to a mere cleft in the rocks as they advanced, the Bidassoa was on their left, there was a tributary torrent to cross, and the bridge was defended by a Spanish *caçadore* battalion, detached from the heights of Vera by General Barceñas. The front was thus as much disordered as the rear, and had Longa or Barceñas reinforced the *caçadores*, those only of the French who being near Sumbilla could take the road

* Notes by the Duke of Wellington, MSS.

† August.

to Echallar would have escaped; but the Spanish generals kept aloof and D'Erlon won the defile. Reille's divisions were still to pass, and when they came up a new enemy had appeared. This was the light division. The order to intercept the French being received the evening of the 31st, Alten, repassing the defiles of Zubieta, again descended into the deep valley of Lerins and reached Elgoriaga about mid-day the 1st of August. He had then marched twenty-four miles, was little more than a league from Estevan, about the same distance from Sumbilla, and the French movement along the Bidassoa was discovered; but instead of marching on Sumbilla he clambered up the great mountain of Santa Cruz and made for the bridge of Yanzi. Very sultry was the weather, the mountain steep and hard to overcome, many men fell and died convulsed and frothing at the mouth, while others, whose spirit and strength had never before been quelled, leaned on their muskets and muttered in sullen tones that they yielded for the first time.

Towards evening, after marching nineteen consecutive hours and over forty miles of mountain roads, the head of the column reached the edge of a precipice near the bridge of Yanzi. Below, within pistol-shot, Reille's divisions were seen hurrying forward along the horrid defile and a fire of musketry commenced, slightly from the British on the high rock, more vigorously from some low ground near the bridge of Yanzi, where the riflemen had ensconced themselves in the brushwood: but the scene which followed shall be described by an eye-witness. "We overlooked the enemy at stone's throw, and from the summit of a tremendous precipice.* The river separated us, but the French were wedged in a narrow road with inaccessible rocks on one side and the river on the other. Confusion impossible to describe followed, the wounded were thrown down in the rush and trampled upon, the cavalry drew their swords and endeavored to charge up the pass of Echallar, but the infantry beat them back, and several, horses and all, were precipitated into the river; some fired vertically at us while the wounded called out for quarter, and others pointed to them, supported as they were on branches of trees, on which were suspended great coats clotted with gore and blood-stained sheets taken from different habitations to aid the sufferers."

On these miserable supplicants brave men could not fire; and so piteous was the spectacle that it was with averted aim the British soldier shot at the sound men; although the latter plied their muskets in passing, and some in their veteran hardihood even dashed across the bridge of Yanzi to make a counter-attack! It

* Cooke's Memoirs.

was a soldier-like but a vain effort, the night found the British in possession of the bridge; and though the great body of the French escaped by the road to Echallar, their baggage was all cut off with many prisoners by the troops hanging on the rear in pursuit from San Estevan.

Heavy was the French loss; that of the allies was about a hundred men, of which sixty-five were British, principally of the fourth division. Wellington was justly discontented with the result. Neither Longa nor Alten had fulfilled their mission. The former excused himself as being too feeble to oppose the mass Soult led down the valley; yet the rocks were so precipitous the French could not have reached him; the resistance of the Spanish *caçadores* was Longa's condemnation. Fatuity seemed to prevail in many quarters. If Barceñas had sent his whole brigade instead of a weak battalion, the small torrent could not have been forced by D'Erlon; if Longa had been at the bridge of Yanzi the French must have surrendered, for the perpendicular rocks on their right forbade even an escape by dispersion; if Alten, instead of marching down the valley of Lerins as far as Elgoriaga, had crossed the Santa Cruz mountain by the road used the night of the 28th, he would have been much earlier at the bridge of Yanzi; and then belike Longa and Barceñas would also have come down. Alten's instructions prescribed Sumbilla and San Estevan as the first points to head the French; judging them too strong at Sumbilla he marched upon Yanzi; and if he had passed the bridge there and seized the road to Echallar with one brigade, while the other plied the flank with fire from the left of the Bidassoa, he would have struck a great blow: it was for that his soldiers had made such a prodigious exertion.

During the night Soult rallied his divisions about Echallar, and on the morning of the 2d occupied the "*Puerto*" of that name. His left was on the rocks of Zagaramurdi; his right on the rock of Ivantelly, communicating with the left of Villatte, who was in position on the ridges between Soult and the head of the great Rhune mountain. Clausel's three divisions, now reduced to six thousand men, took post on a strong hill between the "*Puerto*" and town of Echallar. This position was momentarily adopted to save time, to examine the country, and to make Wellington discover his views, but the latter would not suffer the affront. He had sent Picton and Pakenham to reoccupy the passes of Roncesvalles and the Alduides,—Hill had reached the Col de Maya,—Byng was at Urdax,—the fourth, seventh, and light divisions remained in hand, and with these he resolved to fall upon Clausel, whose position was dangerously advanced.

Combats of Echallar and Ivantelly.—The light division held the road running from the bridge of Yanzi to Echallar until relieved by the fourth division, and then marched by Lesaca to Santa Barbara, thus turning Clausel's right. The fourth division marched from Yanzi upon Echallar to attack his front; the seventh moved from Sumbilla against his left; but Barnes's brigade, contrary to Wellington's intention, arrived unsupported before the fourth and light divisions were either seen or felt, and without awaiting the arrival of more troops, assailed Clausel's strong position. The fire became vehement, yet neither the steepness of the mountain nor the overshadowing multitude of the enemy, clustered above in support of their skirmishers, could arrest the assailants; and then was seen the astonishing spectacle of fifteen hundred men driving by sheer valor and force of arms six thousand good troops from a position, so rugged that there would have been little to boast of if the numbers had been reversed and the defence made good. The fourth division arrived indeed towards the end of the action, and the French, who had fulfilled their mission as a rear-guard, were worn with fatigue and ill-provided with ammunition, having exhausted all their reserve stores during the retreat: but their inferiority here belongs to the highest part of war. The British soldiers, their natural fierceness stimulated by the remarkable personal daring of their general, Barnes, were excited by success; the French were those who had failed in attack the 28th, had been utterly defeated the 30th, and had suffered so severely the day before about Sumbilla. Such then is the preponderance of moral power. The men who had assailed the terrible rocks above Sauroren with a force and energy that all the valor of the hardest British veterans scarcely sufficed to repel, were now, only five days afterwards, unable to sustain the shock of one-fourth of their own numbers. And at this very time, eighty British soldiers, the comrades and equals of those who achieved this wonderful exploit, being surprised while plundering, surrendered to some French peasants who, as Wellington truly observed, "*they would under other circumstances have eat up!*" What gross ignorance of human nature then do those declaimers display, who assert that the employing of brute force is the highest qualification of a general! Clausel thus dispossessed, fell back fighting to a strong ridge beyond the pass of Echallar, having his right covered by the Ivantelly mountain which was strongly occupied. Meanwhile the light division, emerging by Lesaca from the narrow valley of the Bidasoa, ascended the broad heights of Santa Barbara and waited until the operations of the fourth and seventh divisions were far enough advanced to render it advisable to attack the Ivantelly. Lifting its

peaked head out of the Santa Barbara heights, it separated them from the ridges where Clausel was retreating, and as the evening came on, a thick mist capped the crowning rocks, which contained a strong French regiment; the British soldiers, still wearied with their long and terrible march the previous day, had been for two days without sustenance, and were leaning, weak and fainting, on their arms when the advancing fire of Barnes's action about Echallar indicated the necessity of dislodging the enemy from Ivautelly. Andrew Barnard instantly led five companies of his riflemen to the attack, and four companies of the forty-third followed in support. The misty cloud had descended, and the riflemen were soon lost to view, but the sharp clang of their weapons, heard in distinct reply to the more sonorous rolling musketry of the French told what work was going on. For some time the echoes rendered it doubtful how the action went, but the following companies of the forty-third could find no trace of an enemy save the killed and wounded: Barnard had fought his way unaided and without a check to the summit. His dark-clothed, swarthy veterans raised their victorious shout from the highest peak, just as the coming night showed the long ridges of the mountains beyond, sparkling with the last musket-flashes from Clausel's troops then retiring in disorder from Echallar.

This day's fighting cost the British four hundred men, and Wellington narrowly escaped the enemy's hands. He had carried with him towards Echallar half a company of the forty-third as an escort, and placed a serjeant named Blood, with a party to watch in front while he examined his maps. The French being close at hand sent a detachment to cut the party off; and such was the nature of the ground that their troops rushing on at speed, would infallibly have fallen upon Wellington, if Blood, a young intelligent man, seeing the danger, had not with surprising activity, leaping rather than running down the precipitous rocks, given him notice: yet the French arrived in time to send a volley of shot after him as he galloped away.

Soult now made D'Erlon occupy the hills about Ainhos; Clausel those in advance of Sarre, and he sent Reille with two divisions to St. Jean de Luz, behind Villatte's reserve. Foy, who had after his retreat rashly uncovered St. Jean Pied de Port, by descending upon Cambo, was ordered to return and augment his troops with all that he could collect of national guards and detachments.

Wellington had on the 1st directed Graham to move up with pontoons and cross the Bidassoa, but now abandoned this design; the two armies therefore rested quiet in their respective positions, after nine days of continual movement during which they had

fought ten serious actions. Of the allies, including the Spaniards, seven thousand three hundred officers and soldiers had been killed, wounded or taken, and many were dispersed from fatigue or to plunder. On the French side the loss was terrible, and their disorder rendered the official returns inaccurate. Wellington at first called it twelve thousand, but hearing that the French officers admitted more he raised his estimate to fifteen thousand. The engineer, *Belmas*, in his *Journals of Sieges*, compiled from official documents by order of the French government, sets down above thirteen thousand. Soult in his despatches at the time, stated fifteen hundred as the loss at Maya, four hundred at Roncevalles, two hundred on the 27th, and eighteen hundred on the 28th, after which he speaks no more of losses by battle. There remains therefore to be added the killed and wounded at the combats of Linzoain on the 26th, the double battles of Sauroren and Buenza on the 30th, the combats of the 31st, and those of the 1st and 2d of August; finally, four thousand unwounded prisoners. Let this suffice. It is not needful to sound the stream of blood in all its horrid depths.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. The allies' line of defence was weak. Was it therefore injudiciously adopted? Beaten at Vittoria the French were disorganized, and retreated without artillery or baggage on eccentric lines; Foy by Guipuscoa, Clausel by Zaragoza, Rielle by San Estevan, Joseph by Pampeluna. There was no reserve to rally upon, the people fled from the frontier. Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de Port, if not defenceless, was certainly in a very neglected state, and the English general might have undertaken any operation, assumed any position, offensive or defensive, which seemed good to him. Why then did he not establish the Anglo-Portuguese beyond the mountains, leaving the Spaniards to blockade the fortresses behind him? The answer to this question involves the difference between the practice and the theory of war.*

"The soldiers, instead of preparing food and resting themselves after the battle, dispersed in the night to plunder; and were so fatigued that when the rain came on the next day they were incapable of marching, and had more stragglers than the beaten enemy. Eighteen days after the victory twelve thousand five hundred men, chiefly British, were absent, most of them marauding in the mountains."

Such were the reasons assigned by the English general for his slack pursuit after the battle of Vittoria; yet he had commanded that army for six years! Was he then deficient in the first qualifica-

* Wellington's Despatches.

tion of a general, the art of disciplining and inspiring troops ; or was the English military system defective ? It is certain he always exacted the confidence of his soldiers as a leader ; it is not so certain he gained their affections. The barbarity of the English military code excited public horror, the inequality of promotion created public discontent ; yet the general complained he had no adequate power to reward or punish ; and he condemned alike the system and the soldiers it produced. The latter "*were detestable for everything but fighting, and the officers as culpable as the men.*" The vehemence of these censures is inconsistent with his celebrated observation, subsequently made, namely, "that he thought he could go anywhere and do anything with the army that fought on the Pyrenees ; and although it cannot be denied that his complaints were generally too well founded, there were thousands of true and noble soldiers, and zealous worthy officers who served their country honestly and merited no reproaches. It is enough that they have been since neglected, exactly in proportion to their want of that corrupt aristocratic influence which produced the evils complained of.

2. When the misconduct of the troops had thus weakened the effect of victory, the question of following Joseph at once into France assumed a new aspect. Wellington's system of warfare had never varied after the battle of Talavera. Rejecting dangerous enterprise, it rested on profound calculation both as to time and resources for accomplishing the gradual liberation of Spain by the Anglo-Portuguese army. Not that he held it impossible to attain that object suddenly—and his battles in India, the passage of the Douro, the advance to Talavera, prove that by nature he was inclined to daring operations,—but such efforts, however glorious, could not be adopted by a commander who feared even the loss of a brigade lest the government he served should put an end to the war. Neither was it suitable to the state of his relations with the Portuguese and Spaniards ; their ignorance, jealousy, and passionate pride, fierce in proportion to their weakness and improvidence, would have enhanced every danger.

3. No man could have anticipated the extraordinary errors of the French in 1813. Wellington did not expect to cross the Ebro before the end of the campaign, and his battering-train was prepared for the siege of Burgos, not for that of Bayonne. A sudden invasion of France, her military reputation considered, was therefore beyond the pale of his methodized system of warfare, which was founded upon political as well as military considerations ; and of the most complicated nature, seeing that he had at all times to deal with the personal and factious interests and passions, as well as the

great state interests of three nations, two of which abhorred each other. At this moment also the uncertain state of affairs in Germany strongly influenced his views. An armistice which might end in a separate peace excluding England would have brought Napoleon's whole force to the Pyrenees, and Wellington held the military and political proceeding of the coalesced powers cheap. "*I would not move a corporal's guard in reliance upon such a system,*" was the significant phrase he employed to express his contempt.

These considerations justified his caution as to invading France; but there were local military reasons equally cogent. 1. He could not dispense with a secure harbor, because the fortresses still in possession of the French, namely, Santona, Pancorbo, Pampeluna, and St. Sebastian, interrupted his communications with the interior of Spain. 2. He had to guard against the union of Suchet and Clausel on his right flank—hence his efforts to cut off the last-named general—hence also the blockade of Pampeluna in preference to siege, and the launching of Mina and the bands on the side of Zaragoza.

4. After Vittoria the nature of the campaign depended upon Suchet's operations, which were rendered more important by Murray's misconduct. The allied force on the eastern coast was badly organized; it did not advance from Valencia as we have seen until the 16th, and then only partially and by the coast; whereas Suchet had assembled more than twenty thousand excellent troops on the Ebro as early as the 12th of July. He might have saved the castle of Zaragoza with its great stores, and then rallying Paris' division, he could have menaced Wellington's flank with twenty-five thousand men exclusive of Clausel's force, and, if that general joined him, with forty thousand. On the 16th, the day Lord William Bentinck quitted Valencia, Suchet might have marched from Zaragoza on Tudela or Sangüessa; and Soult's preparations, originally made to attack on the 23d, instead of the 25th, would have naturally been hastened. How difficult it would then have been for the allies to maintain themselves beyond the Ebro is evident; much more so to hold a forward position in France. That Wellington feared an operation of this nature is shown by his instructions to Lord William Bentinck and to Mina; and by his keeping Picton and Cole behind the mountains, solely to watch Clausel until he regained France, when Cole was permitted to join Byng and Morillo. It follows that the operations after the battle of Vittoria were well considered, and consonant to the general system; their excellence would have been proved if Suchet had seized the advantages within his reach.

5. A general's capacity is sometimes more taxed to profit from a victory than to gain one. Wellington, master of all Spain, Catalonia excepted, desired to establish himself solidly in the Pyrenees, lest a separate peace in Germany should enable Napoleon to turn his whole force against the allies. In this expectation, with astonishing exertion of body and mind, he had in three days achieved a rigorous examination of the whole mass of the Western Pyrenees, and concluded, if Pampeluna and San Sebastian fell, that a defensive position, strong as that of Portugal, much stronger than could be found behind the Ebro, might be established. But to invest those places and maintain so difficult a covering line was a greater task than to win the battle of Vittoria. However, the early fall of San Sebastian he expected, because the errors of execution in that siege could not be foreseen; and he counted also on the disorganized state of the French army, on Joseph's want of military capacity, and the moral ascendancy which his own troops had acquired. He could not anticipate the expeditious journey, the sudden arrival of Soult, whose rapid re-organization of the French army and vigorous operations, contrasted with Joseph's abandonment of Spain, illustrated the old Greek saying, that a herd of deer led by a lion are more dangerous than a herd of lions led by a deer.

6. Soult was little beholden to fortune at the commencement of his movements. Her first contradiction was the bad weather, which breaking up the roads delayed the concentration of his army at St. Jean Pied de Port for two days; and the effect which heavy rain and hard marches have upon the vigor and confidence of soldiers who are going to attack is well known. If he had commenced the 23d instead of the 25th, the surprise would have been more complete, his army more brisk; and as no conscript battalions would have arrived to delay Reille, that general would have been more ready in his attack; and might possibly have escaped the fog which on the 26th stopped his march along the superior crest of the mountain towards Vellatte. On the other hand the allies would have been spared the unsuccessful assault on San Sebastian, and the Col de Maya might have been better furnished with troops. However Soult's combinations were so well knit, that more than one error in execution, more than one accident of fortune, were necessary to baffle him. Had D'Erlon followed his instructions even on the 26th, Hill would have been shouldered off the valley of Lanz, and there would have been twenty thousand additional French troops in the combats of the 27th and 28th. Such failures however generally attend extensively combined movements, and it is not certain that D'Erlon could have won the Col de Maya if all

Stewart's forces had been posted here. It would perhaps have been more strictly within the rules of art, if D'Erlon had been directed to leave one of his three divisions to menace the Col de Maya while he marched with the other two by St. Etienne de Baygorry up the Alduides. This movement, covered by the national guards who occupied the mountain of La Houssa, could not have been stopped by Campbell's Portuguese brigade; and would have dislodged Hill from the Bastan while it secured a junction with Soult on the crest of the magistral chain.

7. The intrepid constancy of Byng and Ross on their several positions the 25th, the able and clean retreat made by Cole as far as the heights of Linzoain, gave full effect to the French errors; and would probably have baffled Soult at an early period, if Picton had comprehended the importance of his position. Wellington said the concentration of the army would have been effected on the 27th, if that officer and Cole had not agreed in thinking it impossible to make a stand behind Linzoain; and surely the necessity of retreating on that day may be questioned. For if Cole, with ten thousand men, maintained the position in front of Altobiscar, Ibañeta, and Atalosti, Picton might have maintained the more contracted one behind Linzoain and Erro with twenty thousand. And that number he could have assembled, because Campbell reached Eugui long before the evening of the 26th; and Wellington had directed O'Donnel to keep three thousand five hundred of the blockading troops in readiness to act in advance, of which Picton could not have been ignorant. It was impossible to turn him by the valley of Urroz, that line being too rugged for the march of an army, and not leading directly upon Pampeluna. The only roads into the Val de Zubiri were by Erro and Linzoain, lying close together, and both leading upon the village of Zubiri over the ridges which Picton occupied. The strength of the position was evident from Soult's declining an attack on the evening of the 26th, when Cole only was before him; and to abandon such ground so hastily, when the concentration of the army depended upon keeping it, appears therefore an error; aggravated by the neglect of sending timely information to Wellington, who did not know of the retreat until the morning of the 27th, and then only from General Long.* It might be that Picton's messenger failed, but many should have been sent, when a retrograde movement involving the fate of Pampeluna was contemplated.

It has been said Cole was the adviser of this retreat, which, if completed, would have ruined Wellington's campaign. This is incorrect; Picton was not a man to be guided by others. Cole

* Note by the Duke of Wellington, MSS.

indeed gave him a report, drawn up by Colonel Bell, an able topographer, which stated that no position suitable for a very inferior force existed between Zubiri and Pampeluna; and this was true in the sense of the report, which had reference only to a division, not to an army.* The battle of Sauroren was indeed fought by inferior numbers; but the whole position, including the ridges occupied by Picton and the Spaniards, was only maintained by equal numbers; and if Soult had attacked seriously early on the 27th, the position would have been carried. Bell's report influenced Picton, and it was only when his troops had reached Huarte and Villalba that he suddenly resolved on battle; it was a military resolution, vigorous and prompt—and not the less worthy of praise, that he so readily adopted Cole's saving proposition, to regain the more forward heights above Zabaldica.

8. Soult appeared reluctant to attack on the 26th and 27th, yet success depended upon his forestalling the allies at their point of concentration; and it is somewhat inexplicable, that, on the 28th, having possession of the ridge beyond the Lanz river and plenty of cavalry, he should have known so little of the sixth division's movements. The general conception of his second scheme has been blamed by some of his own countrymen, apparently from ignorance of the facts, and because it failed. Crowned with success, it would have been cited as a fine illustration of the art of war. To have retired at once by the two valleys of Zubiri and Lanz, after being reinforced with twenty thousand men, would have given great importance to his repulse on the 28th; his reputation as a general, capable of restoring the French affairs, would have vanished; and mischief must have accrued, even though he should have effected his retreat safely, which, regard being had to the narrowness of the valleys, the position of Hill and Wellington's boldness, was not certain. To abandon the Val de Zubiri and secure that of Lanz; to obtain another and shorter line of retreat by the Doña Maria pass; to crush Hill with superior numbers, gain the Irurzun road, and succor San Sebastian; or, failing of that, to secure the union of the whole army, and give to his retreat the appearance of an able offensive movement—to combine all these chances by one operation immediately after a severe check, was Soult's plan: it was not impracticable, and was surely the conception of a great commander.

To succeed, however, it was essential either to beat Hill off-hand, and thus draw Wellington to that side by the way of Marcalain, or so secure the French left, that no efforts against it should prevail to the detriment of the offensive movement on the right: neither

* Note by General Cole, MSS.

was effected. An overwhelming force drove Hill indeed from the road of Irurzun, but did not crush him, because he fought so strongly, and retired with such good order. Meanwhile the French left was completely beaten, and the advantage gained on the right was more than nullified. Soult trusted to the remarkable defensive strength of the ground occupied by his left, and had reason to do so, for it was nearly impregnable, but Wellington turned it on both flanks at the same time. Yet neither Picton's advance into the Val de Zubiri, on Foy's left, nor Cole's front attack on that general, nor Byng's assault upon the village of Sauroren, would have seriously damaged the French, without the sudden and complete success of Inglis beyond the Lanz. The other attacks would indeed have forced the French to retire somewhat hastily up the valley of the Lanz, yet they could have held together in mass secure of their junction with Soult. But when the ridges running between them and the right wing of the French army were carried by Inglis, and the whole of the seventh division was thrown upon their flank and rear, the front attack became decisive. The key of the defence was on the ridge beyond the Lanz, and instead of two regiments, Clausel should have placed two divisions there.

9. Wellington's quick perception and vigorous stroke on the 30th were to be expected from such a consummate commander, yet he was not master of all the bearings of the French operations; he knew neither the extent of Hill's danger nor Soult's difficulties; otherwise it was probable he would have put stronger columns in motion, and at an earlier hour, towards the pass of Doña Maria on the morning of the 31st. Hill did not commence his march that day until eight o'clock, and it has been shown, that with the help of the seventh division he was too weak to hurt the heavy retreating mass. The faults and accidents which baffled Wellington's after operations have been sufficiently touched upon in the narrative; but he halted in the midst of his victorious career when Soult's army was broken and flying, when Suchet had retired into Catalonia and all things seemed favorable for the invasion of France. His motives for this were strong. He knew the armistice in Germany had been renewed with a view to peace, and he had therefore reason to expect Soult would be reinforced. A forward position in France would have lent his right to the enemy, who, pivoted upon St. Jean Pied de Port, could operate against his flank. His arrangements for intercourse with his dépôts and hospitals would have been more difficult and complicated; and as the enemy possessed all the French and Spanish fortresses commanding the great roads, his need to gain one at least before the fine season closed was absolute, if he would not resign his commu-

nications with the interior of Spain. Long marches and frequent combats had fatigued his troops, destroyed their shoes, and used up their musket ammunition; the loss of men had been great, especially of British in the second division, where their proportion to foreign troops was become too small; the difficulty of re-equipping the troops would have increased on entering an enemy's state, because the English system did not make war support war, and his communications would have been lengthened. Finally France was to be invaded—France in which every person was a soldier, where the whole population was armed and organized under men, not, as in other countries inexperienced in war, but who had all served more or less. Beyond the Adour he could not advance, and if a separate peace was made by the northern powers, if any misfortune befel the allies in Catalonia, so as to leave Suchet at liberty to operate towards Pampeluna—or if Soult, profiting from the possession of San Juan Pied de Port, should turn the right flank of the new position, a retreat into Spain would become necessary; and be dangerous from the hostility and warlike disposition of the French people directed in a military manner.

10. These reasons joined to the fact, that a forward position, although offering better communications from right to left, would have given the enemy greater facilities for operating against an army which, until the fortresses fell, must hold a defensive and somewhat extended line, were conclusive as to the rashness of an invasion; but they do not appear so conclusive as to the necessity of stopping short after the action of the 2d of August. The questions were distinct. The one was a great measure involving vast political and military conditions, the other was simply whether he should profit from the enemy's distress; and in this view the objections above mentioned, save the want of shoes, the scarcity of ammunition and the fatigue of the troops, are inapplicable. But in the two last particulars the allies were not so badly off as the enemy, and in the first not so deficient as to cripple the army; wherefore, if the advantage to be gained was worth the effort, it was an error to halt.

The solution of the problem is to be found in the comparative condition of the armies. Soult had recovered his reserve, his cavalry, and artillery; Wellington was reinforced by Graham's corps, which was more numerous and powerful than Villatte's reserve. The new chances then were in favor of the allies, and the action on the 2d of August proved that their opponents could not stand before them; one more victory would have gone nigh to destroy the French force altogether;* for such was the disorder, that Maucune

* Soult's Report, MSS.

had on the 2d only one thousand men left out of more than five thousand, and on the 6th he had still a thousand stragglers, besides killed and wounded ; Conroux and La Martiniere were scarcely in better plight, and the losses of the other divisions were great. Foy's eight thousand men were cut off from the main body ; and the Nivelle, the sources of which were in the allies' power, was behind the French. With their left pressed from the pass of Maya, their front assailed by the main body, they could hardly have kept together, since more than twenty-one thousand men, exclusive of Foy's troops, were then absent from their colors. As late as the 12th of August, Soult told the minister of war, that he was indeed preparing to assail his enemy again but had not the means of resisting a counter-attack,* although he held a different language to his army and to the people of the country.

Had Cæsar halted because his soldiers were fatigued, Pharsalia would have been but a common battle.

* Appendix 26.

BOOK XXII.

CHAPTER I

New positions of the armies—Lord Melville's mismanagement of the naval co-operation—Siege of St. Sebastian—Progress of the second attack.

AFTER the combats of Echallar and Ivantelly, Soult adopted a permanent position. His left, under D'Erlon, was on the hills of Ainhoa with an advanced guard overhanging Urdax and Zagaramurdi; his centre, under Clausel, was in advance of Sarre, guarding the issues from Vera and Echallar, and holding the greater Rhune mountain; * the right, under Reille, lined the lower Bidassoa to the sea—his third division being under Foy at St. Jean Pied de Port. Villatte's reserve was behind the Nivelles, near Serres; one cavalry division was quartered for the sake of forage between the Nive and Nivelles rivers, the other as far back as Dax.

Wellington occupied his old positions from the pass of Roncesvalles to the mouth of the Bidassoa, but the disposition of his troops was different. Hill, reinforced by Morillo, held the Roncesvalles and Alduides, having field-works at the former. The third and sixth divisions guarded the Bastan and Col de Maya; the seventh division, reinforced with O'Donnel's Spaniards, occupied Echallar and Zagaramurdi. The light division held the Santa Barbara heights, with piquets in the town of Vera; the left rested on the Bidassoa, the right on the Ivantelly rock, round which a bridge communication with Echallar was made by the soldiers. Longa was beyond the Bidassoa on the left of the light division; the fourth division was behind him, near Lesaca. The fourth Spanish army under Freyre prolonged the line from Longa to the sea; it crossed the royal causeway, occupied Irun and Fontarabia and guarded the Jaizquibel mountain. The first division was behind Freyre; the fifth division resumed the siege of San Sebastian, and the blockade of Pampeluna was given to Carlos d'España.

These dispositions, made with increased means, were more powerful for defence than the former. A strong corps under one general was entrenched at Roncesvalles; and in the Bastan, two British divisions, admonished by Stewart's error, were more than

* Soult, MSS. Plan 10, page 846.

sufficient to defend the Col de Maya. The Echallar mountains were, with the aid of O'Donnel's Spaniards, equally secure; and the reserves posted near Lesaca supported the left, now the most important part of the line. The castles of Zaragoza and Daroca had fallen, and the Empecinado, directed upon Alcanitz, maintained the communication between the Catalan army and Mina; the latter and Duran were near Jaca, from whence they could retreat by Sangüessa on Pampeluna. General Paris, being thus menaced, retired, after a skirmish, into France, leaving eight hundred men in Jaca. Lord William Bentinck was then before Tarragona. The allies were thus in direct military communication from the Mediterranean to the Bay of Biscay, while the French could only communicate circuitously through France.

Soult did not fear a front attack, but the augmentation of force at Roncevalles and Maya was disquieting, as menacing to turn him by the course of the Nive. Paris was therefore placed at Oleron to support Foy; the fortresses of St. Jean Pied de Port and Navareins were armed as a pivot of operations on that side; Bayonne served a like purpose on the other flank; and a fortified line from the mouth of the Bidassoa, up to the rocks of Mondarain and the Nive, was commenced. But Wellington, having little to fear from a renewed attack on the side of Pampeluna, was wholly bent on the siege of St. Sebastian. Nor was that a trifling operation, for he was thwarted in a manner to prove that the English ministers were no better than the Spanish and Portuguese authorities. Lord Melville was at the head of the Admiralty; under him the navy of England first met with disaster in battle; and his negligence in giving maritime aid to the operations in Spain went nigh to fasten a like misfortune on the army. This, combined with the cabinet scheme of sending Wellington to Germany, shows that time had taught the English ministers nothing as to the Peninsula war; or that, elated with the array of sovereigns against Napoleon, they were now careless of a cause so mixed up with democracy. That Lord Melville, a man of ordinary capacity, should have been suffered to retard and endanger the final success of a general, whose sure judgment and extraordinary merit were authenticated by exploits unparalleled in English warfare, would be incredible if Wellington's correspondence, and that of Mr. Stuart, did not establish the following facts:—

1. Desertion from the enemy was stopped, chiefly because the Admiralty refused to let the ships of war carry deserters or prisoners to England; they were thus heaped up at Lisbon, and maltreated by the Portuguese government, which checked all desire in the French troops to come over.

2. When the disputes with America commenced, Mr. Stuart's efforts to obtain flour for the army were vexatiously thwarted by the Admiralty; which permitted, if it did not encourage, the English ships of war to capture American vessels trading under the secret licenses.

3. The refusal of the Admiralty to establish certain cruisers along the coast caused the loss of many store ships and merchantmen, to the great detriment of the army before it quitted Portugal. Fifteen were taken off Oporto, and one close to the bar of Lisbon, in May.* And afterwards, the Mediterranean packet, bearing despatches from Lord William Bentinck, was captured, which led to lamentable consequences; for the papers were not in cipher, and contained detailed accounts of plots against the French in Italy, with the names of the principal persons engaged.

4. A like neglect of the coast of Spain caused ships containing money, shoes, and other indispensable stores, to remain in port, or risk being taken on the passage by cruisers issuing from Santona, Bayonne, and Bordeaux.† And while the communications of the allies were thus intercepted, the French coasting vessels supplied their army and fortresses without difficulty.

5. After the battle of Vittoria, Wellington was forced to use French ammunition, though too small for the English muskets, because the ordnance store ships which he had ordered from Lisbon to Santander could not sail for want of convoy. When the troops were in the Pyrenees, a reinforcement of five thousand men was kept at Gibraltar and Lisbon, waiting for ships of war; and the transports employed to convey them were thus withdrawn from the service of carrying home wounded men, at a time when the Spanish authorities at Bilbao refused, even for payment, to concede public buildings for hospitals.

6. When snow was falling on the Pyrenees, the soldiers were without proper clothing, because the ships containing their great-coats, though ready to sail in August, were detained at Oporto until November, waiting for convoy. When the victories of July were to be turned to profit ere the fitting season for the siege of San Sebastian should pass away, the attack of that fortress was retarded sixteen days, because a battering-train and ammunition, demanded several months before by Wellington, had not yet arrived from England.

7. During the siege, the sea communication with Bayonne was free. "Anything in the shape of a naval force," said Wellington, "would drive away sir George Collier's squadron." The garrison

* Appendix 28.

† Wellington, MSS.

received reinforcements, artillery, ammunition, and all necessary stores for its defence, sending away the sick and wounded men in empty vessels. The Spanish general blockading Santona complained at the same time that the exertions of his troops were useless, because the French succored the place by sea when they pleased; and after the battle of Vittoria not less than five vessels laden with stores and provisions, and one transport having British soldiers and clothing on board, were taken by cruisers issuing out of that port. The great advantage of attacking San Sebastian by water as well as by land was foregone for want of naval means; and from the same cause British soldiers were withdrawn from their own service to unload store-ships; the gun-boats employed in the blockade were Spanish vessels manned by Spanish soldiers withdrawn from the army, and the store-boats were navigated by Spanish women!

8. The coasting trade between Bordeaux and Bayonne being quite free, the French, whose military means of transport had been so crippled by their losses at Vittoria that they could scarcely have collected magazines with land-carriage only, received their supplies by water, and were thus saved trouble and expense, and the unpopularity attending forced requisitions.

Between April and August, more than twenty applications and remonstrances were addressed by Wellington to the government upon these points, without producing the slightest attention. Mr. Croker, under-secretary of the Admiralty, of whose conduct he particularly complained, was permitted to write an offensive official letter to him, while his demands and the dangers to be apprehended from neglecting them were disregarded; and, to use his own words, "*since Great Britain had been a naval power, a British army had never before been left in such a situation at a most important moment.*"

Nor is it easy to determine whether negligence and incapacity, or a grovelling insensibility to national honor prevailed most in the cabinet, when we find this renowned general complaining, that the government, ignorant even to ridicule of military operations, seemed to know nothing of the nature of the element with which England was surrounded; and Lord Melville, insensible to the glorious toils of the Peninsula, telling him that his army was the last thing to be attended to!

RENEWED SIEGE OF ST. SEBASTIAN.

(See Plan, page 331.)

Villatte's demonstration against Longa on the 28th of July had caused the ships laden with the battering-train to put to sea; but,

on the 5th of August, the guns were re-landed, and the works against the fortress resumed. On the 8th, a notion having spread that the enemy was mining under the cask redoubt, the engineers seized the occasion to exercise their inexperienced miners by sinking a shaft and driving a gallery; the men soon acquired expertness, but the water rose in the shaft at twelve feet, and the work was discontinued when the gallery had attained eighty feet. The old trenches were repaired, the heights of San Bartolomeo were strengthened, and the convent of Antigua, built on a rock to the left of those heights, was fortified and armed with two guns to scour the open beach and sweep the bay. The siege, however, languished for want of ammunition; and during this forced inactivity the garrison received supplies and reinforcements by sea, repaired their damaged works, made new defences, filled their magazines, and put sixty-seven pieces of artillery in a condition to play. Eight hundred and fifty men had been killed and wounded since the commencement of the attack in July; but fresh men came by sea, and more than two thousand six hundred good soldiers were still present under arms. And to evince their confidence, they celebrated the emperor's birth-day by crowning the castle with a splendid illumination, encircling it with a fiery legend to his honor in characters so large as to be distinctly read by the besiegers.

On the 19th, after a delay of sixteen days, the battering train arrived from England, and in the night of the 22d, fifteen heavy pieces were placed in battery, eight at the right attack, seven at the left. A second battering train came on the 23d, augmenting the number of pieces of various kinds to a hundred and seventeen, including a large Spanish mortar; but, with characteristic negligence, this enormous armament had been sent out from England with no more shot and shells than would suffice for one day's consumption!

In the night of the 23d, the batteries on the Chofres were reinforced with four long pieces, and four sixty-eight pound carronades; the left attack had six additional guns. Ninety sappers and miners had come with the train from England, the seamen under Lieutenant O'Reilly were again attached to the batteries, and part of the field-artillerymen were brought to the siege. The Chofre batteries were also enlarged to contain forty-eight pieces, and two batteries for thirteen pieces were begun on the heights of Bartolomeo. These last were to breach, at seven hundred yards distance, the faces of the left demi-bastion of the horn work, that of St. John on the main front, and the end of the high curtain; for these works, rising in gradation one above another, were in the same line of shot. The approaches on the isthmus were pushed for-

ward by the sap, but the old trenches were still imperfect; and, before daylight on the 25th, the French, coming from the horn work, swept the left of the parallel, injured the sap, and made some prisoners.

In the night of the 25th, the batteries were all armed on both sides of the Urumea, and on the 26th, fifty-seven pieces, opening with a general salvo, continued to play with astounding noise and rapidity until evening. The firing from the Chofre hills destroyed the revêtement of the demi-bastion of St. John, and nearly ruined the towers at the old breach, together with the wall connecting them; but at the isthmus, the batteries, although they injured the horn work, made little impression on the main front, from which they were too far distant.

Wellington, present at this attack, and discontented with the operation, then ordered a battery for six guns to be constructed amongst some ruined houses on the right of the parallel, three hundred yards from the main front. Two shafts were also sunk, with a view to drive galleries for its protection against the enemy's mines; but the sandy soil made this work slow.

Early on the 27th, the boats of the squadron, under Lieutenant Arbuthnot, of the *Surveillante*, carrying a hundred soldiers of the ninth regiment, under Captain Cameron, attacked the Island of Santa Clara. The troops landed, with some difficulty, under a heavy fire, but a lodgment was made, with the loss of only twenty-eight men and officers, of whom eighteen were seamen. In the night, the French sallied against the new battery on the isthmus; but, as Colonel Cameron, of the ninth regiment, met them on the very edge of the trenches with the bayonet, the attempt failed, yet it delayed the arming of the battery. At daybreak, the renewed fire of the besiegers was extremely heavy, and the shrapnel shells were supposed to be very destructive; nevertheless, the practice with that missile was very uncertain; the bullets frequently flew amongst the guards in the parallel, and one struck the field officer. In the course of the day another sally was commenced, but the enemy, being fired upon, did not persist. The trenches were now furnished with banquettes and parapets as fast as the quantity of gabions and fascines would permit; yet the work was slow; because the Spanish authorities of Guipuscoa, like those in every other part of Spain, neglected to provide carts to convey the materials from the woods, and this hard labor was performed by Portuguese soldiers; these things, however, should have been prepared during the blockade.

Wellington visited the works again, and the advanced battery was armed with four guns, and opened next morning; but an ac-

cident prevented the arrival of one gun, the enemy dismounted another, and only two, instead of six guns, as Wellington had designed, smote the demi-bastion of St. John and the end of the high curtain. However, the general firing was severe upon the castle and the town works, and the defences were damaged; the French guns were nearly silenced, and additional mortars were mounted at the Chofres, making in all sixty-three pieces, of which twenty-nine threw shells, and the superiority of the besiegers was established. Now, however, the Urumea was discovered to be fordable by Captain Alexander Macdonald of the artillery, who had waded across in the night, and passed close under the works to the breach. A few minutes would suffice to bring the enemy into the Chofre batteries, and, therefore, to save the guns from being spiked, their vents were covered at night with iron plates fastened by chains.

This day the materials and ordinance for a battery of six pieces, to take the defences of the Monte Orgullo in reverse, were sent to the island of Santa Clara; and from the Chofres, some guns played on the retaining wall of the horn-work; but with low charges, to shake down any mines constructed there, without destroying the wall itself, which offered cover for the troops in an assault. The trenches at the isthmus were now wide and good, the sap was pushed close to the horn-work; and the sea-wall, supporting the high road into the town, which had in the first assault lengthened the run and cramped the columns, was broken through to give access to the strand, and shorten the approach to the breaches. The crisis was now at hand, and in the night of the 29th, a false attack was ordered, to make the enemy spring his mines. This desperate service was executed by Lieutenant Macadam, of the ninth regiment; the order was sudden, and no volunteers were demanded, no rewards offered, no means of excitement resorted to; yet such is the inherent bravery of British soldiers, that seventeen men of the royals, the nearest at hand, immediately leaped forth ready and willing to encounter what seemed certain death. With a rapid pace, all the breaching batteries playing hotly at the time, they reached the foot of the breach unperceived, and then mounted in extended order shouting and firing; the French were too steady to be imposed upon, their musketry laid the party low, and their commander returned nearly alone to the trenches.

On the 30th, the sea flank being opened from the half bastion of St. John to the most distant of the old breaches, five hundred feet, the Chofre batteries were turned against the castle and the other defences of the Monte Orgullo. The battery on the isthmus, in conjunction with the fire from the Chofres, also demolished the face of the St. John's bastion, and the end of the high curtain above it;

thus the whole of that quarter was in ruins. The San Bartolomeo batteries then broke the demi-bastion of the horn-work, and Wellington, after examining the defences, decided to make a lodgment, and ordered an assault for the next day at eleven o'clock, when the ebb of tide would leave space between the horn-work and the water. The galleries in front of the advanced battery on the isthmus were now pushed to the sea wall; and three mines were formed with the double view of opening a way for the troops to reach the strand, and rendering useless any subterranean works the enemy might have made in that part. At two o'clock in the morning of the 31st, they were sprung and opened three wide passages; these were immediately connected, and a traverse of gabions, six feet high, was run across the mouth of the main trench on the left, to screen the opening from the grape-shot of the castle. Everything was now ready for the assault; but before describing that terrible event, it will be fitting to show the exact state of the besieged in defence.

Graham had been before the place for fifty-two days, during thirty of which the attack was suspended. All this time the garrison had labored incessantly; and though the besiegers' fire appeared to have ruined the defences of the enormous breach in the sea flank, it was not so. A perpendicular fall behind of more than twenty feet barred progress; and beyond, amongst the ruins of the burned houses, was a strong counter-wall, fifteen feet high, loopholed for musketry and parallel with the breaches, which were also cut off from the sound part of the rampart by traverses at the extremities. The only really practicable road into the town was by the narrow end of the high curtain above the half bastion of St. John. About the middle of the great breach stood the tower of Los Hornos, still capable of some defence, and beneath it a mine charged with twelve hundred weight of powder. The streets were all trenched and furnished with traverses to dispute the passage and cover a retreat to the Monte Orgullo; to reach the main breach, it was necessary also to form a lodgment in the horn-work, or pass, as in the former assault, under a flanking fire of musketry for two hundred yards; and the first step was close under the sea wall at the salient angle of the covered way, where two mines, charged with eight hundred pounds of powder, were prepared.

Besides these retrenchments and mines, the French had still some artillery in reserve. One sixteen-pounder mounted at St. Elmo flanked the left of the breaches on the river face; a twelve and an eight pounder, preserved in the casemates of the Cavalier, were ready to flank the land face of the half-bastion of St. John;*

* Belmas.

many guns from the Monte Orgullo, especially those of the *Mirador*, could play upon the columns, and there was a four-pounder hidden on the horn-work to be brought into action when the assault commenced. Neither the resolution of the governor nor the courage of the garrison was abated, but the overwhelming fire of the last few days had reduced the number of fighting men; and Rey who had only two hundred and fifty men in reserve, demanded of Soult whether his brave garrison should be exposed to another assault. "The army would endeavor to succor him" was the reply, and he abided his fate.

Napoleon's ordinance, which forbade the surrender of a fortress without having stood at least one assault, has been strongly censured by English writers upon slender grounds. The obstinate defences made by French governors in the Peninsula were the results; and to condemn an enemy's system from which we have ourselves suffered will scarcely bring it into disrepute. The argument runs that the besiegers working by the rules of art must make way into the place and to risk an assault for the sake military glory or to augment the loss of the enemy, is to sacrifice brave men uselessly; capitulation always followed a certain advance of the besiegers in Louis the Fourteenth's time; and to suppose Napoleon's upstart generals possessed superior courage and sense of military honor to the high-minded nobility of that age, was quite inadmissible. It has been rather whimsically added, also, that obedience to the emperor's orders might suit a predestinarian Turk, but could not be tolerated by a reflecting Christian. From this it would seem, that certain nice distinctions as to extent and manner reconcile human slaughter with Christianity; and the true standard of military honor was fixed by the intriguing, depraved, and insolent Louis the Fourteenth. It may, however, be supposed, that, as Napoleon's generals far surpassed the cringing courtier commanders of Louis in military daring, they possessed greater military virtue. Moreover, Marshal Villars held that a governor should never surrender, and when his works were ruined, should break through the besiegers. Lord Clive also recommended that an ordinance similar to Napoleon's should be applied to British fortresses in India. Finally, Napoleon's ordinance was merely a revival of one issued by Louis himself!

But the whole argument rests on false grounds. To inflict loss on an enemy is the essence of war; and as the bravest men will always be foremost in an assault, the loss thus occasioned may be of the utmost importance. To resist when nothing can be gained or saved is an act of barbarous courage which reason spurns at; but Napoleon only demanded a resistance which should make it

dangerous for the besiegers to hasten a siege beyond the rules of art,—he would not have a weak governor yield to a simulation of force,—he desired that military honor should rest upon the courage and resources of men rather than upon the strength of walls: in fine, he made a practicable application of the proverb that necessity is the mother of invention. Granted that a siege conducted with sufficient means must reduce the fortress attacked; still a governor may display his resources of mind. Vauban admits of one assault and several retrenchments after a lodgment is made on the body of the place. Napoleon only insisted that every effort which courage and genius could dictate should be exhausted before a surrender, and those efforts can never be defined or bounded before-hand. Tarifa is a happy example.

To be consistent, any attack which deviates from the rules of art must also be denounced as barbarous; yet, how seldom has a general all the necessary means at his disposal. In Spain, not one siege could be conducted by the British army according to the rules. And there is a manifest weakness in praising the Spanish defence of Zaragoza, and condemning Napoleon, because he demanded from regular troops a devotion similar to that displayed by peasants and artisans. What governor was ever in a more desperate situation than Bizanet was at Bergen-op-Zoom? General Graham, with a hardihood and daring which would alone place him amongst the foremost men of enterprise which Europe can boast of, threw more than two thousand men upon the ramparts of that almost impregnable fortress. The young soldiers of the garrison, surprised in the night, were dispersed, were flying, the British had possession of the walls for several hours! yet some cool and brave officers rallied their men, charged up the narrow ramps, and drove the assailants over the parapets into the ditch; they who could not at first defend their works were then able to retake them; and so completely successful and illustrative of the principle was this counter-attack, that the number of prisoners equalled that of the garrison. There are no rules to limit energy and genius, and no man knew better than Napoleon how to call those qualities forth: he possessed them himself in the utmost perfection, and created them in others.

CHAPTER II.

Storming of St. Sebastian—Lord Wellington calls for volunteers from the first, fourth and light divisions—The place is assaulted and taken—The town burned—The castle is bombarded, and surrenders—Observations.

STORMING OF SAN SEBASTIAN.

TO assault the breaches without having destroyed the enemy's defences or established a lodgment on the horn-work was, notwithstanding the increased fire and greater facilities of the besiegers, obviously a repetition of error. And the same generals who had before made their disapproval of such operations public, now more freely dealt out censures, not ill-founded, but very indiscreet, since there is much danger when doubts come down from the commanders to the soldiers. Wellington thought the fifth division had been thus discouraged. He was incensed and demanded fifty volunteers from each of the fifteen regiments composing the first, fourth, and light divisions, *men who could show other troops how to mount a breach*. Such was the phrase employed, and seven hundred and fifty gallant soldiers instantly marched to San Sebastian in answer to the appeal. Colonel Cooke and Major Robertson led the guards and Germans of the first division; Major Rose commanded the men of the fourth division; Colonel Hunt, a daring officer who had already won his promotion at former assaults, was at the head of the fierce rugged veterans of the light division; yet there were good officers and brave soldiers in the fifth division.

It being at first supposed that Wellington designed only a simple lodgment on the great breach, the volunteers and one brigade of the fifth division only were ordered to be ready; but in a council held at night, Major Smith maintained that the orders were misunderstood, as no lodgment could be formed, unless the high curtain was gained. General Oswald being called to the council, was of the same opinion; whereupon the remainder of the fifth division was brought to the trenches; and General Bradford having offered the services of his Portuguese brigade, was told he might ford the Urumea and assail the farthest breach if he judged it advisable. Leith had now resumed command of the fifth division, and directed the attack from the isthmus; but he was extremely offended with the volunteers, and would not suffer them to lead the assault; some

he spread along the trenches to keep down the fire of the horn-work, the remainder were held in reserve with Hay's British and Sprye's Portuguese brigades of the fifth division; to Robinson's brigade the assault was confided. It was formed in two columns, one to attack the old breach between the towers, the other to storm the bastion of St. John and the end of the high curtain. The small breach on the extreme right was left for Bradford's Portuguese, who were on the Chofre hills; some large boats filled with troops were directed to make a demonstration against the sea-line of the Monte Orgullo, and Graham overlooked the whole operations from the right bank of the river.

Heavily the morning of the 31st broke, a thick fog hid every object, and the besiegers' batteries could not open until eight o'clock; from that hour, however, a constant shower of missiles was poured upon the besieged until eleven, when Robinson's brigade quitted the trenches, and, passing through the openings in the sea-wall, was launched against the breaches. While the head of this column was still gathering on the strand, thirty yards from the salient angle of the horn-work, twelve men, under a sergeant, whose heroic death has not sufficed to preserve his name, running violently forward, leaped upon the covered way with intent to cut the sausage of the enemy's mines. The French, startled by this sudden assault, fired the train prematurely; but, though the sergeant and his followers were all destroyed, and the high sea-wall thrown with a dreadful crash upon the head of the advancing column, not more than forty men were crushed by the ruins, and the rush of the troops was scarcely checked. The forlorn hope had before passed beyond the play of the mine, and now speeded along the strand amidst a shower of grape and shells, the leader, Lieutenant Macguire, of the fourth regiment, conspicuous from his long white plume, his fine figure, and his swiftness, bounding far ahead of his men in all the pride of youthful strength and courage; but at the foot of the great breach he fell dead, and the stormers went sweeping like a dark surge over his body; many died, however, with him, and the trickling of wounded men to the rear was incessant.*

This time there was a broad strand left by the retreating tide, and the sun had dried the rocks; yet they still disturbed the order and closeness of the formation, and the main breach was two hundred yards distant. The French, seeing the first mass pass the horn-work, regardless of its broken bastion, crowded to the river face, and poured their musketry into the second column, as it rushed along a few yards below them; but the English returned

* Cooke's Memoirs.

this fire without slackening their speed. Then the batteries of Monte Orgullo and the St. Elmo sent down showers of shot and shells, the two pieces on the Cavalier swept the face of the breach in St. John, the four-pounder in the horn-work was suddenly mounted on the broken bastion, and poured grape shot into the rear. Thus scourged with fire from all sides, the stormers, their array broken alike by the shot and by the rocks they passed over, reached their destinations. The first column soon gained the top of the great breach, but the unexpected gulf below could only be passed at a few places where meagre parcels of the burned houses were still attached to the rampart, and the deadly French muskets, clattering from the loop-holed wall beyond, strewed the crest of the ruins with dead. In vain the following multitude, covering the ascent, sought entrance at every part; to advance was impossible, and, slowly sinking downwards, the mass remained stubborn and immovable on the lower part of the breach. There they were covered from the musketry in front; but from isolated points, especially from Los Hornos, under which the great mine was placed, the French still smote them with small arms, and from Monte Orgullo came shells and grape without intermission.

At the half bastion of St. John the access to the top of the high curtain being quite practicable, the efforts to force a way were more persevering and constant, and the slaughter was in proportion; for the traverse on the flank was defended by French grenadiers who would not yield; the two pieces on the Cavalier itself swept the front of the opening, and the four-pounder and musketry from the horn-work swept the river face. Some sappers and a working party attached to the assaulting columns endeavored to form a lodgment; but no artificial materials had been provided, and most of the laborers were killed before they could raise the loose rocky fragments into a cover. During this time the British counter-fire of artillery killed many; and the reserve brigades of the fifth division were pushed on by degrees to feed the attack, until the left wing of the ninth regiment only remained in the trenches. The volunteers, also, who had been with difficulty restrained in the trenches, "calling out to know why they had been brought there if they were not to lead the assault," these men, whose presence had given such offence to Leith that he would have kept them altogether from the assault, being now let loose, went like a whirlwind to the breaches, and the crowded masses swarmed up the face of the ruins; but on reaching the crest line, they came down again like a falling wall: crowd after crowd were seen to mount, to totter, to sink; the French fire was unabated, the smoke floated away, and the crest of the breach bore no living man!

Graham, standing on the nearest of the Chofre batteries, beheld this frightful destruction with a stern resolution to win at any cost; and he was a man to have put himself at the head of the last company, and die sword in hand upon the breach, rather than sustain a second defeat; yet neither his confidence nor his resources were yet exhausted. He directed an attempt to be made on the horn-work, and turned all the Chofre batteries, and one on the isthmus, that is to say, the concentrated fire of fifty heavy pieces upon the high curtain. The shot ranged over the heads of the troops, now gathered at the foot of the breach; and the stream of missiles thus poured along the upper surface broke down the traverses, and in its fearful course, shattering all things, strewed the rampart with the mangled limbs of the defenders.* When this flight of bullets first swept over the heads of the soldiers, a cry arose from some inexperienced people, "to retire, because the batteries were firing on the stormers;" but the veterans of the light division under Hunt were not men to be so disturbed; and in the very heat and fury of the cannonade, they effected a solid lodgment in some ruins of houses actually within the rampart on the right of the great breach.

For half an hour this horrid tempest smote upon the works and the houses behind; and when it ceased, the small clatter of the French muskets showed that the fight was renewed. At this time, also, the thirteenth Portuguese regiment, led by Major Snodgrass, and followed by a detachment of the twenty-fourth, under Colonel Macbean, entered the river from the Chofres. The ford was deep, the water rose above the waist, and when the soldiers reached the middle of the stream, which was two hundred yards wide, a heavy gun struck the head of the column with a shower of grape; the havoc was fearful, yet the survivors closed and moved on. A second discharge from the same piece tore the ranks from front to rear; still the regiment moved on; and amidst a confused fire of musketry from the ramparts and of artillery from St. Elmo, from the castle, and from the Mirador, landed on the left bank, and rushed against the third breach. Macbean's men, following with equal bravery, reinforced the great breach eighty yards to the left of the other, although the line of ruins seemed to extend the whole way.

Then the fighting became fierce and obstinate again at all the breaches; but the French musketry still rolled with deadly effect, the heaps of slain increased, and once more the great mass of stormers sunk to the foot of the ruins unable to win—the living sheltered themselves as they could, and the dead and wounded lay

* Notes by Colonel Hunt, MSS.

so thickly, that hardly could it be judged whether the hurt or unhurt were the most numerous.

It was now evident the assault must fail, unless some accident intervened; for the tide was rising, the reserves all engaged, and no greater effort could be expected from men whose courage had been already pushed to the verge of madness. In this crisis fortune interfered. A number of powder barrels, live shells, and combustible materials, which the French had accumulated behind the traverses for their defence, caught fire. Soon a bright consuming flame wrapped the whole of the high curtain, a succession of loud explosions were heard, hundreds of the French grenadiers were destroyed, the rest were thrown into confusion; and while the ramparts were still enveloped with suffocating eddies of smoke, the British soldiers broke in at the first traverse. The defenders, bewildered by this terrible disaster, yielded for a moment, yet soon rallied, and a close desperate struggle took place along the summit of the high curtain; but the fury of the stormers, whose numbers increased every moment, could not be stemmed. The French colors on the Cavalier were torn away by Lieutenant Gethin, of the eleventh regiment: the horn-work, the land front below the curtain, the loop-holed wall behind the great breach, were all abandoned; the light division soldiers, who had already established themselves in the ruins on the French left, penetrated to the streets; and the Portuguese, at the small breach, mixed with British who had wandered to that point seeking for an entrance, burst in on their side.

Five hours the dreadful battle had lasted at the walls, and now the stream of war went pouring into the town. The undaunted governor still disputed the victory for a short time with the aid of his barricades; but several hundreds of his men were cut off and taken in the horn-work, and even to effect a retreat behind the line of defences which separated the town from the Monte Orgullo was difficult: however, a crowd of his troops, flying from the horn-work along the harbor flank of the town, broke through a body of the British, who had reached the vicinity of the fortified convent of Santa Teresa. This post was the only one retained by the French in the town, and it was thought that Monte Orgullo might have been carried, if a general to direct the troops had been at hand; but whether from wounds or accident, no officer of that rank entered the place until long after the breach had been won; the battalion chiefs were thus embarrassed for want of orders, and a thunder-storm, coming down from the mountains with unbounded fury immediately after the place was carried, added to the confusion of the fight.

This storm seemed to be a signal from hell, for the perpetration of villany, which would have shamed the most ferocious barbarians of antiquity. At Rodrigo, intoxication and plunder had been the principal object; at Badajos, lust and murder were joined to rapine and drunkenness; but at San Sebastian, the direst, the most revolting cruelty was added to the catalogue of crimes,—one atrocity of which a girl of seventeen was the victim, staggers the mind by its enormous, incredible, indescribable barbarity. The resolution of the troops to throw off discipline was quickly made manifest. A British staff-officer was pursued with a volley of small arms, and escaped with difficulty from men who mistook him for the provost-marshal of the fifth division; a Portuguese adjutant, who endeavored to prevent some wickedness, was put to death in the market-place, not with sudden violence from a single ruffian, but deliberately by a number of English soldiers; and though many officers exerted themselves to preserve order, and many men were well conducted, the rapine and violence commenced by villains spread; the camp-followers soon crowded into the place, and the disorder continued until the flames, following the steps of the plunderer, put an end to his ferocity by destroying the whole town. Three generals, Leith, Oswald, and Robinson, had been hurt in the trenches; Sir Richard Fletcher, chief engineer, a brave man who had long served his country honorably, was killed; Colonel Burgoyne, second engineer, was wounded, and the carnage at the breaches was appalling. The volunteers, although brought late into the action, had nearly half their numbers struck down; most of the regiments of the fifth division suffered in the same proportion, and the whole loss since the renewal of the siege exceeded two thousand five hundred men and officers.

When the town was taken, the steep and rugged Monte Orgullo, with its citadel, remained to be assailed. It presented four batteries connected with masonry in first line; and from the extremities, ramps protected by redans led to the Santa Teresa convent, which offered a salient point of defence. On the side facing Santa Clara, and behind the Orgullo were some sea batteries; and if all these works had been of good construction, and guarded by fresh troops, the second siege would have been difficult. But the force of the garrison was shattered by the recent assault, most of the engineers had been killed, the governor and many others wounded, five hundred men were sick or hurt, the soldiers fit for duty did not exceed thirteen hundred, and they had four hundred prisoners to guard. The castle was small, the bomb-proofs scarcely sufficed to protect the ammunition and provisions, and only ten guns remained in a condition for service, three of which were on the sea

line. There was very little water, and the troops had to lie out on the naked rock exposed to fire, or only covered by the asperities of ground: Rey and his brave garrison were, however, still resolute to fight, and they received nightly by sea small supplies of ammunition.

Wellington arrived the day after the assault. Regular approaches could not be carried up the steep naked rock, he doubted the power of vertical fire, and ordered batteries to be formed on the captured works of the town, intending to breach the enemy's remaining lines of defence, and then storm the Orgullo. Meanwhile seeing the Santa Teresa would enable the French to sally by the rampart on the left of the allies, he composed his first line with a few troops strongly barricaded, and placed a supporting body in the market-place with strong reserves on the high curtain and flank ramparts. But from the convent, which was actually in the town, the enemy killed many of the besiegers; and when after several days it was assaulted, they set the lower parts on fire, and retired by a communication made from the roof to a ramp on the hill behind. All this time the flames were licking up the houses, and the Orgullo was overwhelmed with a vertical fire of shells.

On the 3d of September, the governor was summoned, but his resolution was not to be shaken, and the vertical fire was therefore continued day and night. The British prisoners suffered as well as the enemy;* for the officer commanding in the castle, irritated by the misery of the garrison, cruelly refused to let the unfortunate captives make trenches to cover themselves;† the French also complain that their wounded and sick men, lying in an empty magazine with a black flag flying, and having the English prisoners in their red uniforms placed around to strengthen the claim of humanity, were fired upon.

Guns for the new batteries were now brought from the Chofres across the Urumea, at first by night, but the difficulty of struggling with the water in darkness induced the transport by day and within reach of the French batteries, which however did not fire. The flaming houses impeded the works, but the ruins furnished cover for marksmen to gail the French, and the guns on Santa Clara were augmented and worked by seamen. With the besieged ammunition was scarce, the horrible vertical fire subdued their energy, and the besiegers labored freely until the 8th; then, fifty-nine heavy pieces opened at once from the island, the isthmus, the horn-work and the Chofres, and in two hours the Mirador and Queen's battery were broken, the French fire extinguished, the hill torn and

* Jones.

† Bellas.

furrowed in a frightful manner; the bread-ovens were destroyed, a magazine exploded, and the castle, small and crowded with men, was overlaid with the descending shells. Then, the governor, proudly bending to fate, surrendered. On the 9th, this brave man and his heroic garrison, reduced to one-third of their original number, and leaving five hundred wounded behind them in the hospital, marched out with the honors of war. The Spanish flag was hoisted under a salute of twenty-one guns, and the siege terminated after sixty-three days open trenches; precisely when the tempestuous season, then beginning to vex the coast, would have rendered a continuance of the sea blockade impossible.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. San Sebastian, a third-rate fortress, and in bad condition when first invested, resisted a besieging army possessing an enormous battering-train for sixty-three days. This is to be attributed partly to the errors of the besiegers, principally to obstructions extraneous to the military operations; and conspicuous among the last was the misconduct of the Admiralty and general negligence of the government. The latter retarded the siege for sixteen days, the former enabled the garrison to increase its means as the siege proceeded. The Spanish failures came next, the authorities would not supply carts and boats, and even refused the use of their public buildings for hospitals! Thus, between the sea and the shore, receiving aid from neither, Wellington had to conduct an operation which more than any other depends for success upon labor and provident care: it was the first time that an important siege was maintained by women's exertions, for the stores of the besiegers were landed from boats rowed by Spanish girls! Soult's advance was but a slight interruption; the want of ammunition would have equally delayed the siege. The measure of the English ministers' negligence is thus obtained: it was more hurtful than the operations of sixty thousand men under a great general.

In the second siege, the approaches on the isthmus were pushed further than in the first attack, and the French fire on the front was more quelled; the openings made in the sea-wall enabled the troops to get out of the trenches more rapidly, and shortened the distance to the breach. These were advantages, but not proportionate to the increase of the besiegers' means, which were sufficient to ruin all the defences, if employed to silence the enemy's fire, according to the rules of art: a lodgment in the horn-work could then have been made with little difficulty, and the breach attacked without much danger.

The faults of the first attack were repeated in the second, and

the enemy's resources had increased, because a sea intercourse with France was never cut off; it follows, there was no reasonable chance of success in the assault, nor even to make a lodgment in the breach, for the workmen, being without materials, failed to effect that object. The primary arrangement, the change adopted in the council of war, the option given to Bradford, the remarkable fact that the simultaneous attack on the horn-work was only thought of when the first efforts against the breach had failed, all prove that the enemy's defensive means were underrated, and the success exceeded the preparations to obtain it. The place was in fact won by accident. For the explosion of the great mine under Los Hornos was only prevented by a happy shot which cut the sausage of the train during the fight; and this was followed by the ignition of the French powder-barrels and shells along the high curtain, which alone opened the way into the town. Graham's firmness and perseverance in the assault, and the judicious usage of his artillery during the action, were no mean helps to the victory; it was on such occasions that his prompt genius shone; yet it was nothing wonderful that heavy guns at short distances, the range perfectly known, should strike with certainty along a line of rampart more than twenty-seven feet above the heads of the troops. Such practice was to be expected, and Graham's genius was more evinced by the promptness of the thought and the trust he put in the valor of his soldiers. It was more remarkable that the stormers did not relinquish their attack when thus exposed to their own guns; for it is a mistake to say no mischief occurred: a serjeant of the ninth regiment was killed, close to his commanding officer, and other casualties also had place.

4. It is supposed the explosion on the ramparts was caused by the cannonade from the Chofres; yet a cool observer,* whose account I have adopted, because he was a spectator undisturbed, affirms that the cannonade ceased before Snodgrass forded the river, and the great explosion did not happen until half-an-hour after that event. That enterprid exploit of the Portuguese was thought one of the principal causes of success; and an entrance was certainly made at the small breach by several soldiers, British and Portuguese, many of the former having wandered from the great breach and got mixed with the latter, before the explosion happened on the high curtain. Whether those men would have been followed by greater numbers is doubtful, but the lodgment made by the light division volunteers within the great breach was solid, and could have been maintained.† The French call the Portuguese attack a feint. Graham certainly did not found much upon it.

* Captain Crooke.

† Bellas.

He gave Bradford the option to attack, or remain tranquil; and M'Bean actually received counter-orders when his column was already in the river, but he was then too far advanced.

5. When the destruction of San Sebastian became known, it was used by the anti-British party at Cadiz to excite the people against England. The political chief of Guipuscoa publicly charged Graham with having "*sacked and burned the place because it had formerly traded entirely with France*;" his generals were said to have excited the furious soldiers to the horrid work, and his inferior officers to have boasted of it afterwards. A newspaper, edited by an agent of the Spanish government, repeating these accusations, called upon the people to avenge the injury upon the British army. The Spanish minister of war demanded explanations. Wellington, designating him as the abettor, and even the writer of this and other malignant libels published at Cadiz, addressed a letter of indignant denial and remonstrance to Sir Henry Wellesley. "It was absurd," he said, "to suppose the officers of the army would have risked the loss of all their labors and gallantry, by encouraging the dispersion of the men while the enemy still held the castle. To him the town was of the utmost value, as a secure place for magazines and hospitals. He had refused to bombard it when advised to do so, as he had previously refused to bombard Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, because the injury would fall on the inhabitants, and not upon the enemy; yet nothing could have been more easy or less suspicious than this method of destroying the town, if he had been so minded. It was the enemy who set fire to the houses; it was part of the defence; the British officers strove to extinguish the flames; some, in doing so, lost their lives by the French musketry from the castle; and the difficulty of communicating and working through the fire was so great, that he had been on the point of withdrawing the troops altogether." He admitted the plunder, observing, "that he knew not whether that or the libels made him most angry; he had taken measures to stop it; but when two-thirds of the officers had been killed or wounded in the action, and when many of the inhabitants, taking part with the enemy, fired upon the troops, to prevent it was impossible. Moreover, he was for several days unable from other circumstances to send fresh men to replace the stormers."

This was a solid reply to the scandalous libels circulated, but the broad facts remained. San Sebastian was a heap of smoking ruins, and atrocities degrading to human nature had been perpetrated by the troops. A detailed statement of these crimes was published and signed by the municipal and ecclesiastical bodies, the consuls, and principal persons of San Sebastian, who solemnly affirmed the

truth of each case; and if Spanish testimony here is not to be heeded, four-fifths of the excesses attributed to the French armies must be effaced as resting on a like though a weaker foundation. That the town was fired behind the breaches during the operations, and that it spread in the tumult following the assault, is undoubted; yet it is not improbable that plunderers increased it; and certainly the great destruction did not befall until long after the place was in possession of the allies. I have been assured by a surgeon, that he lodged the third day after the assault at a house well furnished, and in a street then untouched by fire or plunderers, but house and street were afterwards plundered and burned. The inhabitants could only have fired upon the allies the first day, and it might well have been in self-defence, for they were barbarously treated. The abhorrent case of the young girl was notorious; so were many others. Around the piquet fires, where soldiers, as every experienced officer knows, speak without reserve of their past deeds and feelings, I have heard the abominable actions mentioned by the municipality related, with little variation, long before that narrative was published; told, however, with sorrow for the sufferers, and indignation against the perpetrators; for these last were not so numerous as might be supposed from the extent of the calamities they inflicted.

It is a common but shallow and mischievous notion, that a villain makes never the worse soldier for an assault, because the appetite for plunder supplies the place of honor; as if the compatibility of vice and bravery rendered the union of virtue and courage unnecessary in warlike matters. In all the host which stormed San Sebastian there was not a man, being sane, would for plunder only have encountered the danger of that assault; yet, under the spell of discipline, all rushed eagerly to meet it. Discipline, however, has its root in patriotism, or how could armed men be controlled at all? It would be wise and not difficult to graft moderation and humanity upon such a noble stock. The modern soldier is not necessarily the stern, bloody-handed man the ancient soldier was: there is as much difference between them as between the sportsman and the butcher; the ancient warrior, fighting with his sword, and reaping his harvest of death when the enemy was in flight, became habituated to the act of slaying. The modern soldier seldom uses his bayonet, sees not his peculiar victim fall, and exults not over mangled limbs as proofs of personal prowess. Hence, preserving his original feelings, his natural abhorrence of murder, he differs not from other men, unless often engaged in the assault of towns, where rapacity, lust, and inebriety, unchecked by the restraints of discipline, are excited by temptation. It is said no soldier can be

restrained after storming a town, and a British soldier least of all, because he is brutish and insensible to honor! Shame on such calumnies! What makes the British soldier fight as no other soldier ever fights? His pay! Soldiers of all nations receive pay. At the period of this assault, a sergeant of the twenty-eighth regiment, named Ball, had been sent with a party to the coast from Roncevalles, to make purchases for his officers.* He placed the money he was entrusted with, two thousand dollars, in the hands of a commissary, and, having secured a receipt, persuaded his party to join in the storm: he survived, reclaimed the money, made his purchases, and returned to his regiment. And these are the men, these the spirits, who are called too brutish to work upon except by fear! it is precisely fear to which they are most insensible.

Undoubtedly, if soldiers hear and read that it is impossible to restrain their violence, they will not be restrained. But let the plunder of a town, after an assault, be expressly made criminal by the articles of war, with a due punishment attached; let it be constantly impressed upon the troops that such conduct is as much opposed to military honor and discipline as it is to morality; let a select body of men receiving higher pay form a part of the army, and be charged to follow storming columns, with power to inflict instantaneous punishment, death if it be necessary. Finally, as reward for extraordinary valor should keep pace with chastisement for crimes committed under such temptation, it would be fitting that money, apportioned to the danger and importance of the service, should be insured to the successful troops, and always paid without delay. This might be taken as ransom from enemies, but if the inhabitants are friends, or too poor, government should furnish the amount. With such regulations, the storming of towns would not produce more military disorders than the gaining of battles in the field.

CHAPTER III.

Soult's views and positions during the siege described—He endeavors to succor the place—Attacks Lord Wellington—Combats of San Marcial and Vera—The French are repulsed the same day that San Sebastian is stormed—Soult resolves to adopt a defensive system—Observations.



WHILE San Sebastian was being stormed, Soult fought a battle with the covering force; not willingly nor with much hope of success; but he was averse to let the place fall without another effort,

* Cadell's Memoirs.

and thought a bold demeanor would best hide his real weakness. Guided by the progress of the siege, which he knew through his sea communication, he awaited the last moment of action, striving meanwhile to improve his resources and to revive the confidence of the army and of the people. Of his dispersed soldiers, eight thousand had rejoined their regiments by the 12th of August, and he was promised a reinforcement of thirty thousand conscripts; these last were however yet to be enrolled; and neither the progress of the siege nor the general panic along the frontier, which recurred with increased violence after the late battles, would suffer him to remain inactive. He knew his enemy's superior strength of position, number, and military confidence; but his former efforts had interrupted the attack of San Sebastian, and another offensive movement would necessarily produce a like effect; wherefore he hoped by repeating the disturbance, as long as the intercourse by sea enabled him to reinforce and supply the garrison, to render the siege a wasting operation. To renew the movement against Pampeluna was most advantageous; but it required fifty thousand infantry for attack, twenty thousand for observation on the lower Bidassoa, and he had not such numbers. Subsistence also was uncertain, because the loss of all the military carriages at Vittoria was still felt; and the resources of the country were reluctantly yielded by the French people. To act on the side of St. Jean Pied de Port was therefore impracticable. To attack the allies' centre, at Vera, Echallar, and the Bastan, was unpromising, seeing that two mountain-chains were to be forced before the movement could seriously affect Wellington; moreover, the ways being impracticable for artillery, success would lead to no decisive result.

To attack the left of the allies by the great road of Irun remained. Against that quarter, he could bring more than forty thousand infantry, but the positions were of perilous strength. The upper Bidassoa was in Wellington's power, because the light division, occupying Vera and the heights of Santa Barbara on the right bank, covered all the bridges. The lower Bidassoa, flowing from Vera with a bend to the left, separated the hostile armies on an extent of nine miles; but from the broken bridge of Behobia in front of Irun, to the sea, the river, broad and tidal, offered no apparent facility for a passage; and between the fords of Biriatu and those of Vera, three miles, there was only the one passage of Andarlassa, two miles below Vera; along this space also, steep craggy mountain ridges without roads, lining the river, forbade any great operations. Thus the points of attack were restricted to Vera, and the fords between Biriatu and the broken bridge of Behobia.

To raise the siege of San Sebastian, it was only necessary to



force a way to Oyarzun, a small town seven or eight miles beyond the Bidassoa; from thence, the assailants could march at once upon Passages and upon the Urumea. The royal road led directly to Oyarzun along the broad valley separating the Peña de Haya from the Jaizquibel mountain. The latter was on the sea-coast, but the Peña de Haya, commonly called the four-crowned mountain, filled with its dependent ridges all the space between Vera, Lesaca, Irun, and Oyarzun. Its staring head bound with a rocky diadem was impassable; but from the bridges of Vera and Lesaca, several roads, one of them not absolutely impracticable for guns, passed over its enormous flanks to Irun at one side, to Oyarzun on the other, falling into the royal road at both places. Soult's first design was to unite Clausel's and D'Erlon's troops, drive the light division from Santa Barbara, and then, using the bridges of Lesaca and Vera, force a passage over the Peña de Haya on the left of its summit, and push the heads of columns towards Oyarzun and the upper Urumea; Reille and Villatte, passing the Bidassoa at Biriatu, were meanwhile to fight their way to Oyarzun by the royal road.* He foresaw that Wellington might, during this time, collect his right wing, and seek to envelope the French army, or march upon Bayonne; but he thought daring measures were necessary, and the progress of the besiegers at San Sebastian soon drove him into action.

On the 29th Foy, marching by the road of Lohoussoa, crossed the Nive at Cambo and reached Espelette; leaving behind him six hundred men and the national guards, who were very numerous, with orders to watch the roads and valleys leading upon St. Jean Pied de Port. If pressed by superior forces, this corps of observation was to fall back upon that fortress, and it was supported with a brigade of light cavalry, stationed at St. Palais. In the night, two of D'Erlon's divisions were secretly drawn from Ainhoa, and Foy continued his march through Espelette, by the bridges of Amotz and Serres to San Jean de Luz, from whence the reserve moved forward. Thus, in the morning of the 30th, two strong French columns of attack were assembled on the lower Bidassoa. One under Clausel, being twenty thousand men, with twenty pieces of artillery, was concentrated in the woods behind the Commissari and Bayonette mountains above Vera. The other under Reille, furnished, including Villatte's reserve, only eighteen thousand men; but Foy's division with some light cavalry were in rear, ready to augment this column to twenty-five thousand: and there were thirty-six pieces of artillery and two bridge equipages collected near the camp of Uroge on the royal road.

* Soult's MSS.

Reille's troops were secreted, partly behind the Croix des Bouquets mountain, partly behind that of Louis XIV., and the lower ridges of the Mandale, near Biriatu. D'Erlon, having Conroux's and Abbé's divisions and twenty pieces of artillery, held the camps in advance of Sarre and Ainhoa. If the allies in his front marched to reinforce their own left on the crowned mountain, he was to vex and retard their movements, avoiding a serious engagement, and feeling to his right for Clausel's column—that is to say, Abbé's division, moving from Ainhoa, was to menace Zagaramurdi and the Puerto de Echallar, while Conroux's division, then in front of Sarre, was to menace the light division, seize the rock of Ivantelly, if it was abandoned, and join Clausel, if occasion offered. But if the allies assembled a large force to operate offensively by the Nive and Nivelle rivers, D'Erlon, without losing his connection with the main army, was to concentrate on the slopes descending from the Rhune mountain towards San Pé. If the attack on the lower Bidassoa succeeded, he was to join Clausel by Vera, or by the heights of Echallar and the bridge of Lesaca. D'Erlon was also to have been strengthened with the heavy cavalry; but forage could only be obtained for the artillery horses, the light horsemen, six chosen troops of dragoons, and two or three hundred gendarmes, which were all assembled on the royal road behind Reille.

Soult designed to attack at daybreak, the 30th; but his preparations being incomplete, he deferred it until the 31st, and took rigorous precautions to prevent intelligence passing over to the allies' camps. Nevertheless, Wellington's emissaries advised him of the movements in the night of the 29th; the augmentation of troops in front of Irun was observed in the morning of the 30th; and in the evening, the bridge equipage and the artillery were descried on the royal road beyond the Bidassoa. Thus warned, he prepared for battle with little anxiety. For the brigade of English footguards, left at Oporto when the campaign commenced, was now come up; most of the marauders and men wounded at Vittoria had rejoined, and three regiments just arrived from England formed a new brigade under Lord Aylmer; making the total augmentation of British troops in this quarter little less than five thousand men. His extreme left was on the Jaizquibel. This narrow mountain, seventeen hundred feet high, runs along the coast, abutting at one end upon the Passages harbor, and at the other upon the navigable mouth of the Bidassoa. Offering no mark for attack, it was only guarded by a Spanish detachment; but at its foot the small fort of Figueras, commanding the entrance of the river, was garrisoned by seamen from the naval squadron. Fuenterrabia, a walled town

at the mountain foot, was also occupied, and the low ground between it and Irun was defended by a chain of eight large field redoubts; thus the Jaizquibel was connected with the heights covering the royal road to Oyarzun.

On the right of Irun, between Biriatu and the bridge of Behobia, there was a sudden bend in the river, the concave towards the French, and their positions commanded the passage of the fords below; but opposed to them was the exceedingly stiff ridge, called San Marcial, terminating one of the great flanks of the Pena de Haya. The water flowed round the left of this ridge, confining the road, leading from the bridge of Behobia to Irun, for one mile, to the narrow space between its channel and the foot of the height. Irun itself, strongly occupied and defended by a field-work, blocked this way; and it followed that the French, after forcing the passage of the river, must of necessity win San Marcial before their army could use the great road.

Six thousand Spaniards under Freyre were established on the crest of San Marcial, which was strengthened by abbatiss and temporary field works. Behind Irun the first British division under Howard was posted, and Lord Aylmer's brigade was pushed somewhat in advance to support the left of the Spaniards. The right of San Marcial, falling back from the river, was, although distinct as a position, connected with the Pena de Haya, and in some degree exposed to an enemy passing the river above Biriatu; wherefore, Longa's Spaniards were drawn from those slopes of the Pena de Haya which descended towards Vera, to be posted on those descending towards Biriatu: in that situation he protected the right of San Marcial.

Eighteen thousand fighting men were thus directly opposed to the progress of the enemy. The fourth division, quartered near Lesaca, was still disposable, and a Portuguese brigade was detached from it, to replace Longa on the heights opposite Vera; and to cover the roads leading from the bridge and fords of that place over the flanks of the Pena de Haya. The British brigades were stationed up the mountain, close under the foundry of San Antonio, where they commanded the intersection of the roads coming from Vera and Lesaca, and formed a reserve to the Portuguese brigade, to Longa, and to Freyre, tying the whole together. The Portuguese brigades were, however, somewhat exposed, and too weak to guard the enormous slopes on which they were placed; wherefore Inglis's brigade of the seventh division came from Echalar to reinforce it: even then, the flanks of the Pena de Haya being so rough and vast, the troops seemed sprinkled here and there with little coherence. Wellington, aware that his positions

were too extensive, had commenced the construction of redoubts on commanding points of the mountain; and had traced out a fortified camp on some heights immediately in front of Oyarzun, which connected the Haya with the Jaizquibel; but these works were unfinished.

During the night of the 30th, Soult garnished with artillery all the points commanding the fords of Biriatu, the descent to the bridge, and the banks below, called the Bas de Behobia. This was to cover the passage of the fords, and formation of the bridges, and to stop gun boats coming up; in which view also he spread Casa Palacio's brigade of Joseph's Spanish guards along the river to Andaya, fronting Fuenterrabia.*

Reille was directed to storm San Marcial, and leave a strong reserve there in watch for troops coming from Vera or descending the Pena de Haya; with the rest of his force he was to drive the allies from ridge to ridge, until he gained that flank of the great mountain which descends upon Oyarzun. The royal road being thus opened, Foy's division and the cavalry and artillery were to cross by bridges to be laid during the attack on San Marcial; and it was Soult's intention to retain this last-named ridge and fortify it as a bridge-head, with a view to subsequent operations.

To aid Reille, and provide for the concentration of the whole army at Oyarzun, Clausel was directed to make a simultaneous attack from Vera; not, as at first designed, by driving the allies from Santa Barbara, and seizing the bridges; but leaving one division and his guns above Vera to keep the light division in check, to cross the river by two fords below, and assail that slope of the Pena de Haya where the Portuguese brigade and Inglis were posted. Then forcing his way upwards to the forge of San Antonio, he could aid Reille directly by falling on the rear of San Marcial, or meet him at Oyarzun by turning the rocky summit of the Pena de Haya.

Combat of San Marcial.—At daylight on the 1st, Reille, under protection of the French guns, forded the Bidassoa, above Biriatu, with two divisions and two pieces of artillery. He quickly seized a detached ridge of inferior height just under San Marcial, and leaving one brigade there as a reserve, detached another to attack the Spanish left by a slope which descended in that quarter to the river. La Martiniere's division assailed their right at the same time, but the mountain was covered with brushwood and remarkably steep;* the French troops preserved no order, the supports and skirmishers got mixed in confusion, and when two-thirds of the height were gained, the Spaniards charged in columns and

* Soult, MSS.

drove them headlong down. Meanwhile, two bridges were thrown below the fords, and the head of Villatte's reserve passed and renewed the fight more vigorously; one brigade even reached the chapel of San Marcial, and the left of the Spanish line was shaken; but the eighty-fifth regiment advanced from Lord Aylmer's brigade to support it, and at that moment Wellington rode up with his staff. The Spaniards cared very little for their own officers; but with that noble instinct which never abandons the poor people of any country, acknowledged real greatness without reference to nation; at his order, with loud shouts they dashed their adversaries down, and with so much violence that many were driven into the river, where some of the pontoon boats, coming to their succor, were overloaded and sunk. It was several hours before the confused masses could be rallied, or the bridges, which had been broken up to let the boats save the drowning men, be repaired. When this was effected, Soult, who overlooked the action from the summit of the mountain Louis XIV., sent the remainder of Villatte's reserve over the river, and calling up Foy, prepared a more formidable attack; and he expected greater success, because the operation on the side of Vera, of which it is time to treat, was now making considerable progress up the Pena de Haya on the allies' right.

Combat of Vera.—Clausel had descended the Bayonette and Commissari mountains under cover of a thick fog, but at seven o'clock the weather cleared, and three heavy columns were seen by the troops on Santa Barbara making for the fords below Vera, in the direction of two hamlets called the Salinas and the Barrio de Lesaca. A fourth division remained with the guns on the mountain slopes, and the artillery opened now and then upon the little town of Vera; from which the piquets of the light division were recalled, with exception of one post in a fortified house commanding the bridge. At eight o'clock the enemy's columns began to pass the fords, covered by the fire of their artillery; yet the first shells thrown fell into the midst of their own ranks, and the British troops on Santa Barbara cheered the French battery with a derisive shout.* Their march was, however, sure, and a battalion of light troops without knapsacks quickly commenced battle with the Portuguese brigade, and by their extreme activity and rapid fire forced the latter to retire up the slopes of the mountain.† Inglis reinforced the line of skirmishers, and the whole of his brigade was soon afterwards engaged; but Clausel menaced his left flank from the lower ford, and still forced a way upwards without a check, until the whole mass disappeared fighting amidst the asperities of the Pena de la Haya. Inglis lost two hundred and seventy men

* Soult, MSS.

† Notes by General Inglis, MSS.

and twenty-two officers, and finally halted on a ridge commanding the intersection of the roads leading from Vera and Lesaca to Irun and Oyarzun. This was somewhat below the foundry of Antonio, where the fourth division, having now recovered its Portuguese brigade, was, in conjunction with Longa's Spaniards, so placed as to support and protect equally the left of Inglis and the right of Freyre on San Marcial.

From the great height and asperity of the mountain, the fight occupied many hours, and it was past two o'clock ere the head of Clausel's columns reached this point. The French troops left in front of Santa Barbara made no movement; and as Wellington had before directed the light division to aid Inglis, a wing of the forty-third and three companies of the riflemen from Kempt's brigade, with three weak Spanish battalions drawn from O'Donnel's Andalusians at Echallar, crossed the Bidassoa by the Lesaca bridge. They were to occupy some lower slopes on the right of Inglis, and cover another knot of minor communications coming from Lesaca and Vera; the remainder of Kempt's brigade occupied Lesaca itself; and thus the connection between Santa Barbara and the positions of the fourth division on the Pena de la Haya was completed.

Clausel, seeing these movements, and thinking the allies at Echallar and Santa Barbara, were only awaiting the proper moment to take him in flank and rear if he engaged further up the mountain, abated his battle, and sent notice to Soult.* This opinion was well founded; Wellington was not a general to let half his army be paralyzed by D'Erlon's divisions. On the 30th, when he observed Soult's first preparations in front of San Marcial, he had ordered attacks to be made upon D'Erlon from the Puerto of Echallar, Zagaramurdi and Maya; Hill was also to show the heads of columns towards St. Jean Pied de Port. And on the 31st, when the force and direction of Clausel's columns were known, he directed Giron to sustain the light division on Santa Barbara, and Lord Dalhousie to bring the remainder of the seventh division by Lesaca to aid Inglis.

Following these orders, Giron, who commanded the Spaniards, O'Donnel being sick, slightly skirmished on the 30th with Conroux's advanced posts in front of Sarre, and on the 31st, at day-break, the whole of the French line was assailed. That is to say, Giron again fought with Conroux, feebly as before; but two Portuguese brigades of the sixth and seventh divisions, directed by Lord Dalhousie and General Colville, drove the French from their camp behind Urdax and burned it. Abbé, who commanded there,

* Clausel's report, MSS.

being thus pressed, collected his whole force in front of Ainhoa, on an entrenched position, and repulsed the allies with some loss. Thus five combats were fought in one day at different points of the general line; and D'Erlon, who had lost three or four hundred men, seeing a fresh column coming from Maya as if to turn his left, judged that a great movement against Bayonne was in progress, and sent notice to Soult. He was mistaken. Wellington only sought by these demonstrations to disturb the plan of attack. Giron and the seventh division, following the second orders, then marched towards Lesaca; but as the fighting at Urdax lasted until mid-day, Lord Dalhousie's movement was not completed that evening.

D'Erlon's despatch reached Soult at the time Clausel's report arrived. All his arrangements for a final attack on San Marcial were then completed; but these reports and the ominous cannonade at San Sebastian, plainly heard during the morning, induced him to abandon this object, and hold his army ready for a general battle on the Nivelle. In this view, he sent Foy, who had not yet crossed the Bidassoa, to Serres, behind the Nivelle, as a support to D'Erlon, and six troops of dragoons marched to San Pé higher up that river. Clausel was directed to repass the Bidassoa in the night, to leave Maransin upon the Bayonette mountain and the Col de Vera, and march with his other three divisions to join Foy on the heights of Serres.

But Reille's troops were still beyond the Bidassoa, and the battle went on sharply; for the Spaniards continually detached men from the ridge, endeavoring to drive the French from the lower positions into the river, until about four o'clock; then their hardihood abating, they desired to be relieved; but Wellington, seeing the French attacks were exhausted, thought it a good opportunity to fix the Spanish military spirit, and refused to relieve or to aid them. It would not be just to measure their valor by this fact. The English general blushed while he called upon them to fight, for they had been previously famished by their vile government, and there were no hospitals to receive them when wounded. The battle was however arrested by a tempest which commenced about three o'clock, and raged for several hours with wonderful violence. Huge branches were torn from the trees, and whirled through the air like feathers by the howling winds, and the thinnest streams, swelling into torrents, dashed down the mountains, rolling innumerable stones along with a frightful clatter. This was the storm which fell at San Sebastian, and amidst its turmoil, and under cover of night, the French recrossed the Bidassoa.

Clausel's retreat was more unhappy. Having received the order

to retire early in the evening, when the storm had already put an end to all fighting, he repassed the fords before dark with two brigades, ordering General Vandermaesen to follow with the remainder of his divisions. It would appear that he expected no difficulty, since he did not take possession of the bridge of Vera, nor of the fortified house covering it, and occupied himself with suggesting new projects displeasing to Soult.* Meanwhile, Vandermaesen's division was endangered; many of his soldiers, attempting to cross, were drowned by the rising waters; and finally, unable to effect a passage at the fords, he marched up the stream to seize the bridge of Vera. His advanced guard surprised a corporal's piquet, and rushed over, but it was driven back by a rifle company posted in the fortified house. This happened at three o'clock in the morning, and the riflemen defended the passage until daylight, when a second company and some *caçadores* came to their aid. The French reserve left at Vera, seeing how matters stood, then opened a fire of guns against the fortified house, from a high rock just above the town; and their skirmishers approached it on the right bank, while Vandermaesen plied his musketry from the left bank. The two rifle captains and many men fell under this cross fire, and the passage was forced, but Vandermaesen, urging the attack in person, was killed, and more than two hundred of his soldiers were hurt.

Soult, having heard from Count D'Erlon that offensive movements on the side of Maya had entirely ceased at twelve o'clock on the 31st, now contemplated another attack on San Marcial; but, in the course of the day, Rey's report of the assault reached him, and he heard that Hill was in movement on the side of St. Jean Pied de Port. San Sebastian was lost, a fresh attempt to carry off the wasted garrison from the castle would cost five or six thousand good soldiers, and the safety of the whole army would be endangered by pushing headlong amongst the terrible asperities of the crowned mountain. Wellington could throw his right wing and centre, amounting to thirty-five thousand men, upon the French left during the action; and he would be nearer to Bayonne than the French right when once the battle was engaged beyond the lower Bidassoa. The recent actions had cost three thousand six hundred men; Vandermaesen had been killed, La Martiniere, Mene, Remond, and Guy were wounded, the first mortally; all the superior officers agreed that a fresh attempt would be most dangerous, and serious losses might draw on an immediate invasion of France before the necessary defensive measures were completed.

Yielding to these reasons, Soult resolved to recover his former

* Soult's MSS.

positions, and remain entirely on the defensive, for which his vast knowledge of war, his foresight, his talent for methodical arrangement and his firmness of character peculiarly fitted him. Twelve battles or combats fought in seven weeks, bore testimony that he had strived hard to regain the offensive for the French army; and willing still to strive if it might be so, he had called upon Suchet to aid him, and demanded fresh orders from the emperor; but Suchet helped him not, and Napoleon's answer indicated at once his own difficulties and his reliance upon Soult's capacity and fidelity: "*I have given you my confidence, and can add neither to your means nor to your instructions.*"

One thousand Anglo-Portuguese and sixteen hundred Spaniards had been killed or wounded, making, with the loss in the assault, above five thousand; yet the siege was not disturbed; the French were powerless against those strong positions. Forty-five thousand French had been poured on to a square of less than five miles, and were repulsed by ten thousand, for that number only of the allies fought. But Soult's battle was only a half measure. Wellington's experience of French warfare, his determined character, coolness, and thorough acquaintance with the principles of his art, left no hope that he would suffer two-thirds of his army to be kept in check by D'Erlon; and, accordingly, when that general was menaced, Soult made a counter-movement to deliver battle on more favorable ground. Perhaps his secret hope was to draw his opponent to such a conclusion; but if so, the combat of San Marcial was too dear a price to pay for the chance. If he had really resolved to force a way to San Sebastian, he would have organized his rear so that no serious embarrassment could arise from partial incursions towards Bayonne; he would have concentrated his whole army, and made his attack felt at San Sebastian before a counter-movement could be felt at Bayonne. In this view, D'Erlon would have come in the night of the 30th to Vera, which, without weakening the reserve opposed to the light division, would have augmented Clausel by ten thousand men; and on the most important point, because San Marcial offered no front for the action of great numbers.

The secret of mountain warfare is, by surprise, or the power of overwhelming numbers to seize such commanding points as shall force an enemy either to abandon his strong position, or become the assailant to recover the points thus lost. Now, the difficulty of defending the crown mountain was evinced by the rapid manner in which Clausel at once gained the ridges as far as the foundry of San Antonio; with ten thousand additional men, he might have gained a commanding position on the rear and left flank of San

Marcial, and forced the allies to abandon it. That Wellington thought himself weak on the Haya mountain is proved by his calling up the seventh division from Echallar, and by his orders to the light division. Soult's object was to raise the siege, but his plan involved the risk of having thirty-five thousand allies interposed between him and Bayonne; a more decisive operation than the raising of the siege; wherefore the enterprise may be pronounced injudicious.* He admitted, indeed, that excited to the enterprise, partly by insinuations, whether from the minister of war or his own lieutenants does not appear, partly by a generous repugnance to abandon the brave garrison, he was too precipitate, acting contrary to his judgment; but he was probably tempted by the hope of obtaining at least the camp of San Marcial as a bridge-head, and thus securing a favorable point for after combinations.

Wellington having resolved not to invade France at this time, was unprepared for so great an operation as throwing his right and centre upon Soult's left; and it is obvious also that, on the 30th, he expected only a partial attack at San Marcial. The order he first gave to assail D'Erlon's position, and the counter-order for the seventh division to come to Lesaca, prove this; because the latter was issued after Clausel's numbers and the direction of his attack were ascertained. Two Portuguese brigades sent against D'Erlon rendered null Soult's combinations, and his extreme sensitiveness to their attacks marks the vice of his own. Here it may be observed, that the movement of the forty-third, the rifle companies and Spaniards, to secure the right flank of Inglis, was ill-arranged. Despatched by different roads, without knowing precisely the point they were to concentrate at, each fell in with the enemy at different places; the Spaniards got under fire, and altered their route; the forty-third, stumbling on a French division, had to fall back half a mile; it was only by thus feeling the enemy at different points that the destined position was at last found, and a disaster was scarcely prevented by the fury of the tempest. Those detachments were, however, finally well placed to have struck a blow the next morning, because they were only half an hour's march from the high ground behind Vandermaesen, when he forced the bridge at Vera; the firing would have served as a guide, and the rest of Kempt's brigade could also have moved upon the same point from Lesaca; but it is difficult to seize such occasions in mountain warfare, where so little can be seen of the general state of affairs.

A more obvious advantage was neglected by General Skerrett. A single company of rifles defended the bridge an hour; and four brigades of the enemy, crossing in a tumultuous manner, could not

* Soult's Correspondence, MSS.

have cleared the narrow passage after it was won in a moment; Wellington's despatch erroneously describes the French as passing under the fire of great part of Skerrett's brigade, whereas that officer remained inert on the lower slopes of Santa Barbara, half a mile distant, and allowed the enemy to escape. A large mass of French troops were, indeed, on the counter-slopes of the Bayonette mountain, beyond Vera; but the seventh division, then close to Santa Barbara, would have prevented any serious disaster, if the blow had failed. A great opportunity was certainly lost.

CHAPTER IV.

The duke of Berri proposes to invade France, promising the aid of twenty thousand insurgents—Lord Wellington's views on this subject—His personal acrimony against Napoleon—That monarch's policy and character defended—Dangerous state of affairs in Catalonia—Lord Wellington's designs to go there himself, but at the desire of the allied sovereigns and the English government, resolves to establish a part of his army in France—His plans retarded by accidents and bad weather—Soult unable to divine his project—Passage of the Bidassoa—Second combat of Vera—Colonel Colborne's great presence of mind—Gallant action of Lieutenant Havelock—The French lose the redoubt of Sarre, and abandon the great Rhone—Observations.

SOULT was so fearful of an attack along the Nive, that his uneasy movements made the allies think he was again preparing for offensive operations; this double misunderstanding did not, however, last long, and each army resumed its former position. The fall of San Sebastian had given Wellington a new port and point of support, had increased the value of Passages as a dépôt, and let loose many troops for field operations; the armistice in Germany was at an end, Austria had joined the allies, and it seemed therefore certain that he would immediately invade France. The English cabinet had promised the continental sovereigns that it should be so when the French were expelled from Spain, meaning Navarre and Guipuscoa; and the newspaper editors were, as usual, actively deceiving the people of all countries by their dictatorial absurd projects and assumptions. The Bourbon partisans were secretly endeavoring to form a conspiracy in the south; and the duke of Berri desired to join the British army, pretending that twenty thousand Frenchmen, armed and organized, awaited his arrival. All was exultation and extravagance. Wellington however, well understanding the inflated nature of such hopes and promises, while affecting to rebuke the absurdity of the newspapers, took the opportunity to check similar folly in higher places, by observing,

"that if he had done all that was expected, he should have been before that period in the moon."

With respect to the Duke of Berri, it was for the sovereigns, he said, to decide whether the restoration of the Bourbons should form part of their policy, but as yet no fixed line of conduct on that or any other political points was declared. It was for their interest to get rid of Napoleon, and there could be no question of the advantage or propriety of accepting the aid of a Bourbon party without pledging themselves to dethrone the emperor. The Bourbons might indeed decline, in default of such a pledge, to involve their partisans in rebellion; and he advised them to do so, because Napoleon's power rested, internally upon the most extensive and expensive system of corruption ever established in any country; externally, upon his military force, which was supported almost exclusively by foreign contributions. Once confined to the limits of France, he would be unable to bear the double expense of his government and army; the reduction of either would be fatal to him, and the object of the Bourbons thus obtained without risk. But, if they did not concur in this reasoning, the allies in the north of Europe must declare they would dethrone Napoleon, before the Duke of Berri should be allowed to join the army; and the British government must make up its mind upon the question.

This reasoning put an end to the project, because neither the English cabinet nor the allied sovereigns were ready to adopt a decisive open line of policy. The ministers, exulting at the progress of aristocratic domination, had no thought save that of wasting England's substance by extravagant subsidies and supplies; these were taken without gratitude by the continental powers, who held themselves no-ways bound thereby to uphold the common cause, which each secretly designed to make available for peculiar interests: moreover, they still trembled before their former conqueror, and none would pledge themselves to a decided policy. Wellington alone moved with a firm composure, the result of profound and well-understood calculations; yet his mind, naturally so dispassionate, was strangely clouded at this time by personal hatred of Napoleon.

Where is the proof, or even probability, of that great man's system of government being internally dependent upon *"the most extensive corruption ever established in any country."* The annual expenditure of France was scarcely half that of England; and Napoleon rejected public loans, which are the life-blood of state corruption. He left no debt. Under him no man devoured the public substance in idleness, merely because he was of a privileged class; the state servants were largely paid, but they

were made to labor effectually for the state. They did not eat their bread and sleep. His system of public accounts, remarkable for its exactness, simplicity and comprehensiveness, was vitally opposed to public fraud, and therefore extremely unfavorable to corruption. Napoleon's power was supported in France by that deep sense of his goodness as a sovereign, and that admiration for his genius which pervaded the poorer and middle classes of the people; by the love they bore him, and still bear for his memory, because he cherished the principles of a just equality. They loved him also for his incessant activity in the public service, his freedom from private vices; and because his public works, wondrous for their number, their utility and grandeur, never stood still: under him the poor man never wanted work. To France he gave noble institutions, a comparatively just code of laws, and glory unmatched since the days of the Romans. His *Cadaastre*, more extensive and perfect than the Domesday Book, that monument of the wisdom and greatness of our Norman Conqueror, was alone sufficient to endear him to the nation. Rapidly advancing under his vigorous superintendence, it registered and taught every man the true value and nature of his property, and all its liabilities, public or private. It was designed and ably adapted to fix and secure titles to property, to prevent frauds, to abate litigation, to apportion the weight of taxes equally and justly, to repress the insolence of the tax-gatherer without injury to the revenue, and to secure the sacred freedom of the poor man's home. The French *Cadaastre*, although not original, would, from its comprehensiveness, have been, when completed, the greatest boon ever conferred upon a civilized nation by a statesman.

To say that the emperor was supported by his soldiers, is to say that he was supported by the people; because the law of conscription, that mighty staff on which France leaned when all Europe attempted to push her down,—the conscription, without which she could never have sustained the dreadful war of antagonist principles entailed upon her by the revolution,—that energetic law, which he did not establish, but which he freed from abuse, and rendered great, national, and enduring, by causing it to strike equally on all classes,—the conscription made the soldiers the real representatives of the people. The troops idolized Napoleon, well they might; and to say their attachment commenced only when they became soldiers, is to acknowledge that his excellent qualities and greatness of mind turned hatred into devotion the moment he was approached. But Napoleon never was hated by the people of France; he was their own creation, and they loved him so as never monarch was loved before. His march from Cannes to

Paris, surrounded by hundreds of thousands of poor men, who were not soldiers, can never be effaced or even disfigured. For six weeks, at any moment, a single assassin might, by a single shot, have acquired the reputation of a tyrannicide; and obtained vast rewards besides from the trembling monarchs and aristocrats of the earth, who scrupled not to instigate men to the shameful deed. Many there were base enough to undertake, none so hardy as to execute the crime; and Napoleon, guarded by the people of France, passed unharmed to a throne from whence it required a million of foreign bayonets to drive him again. From the throne they drove him, not from the thoughts and hearts of men. He has been recalled once alive, once dead!

Wellington, having shaken off the weight of the continental policy, proceeded to consider the question of invading France simply as a military operation, which might conduce to, or militate against the security of the Peninsula while Napoleon's power was weakened by the war in Germany. And such was his inflexible probity of character, that no secret ambitious promptings, no facility of gaining personal reputation, diverted him from this object; he would not evade, when he might have done so by assenting to the minister's projects for Germany and Italy, the enormous embarrassments and mortifications still attending his work, though to the surface-seeing public there appeared none. Austria's accession to the coalition favored the invasion of France, yet he relied little on the military skill of the banded sovereigns, and a defeat might at any moment dissolve their alliance. Napoleon could then reinforce Soult, and drive the allies back upon Spain, where the French still possessed the fortresses of Santona, Pampeluna, Jaca, Venasque, Monzon, Fraga, Lerida, Mequinenza, Figueras, Gerona, Hostalrich, Barcelona, Tortosa, Morella, Peniscola, Saguntum and Denia. In this view, Lord William Bentinck, misled by false information, had committed a serious error in sending Del Parque to Tudela; because the Ordal disaster and subsequent retreat showed Suchet was strong enough to drive back the Anglo-Sicilians to the Xucar. The affairs of Catalonia were, indeed, very unpromising, and it was not even certain that the British could remain there. Lord William, assured of Murat's defection, was again intent upon invading Italy; and the ministers must have leaned to that project, for Wellington now seriously demanded that they should say whether the Anglo-Sicilians were to go or stay in Spain.

Lord William Bentinck had quitted the army, making the seventh change of commanders in fifteen months, which alone accounted for an inefficiency so notorious, that the Spanish generals ridiculed its ill success, and spoke vauntingly of themselves.

Strenuously did Wellington urge the appointment of some commander who would devote himself to his business, observing that at no period of the war could he have quitted his army, even for a few days, without danger to its interests. But the English ministers' ignorance of everything relating to war was profound, and at this time he was himself being stript of generals. Graham, Picton, Leith, Lord Dalhousie, H. Clinton and Skerrett had gone or were going to England on account of sickness, wounds or private business; Beresford was at Lisbon; where dangerous intrigues, to be noticed hereafter, menaced the existence of the Portuguese army; Castaños and Giron had been removed by the Spanish regency from their commands; O'Donnell, an able officer, but of impracticable temper, being denied the chief command of Elio's, Copons' and Del Parque's troops, also quitted the army, under pretext that his old wounds had broken out, and Giron became his successor.*

But though Catalonia was thus neglected by the ministers, Wellington thought it now the most important and inviting theatre of war. The country immediately beyond the Bidassoa, which he was called upon to enter, was sterile; it would be difficult for him to feed his army there in winter; and the twenty-five thousand half-starved Spaniards under him would certainly plunder for subsistence, and incense the people of France. Soult's position was strong, his troops still numerous, and his entrenched camp furnished a secure retreat. Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de Port were so placed, that no serious invasion could be made until one or both were taken or blockaded, which, in the tempestuous season and while the Admiralty refused to furnish sufficient naval means, was scarcely possible; even to get at those fortresses would be a work of time, difficult against Soult alone, impracticable if Suchet came to his support. Towards Catalonia, therefore, Wellington desired to turn, when the frontier of the western Pyrenees should be secured by the fall of Pampeluna; and he would have taken the command there in person if Napoleon's succeeding misfortunes in Germany had not rendered it impossible to reinforce the French armies of Spain. Meanwhile, yielding something to the allied sovereigns, he thought it not amiss to spur public feeling by taking a menacing position within the French territory. This was, however, no slight military concession to political considerations.

Soult's position was the base of a triangle, Bayonne being the apex, and the great road from Irun and St. Jean Pied de Port the sides. A rugged mass of mountains intervened between the left and centre; but nearly all the valleys and communications, coming

* Wellington, MSS.

from Spain beyond the Nive, united at St. Jean Pied de Port, and were embraced by an entrenched camp, which Foy occupied in front of that fortress. He could therefore, without aid from Paris, who was at Oleron, bring fifteen thousand men, including national guards, into action, and serious dispositions were necessary to dislodge him; these could not be made secretly, and Soult would have time to aid him, and deliver battle on chosen ground. Foy thus held the right bank of the Nive, and could, by the great road leading to Bayonne, or by shorter communications through Bidaray, reach the bridge of Cambo, and gain Espelette behind the camps of Ainhoa. From thence, passing the Nivelle by the bridges of Amotz and Serres, he could reach St. Jean de Luz, and it was by this route he moved to the attack of San Marcial. The allies, indeed, marching from the Alduides and the Bastan, could, by St. Martin d'Arosa and the Gorospil mountain, also reach Bidaray, between Foy's and D'Erlon's positions; but the roads were difficult, the French frequently scoured them, the bridge of Cambo was secured by works, and Foy could not be easily cut off.

D'Erlon had an advanced camp at Urdax, and on the Mondarain and Choupera mountains; his main position was a broad ridge behind Ainhoa, the right covering the bridge of Amotz.* Beyond that bridge, Clausel's position extended along a range of strong hills, trending towards Ascaïn and Serres; and as the Nivelle swept with a curve quite round his rear, his right flank rested on that river also. The redoubts of San Barbe and the camp of Sarre, barring the roads leading from Verra and the Puerto de Echallar, were in advance of his left; the greater Rhune, whose bare rocky head lifted two thousand eight hundred feet above the sea level, overtopped all the neighboring mountains, formed, in conjunction with its dependents, the Commissari and Bayonette, a mask for his right. From the Bayonette, the line run along the Mandale or Sulcogain mountain; but from thence to the sea the ridges suddenly abated, and there were two lines of defence: the first along the Bidassoa, the second, commencing near St. Jean de Luz, stretched from the heights of Bordegain towards Ascaïn, having the camps of Urogne and the Sans Culottes in advance. Reille guarded these lines, and the second was connected with Clausel by Villatte, who was posted at Ascaïn. This system of defence was tied to that of St. Jean Pied de Port by the double bridge-head at Cambo, which secured the junction of Foy with the rest of the army.

Diligently the French worked on their entrenchments, yet they were but little advanced when the castle of San Sebastian surrendered, and Wellington, yielding to the political pressure, then

* Plans 12, p. 418, and 1, p. 18, Vol. V.

matured a plan for placing himself within the French territory. It was one to prove the idle facility with which the ministers urged measures, the nature of which they did not understand; for it involved as dangerous and daring an enterprise as any undertaken by him during the whole war. This was to seize the great Rhune mountain and its dependents, and at the same time force the passage of the lower Bidassoa, and establish his left wing in France. The Rhune, Commissari and Bayonette mountains, forming a salient menacing point, of great altitude and strength, towards the French centre, would thus be brought within his own system, and his communications would be shortened by gaining the road along the river from Irun to Vera. The port of Fuenterrabia also would fall, and, though bad in winter, be of some advantage to a general whose supplies came from the ocean; who had to encounter the perverse opposition of the Spanish authorities; and whose nearest port, Passages, was restricted in its anchorage-ground, hard to make from the sea, and dangerous when full of vessels.

He had designed this operation for the middle of September, immediately after the castle of San Sebastian fell, and before the French works acquired strength; but some error retarded the arrival of his pontoons, the weather became bad, and the attack, which depended upon the state of the tides and fords, was of necessity deferred until the 7th of October. Meanwhile, to mislead Soult, ascertain Foy's true position, and strengthen his own right, he brought up part of Del Parque's force to Pampeluna, and sent the Andalusians to Echallar. Mina's troops also gathered about Roncesvalles, and Wellington went there in person the 1st of October. As he passed the Aldudes, he caused Campbell to surprise some isolated posts on the rock of Airola, carried off two thousand French sheep from the valleys of Baygorry, and cut off a French scouting detachment.* This disquieted Soult. He expected an attack, yet could not foresee where. Deceived by false information, that Cole had reinforced Hill, he thought the movements of Mina and the Andalusians were to mask an operation by the Val de Baygorry;† the arrival of light cavalry in the Bastan, Wellington's presence at Roncesvalles, and the surprise at Airola, seemed to confirm this; but the pontoons collected at Oyarzun indicated other objects, and some deserters told him the allies aimed at the great Rhune mountain. However, a French commissary, taken at St. Sebastian, and exchanged, after remaining at Lesaca twelve days, assured him nothing at the British head-quarters indicated a serious attack, although the officers spoke of one, and

* Foy's Report MSS.

† Soult, MSS.

there were movements of troops; this weighed much with Soult, because the slow march of the pontoons and the wet weather having delayed the attack, the reports of the spies and the deserters seemed false.

It was also beyond calculation that Wellington should, against his military judgment, push his left wing into France merely to meet the wishes of the allied sovereigns in Germany; and as the most obvious line for permanent invasion was by his right and centre, there was no apparent cause for deferring his operations. The true reason of the procrastination, namely, the state of the tides and fords on the lower Bidassoa, was necessarily hidden; and Soult finally judged that Wellington only designed to secure his blockade of Pampeluna from interruption, by menacing the French, and impeding their entrenchments; nevertheless, as all the deserters and spies came with the same story, he recommended increased vigilance along the whole line. On the 6th, he reviewed d'Erlon's divisions at Ainhoa, and remained that night at Espelette, doubting if any attack was intended, and no way suspecting that it would be against his right. For Wellington could not diminish his force at Roncevalles and the Alduides, lest Foy and Paris, and the light cavalry under Pierre Soult, should unite at St. Jean Pied de Port to raise the blockade of Pampeluna; the troops at Maya menaced the line between the Nive and the Nivelle; and it was therefore only with his left wing and left centre, and against the French right, that he could act, and that seemed too dangerous.

Early in October, twelve hundred British soldiers arrived from England; Mina was then in the Ahescoa, on the right of Hill, who was thus enabled to relieve Campbell's Portuguese in the Alduides; and the latter, marching to Maya, replaced the third division, which, shifting to its left, occupied the heights above Zagaramurdi to enable the seventh division to relieve Giron's Andalusians in the Puerto de Echallar. These dispositions were made for the attack of the great Rhune and its dependents, which was arranged in the following manner.

Giron, moving from the Ivantelly, was to assail a lofty ridge, or saddle, uniting the Commissari and the great Rhune; one battalion, stealing up the slopes and hollows on his right flank; was to seize the rocky head of the last-named mountain, to place detachments there, to watch the roads leading round it from Sarre and Ascain, and thereto descend upon the saddle and menace the rear of the enemy, at the Puerto de Vera.* The principal attack was to be made in two columns; but to protect the right and rear against a counter-attack from Sarre, Giron was to leave a brigade in the

* Plan 12, page 418. Order of Movements, MSS.

narrow pass leading to Sarre from Vera, between the Ivantelly and the Rhune.

On the left of Giron, the light division was to assail the Bayonette mountain and the Puerto de Vera, connecting its right with Giron's left by skirmishers.

Longa, who had resumed his old positions above the Salinas de Lesaca, was to move in two columns across the Bidassoa; one, passing by the ford of Salinas, was to aid the left wing of the light division in its attack on the Bayonette; the other, passing by the bridge of Vera, was to move up the ravine separating the slopes of the Bayonette from the Puerto de Vera, and thus connect the attacks of the light division. During these operations, Longa was to send some men over the river at Andarlasa, and seize a telegraph which the French used to communicate between the left and centre of their line.

Behind the light division, Cole was to hold Santa Barbara, pushing forward detachments to secure the commanding points gained by the fighting troops. The sixth division was to make a demonstration on the right, by Urdax and Zagaramurdi, against D'Erlon's advanced posts. Thus, without weakening his line between Roncevalles and Echallar, Wellington put nearly twenty thousand men in motion against the Rhune mountain and its dependents; and he had still twenty-four thousand disposable to force the passage of the lower Bidassoa.

From Andarlasa to Biriatu, three miles, there were neither roads nor fords nor bridges; the French, trusting to this difficulty of approach and to their entrenchments on the craggy slopes of the Mandale, had collected their troops principally where the Bildox or green mountain, and the entrenched camp of Biriatu overlooked the fords. Against those points, Wellington directed Freyre's Spaniards. They were to descend from San Marcial, cross the upper fords of Biriatu, assail the Bildox and Mandale mountains, and turn the left of that part of the French line, which passed behind the town of Andaya.

Between Biriatu and the sea the advanced points of defence were the mountain of *Louis XIV.*, the ridge called the *Caffé Republicain*, and the town of Andaya. Behind these, the *Calvaire d'Urogne*, the *Croix des Bouquets*, and the camp of the *Sans Culottes*, served as rallying posts. Against them were set the first and fifth divisions, and the unattached brigades of Wilson and Lord Aylmer, in all fifteen thousand men.

The Spanish fishermen had secretly discovered three fords, practicable at low water, between the bridge of Behobia and the sea, and Wellington decided to pass his columns there; using the

old fords above bridge and these new ones below bridge, although the tides rose sixteen feet, leaving at ebb heavy sands not less than half-a-mile broad; and though his bank was overlooked from the French hills, which were also strong for defence. But relying on his previous measures, he affronted all these dangers. It appeared so unlikely that a general having a better line of operations on his right, should attempt to pass the Bidassoa at its mouth, that Soult was completely deceived; his lieutenants on that side were also negligent. Of Reille's two divisions, one under Boyer was at the camp of Urogne, and on the morning of the 7th was, as usual, laboring at the works; Villatte was at Ascain and Serres; Maucune's division, five thousand strong, was indeed in line, but unexpectant of an attack; and though the works on the Mandale were finished, and those at Biriatu in a forward state, from the latter to the sea the entrenchments were scarcely commenced.

Passage of the Bidassoa.—The night set in heavily. A sullen thunder-storm, gathering about the craggy crown of the Pena de Haya, came slowly down its flanks, and towards morning, rolling over the Bidassoa, fell in its greatest violence upon the French positions. During this turmoil, Wellington, whose pontoons and artillery were close up to Irun, disposed a number of guns and howitzers along the crest of San Marcial, and his columns attained their respective stations along the banks of the river. Freyre's Spaniards, a brigade of the guards, and Wilson's Portuguese, stretching from the Biriatu fords to that near the broken bridge of Behobia, were ensconced behind the detached ridge which the French had first seized in the attack of the 31st. A second brigade of guards and the Germans of the first division were concealed near Irun, at a ford below the bridge of Behobia called the great Jonco. The British brigades of the fifth division were directed to cover themselves behind a large river embankment opposite Andaya; Sprye's Portuguese and Lord Aylmer's brigade were posted in the ditch of Fuenterrabia.

All the tents were left standing in the camps of the allies, and the enemy could perceive no change on the morning of the 7th; but at seven o'clock, the fifth division and Lord Aylmer's brigade, emerging from their concealment, took the sands in two columns; that on the left pointed against the French camp of the Sans Culottes, that on the right against the ridge of Andaya. No shot was fired until they had passed the fords of the low-water channel, when a rocket was sent up from the steeple of Fuenterrabia as a signal. Then the artillery opened from San Marcial; the troops near Irun, covered by the fire of a battery, made for the Jonco ford, and the passage above the bridge also commenced. From

the crest of San Marcial seven columns could now be seen at once, moving on a line of five miles; those above bridge plunging at once into the fiery contest, those below appearing in the distance like huge sullen snakes winding over the heavy sands. The Germans, missing the Jonco ford, got into deep water, yet quickly recovered the true line; and the French, completely surprised, permitted even the brigades of the fifth division to gain the right bank and form their lines, before a hostile musket flashed.

Soult heard the cannonade of San Marcial at Espelette; and at the same time the sixth division, advancing beyond Urdax and Zagaramurdi, made a false attack on D'Erlon's positions. A Portuguese brigade under Colonel Douglas, being pushed too far, were repulsed with the loss of one hundred and fifty men; the French marshal, having thus detected the true nature of this attack, then hurried to his right, but his camps on the Bidassoa were lost before he arrived. For when the British artillery first opened, Maucune's troops had assembled at their different posts of defence, and the French guns, established principally near the mountain of Louis XIV. and the Caffé Republicain, commenced firing. The alarm spread, and Boyer marched from Urogne to support Maucune, without waiting for the junction of the working parties; but his brigades moved separately as they could collect, and before the first came into action, Sprye's Portuguese, forming the extreme left of the allies, was menacing the Sans Culottes; thither, therefore, one of Boyer's regiments was ordered, while the others advanced by the royal road towards the Croix des Bouquets. But Andaya, guarded only by a piquet, was abandoned; and Reille, thinking the camp of the Sans Culottes would be lost before Boyer's men could reach it, sent a battalion there from the centre; thus weakening his force at the chief point of attack, because the British brigades of the fifth division were now advancing from Andaya, and bearing under a sharp fire of artillery and musketry towards the Croix des Bouquets.

By this time, the columns of the first division had passed the river: one above bridge, preceded by Wilson's Portuguese; one below, preceded by Halket's German light troops; who, aided by the fire of the guns on San Marcial, drove back the enemy's advanced posts, won the Caffé Republicain, the mountain of Louis XIV., and drove the French from those heights to the Croix des Bouquets. This was the key of the position, and towards it guns and troops were now hastening from every side; the Germans, who had lost many men in the previous attacks, were brought to a check, for the heights were strong, and Boyer's leading battalions close at hand; but at this moment, Cameron arrived with the ninth

regiment, and passing through the German skirmishers, rushed with great vehemence to the summit of the first height. The French infantry opened ranks to let the guns retire, and then retreated themselves at full speed to a second ridge, somewhat lower, but where they could only be approached on a narrow front. Cameron as quickly threw his men into a single column, and bore against this new position, which curving inwards, enabled the French to pour a concentrated fire upon his regiment; nor did his violent course seem to dismay them until he was within ten yards, when appalled by the furious shout and charge of the ninth, they gave way and the ridges of the Croix des Bouquets were won as far as the royal road. The British regiment lost many men and officers, and during the fight the French artillery and scattered troops coming from different points and rallying on Boyer's battalions, gathered on the ridges to the French left of the road.

Above Biriatu and the Bildox, the entrenched camp had been defended with success in front; but Freyre turned it with his right wing, which being opposed only by a single battalion, soon won the Mandale mountain, and the French fell back from that quarter to the Calvaire d'Urogne and Jollimont. Reille, beaten at the Croix des Bouquets, and having his flanks turned by the Mandale and along the sea-coast, retreated in disorder along the royal causeway and the old road of Bayonne. He passed through the village of Urogne, and the British skirmishers entered it in pursuit, but they were beaten out by Boyer's second brigade; and now Soult arriving with part of Villatte's reserve and many guns, restored order, and revived the courage of the troops, just as the retreat was degenerating into a flight.

Reille lost eight guns and four hundred men, the allies six hundred, half being Spaniards; so slight and easy had the skill of the general rendered this stupendous operation. But if Soult, penetrating Wellington's design, had opposed all his troops, amounting, with what Villatte could spare, to sixteen thousand, instead of the five thousand actually engaged, the passage could scarcely have been forced; and a check would have been tantamount to a terrible defeat, because in two hours the returning tide would have come with a swallowing flood upon the rear.

Equally unprepared were the French on the side of Vera, although the struggle there proved more fierce and constant.

Giron had descended from the Ivantelly rocks, and Alten from the ridge of St. Barbara at daybreak; the first to the pass leading from Vera to Sarre, the last to the town of Vera, where he was joined by half of Longa's force. The forty-third British, the seventeenth Portuguese, and the first and third battalions of rifle-

men drew up in column, on an open space, to the right of Vera; the fifty-second, two battalions of the caçadores, and a battalion of British riflemen, under Colonel Colborne, were disposed on the left of Vera. Half of Longa's division was between these columns, the other half, crossing the ford of Salinas, drew up on Colborne's left; the narrow vale of Vera was thus filled with troops ready to ascend the mountains; and Cole, displaying his force to advantage on the heights of Santa Barbara, presented a formidable reserve.

Taupin's division guarded the enormous French positions. His right was on the Bayonette, from whence a single slope descended to a small plain about two parts down the mountain; from this platform, three tongues shot into the valley below, each defended by an advanced post; the platform itself was secured by a star redoubt, behind which, half way up the slope, there was a second retrenchment with abbatis. Another large redoubt, and an unfinished breast-work on the crest of the Bayonette completed the system.

The Commissari, which is a continuation of the Bayonette towards the great Rhune, was covered by a profound gulf, thickly wooded, and defended with skirmishers; between this gulf and another of the same nature, the main road, leading from Vera over the Puerto, pierced the centre of the French position. Rugged and ascending with short abrupt turns, this road was blocked at every uncovered point with abbatis and small retrenchments; each obstacle was commanded at half musket shot by small detachments placed on all the projecting parts overlooking the ascent; and a regiment, entrenched above in the Puerto, connected the troops on the crest of the Bayonette and Commissari with those on the saddle ridge, against which Giron's attack was directed.

Between Alten's right and Giron's left, was an isolated ridge called by the soldiers the *Boar's back*, the summit of which, half a mile long and rounded at each end, was occupied by four French companies. This huge cavalier, thrown as it were into the gulf to cover the Puerto and saddle ridges, although of mean height in comparison of the towering ranges behind, was yet so great that the few warning shots fired from the summit by the enemy, reached the allies at its base with that slow singing sound which marks the dying force of a musket-ball. It was essential to take the Boar's back before the general attack commenced, and five companies of British riflemen, supported by the seventeenth Portuguese regiment, were ordered to assail it at the Vera end, while one of Giron's battalions, preceded by a detached company of the forty-third, attacked it on the other.

At four o'clock in the morning, Clausel received intelligence

that the Bayonette was to be assaulted that day or the next;* at seven o'clock, he heard from Conroux, who commanded at Sarre, that Giron's camps were abandoned, but the tents of the seventh division were still standing; at the same time, musketry was heard on the side of Urdax, a cannonade on the side of Irun, and Taupin reported that the vale of Vera was filled with troops. To this last quarter, Clausel hurried. The Spaniards had already driven Conroux's outposts from the gorge leading to Sarre, and a detachment was creeping up towards the unguarded head of the great Rhune; he immediately ordered four regiments of Conroux's division to occupy the summit, the front, and the flanks of that mountain, and he formed a reserve of two other regiments: with these troops, he designed to secure the mountain and support Taupin, but ere they could reach their destination that general's fate was decided.

Second Combat at Vera.†—At seven o'clock, a few cannon-shot from some mountain-guns, of which each side had a battery, were followed by the Spanish musketry on the right, and the next moment the Boar's back was simultaneously assailed at both ends. On the Vera side, the riflemen ascended to a small pine-wood two-thirds of the way up, and there rested; but soon resuming their movement, with a scornful gallantry they swept the French off the top, disdaining to use their rifles beyond a few shots down the reverse side, to show they were masters of the ridge. This was the signal for the general attack. The Portuguese followed the victorious sharp-shooters,—the forty-third, preceded by their own skirmishers, and the remainder of the riflemen of the right wing, plunged into the rugged pass,—Longa's troops entered the gloomy wooded ravine on the left. Colborne's brigade, moving by narrow paths and throwing out skirmishers, assailed the Bayonette; the fifty-second took the middle tongue, the caçadores and riflemen the two outermost, and all bore with a concentric movement against the star redoubt on the platform above. Longa's second brigade should have skirted the left of this attack, but knowing little of such warfare, quietly followed the riflemen.

Soon the open slopes were covered with men and with fire, a mingled sound of shouts and musketry filled the deep hollows between, and the white smoke came curling up above the dark forest trees in their gloomy recesses. The French scattered on the mountain side seemed weak, and Kempt's brigade easily forced all the retrenchments on the main pass; his skirmishers then spread wider, and formed small detachments of support as the depth of

* Clausel's Report, MSS.

† Plan 1.

the ravine lessened and the slopes melted into the higher ridges. Half way up an open space gave a clear view over the Bayonette and all eyes were turned that way. Longa's right brigade, fighting in the gulf between, seemed laboring and over-matched; but beyond, on the open space in front of the star fort, Colborne's caçadores and riflemen were coming out in small bodies from a forest below the edge of the platform. Their fire was sharp, their pace rapid, and they closed upon the redoubt in mass as if resolved to storm it. The fifty-second were not then in sight, and the French seeing only dark clothing thought all were Portuguese and rushed in close order out of the entrenchment; they were numerous and very sudden, the rifle is unequal to the musket and bayonet, and this rough charge sent the scattered assailants back over the rocky edge of the descent. With shrill cries the French followed, but just then the fifty-second appeared, partly in line, partly in column, and raising their shout rushed forward. The red uniform and full career of this regiment startled the adventurous French; they stopped short, wavered, turned and fled to their entrenchment; the fifty-second entered the works with them, the riflemen and caçadores rallied and passed it on both flanks, and for a few moments everything was hidden by a dense volume of smoke. Soon however the British shout pealed again and the whole mass emerged on the other side, the French flying, until the second entrenchment enabled them to make another stand.

Then with exulting cheers Kempt's brigade made the mountain side ring, and with renewed vigor the men scaled the craggy mountain, fighting their toilsome way to the top of the Puerto. Meanwhile Colborne carried the second entrenchment above the star fort; but he was brought to a check by the works on the crest of the mountain, from whence the French plied their musketry at a great advantage and rolled huge stones down the steep. These works were extensive, well lined with men, and strengthened by a large redoubt on the right; yet their left was already turned by Kempt, and the effects of Wellington's skilful combinations were now felt in another quarter.

Freyre, after carrying the Mandale mountain, had pushed to the road leading from the Bayonette by Jollimont to St. Jean de Luz; this was the line of retreat for Taupin's right-wing; but Freyre got there first, and if Longa, instead of following Colborne, had spread out widely on the left a military line would have been completed from Giron to Freyre. Still Taupin's right was cut off on that side, and he was forced to file under fire along the crest of the Bayonette to reach the Puerto de Vera road, where he was joined by his centre: he effected this but lost his battery and three

hundred men. These last, apparently the garrison of the large fort on the extreme right of the Bayonette crest, were captured by Colborne in a remarkable manner. Accompanied by only one of his staff and half-a-dozen riflemen, he crossed their march unexpectedly, and with great presence of mind ordered them to lay down their arms; an order which they, thinking themselves entirely cut off, obeyed! And all the French skirmishers, in the deep ravine between the two lines of attack were likewise taken; for being feebly pushed by Longa's troops they retreated too slowly, got entangled in the rocks and surrendered to Kempt's brigade. Taupin's right and centre being thus completely beaten fled down the mountain towards Olette pursued by a part of the allies, but they rallied on Villatte, who was in order of battle between Urogne and Ascian. The Bayonette and Commissari, with the Puerto de Vera, were won in this manner after five hours' incessant fighting and toiling up their craggy sides; nevertheless the battle was still maintained by the French on the Rhune.

Giroun, after driving Conroux's advanced post out of the gorge leading from Vera to Sarre, had pushed a battalion towards the head of the great Rhune, and placed a reserve in the gorge to cover his rear from any counter-attack. But when the taking of the Boar's back freed his left wing he fought his way up abreast with the British line until near the saddle-ridge, a little to the right of the Puerto. There he was arrested by a strong line of abbatis and the heavy fire of two French regiments. The Spaniards stopped, and though the adventurer Downie, now a Spanish general, encouraged them and they kept their ranks, they seemed irresolute and did not advance; but it happened that an officer of the forty-third regiment, named Havelock, attached to Alten's staff, had been sent to ascertain Giron's progress, and his fiery temper could not brook the check. Taking off his hat he called upon the Spaniards to follow him, and putting spurs to his horse at one bound cleared the abbatis, and went headlong amongst the enemy. Then the soldiers, shouting for "*El chico blanco*," "*the fair boy*," so they called him, for he was very young and had light hair, with one shock broke through the French; and this at the very moment when their centre was flying under the fire of Kempt's skirmishers from the Puerto de Vera.

The defeated troops retired by their left along the saddle-ridge to the flanks of the Rhune. Clausel had thus eight regiments concentrated on this great mountain. Two occupied the crest and the rock called the Hermitage; four were on the flanks, descending towards Ascain on one hand, and Sarre on the other; the remaining two occupied a lower and parallel crest behind called the small

Rhune. Giron's right wing first dislodged a small body from a detached pile of crags about musket-shot below the summit, and then assailed the bald staring rocks of the Hermitage itself; endeavoring at the same time to turn it by the right, but the attempt was quite defeated; the Hermitage was impregnable; the French rolled down stones large enough to sweep away a whole column at once, and the Spaniards resorted to a distant musketry which lasted until night. Taupin had two generals and four hundred men killed and wounded, and five hundred prisoners. The loss of the allies was nearly a thousand, of which five hundred were Spaniards, and the success was not complete; for while the French kept possession of the summit of the Rhune, the allies' new position was insecure. The front and right flank of that mountain were impregnable; but Wellington observing that the left flank descending towards Sarre was less inaccessible, concentrated the Spaniards on that side the 8th; designing a combined attack against the mountain itself, and against the camp of Sarre. The rocks studding the lower slopes were assailed by the Spaniards, and detachments of the seventh division descended from the Puerto de Echallar upon the fort of San Barbe, and other outworks covering the French camp of Sarre.

The Andalusians then won the rocks and an entrenched height commanding the camp; for Clausel, alarmed at some demonstrations now made by the sixth division towards the bridge of Amotz, thought he should be cut off from his great camp, and suddenly abandoned not only the slope of the Rhune, but all his advanced works in the basin below, including the fort of San Barbe. His troops were thus concentrated on the height behind Sarre, still holding with their right the smaller Rhune, but the consequences of his error were soon made apparent. Wellington established a strong body of Spaniards close to the Hermitage; and the French regiments there, seeing the lower slopes and San Barbe given up, imagined they also would be cut off and without orders abandoned their impregnable rocks in the night, retiring to the smaller Rhune. Next morning some of the seventh division rashly pushed into the village of Sarre, but were quickly repulsed and would have lost the camp and works taken the day before, if the Spaniards had not succored them.

In the three days' fighting, fourteen hundred French and sixteen hundred of the allies, one half being Spaniards, were killed or wounded, but many of the latter were not brought in until the third day; and several perished miserably where they fell, it being impossible to discover them in those vast solitudes; some men also were lost from want of discipline; for, having descended into the

French villages, they got drunk, and were taken next day by the enemy. Nor was the number small of those who plundered in defiance of Wellington's proclamation. He arrested and sent to England several officers, and renewed his proclamation, saying, if he had five times as many men, he could not venture to invade France, unless marauding was prevented; and it is remarkable that the French troops, on the same day, acted towards their own countrymen in the same manner. But Soult also checked the mischief with a vigorous hand, causing a captain of some reputation to be shot as an example, for having suffered his men to plunder a house in Sarre during the action.

These operations had been eminently successful, and the bravery of troops who assailed and carried such stupendous positions must be admired. To them, the unfinished state of the French works was not visible. Day after day, for more than a month, entrenchment had risen over entrenchment, covering the vast slopes of mountains which were scarcely accessible from their natural steepness and asperity. This they could see, yet cared neither for the growing strength of the works, the height of the mountains, nor the breadth of the river with its heavy sands and its mighty rushing tide; all were despised; and while they assailed with confident valor, the French fought in defence of their dizzy steeps with less fierceness than, when striving against insurmountable obstacles, they attempted to storm the lofty rocks of Sauroren. Continual defeat had lowered their spirit, but the feebleness of the defence, on this occasion, may be traced to another cause. It was a general's not a soldier's battle. Wellington had, with overmastering combinations, overwhelmed each point of attack. Taupin's and Maucune's divisions, each less than five thousand strong, were separately assailed, the first by eighteen the second by fifteen thousand men; and at neither point were Reille and Clausel able to bring their reserves into action before the positions were won.

Soult complained that he had repeatedly told his lieutenants an attack was to be expected, and recommended extreme vigilance;* yet they were quite unprepared, although they heard the noise of the guns and pontoons about Irun on the night of the 5th, and again on the night of the 6th. The passage of the river, he said, had commenced at seven o'clock, long after daylight; the allies' masses were then clearly seen forming on the banks, and there was time for Boyer to arrive before the Croix des Bouquets was lost. Thus, the battle was fought in disorder, with less than five thousand men, instead of with ten thousand in good order, and supported by a part of Villatte's reserve. To this negligence, the generals

* Soult's MSS.

also added great despondency. They had so little confidence in the strength of their positions, that if the allies had pushed vigorously forward before the marshal's arrival from Espelette, they would have entered St. Jean de Luz, turned the right of the second position, and forced the French army back upon the Nive and Adour. This was true, but the stroke did not belong to Wellington's system. He could not go beyond the Adour, he doubted whether he could even maintain his army during the winter in the position he had already gained; and he was averse to the experiment, while Pampeluna held out and the war in Germany bore an undecided aspect.

CHAPTER V.

Soult retakes the redoubt of Sarre—Wellington organizes the army in three great divisions under Sir Rowland Hill, marshal Beresford, and Sir John Hope—Disinterested conduct of the last-named officer—Soult's immense entrenchments described—His correspondence with Suchet—Proposes to retake the offensive, and unite their armies in Aragon—Suchet will not accede to his views, and makes inaccurate statements—Lord Wellington, hearing of advantages gained by the allied sovereigns in Germany, resolves to invade France—Blockade and fall of Pampeluna—Lord Wellington organizes a brigade under Lord Aylmer to besiege Santona, but afterwards changes his design.

SOULT was apprehensive for some days that Wellington would push his operations further; but when he knew from Foy, and by the numbers assembled on his right, there was no design to attack his left, he resumed his labors on the works covering St. Jean de Luz*. He also kept a vigilant watch from his centre, holding his troops in readiness to concentrate towards Sarre; and when he saw the heavy masses in his front disperse by degrees into different camps, he directed Clausel to recover the San Barbe. This work, constructed on a comparatively low ridge, barred issue from the gorge leading from Vera to Sarre; and it defended the narrow ground between the Rhunes and the Nivelle river. Abandoned on the 8th without reason by the French, since it did not naturally belong to the position of the allies, it was now occupied by a Spanish piquet of forty men; some battalions were encamped in a small wood close behind, and many officers and men slept in the fort. On the night of the 12th, three of Conroux's battalions reached the platform on which the fort stood, without being perceived and escalated; the troops behind it went off in confusion at the first alarm, and two hundred soldiers with fifteen officers were made prisoners. The Spaniards made a vigorous effort to

* Soult, MSS.

recover the fort at daylight, were repulsed, and repeated the attempt with five battalions; Clausel then brought up two guns and a sharp skirmish took place in the wood for several hours, the French endeavoring to regain the whole of their old entrenchments, the Spaniards to recover the fort. Neither succeeded, and San Barbe, too near the enemy's position to be safely held, was resigned, with a loss of two hundred men by the French and five hundred by the Spaniards. Soon after this isolated action, a French sloop freighted with stores for Santona attempted to run from St. Jean de Luz, and being chased by three English brigs and out off from the open sea, her crew, after exchanging a few distant shots with one of the brigs, set her on fire, and escaped in their boats to the Adour.

Head-quarters were now fixed in Vera, and the allied army was organized in three grand divisions. The right, having Mina and Morillo attached to it, was commanded by Hill, and extended from Roncevalles to the Bastan. The centre, occupying Maya, the Echallar, Rhune and Bayonette mountains, was given to Beresford. The left, extending from the Mandale mountain to the sea, was under Sir John Hope. This officer succeeded Graham, who had returned to England. Commanding in chief at Coruña, after Sir John Moore's death, he was superior in rank to Lord Wellington during the early part of the peninsular war; but when the latter obtained the baton of field-marshal at Vittoria, Hope, with a patriotism and modesty worthy of the pupil of Abercrombie, the friend of Moore, offered to serve as second in command; and Wellington joyfully accepted him, saying he was the "*ablest officer in the army.*"

On the right and centre the positions were offensive, but the left was still defensive; and the Bidassoa, impassable at high water below the bridge, was close behind. The ridges were, however, strong, and powerful batteries established on the right bank; field-works were constructed; and though the fords below Behobia were dangerous for retreat, even at low water, those above were secure, and there was a pontoon-bridge. The front run along the heights of Croix des Bouquets, facing Urogne and the camp of the Sans Culottes; the reserve was entrenched above Andaya; the right rested on the Mandale, and from that mountain and the Bayonette the allies could flank an attacking army. Soult, however, looked only to defence. He had not more than seventy-nine thousand old soldiers under arms, including officers and artillerymen. His garrisons absorbed thirteen thousand, leaving sixty-six thousand in the field; whereas the allies, counting Mina's and Del Parque's troops, now at Tudela, Pampeluna and the Val de Irati, exceeded one hundred thousand; seventy-three thousand, including

officers, sergeants and artillerymen, being British and Portuguese.* The French marshal thought there were more; for exaggerated reports made Del Parque twenty thousand strong, and gave Wellington one hundred and forty thousand combatants. But it was not so, and as good conscripts were joining the French army rapidly, and the national guards of the Pyrenees were many, it was in the number of soldiers, rather than of men, the English general had the advantage.

Soult's policy was to maintain a strict defensive, under cover of which the spirit of the troops might be revived, the country in rear organized, and the conscripts hardened to war. The loss of the lower Bidassoa had an injurious effect upon the spirit of the frontier departments, and gave encouragement to the secret partisans of the Bourbons, but in a military view it was a relief. For the great development of the mountains bordering the Bidassoa had rendered their defence difficult, the line could always be pierced, and the army suddenly driven beyond the Adour. The position was now more concentrated. The right, under Reille, was on two lines. One across the royal road on the fortified heights of Urogne and the camp of the Sans Culottes;† the other in the entrenched camps of Bourdegain and Belchena, covering St. Jean de Luz and barring the gorges of Olhette and Jollimont. The centre under Clausel, was on the ridges between Ascain and Amotz, holding the smaller Rhune in advance; one division was however retained in the camp of Serres on the right of the Nivelle, overhanging Ascain; to replace it, one of D'Erlon's divisions was on the left of that river, reinforcing Clausel's left above Sarre. Villatte's reserve was about St. Jean de Luz, having the Italian brigade in the camp of Serres. D'Erlon's remaining divisions continued in their old position, the right connected with Clausel's line by the bridge of Amotz; the left held the Choupera and Mondarin mountains bordering on the Nive.

Behind Clausel and D'Erlon Soult had commenced a second chain of entrenched camps, prolonged from the camp of Serres up the right bank of the Nivelle to San Pè; thence by Suraide to the double bridge-head of Cambo on the Nive; and beyond that river to the Ursouia mountain, covering the great road from Bayonne to St. Jean Pied de Port. He called Paris from Oleron to the defence of the latter fortress and its entrenched camp; and drew Foy down the Nive to Bidarray, half-way between St. Jean Pied de Port and Cambo. Foy thus watched the issues from the Val de Baygorry, and could occupy the Ursouia mountain on the right of

* Appendix 29, § 2.

† Plan 12, p. 418, and 1, p. 18, Vol. V.

the Nive, or, moving by Cambo, reinforce the position on the left of that river.

To complete these immense entrenchments, and between the Nive and the sea they were double, on an opening of sixteen miles, the whole army labored incessantly; and all the resources of the country in materials or workmen were called out by requisition. This defensive warfare was however justly regarded by Soult as unsuitable to the general state of affairs; the offensive was most consonant to the character of the French soldiers, and also to the exigencies of the time. Experience had indeed shown the impregnable nature of the allies' position, and he was too weak singly to change the theatre of operations; but when he considered how strong the armies appropriated to the Spanish contest were, he thought France would be ill-served if her generals could not resume the offensive successfully. Suchet had proved his power at Ordal. Lord William's successor, of inferior rank and power, having an army unpaid, and feeding on salt meat from the ships, and Spanish colleagues unwilling to act cordially or upon a fixed plan, was in no condition to menace the French seriously. And that he was permitted to paralyze fifty or sixty thousand excellent French troops possessing all the strong places of the country, was one of the most singular errors of the war.

Exclusive of national guards and detachments of the line, disposed along the frontier to guard France against marauding excursions, there were available one hundred and seventy thousand men and seventeen thousand horses.* One hundred and thirty-eight thousand were present under arms, and thirty thousand conscripts were in march to join them; they held all the fortresses of Valencia and Catalonia, and most of those in Aragon, Navarre, and Guipuscoa; and they could all unite behind the Pyrenees for a combined effort. Wellington could not, including the Anglo-Sicilians and the Spaniards on the eastern coast, bring into line one hundred and fifty thousand men; he had several sieges on his hands; and to unite his forces at any point required skilful dispositions to cover flank marches. Suchet had thirty thousand disposable men and could make them forty thousand by relinquishing some unimportant posts; and as his artillery means were immense, and distributed in all his strong places, he could furnish himself from almost any point. Ninety thousand old soldiers and two hundred guns might therefore have been united on Wellington's flank; thirty thousand conscripts and the frontier national guards would have remained. These based on the fortresses and camps of Bayonne and of St. Jean Pied de Port, and on the castles of Jaca and

* Appendix 30, § 2.

Navarens, would recover the northern parts while the numerous fortresses of Catalonia would protect France on the south.

To make this great power bear in a right direction was Soult's object, but he could never persuade Suchet to adopt his projects; and that marshal's resistance would appear to have sprung from personal dislike contracted during Soult's sojourn near Valencia, in 1812. It has been shown how lightly he abandoned Aragon after quitting Valencia; he did not, indeed, then know that Soult commanded, and was preparing his great effort to relieve Pampeluna; but he knew Clausel and Paris were on the side of Jaca, and that to menace Wellington's flank would palliate the defeat at Vittoria. At Zaragoza, he had a large garrison and an immense artillery dépôt; from thence, he could, by Jaca, have communicated quickly and surely with Soult; and thus acting in concert, they would have succored Pampeluna.

Soult had not time to communicate with Suchet. He quitted Dresden the 4th of July, reached Bayonne the 12th, and on the 20th, he was in march towards St. Jean Pied de Port; and it was during this rapid journey Suchet abandoned Valencia. Soult therefore knew nothing of Suchet's plans, of his forces, of his movements, of his actual positions. However, between the 6th and 16th of August, immediately after the retreat from Sauron, he urged Suchet to march upon Zaragoza, open a communication by Jaca, and thus aid the effort to relieve San Sebastian. As an inducement, he stated that his recent operations had caused troops actually in march under Hill towards Catalonia to be recalled; this was an error; his emissaries were deceived by the movements and counter-movements in pursuit of Clausel after the battle of Vittoria, and by the change in Wellington's plans as to the siege of Pampeluna. No troops were sent towards Catalonia; but it is remarkable that Picton, Hill, Graham and O'Donnell were all mentioned in this correspondence between Soult and Suchet as being actually in Catalonia, or on the march; the three first having been really sounded as to taking the command in that quarter, and the last having demanded it himself.

Suchet treated the proposal as chimerical. His movable troops did not, he said, exceed eleven thousand, and a march upon Zaragoza with so few men would be to renew the disaster of Baylen; unless he could fly into France by Venasque, where he had a garrison. This extraordinary view of affairs he supported by statements still more extraordinary. "*Hill had joined Lord William Bentinck with twenty-four thousand men.*"—" *La Bisbal had arrived with fifteen thousand.*"—" *There were more than two hundred thousand men on the lower Ebro.*"—" *The Spanish insurrection was*

general and strongly organized."—"He had recovered the garrison of Tarragona and destroyed the works, and he must revictual Barcelona, and then withdraw to the vicinity of Gerona and remain on the defensive!"

This letter was written the 23d of August. Lord William had then retreated from the Gaya to the mountains above Hospitalet; the imperial muster-rolls prove that the two armies of Catalonia and Aragon, both under Suchet's command, exceeded sixty-five thousand men, fifty-six thousand being present under arms.* Thirty thousand were united in the field when he received Soult's letter; there was nothing to prevent him marching by Tortosa, except Lord William's army, which had just acknowledged, by a retreat, its inability to cope with him; there was nothing at all to prevent him marching by Lerida. O'Donnel had thrown up his command from bad health, leaving his troops under Giron on the Echallar mountains; Hill was at Roncevalles, and not a man had moved from Wellington's army. Elio and Roche were near Valencia in a starving condition; the Anglo-Sicilians, only fourteen thousand strong, including Whittingham's division, were on the barren mountains above Hospitalet, where no Spanish army could remain; Del Parque and Sarsfield had gone over the Ebro, Copons had taken refuge in the mountains of Cervera. In fine, not two hundred thousand, but less than thirty-five thousand men, half-organized, ill-fed and scattered from Vich to Vinaros, were opposed to Suchet; and their generals had different views and different lines of operations—the Anglo-Sicilians could not abandon the coast, Copons could not abandon the mountains. Del Parque soon afterwards marched to Navarre, and, to use Wellington's phrase, there was nothing to prevent Suchet "*tumbling Lord William Bentinck back even to the Xucar.*" The nature of the insurrection which Suchet pretended to dread shall be shown when the political condition of Spain is treated of.

Suchet's errors respecting the allies were easily detected by Soult. Those touching the French in Catalonia he could not suspect, and acquiesced in the objections to his first plan; but fertile of resource, he immediately proposed another, akin to that which he had urged Joseph to adopt in 1812, after the battle of Salamanca; namely, to change the theatre of war. The fortresses in Spain would, he said, inevitably fall before the allies in succession, if the French armies remained on the defensive, and the only mode of rendering offensive operations successful was a general concentration of means and unity of action. The levy of conscripts under an imperial decree issued in August, would furnish, in conjunction

* Appendix 30, § 2.

with the dépôts of the interior, a reinforcement of forty thousand men; ten thousand would form a sufficient corps of observation about Gerona; and he hoped that, by sacrificing some posts, Suchet could bring twenty thousand infantry to the field. He could have produced forty thousand; but Soult, misled by his erroneous statements, assumed only twenty thousand; and he calculated that he could himself bring thirty-five or forty thousand good infantry and all his cavalry to a given point of junction for the two bodies between Tarbes and Pau. Fifteen thousand of the remaining conscripts were also to go there; and thus seventy or seventy-five thousand infantry, all the cavalry of both armies, and one hundred guns, would be suddenly assembled to thread the narrow pass of Jaca, and descend upon Aragon. Once in that kingdom, they could attack the allied troops in Navarre if the latter were dispersed; and if they were united, retire upon Zaragoza, there to fix a solid base and deliver a general battle upon the new line of operations. Meanwhile, the fifteen thousand unappropriated conscripts might reinforce twenty or twenty-five thousand old soldiers left to cover Bayonne.

An army so great and strongly constituted appearing in Aragon would, Soult argued, necessarily raise the blockades of Pampeluna, Jaca, Fraga, and Monzon, and it was probable Tortosa and even Saguntum would be relieved; the great difficulty was to pass the guns by Jaca; yet he was resolved to try, even though he should convey them upon trucks to be made in Paris and sent by post to Pau. He anticipated no serious inconvenience from the union of the troops in France, since Suchet had already declared his intention of retiring towards Gerona; and on the Bayonne side, the army to be left there could dispute the entrenched line between Cambo and St. Jean de Luz. If driven from thence, it could take a flanking position behind the Nive; the right resting upon the entrenched camp of Bayonne, the left upon the works at Cambo, and holding communication by the fortified mountain of Ursoria with St. Jean Pied de Port. There could be little fear for this secondary force when the great army was once in Aragon; but what he dreaded was delay, because a fall of snow, always to be expected after the middle of October, would entirely close the pass of Jaca.

This proposition, written the 2d of September, immediately after the battle of San Marcial, reached Suchet the 11th, and was peremptorily rejected. If he withdrew from Catalonia, discouragement, he said, would spread, desertion would commence, and France be immediately invaded by Lord William Bentinck, at the head of fifty thousand men. The pass of Jaca was impracticable, and the power of man could not open it for carriages under a year's labor.

His wish was to act on the defensive, but if an offensive movement was absolutely necessary, he offered a counter-project; that is, he would first make the English in his front re-embark at Tarragona, or he would drive them over the Ebro, and then march with one hundred guns and thirty thousand men by Lerida to the Gallego river near Zaragoza; Soult's army, coming by Jaca without guns, might there meet him, and the united forces could then do what was fitting. But to effect this, he required a reinforcement of conscripts, and to have Paris's division and the artillerymen and draft horses of Soult's army sent to Catalonia; he demanded also that two thousand bullocks for the subsistence of his troops should be provided to meet him on the Gallego. Then, touching upon the difficulties of the road from Sanguessa to Pampeluna, he declared, that after forcing Wellington across the Ebro, he would return to Catalonia to revictual his fortresses and prevent an invasion of France. This plan he judged far less dangerous than Soult's; yet he enlarged upon its difficulties and its dangers if the combined movements were not exactly executed. In fine, he continued, "The French armies are entangled amongst rocks, and the emperor should direct a third army upon Spain to act between the Pyrenees and the Ebro in the centre, while the army of Spain, sixty thousand strong, and that of Aragon, thirty thousand strong, operate on the flanks. Thus, *the reputation of the English army, too easily acquired at Salamanca and Vittoria, will be abated.*"

This illiberal remark, combined with the defects of his project, proves that the Duke of Albufera was far below the Duke of Dalmatia's standard, both in magnanimity and capacity: the one giving his adversary just praise, thought the force already supplied by the emperor sufficient to dispute for victory; the other with an unseemly boast, desired overwhelming numbers. Soult's letter reached Suchet the day before the combat of Ordal, and in pursuance of his own plan, the latter should have driven Lord William over the Ebro; as he could well have done, because the Catalan troops had then separated from the Anglo-Sicilians. In his former letters he had estimated his enemies at two hundred thousand fighting men and his own disposable force at eleven thousand, giving that as a reason why he could not march to Aragon. Now, forgetful of his previous objections and estimates, he admitted that he had thirty thousand disposable troops, and proposed the very movement which he had rejected as madness when suggested by Soult. And the futility of his arguments, relative to the general discouragement, the desertion, and the temptation to an invasion of France if he adopted Soult's plan, is apparent; for these things could only happen on the supposition that he was retreating from

weakness ; a notion which would, if entertained, have effectually covered the real design, until the great movement in advance should change the public opinion.

Soult's plan was surer, better imagined, grander than his ; it was less dangerous in the event of failure, and more conformable to military principles. Suchet's project involved double lines of operation without any sure communications, and consequently without any certainty of just co-operation ; his point of junction was within the enemy's power, and the principal army was to be deprived of its artillery—a failure would have left no resource. But in Soult's project the armies were to be united at a point beyond the enemy's reach, and to operate afterwards in mass, with all arms complete, which was conformable to the principles of war. Suchet averred the impracticability of moving the guns by Jaca, yet Soult's counter-opinion claims more respect ; Clausel and Paris, who had lately passed with troops through that defile, were in his camp ; he had made very exact inquiries of the country people, had caused the civil engineers of roads and bridges on the frontiers to examine the route, and from their reports judged the difficulty to be surmountable.

Neither the inconsistency nor the exaggerations of Suchet's statements escaped Soult's observation ; but anxious to effect something while Pampeluna still held out, and the season permitted operations in the mountains, he frankly accepted the other modification, and adopted every stipulation save that of sending the artillerymen and horses of his army to Catalonia, which he considered dangerous. The preparations for this great movement were therefore immediately commenced, and Suchet on his part seemed equally earnest, although he complained of increasing difficulties ; pretending Longa and Morillo had arrived in Catalonia, and that Graham was also in march to that quarter. He also deplored the loss of Fraga, from whence the Empecinado had just driven his garrison, as if it were irreparable ; but though it commanded a bridge over the Cinca, a river dangerous from its sudden and great floods, he still possessed the bridge of Monzon.

During this correspondence, Napoleon remained silent ; yet at a later period, he expressed discontent at Suchet's inactivity ; and indirectly approved of Soult's plans by recommending a movement towards Zaragoza, which Suchet, however, did not execute. It would appear, that having given all the reinforcements he could spare, and full powers to both marshals to act as they judged fitting, he would not, at a distance, and while engaged in such vast operations as those he was carrying on at Dresden, decide so important a question. The vigorous execution essential to success

was not to be expected if either marshal acted under constraint and against his own opinion; Soult had adopted Suchet's modification, and it would have been unwise to substitute a new plan, which would have probably displeased both commanders. Meanwhile, Wellington passed the Bidassoa, and Suchet's project was annulled by the approach of winter and the further operations of the allies.

If the plan of uniting the two armies in Aragon had been happily achieved, it would certainly have forced Wellington to repass the Ebro, or fight a great battle with an army less strongly constituted than the French army. If he chose the latter, victory would have profited him little, because his enemy, strong in cavalry, could have easily retired on the fortresses of Catalonia. If he received a check, he must have gone over the Ebro, perhaps back to Portugal, and the French would have recovered Aragon, Navarre and Valencia. It is not probable, however, that such a great operation could have been conducted without being discovered in time by Wellington. It has been already shown, that besides the ordinary spies and modes of gaining intelligence, he had secret emissaries amongst Joseph's courtiers, and even amongst French officers of rank; and Soult vainly endeavored to surprise him the 31st of August, when the combinations were only two days old. Suchet's retreat from Catalonia and junction with Soult in France, when Napoleon was pressed in Germany, together with the known difficulty of passing guns by Jaca, would indeed have made it appear a movement of retreat and fear; nevertheless, the secret must have been known to more than one, and the English general had agents who were little suspected. Soult, however, could still have returned to his old positions, and, reinforced by Suchet's troops, repeated his former attack by the Roncevalles. It might be, his secret design was to involve that marshal in his operations, and that he was not very eager to adopt his modified plan, which the approach of the bad season and the menacing position of Wellington rendered each day less promising. But his own project, hardy and dangerous for the allies, proved Wellington's profound acquaintance with his art; for he had entered France only to please the allied sovereigns, and always watched closely for Suchet; averring that the true military line of operations was towards Aragon and Catalonia. Being now, however, in France, and the war in Germany having taken a favorable turn, he resolved to continue operations on the actual front, awaiting only the

FALL OF PAMPELUNA.

This event was produced by a long blockade, less fertile of incident than the siege of San Sebastian, yet very honorable to the

firmness of the governor, Cassan. The town, containing fifteen thousand inhabitants, stood on a bold table-land, where a number of valleys opened; and where the great roads coming from St. Jean Pied de Port, Sangüessa, Tudela, Estella, Vittoria and Irurzun were concentrated. The northern and eastern fronts were covered by the Arga, the defences being only simple walls, edging the perpendicular rocky bank of the river; the other fronts were regularly fortified with ditches, covered way and half-moons. Two unfinished outworks only were constructed on the south front; but the citadel on the south-west was a regular pentagon with bomb-proofs and magazines, vaulted barracks for a thousand men, and a complete system of mines.

Pampeluna had been partially blockaded by Mina for eighteen months previous to the battle of Vittoria, and when Joseph fled there, it was badly provisioned. The stragglers of his army increased the garrison to more than three thousand five hundred men. Many inhabitants went off during the short interval between the King's arrival and departure, and Cassan, finding his troops too few for action, too many for the food, abandoned the unfinished outworks, demolished everything interfering with his defence outside, and commenced other works inside. Moreover, foreseeing the French army might possibly make a sudden march without guns, to succor the garrison, he prepared a field-train of forty pieces to meet the occasion. When the blockade was established, his chief object was to obtain provisions, and the 28th and 30th of June he fought actions to cover his foragers; the 1st of July, he burned the suburb of Madalina, beyond the river Arga, and forced many inhabitants to quit the place before the blockaders' works were completed. Skirmishes then occurred almost daily, the French always seeking to gather grain and vegetables, which were ripe and abundant beyond the walls; the allies seeking to fire the standing corn within range of the fortress.

On the 14th O'Donnel undertook the blockade, and the next day the garrison made a successful forage south of the town; they repeated it on the east, beyond the Arga the 19th, with a sharp engagement of cavalry, during which the infantry carried away a great deal of corn. The 26th the sound of Soult's artillery reached the place, and Cassan, judging he was coming to succor Pampeluna, made a sally in the night, by the Roncevalles road; he was driven back, but the next morning came out again with eleven hundred men and two guns, overthrew the Spanish outguards, and advanced towards Villalba at the moment when Picton was falling back with the third and fourth divisions. Then O'Donnel, as before related, evacuated some of the entrenchments,

destroyed amunition, spiked guns, and but for the timely arrival of Carlos d'España, and Picton's stand at Huarte, would have abandoned the blockade altogether.

When the battle on the mountains commenced, the smoke rose over the intervening heights of Escava and San Miguel, the French cavalry appeared on the slopes above El Cano, and the allies' baggage was seen filing along the road of Irurzun. Cassan thought deliverance sure, and having reaped much corn during O'Donnel's panic, awaited the result. Soult's bivouac fires could be seen during the night, and in the morning a fresh sally procured more corn, with little loss of men. Some deserters from the foreign British corps also went over with intelligence, exaggerated and colored, after the manner of such men, and the French re-entered the place, elated with hope. In the evening, the sound of conflict ceased, and the silence of the next day told how the battle had gone; but Cassan made another sally, and again obtained provisions from the south side.

On the 30th the battle recommenced, and the retreating fire of the French made sick the spirit of the garrison: nevertheless their indefatigable governor led another sally on the south side, whence they carried off grain and some ammunition, which had been left in one of the abandoned outworks. Next day Carlos d'España came to resume the blockade, with seven thousand men, and maintained it until the middle of September, when the prince of Anglona's division of Del Parque's army relieved the Andalusian portion of the troops, who rejoined their own corps near Echallar. The allies' works of contravallation were then augmented; and when Paris retired into France from Jaca, part of Mina's troops occupied the valleys leading from the side of Sanguessa to Pampeluna, and made entrenchments to bar the escape of the garrison that way.

In October Cassan put his fighting men upon rations of horse-flesh, four ounces to each with some rice, and he turned more families out of the town; but this time they were fired upon by their countrymen, and forced to re-enter.

On the 9th of September, Baron Maucane, who had conducted most of the sallies during the blockade, attacked and carried some fortified houses on the east side of the place. He was assailed by the Spanish cavalry, but he beat them, and pursued the fugitives close to Villalba; whereupon Carlos d'España advanced with a greater body, and the French were driven in with the loss of eighty men; yet the Spaniards lost a far greater number, d'España himself was wounded, and the garrison obtained some corn, which was their principal object; for the soldiers were now feeding on rats and other disgusting animals. Many seeking for roots beyond the

walls, were poisoned by eating hemlock in their hunger, and a number deserted. In this state Cassan, designing to break out, made an experimental sally to try the strength of the lines, but after some fighting, was driven back with a loss of seventy men, and his hope of escape vanished. Yet he still spoke of attempting it, and the public manner in which he increased the mines under the citadel, induced Wellington to reinforce the blockade, and bring his cavalry into the vicinity.

Scurvy affected the garrison. One thousand men were sick, eight hundred had been wounded, the deaths by battle and disease exceeded four hundred, one hundred and twenty had deserted, and Cassan, moved by the misery around him, proposed to surrender, if allowed to retire with six pieces of canon. Being denied, he offered to yield on condition of not serving for a year and a day, which was also denied; then he broke the negotiation, giving out that he would blow up the works of the fortress, and burst through the blockade. To deter him, a menacing letter was thrown to his outposts, and Wellington, denouncing his design as contrary to the laws of war, directed Carlos d'España to put him, his officers, non-commissioned officers, and a tenth of his soldiers to death, when the place should be taken, if any damage were done to the works.

Cassan's object being merely to obtain better terms, this order remained dormant, and happily so, for the execution would never have borne the test of public opinion. To destroy the works of Pampeluna, and break through the blockading force, as Brennier did at Almeida, would have been a very noble exploit, and a useful one, if Soult's plan of changing the theatre of war by descending into Aragon had been followed. There could therefore be nothing contrary to the laws of war in a resolute action of that nature. On the other hand, if the governor, having no chance whatever of success, made a hopeless attempt the pretence for destroying a great fortress belonging to the Spaniards, thus depriving the allies of the fruits of their long blockade and glorious battles, the conquerors might have justly exercised that severe but undoubted right of war, refusing quarter to an enemy. But Wellington's letter to España involved another question, namely, the putting of prisoners to death. For the soldiers could not be decimated until captured, and their crime would have been only obedience to orders in a matter of which they dared not judge; this would have been quite contrary to the usages of civilized nations; hence the threat must be considered as a device to save the works of Pampeluna and avoid the odium of refusing quarter.

A few days longer the governor and garrison endured their distress, and then capitulated, having defended themselves more than

four months with great constancy. The officers and soldiers became prisoners of war; the first to keep their arms and baggage, the second their knapsacks, expressly on the ground that they had treated the inhabitants well during the investment. This compliment was honorable to both sides; but there was another article, enforced by España, without being accepted by the garrison, for which it is difficult to assign any motive save the vindictive ferocity of the Spanish character: no person of either sex was permitted to follow the French troops, and women's affections were thus barbarously brought under the action of the sword.

There was no stronghold now retained by the French in the north of Spain, except Santona. The blockade there had been tedious, and Wellington, whose sea communications were interrupted by the privateers from thence, formed a small British corps, under Lord Aylmer, to attack Laredo, which, on the opposite point of Santona harbor, commanded the anchorage. Accidental circumstances prevented this enterprise, and Santona remained in the enemy's possession; but, with this exception the contest in the northern parts of Spain was terminated. It is now fitting to show with what great political labor Wellington had brought it to this state; and what contemptible actions and sentiments, what a faithless alliance, what vile governments his dazzling glory hid from the sight of the world.

CHAPTER VI.

Political state of Portugal—Violence, ingratitude, and folly of the government of that country—Political state of Spain—Various factions described, their violence, insolence, and folly—Scandalous scenes at Cadiz—Several Spanish generals desire a revolution—Lord Wellington describes the miserable state of the country—Anticipates the necessity of putting down the Cortes by force—Resigns his command of the Spanish armies—The English ministers propose to remove him to Germany—The new Cortes reinstate him as generalissimo on his own terms—He expresses his fears that the cause will finally fail, and advises the English ministers to withdraw the British army.

Political state of Portugal.—In that country, national jealousy, long compressed by fear, had expanded with violence as danger receded, and England's influence declined in an inverse proportion to her success in removing the peril of invasion. When Wellington crossed the Ebro, the vile Souza faction became elate; and those members of government who had supported the British policy while it sustained them against court intrigues, now sought popularity by an opposite course. Noguera vexatiously resisted or suspended commercial and financial operations,—principal Souza

wrangled fiercely and insolently at the council-board—the patriarch fomented ill-will at Lisbon and in the northern provinces—Forjas, ambitious to command the national troops, became the organ of discontent upon military matters.* The return of the Prince-Regent, the treaty of commerce, the Oporto company, the privileges of the British factory merchants, the mode of paying the subsidy, and the military transport; the convention with Spain relative to the supply of the Portuguese troops in that country; the recruiting, the organization, the command of the national army and the honors due to it; all furnished grounds for factious proceedings, conducted with that ignoble subtlety which invariably characterized Peninsular politics. The expenditure of the British army had been immense; the trade and commerce dependent on it, now removed to the Spanish ports, enormous: Portugal had lived upon England. Her internal taxes, carelessly or partially enforced, were vexatious to the people without being profitable to the government. Nine-tenths of the revenue accrued from duties on British trade. The sudden cessation of markets and of employment, the absence of ready money, the loss of profit, public and private, occasioned by the departure of the army, while the contributions and other exactions remained the same, galled all classes, and the nation was quite ready to shake off the burden of gratitude.

Emissaries promulgated tales, some true, some false, of the disorders perpetrated by the military detachments on the lines of communication, adding that Wellington gave secret orders for this to satisfy his personal hatred of Portugal! Discourses and writings against the British influence abounded in Lisbon and Rio Janeiro, and were re-echoed or surpassed by the London newspapers, whose statements, overflowing of falsehood, could be traced to the Portuguese embassy in that capital. It was asserted that England, designing to retain her power in Portugal, opposed the return of the Prince-Regent; that the war itself being removed, was become wholly a Spanish cause; and it was not for Portugal to levy troops and exhaust her resources, to help a nation whose aggressions she must be called upon sooner or later to resist. Mr. Stuart's diplomatic intercourse, always difficult, became one of continual remonstrance and dispute; his complaints were met with insolence or subterfuge; and illegal violence against the persons and property of British subjects was pushed so far, that Mr. Sloane, an English gentleman upon whom no suspicion rested, was cast into prison for three months, because he had come to Lisbon without a passport. The rights of the English factory were invaded, and the Oporto company, established as its rival in violation of

* Mr. Stuart, MSS.

treaty, was openly cherished. Irresponsible and rapacious, this pernicious company robbed everybody, and the Prince-Regent, promising to reform or totally abolish it, ordered a preparatory investigation; but, in Mr. Stuart's words, the Regency acted no less unfairly by their sovereign than unjustly by their ally.

Especial privileges claimed by the factory merchants were another cause of disquiet. They pretended to exemption from certain taxes and from billets; and that a fixed number of their clerks, domestics and cattle should be exonerated of military service. These pretensions were disputed. The one touching servants and cattle, doubtful at best, had been grossly abused, and that relating to billets unfounded. The taxes were justly resisted, and the merchants offered a voluntary contribution to the same amount. The government rudely refused this offer, seized their property, imprisoned their persons, impressed their cattle to transport supplies that never reached the troops, and made soldiers of their clerks and servants without any intention of reinforcing the army. Mr. Stuart then deducted from the subsidy the amount of the property thus forcibly taken, and repaid the sufferers. The Regency also commenced a dispute upon the fourth article of the treaty of commerce; and the Prince, though he openly ordered it to be executed, secretly permitted Count Funchal, his prime minister, to remain in London as ambassador until the disputes arising upon this treaty were arranged; wherefore Funchal, who liked the English capital, took care to interpose many obstacles to a final decision, advising delay under pretence of rendering ultimate concession of value in other negotiations.

When the battle of Vittoria became known, the Regency proposed to entreat the return of the Prince from the Brazils, hoping thereby to excite the opposition of Mr. Stuart; but when he, contrary to their expectations, approved of the proposal, they deferred the execution. The British Cabinet, which had long neglected Wellington's suggestions on this head, then pressed the matter at Rio Janeiro, and Funchal, at first averse, now urged it warmly, fearing if the Prince remained at the Brazils, he must go there. However, few of the Portuguese nobles desired the return of the royal family, and when the thing was proposed to the Regent, he discovered no inclination for the voyage. But the most important subject of discord was the army. The absence of the sovereign and the intrigues at Rio Janeiro virtually rendered the government at Lisbon an oligarchy without a leader, in other words, a government formed for mischief; and it has been sufficiently shown, that Wellington's energy and ability, aided by Mr. Stuart's sagacity and firmness, and the influence of England's power and riches,

were scarcely able to dry up the evils flowing from this foul source. At the end of 1812, the native military force was, for want of sustenance, on the point of dissolving.

The strenuous interference of the English general and envoy, seconded by the great exertions of the British officers in the Portuguese service, restored indeed the efficiency of the army, and in the campaign of 1813, the spirit of the troops was surpassing; even the militia-men, deprived of their colors and drafted into the line, to punish their bad conduct at Guarda under Trant, nobly regained their standards on the Pyrenees. But this state of affairs, acting upon the naturally sanguine temperament and vanity of the Portuguese, created a very exaggerated notion of their military prowess and importance, and withal a morbid sensitiveness to praise or neglect.* Picton had thrown some slur upon the conduct of a regiment at Vittoria, and Beresford complained that justice had not been done to their merits. The eulogiums passed in the English Parliament, and in the despatches upon the conduct of the British and Spanish troops, but not extended to the Portuguese, galled the whole nation; and the remarks and omissions of the London newspapers were as wormwood.

Meanwhile, the regency, under pretext of a dispute with Spain relative to a breach of the military convention of supply, neglected the subsistence of the army altogether; and so many obstacles to recruiting were raised, that the dépôts, which ought to have furnished twelve thousand men to replace the losses sustained in the campaign, only contained four thousand, without the means of taking the field. This serious matter drew Beresford to Lisbon in October, to propose a new regulation, which should disregard the exemptions claimed by the nobles, the clergy and the English merchants for their servants and followers. On his arrival, Forjas urged the public discontent as to the position of the Portuguese troops. They were, he said, generally incorporated with the British divisions, commanded by British officers, had no distinct recognized existence; their services were unnoticed, and the glory of the country suffered; the world at large knew not how many men Portugal furnished for the war. It was known there were Portuguese soldiers, as it was known there were Brunswickers and Hanoverians, but as a national army, nothing was known of them; their exertions, their courage, only went to swell the general triumph of England, while the Spaniards, inferior in numbers, and far inferior in all military qualities, were flattered, praised, thanked in the public despatches, in the English newspapers, and in the discourses and votes of the British Parliament. He proposed,

Mr. Stuart, MSS.

therefore, to have the Portuguese formed into a distinct army, acting under Wellington.

It was objected that the brigades incorporated with the British divisions were fed by the British commissariat, the cost being deducted from the subsidy, and the loss of that advantage the Portuguese could not sustain. Forjas rejoined, that they could feed their own troops cheaper if the subsidy was paid in money, but Beresford referred him to the scanty means of transport; so scanty that the few stores they were then bound to furnish for the unattached brigades depending upon the Portuguese commissariat were not forwarded. Forjas then proposed to withdraw gradually the best brigades from the English divisions, to incorporate them with the unattached brigades and so form an auxiliary corps; the same objection of transport applied however to this matter and it dropped for the moment. The regency then agreed to reduce the legal age of men liable to the conscription for the army; but the islands, which ought to have given three hundred men yearly, were exempt from their control; and the governors, supported by the prince-regent, refused to permit levies and granted asylums to those who wished to avoid the levy in Portugal. In the islands also, the persons so unjustly and cruelly imprisoned in 1810 were still kept in durance, although the regency, yielding to the persevering remonstrances of Stuart and Wellington, had released those at Lisbon.

Soon after this, Beresford desired to go to England, and the occasion was seized by Forjas to renew his proposition for a separate army, which he designed to command himself. Silveira's claim to that honor was however supported by the Souzas, to whose faction he belonged; and the only matter in which all agreed was the display of ill-will towards England. Wellington became indignant. The English newspapers, he said, did much mischief by their assertions, but he never suspected they could by their omissions alienate the Portuguese nation and government. The latter complained that their troops were not praised in parliament, nothing could be more different from a debate within the house than the representation of it in the newspapers;—the latter seldom stated an event or transaction as it really occurred, unless when they absolutely copied what was written for them; and even then their observations branched out so far from the text that they appeared absolutely incapable of understanding much less of stating the truth upon any subject. The Portuguese people should therefore be cautious of taking English newspapers as a test of the estimation in which the Portuguese army was held in England, where its character stood high and was rising daily. "Mr. Forjas is," said Wellington, "the ablest man of business I have met with in

the Peninsula, it is to be hoped he will not on such grounds have the folly to alter a successful military system. I understand something of the organization and feeding of troops, and I assure him that, separated from the British, the Portuguese army could not keep the field in a good state although their government were to incur ten times the expense under the actual system; and if they are not in a fitting state for the field they can gain no honor, they must suffer dishonor! The vexatious disputes with Spain are increasing daily, and if the omissions or assertions of newspapers are to be the causes of disagreement with the Portuguese *I will quit the Peninsula for ever!*"

This remonstrance being read to the regency, Forjas replied officially.

"The Portuguese government demanded nothing unreasonable. The happy campaign of 1813 was not to make it heedless of sacrifices beyond its means. It had a right to expect greater exertions from Spain, which was more interested than Portugal in the actual operations since the safety of the latter was obtained. Portugal only wanted a solid peace, she did not expect increase of territory; nor any advantage save the consideration and influence which the services and gallantry of her troops would give her amongst European nations, and which, unhappily, she would probably require in her future intercourse with Spain. The English prince-regent, his ministers and his generals had rendered full justice to her military services in the official reports, but that did not suffice to give them weight in Europe. Official reports did not remove this inconvenience. It was only the public expressions of the English prince and his ministers that could do justice. The Portuguese army was commanded by Marshal Beresford, marquis of Campo Mayor. It ought always to be so considered and thanked accordingly for its exploits, with as much form and solemnity by the English parliament and general as was used towards the Spanish army—the more so, that the Portuguese had sacrificed their national pride to the common good, whereas the Spanish pride had retarded the success of the cause and the liberty of Europe. It was necessary also to form good native generals to be of use after the war; but putting that question aside, it was only demanded to have the divisions separated by degrees and given to Portuguese officers: nevertheless such grave objections being advanced they were willing he said to drop the matter altogether.

The discontent, however, remained, for the argument had weight, and if any native officers' reputation had been sufficient to make the proceedings plausible, the British officers would have been driven from the Portuguese service, the armies separated, and

both ruined. As it was, the regency terminated the discussion from inability to succeed, from fear, not from reason. The persons who pretended to the command were Forjas and Silveira. The English officers, who were well-liked by the troops, would not have served under the former, and Wellington objected strongly to the latter; having, by experience, discovered that he was an incapable officer, seeking a base and pernicious popularity, by encouraging the views of the soldiers. Beresford then relinquished his intention of going to England, and the justice of the complaint relative to the reputation of the Portuguese army being obvious, the general orders became more marked in favor of the troops. Yet the most effectual check to the project was Mr. Stuart's intimation, that England, bound by no conditions as to the subsidy, had a right to withdraw it altogether.

To have this subsidy in specie and supply their own troops was long the cry of the regency, but finally they gave the matter up. Forjas knew well the administration of Portugal was incapable of supporting an army five hundred miles from its own country; the real object was to shake off the British influence, without losing the subsidy. Neither the regency nor the prince had any feelings for the honor of the army or the welfare of the men. The regency, while thus disputing for command, allowed its subordinates to ruin the only asylum in Portugal for mutilated soldiers, and turned the helpless veterans adrift; the prince, while lavishing honors on his intriguing courtiers, placed those officers whose fidelity and hard fighting had preserved his throne in Portugal at the bottom of the list, decorating the menials of the palace with the same ribands! Honor, justice, humanity, were alike despised by the ruling men, and Wellington thus expressed his strong disgust.

"The British army, which I have the honor to command, has met with nothing but ingratitude from the government and authorities in Portugal for their services; everything that could be done has been done by the civil authorities lately to oppress the officers and soldiers on every occasion in which it has by any accident been in their power. I hope, however, that we have seen the last of Portugal!"

Towards Spain the Portuguese government was not more friendly, for the Portuguese regency dreaded the democratic doctrine promulgated in the Cortes; and the leaders of that assembly were intent to spread those doctrines throughout the Peninsula. Seven Spanish envoys had succeeded each other at Lisbon, within three years, and the only bond of sympathy between the governments, was hatred of the English, who had saved both. On all

other points they differed. The exiled Bishop of Orense, from his asylum in Portugal, excited the Gallicians against the Cortes so vigorously, that his expulsion from Portugal, or at least, his removal from the northern frontier, was especially demanded by the Spanish minister; a long and angry discussion followed; yet the bishop was only civilly requested by the Portuguese government to abstain from acts disagreeable to the Spanish regency. The latter demanded him as a delinquent; the Portuguese quoted a decree of the Cortes which deprived the bishop of his rights as a Spanish citizen, and denaturalized him; finally he was removed twenty leagues from the frontier. Nor was the Portuguese government itself quite free from ecclesiastical troubles. The Bishop of Braganza preached doctrines offensive to the patriarch and the government; he was confined, but soon released, and an ecclesiastical sentence pronounced against him, which only increased his followers and extended the influence of his doctrines.

Another cause of uneasiness, at a later period, was the return of Ballesteros from his exile at Ceuta. He had been permitted towards the end of 1813, and, as Wellington thought with no good intent, to reside at Fregenal; the Portuguese regency, fearing he would gather discontented persons round him there, set agents to watch his proceedings; and under pretence of putting down robbers, established a line of cavalry, and called out the militia—thus making it manifest that but a little was wanting to kindle a war between the two countries.

Political state of Spain.—Wellington's victories had put an end to Joseph's intercourse with the French party in Spain, yet those people, not losing hope, formed a strong anti-English party, watching to profit of the disputes between the two factions at Cadiz, which were now rancorous. The serviles, bigoted in religion and politics, had the whole body of the clergy on their side; they were most numerous in the Cortes, and their views generally accorded with the feelings of the people beyond the Isla de Leon, their doctrines being comprised in two sentences—*An absolute king—An intolerant church.* The liberals, supported and instigated by all ardent innovators, and the commercial body and populace of Cadiz, had also partisans beyond the Isla; and, taking as guides the revolutionary writings of the French philosophers, were hastening onwards to a democracy without regard to ancient usages and without practical ability to carry their theories into execution. There was also a fourth faction in the Cortes, American deputies, who secretly labored for the independence of the colonies; they sometimes joined the liberals, sometimes the serviles, and often produced anomalous results, because they were numerous enough to turn the scale in

favor of the side which they espoused. Jealousy of England was, however, common to all, and "*Inglesismo*" was used as a term of contempt. Even when Wellington was commencing the campaign of 1813, the Cortes was with difficulty, and by threats rather than reason, prevented from passing a law forbidding foreign troops to enter a Spanish fortress! Alicant, Tarifa, Cadiz itself, had been preserved,—Rodrigo, Badajos had been retaken by British valor,—English money had restored their broken walls, replenished their magazines—English and Portuguese blood still smoked from their ramparts, but the men from whose veins that blood flowed were to be denied entrance at gates they could not approach without treading on the bones of slaughtered comrades,—comrades who had sacrificed their lives to procure for this sordid ungrateful assembly the power to offer the insult.

To subdue the bishops and clergy, who in Galicia openly opposed the abolition of the inquisition, was of prominent interest with a section of the liberals called the Jacobins. They generally ruled the Cortes, because the Americanos leaned towards their doctrines, and the Anti-English or French party, desiring dissension, supported the most violent public men. A fierce and obstinate faction they were, and they compelled the churchmen to submit for the time; yet, not until the dispute became so serious that Wellington expected a civil war on his communications, and thought the clergy and the peasantry would take part with the French. This notion, which gives his measure for the patriotism of both parties, proved unfounded, his extreme discontent with the liberal doctrines somewhat warped his judgment; the people were less attached to the church than he imagined, the clergy of Galicia finding no solid support, submitted to the Cortes, and the archbishop of Santiago fled to Portugal.

Deep unmitigated hatred of democracy was indeed the moving spring of the English 'Tories' policy. Napoleon was warred against, not, as they pretended, because he was a tyrant and usurper, for he was neither; not because his invasion of Spain was unjust, but because he was the enemy of aristocratic privileges. The welfare and independence of the Peninsula were words of no meaning in their state-papers and speeches; and their anger and mortification were extreme when they found their success against the emperor fostering that democracy they sought to destroy. They were only prevented by the superior prudence and sagacity of their general, from interfering with the internal government of Spain in so arrogant and injudicious a manner, that an open rupture, wherein the Spaniards would have had the appearance of justice, must have ensued. Wellington stifled this folly; he waited to give

the blow with effect, and was quite willing to deal it himself; and the conduct of the Cortes and executive government was so injurious to Spain, and to his military operations, so unjust and ungrateful to him personally, that the warmest friends of freedom cannot blame his enmity. Rather should his moderation be admired, when we find his aristocratic hatred of the Spanish constitution exacerbated by a state of affairs thus described by Vegas, a considerable member of the Cortes.

Speaking of the "*Afrancesados*" or French party, more numerous than was supposed, and active to increase their numbers, he says, "The thing which they most enforced and which made most progress was the diminution of English influence.* Amongst the serviles they gained proselytes, by objecting the English religion and constitution which restricted the power of the sovereign. With the liberals, they said the same constitution gave the sovereign too much power; and the Spanish constitution having brought the king's authority under that of the Cortes, was an object of jealousy to the English cabinet and aristocracy, who, fearing the example would encourage the reformers of England, were resolved the Spanish constitution should not stand. To the Americans they observed, that Wellington opposed them because he did not help them, and permitted expeditions to be sent from Spain; but to the Europeans who wished to retain the colonies and exclude foreign trade, they represented the English as fomenters and sustainers of the colonial rebellion, because they did not join Spain to put it down. To the honest patriots of all parties they said, that every concession to the English general was an offence against the dignity and independence of the nation. If he was active in the field, he was intent to subjugate Spain rather than defeat the enemy; if he was careful in preparation, his delay was to enable the French to conquer; if he was vigorous in urging the government to useful measures, his design was to impose his own laws; if he neglected the Spanish armies, he desired they should be beaten; if he meddled with them usefully, it was to gain the soldiers, turn the army against the country, and thus render Spain dependent on England. And these perfidious insinuations flattered the national pride, as proving the Spaniards could do every thing for themselves, without the aid of foreigners. Nothing could stop the spread of such doctrines but new victories, which would bring the simple honesty and gratitude of the people at large into activity. Those victories came, and did indeed stifle the French party in Spain, but many of their views were too well founded to be stifled with their party.

It was hoped the democratic violence of the Cortes would de-

* Original letter, MSS.

cline under the control of the Cardinal Bourbon; but that prince, who was not of true royal blood in the estimation of the Spaniards, because his father had married without the consent of the king, was, from age, infirmity, and ignorance, a nullity. The new regency became, therefore, more the slaves of the Cortes than their predecessors; and the Cadiz newspaper editors, pre-eminent in falsehood and wickedness, even amongst their unprincipled European brotherhood, became the champions of the Jacobins, and directed the city populace as they pleased. And always the serviles yielded, under the dread of personal violence; their own crimes had become their punishment. They had taught the people at the commencement of the contest, that murder was patriotism; and now their spirit sunk and quailed, because, at every step, to use the terribly significant expression of Wellington, "*The ghost of Solano was staring them in the face.*"

In support of their crude constitution, which they considered as perfect as an emanation from the Deity, the Jacobins sought 1. To abolish the inquisition, to arrest and punish the Gallician bishops, and to war with the clergy. 2. To put aside the claim of Carlotta to the regency. 3. To appoint captain-generals and other officers to suit their factious purposes. 4. To obtain money for their necessities, without including therein the nourishment of the armies. 5. To control the election for a new Cortes, and procure an assembly of their own way of thinking, or prevent its assembling at the legal period in October. In the matter of the bishops they nearly caused a war with Portugal and a civil war with Gallicia. Carlotta's affair was less serious; but her pretensions, wisely opposed by the British authorities, while the army was cooped up in Portugal, were, although she was a declared enemy to the English alliance, now rather favored by Sir Henry Wellesley, as a mode of checking the spirit of democracy. Wellington held aloof, observing, that if appointed according to the constitution, she would not be less a slave to the Cortes than her predecessors, and England would have the discredit of giving power to the "worst woman in existence."

To remove the seat of government from the influence of the Cadiz populace, was one mode of abating the power of the democratic party; and the yellow fever, coming immediately after the closing of the general Cortes in September, seemed to furnish an opportunity for the English ambassador to effect its removal; for the regency, dreading the epidemic, resolved to proceed to Madrid; telling Sir Henry Wellesley, who joyfully hastened to offer pecuniary aid, that to avoid the sickness was their sole motive. Having secretly formed this resolution at night, they designed to begin the journey next day; but a disturbance arose in the city; the regents

then convoked the extraordinary Cortes, the ministers were called before it, and bending with fear declared, with scandalous disregard of truth, there was no intention of quitting the Isla without consulting the Cortes. Certain deputies were thereupon appointed to inquire if there was any fever, and a few cases being discovered, the deputation, apparently to shield the regents, recommended they should remove to Port St. Mary.

This did not satisfy the assembly. The government was commanded to remain at Cadiz until the new general Cortes should be installed, and a committee was appointed to probe the whole affair, or rather to pacify the populace, who were so offended with the report of the first deputation, that Augustin Arguelles, on presenting it, was hissed from the galleries, although the most popular member of the Cortes. The more moderate liberals thus discovered that they were equally with the serviles, the slaves of the newspaper writers. Nevertheless, the inherent excellence of freedom, though here presented in such fantastic and ignoble shapes, was involuntarily admitted by Wellington when he declared, that wherever the Cortes and government should fix themselves, the press would follow to control, and the people of Seville, Granada, or Madrid would become as bad as the people of Cadiz.

The composition of the new Cortes was an object of hope and fear to all factions; and the result being uncertain, the existing assembly took such measures to prolong its own power, it was thought two Cortes would be established, one at Cadiz, the other at Seville, each striving for mastery in the nation. However, the new body, after many delays, was installed at Cadiz in November, and the Jacobins, strong in the violence of the populace, still swayed the assembly, and kept the seat of government at Cadiz until the rapid spread of the fever brought a stronger fear into action. Then the resolution to repair to Madrid was adopted, and the sessions in the Isla closed on the 29th of November. Yet not without troubles. For the general belief being that no person could take the sickness twice, and almost every resident family had already suffered from former visitations, the merchants with infamous cupidity declared there was no fever, induced the authorities flagitiously to issue clean bills of health to ships, and endeavored by intimidation to keep the regency and Cortes in the city. An exact and copious account of these factions and disputes, and of the permanent influence which these discussions of the principles of government, this constant collision of opposite doctrines, had upon the character of the people, would, if sagaciously traced, form a lesson of the highest interest for nations. But to treat the subject largely would be to write a political history of the Spanish revolution, and it is

only the effect upon the military operations which properly appertains to a history of the war. That effect was one of unmitigated evil—but this did not necessarily spring from the democratic system, since precisely the same mischiefs were to be traced in Portugal, where arbitrary power, called legitimate government, was prevalent. In both cases, the people and the soldiers suffered for the crimes of factious politicians.

It has been shown that one Spanish Regency contracted an engagement with Wellington, on the faith of which he took the command of their armies in 1813. Scrupulously adhered to by him, it was systematically violated by the new Regency and minister of war, almost as soon as it was concluded. His recommendations for promotion after Vittoria were disregarded, orders were sent direct to the subordinate generals, and changes were made in the commands and in the destinations of the troops without his concurrence, and without passing through him as generalissimo. Scarcely had he crossed the Ebro when Castaños, Captain-General of Galicia, Estremadura and Castille, was disgracefully removed from his government, under pretence of calling him to assist in the council of state; his nephew, Giron, was at the same time deprived of the Gallician army, although both he and Castaños had been commended for their conduct by Wellington. Freyre, appointed Captain-General of Castille and Estremadura, succeeded Giron, and the infamous Lacy replaced Castaños in Galicia; chosen, it was believed, as a fitter tool to work out the measures of the Jacobins against the clergy in that kingdom; nor was their sagacity at fault, for Castaños would, according to Wellington, have turned his arms against the Cortes if an opportunity had offered. He and others were now menaced with death, and the Cortes contemplated an attack upon the tithes, upon the feudal and royal tenths, and upon the estates of the grandees; all except the last very fitting to do, if times and circumstances had been favorable; but when the nation was generally averse, and there was an invader in the country to whom the discontented could turn, the attempt was insane. The clergy were at open warfare with the government, many generals were dissatisfied, and menaced the superior civil authorities; the soldiers were starving, the people, tired of their miseries, only desired to get rid of the invaders, and avoid the burthen of supplying the troops of either side. The English cabinet, after having gorged Spain with gold and flattery, was totally without influence. A terrible convulsion was at hand if the French could have maintained the war with any vigor in Spain itself; and the following passages from Wellington's letters to the ministers, prove that

even he contemplated a forcible change in the government and constitution.

"If the mob of Cadiz begin to remove heads from shoulders as the newspapers have threatened Castaños, and the assembly seize upon landed property to supply their necessities, I am afraid we must do something more than discountenance them. It is quite impossible such a system can last, and what I regret is that I am the person that maintains it. If I was out of the way, there are plenty of generals who would overturn it. Ballesteros positively intended it, and I am much mistaken if O'Donnel and even Castaños, and probably others, are not equally ready. If the king should return, he also will overturn the whole fabric if he has any spirit."—"I wish you would let me know whether if I should find a fair opportunity of striking at the democracy, the government would approve of my doing it." And in another letter he thus seriously treated the question of withdrawing from the contest altogether. "The government are the best judges of whether they can or ought to withdraw, but Spain cannot be a useful ally, or at all in alliance with England if the republican system is not put down." Meanwhile, he advised the English government and his brother to take no part either for or against the princess of Brazil, and to discountenance the democratical principles and measures of the Cortes; if their opinion was asked regarding the formation of a new Regency, to recommend an alteration of that part of the constitution which lodged all power with the Cortes, and to give, instead, some authority to the executive government, whether in the hands of King or Regent. To fill the latter office, one of royal blood, uniting the strongest claims of birth with the best capacity, should be thought to be selected; but if capacity was wanting in the royal race, then to choose the Spaniard who was most deserving in the public estimation. Thus necessity teaches privilege to bend before merit.

Spain had at this period but one hundred and sixty thousand men in arms, fifty thousand only being available in the field; and those only because they were paid, clothed and armed, and kept together by the English general. He had proposed an arrangement for the civil and political government of the provinces rescued from the French, with a view to the supply of the armies, but his plan was rejected; and his repeated representations of the misery the army and the people endured were unheeded. Certain districts were allotted for the support of each army; yet, with a jealous fear of military domination, the government refused the captain-generals the necessary powers to draw forth the resources of the country, and thus rendered the system a nullity. Each branch of administration was conducted by chiefs independent in their attributes, yet

too restricted in authority, generally at variance with one another, and all of them neglectful of their duty. The evil effect was thus described by Wellington as early as August.

"More than half of Spain has been cleared of the enemy above a year, and the whole of Spain, excepting Catalonia and a small part of Aragon, since the months of May and June last. The most abundant harvest has been reaped in all parts of the country; millions of money spent by the contending armies are circulating everywhere, and yet your armies, however weak in numbers, are literally starving.* The allied British and Portuguese armies under my command have been subsisted, particularly latterly, almost exclusively upon the magazines imported by sea; and I am concerned to inform your excellency, that besides money for the pay of all the armies, which has been given from the military chest of the British army, and has been received from no other quarter, the British magazines have supplied quantities of provisions to all the Spanish armies, in order to enable them to remain in the field at all. And notwithstanding this assistance, I have had the mortification of seeing the Spanish troops on the outposts, obliged to plunder the nut and apple-trees for subsistence, and to know that the Spanish troops employed in the blockade of Pampeluna and Santona, were starving upon half an allowance of bread, while the enemy whom they were blockading was at the same time receiving their full allowance. The system then is insufficient to procure supplies for the army, and at the same time I assure your excellency, it is the most oppressive and injurious to the country that could be devised. It cannot be pretended, the country does not produce means of maintaining the men necessary for its defence; those means are undoubtedly superabundant; and the enemy has proved that armies can be maintained in Spain at the expense of the Spanish nation, infinitely larger than are necessary for its defence." These evils he attributed to the incapacity of the public servants, and to their overwhelming numbers, that certain sign of an unprosperous state—to the disgraceful negligence and disregard of public duties—and to there being no power in the country for enforcing the law: the collection of the revenue cost in several branches seventy and eighty per cent. No Spanish officers capable of commanding a large body of troops, or keeping it in an efficient state, had appeared, no efficient staff, no system of military administration had been formed, and no shame for these deficiencies, no exertions to amend were visible.

From this picture, two conclusions are to be drawn: 1. That the provinces, thus described as superabounding in resources, having

* Letter to the Spanish Minister of War.

been for several years occupied by the French armies, the warfare of the latter could not have been so devastating and barbarous as it was represented. 2. That Spain, being now as helpless as she had been at the beginning and all through the war, was quite unequal to her own deliverance, either by arms or policy—that it was English valor, English steel, directed by the genius of an English general, which rising superior to all obstacles, whether presented by his own or the Peninsular governments, or by the perversity of national character, worked out her independence. So utterly inefficient were the Spaniards, that Wellington declared at this period thirty thousand of their troops could not be trusted to act separately—they were only useful when mixed in the line with larger numbers of other nations! And yet all men in authority, to the lowest alcalde, were as presumptuous, as arrogant, and as perverse as ever. Rendered callous to public misery by the desperate state of affairs, they were reckless of consequences, and never suffered prudential considerations or national honor to check the execution of any project. Repeated failure had rendered the generals insensible to misfortune; and without any remarkable personal daring, they were always urgent for battle, as if that were a common matter, instead of being the great event of war. The government agents were corrupt, and the government itself tyrannical, faithless, mean and equivocating to the lowest degree. In 1812, a Spaniard of known and active patriotism thus commenced an elaborate plan of defence for the provinces: "Catalonia abhors France as her oppressor, but she abhors still more the despotism which has been carried on in all the branches of her administration since the beginning of the war." Everything was rotten, except the hearts of the poorer people. Even at Cadiz, Spanish writers compared the state to a vessel in a hurricane, without captain, pilot, compass, chart, sails or rudder, and advised the crew to cry to heaven as their sole resource. But they only blasphemed.

When Wellington, indignant at the systematic breach of his engagement, remonstrated, he was answered that the actual regency did not hold itself bound by the contracts of the former government. No consideration for truth, for they had themselves also accepted the contract, nor of honest policy, nor the usages of civilized states, with respect to national faith, had any influence on their conduct. Enraged at this scandalous subterfuge, he was yet conscious how essential it was he should retain his command; and seeing all Spanish generals more or less engaged in political intrigues, none capable of co-operating with him,—conscious also that public opinion in Spain would, better than menaces from the English government, enable him to obtain a counterpoise of the

democratic party,—he tendered, indeed, his resignation, if the government engagement was not fulfilled, but at the same time endeavored, with mild argument and reproof, to induce reason. He told them, however, there were limits to his forbearance under injury, and he had been already most unworthily treated, even as a gentleman, by the Spanish government.

From the world these quarrels were covered by an appearance of the utmost respect and honor. He was made a grandee of the first class, and the estate of Soto de Roma, in Grenada, of which the much-maligned, miserable Godoy had been despoiled, was settled upon him. He accepted the gift, but, as he had before done with his Portuguese and Spanish pay, transferred the proceeds to the public treasury during the war. The regents, however, under pressure of the Jacobins, and apparently bearing some personal enmity, though one of them, Ciscar, had been instrumental in procuring him the command of the Spanish army, were now intent to drive him from it; and the excesses committed at San Sebastian served their factious writers as a topic for exciting the people, not only to demand his resignation, but to commence a warfare of assassination against the British soldiers. Combining extreme folly with wickedness, they pretended, amongst other absurdities, that the nobility had offered, if he would change his religion, to make him king of Spain; this tale was eagerly adopted by the English newspapers, and three Spanish grandees thought it necessary to declare, that they were not among the nobles who made the proposition. His resignation was accepted in the latter end of September, and he held the command only until the assembling of the new Cortes; but the attempt to render him odious, failed even at Cadiz, owing chiefly to the personal ascendancy which all great minds so surely attain over the masses in troubled times. Both the people and the soldiers respected him more than they did their own government; and the Spanish officers had generally yielded as ready obedience to his wishes, before he was appointed generalissimo, as they did to his orders when holding that high office. It was this ascendancy which enabled him to maintain the war with such troublesome allies; and yet so little were the English ministers capable of appreciating its importance, that after the battle of Vittoria they proposed, as before noticed, to remove him from Spain to Germany. His answer was short and modest, but full of wisdom: "Many might be found to conduct matters as well as I can both here and in Germany; but nobody would enjoy the same advantages here, and I should be no better than another in Germany."

This egregious folly was thus checked, and in December the new Cortes decided that he should retain the command of the armies,

and the regency be bound to fulfil its predecessor's engagements. Nevertheless, so deeply had he been offended by the libels relative to San Sebastian, that a private letter to his brother terminated thus :—" *It will rest with the king's government to determine what they will do upon a consideration of all the circumstances of the case, but if I was to decide, I would not keep the army in Spain for one hour.*" And to many other persons, at different times, he expressed his fears and conviction that the cause was lost, and that he should fail at last. It was under these and other enormous difficulties he carried on his military operations ; it was with an enemy at his back, more to be dreaded than the foe in his front, that he invaded the south of France. And this is the answer to those French writers who have described him as being at the head of more than two hundred thousand well-furnished soldiers, supported by a well-organized insurrection of the Spanish people, unembarrassed in his movements, and luxuriously rioting in all the resources of the Peninsula and of England.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

[The following extracts of letters are published to avoid any future cavils upon the points they refer to, and also to show how difficult it is for the historian to obtain certain and accurate details, when eye-witnesses, having no wish to mislead, differ so much.

BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.

Extract of a memoir by Sir Charles Dalbiac, who was one of Le Marchand's brigade of heavy cavalry.

"Throughout these charges upon the enemy the heavy brigade was unsupported by any other portion of the cavalry whatever; but was followed, as rapidly as it was possible for infantry to follow, by the third division which had so gloriously led the attack in the first instance and had so effectually turned the enemy's extreme left."

Extract from a memoir by Colonel Money, who was one of General Anson's brigade of light cavalry.

"The third division moved to the right, and the cavalry, Le Marchand's and Anson's, were ordered to charge as soon as the tirailleurs of the third division began to ascend the right flank of the hill."—"The rapid movement of the cavalry, which now began to gallop, and the third division pressing them (the French), they ran into the wood which separated them from the army; we (Anson's light cavalry) charged them under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery from another height; near two thousand threw down their arms in different parts of the wood, and we continued our charge through the wood until our brigade came into an open plain of ploughed fields, where the dust was so great we could see nothing and halted; when it cleared away we found ourselves within three hundred yards of a large body of French infantry and artillery, formed on the declivity of a hill. A tremendous battle was heard on the other side, which prevented the enemy from perceiving us. At last they opened a fire of musketry and grape-shot, and we retired in good order and without any loss."

Extract of a letter from Sir Henry Watson, commanding the first regiment of Portuguese cavalry under General D'Urban.

"When Marmont, at the battle of Salamanca, advanced his left, Lord Wellington ordered down the reserve, of which the first and tenth Portuguese cavalry and two squadrons of the British cavalry under Captain Townsend, now Lieutenant colonel Townsend, formed a part under Sir B.

D'Urban. The cavalry was pushed forward in contiguous columns, and were protected from the enemy by a small rising ground, which, as soon as I had passed, I was ordered to wheel up and charge the front in line. *The enemy had formed a square and gave us a volley as we advanced, the eleventh and fourteenth remained en potence. In this charge we completely succeeded and the enemy appeared panic-struck, and made no attempt to prevent our cutting and thrusting at them in all directions until the moment I was about to withdraw: then a soldier at not more than six or eight paces levelled his musket at me, and shot me through the shoulder, which knocked me off my horse, where I continued to lie till the whole of our infantry had passed over.*"

Extract of a letter from Colonel Townsend, 14th dragoons.

"At the battle of Salamanca, I perfectly recollect seeing D'Urban's cavalry advance up the hill and charge the French infantry. *They were repulsed, and left Watson (now Sir Henry), who led his regiment, the first Portuguese, badly wounded on the field.*"—"I am almost positive the French were not in square, but in line, waiting to receive the attack of the leading brigade of the third division, which gallantly carried everything before it."

No. II.

Copie de deux dépêches de l'empereur au ministre de la guerre relatives au duc de Raguse.

Dresde, le 28 Mai, 1812.

MONSIEUR LE DUC DE FELTRE,—Je vous renvoie la correspondance d'Espagne. Ecrivez au duc de Raguse que c'est le roi qui doit lui donner des directions; que je suppose qu'il s'est retiré devant Lord Wellington selon les règles de la guerre, en l'obligeant à se masser, et non en se reployant devant sa cavalerie légère; qu'il aura conservé des têtes de pont sur l'Agueda, ce qui peut seul lui permettre d'avoir des nouvelles de l'ennemi tous les jours, et de le tenir en respect. Que si au contraire il a mis trente lieues d'intervalle entre lui et l'ennemi, comme il l'a déjà fait deux fois contre tous les principes de la guerre, il laisse le général Anglais maître de se porter où il veut, il perd constamment l'initiative, et n'est plus d'aucun poids dans les affaires d'Espagne; que la Biscaye et le nord sont dans des dispositions fâcheuses par les suites de l'évacuation des Asturies par la division Bonnet; que la réoccupation de cette province n'a pas encore eu lieu, que le nord est exposé à de grands malheurs, que Santona et St. Sebastian sont compromis, que les libres communications des guerillas avec la Galice et les Asturies par la mer les rendront formidables, que s'il ne fait pas réoccuper promptement les Asturies, sa position ne peut s'améliorer.

Recommandez au général Caffarelli de réunir davantage ses troupes, et d'avoir toujours une colonne dans la main.

Ecrivez au général L'Huillier d'avoir l'œil sur St. Sebastian, et d'avoir toujours 3000 hommes dans la main pour les diriger sur cette place si elle avoit besoin d'être secourue.

En général, pour parer à la mauvaise manœuvre et à la mauvaise direction que le duc de Raguse donne à nos affaires, il est nécessaire d'avoir beaucoup de monde à Bayonne. Activez la marche du 3^e et du 108^e et de la 5^e demi brigade provisoire sur cette place. Tenez-y deux généraux de brigade afin que le général L'Huillier puisse toujours disposer des forces pour être en mesure d'agir selon les circonstances.

Réunissez un millier d'hommes des dépôts de cavalerie de l'armée d'Espagne, et dirigez-les en régimens de marche sur Bayonne.

Prescrivez au général L'Huillier de tenir ses troupes dans la vallée de Bastan, à Bayonne, St. Jean de Luz, et Irun, en les munissant bien, les baraquant, les exerçant, et les formant. Ce sera au moyen de cette ressource que si le duc de Raguse continue à faire des bévues on pourra empêcher le mal de devenir extrême.

Sur ce, je prie Dieu, &c.

(Signé)

NAPOLÉON.

[For second despatch, see Appendix No. VII.]

No. III.

Lettre de M. le Duc de Dalmatie au roi.

Seville, 12 Août, 1812.

Je n'avais reçu aucune nouvelle de V. M. depuis les lettres qu'elle m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire des 6 et 7 Juillet dernier. Enfin je viens de recevoir celle datée de Ségovie le 29 du même mois. Les rapports publiés par les ennemis m'avaient déjà instruit des événemens survenus en Castille lesquels étaient naturellement exagérés; V. M. a bien voulu en quelque sorte fixer à ce sujet mes idées. Je déplore les pertes que l'armée de Portugal a éprouvées. Dans l'état où étaient les affaires d'Espagne, une bataille ne devait se donner qu'à la dernière extrémité, mais tout n'est pas perdu. V. M. après m'avoir communiqué les dispositions qu'elle a faites depuis le 6 (date de la dernière lettre) au 19 Juillet, m'ordonne comme une ressource d'évacuer l'Andalousie et de me diriger sur Tolède. Je ne puis dissimuler que cette disposition me paraît fort extraordinaire. J'étais loin de penser que V. M. s'y serait déterminée. Le sort de l'Espagne est-il donc décidé? V. M. veut-elle sacrifier le royaume à la capitale? et a-t-elle la certitude de la conserver en prenant ce parti? Enfin l'évacuation de l'Andalousie et ma marche sur Tolède sont-elles l'unique ressource qui nous reste? Je vais me préparer à cette disposition que je regarde comme des plus funestes pour l'honneur des armes impériales, le bien du service de l'empereur et l'intérêt de V. M. dans l'espoir qu'avant qu'elle s'exécute V. M. l'aura changée ou modifiée suivant les propositions que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui faire le 19 Juillet, le 8 de ce mois, et par M. le colonel Desprez.

J'ai l'honneur d'adresser à votre majesté triplicata de ma lettre du 8 de ce mois. En me référant aux observations et propositions qu'elle renferme, si V. M. ne prend pas des dispositions en conséquence, je considère que l'évacuation de toute l'Espagne est décidée, car il faut que V. M. se persuade que du moment que mon mouvement sera commencé je serai suivi par soixante mille ennemis, lesquels ne me donneront pas le temps ni la liberté de prendre la direction que V. M. m'indique et qui se réuniront à ceux qui ont pénétré en Castille et m'empêcheront de séjourner sur le Tage, encore moins d'arriver à Madrid. Il n'y a qu'un moyen pour rétablir les affaires: que V. M. vienne en Andalousie et qu'elle y amène toutes les troupes de l'armée du centre, de l'armée de Portugal, de l'armée d'Aragon auxquelles ses ordres pourront parvenir, quand bien même tout le royaume de Valence devrait être évacué. Qu'importe à V. M. de conserver Madrid si elle perd le royaume? Philippe V. en sortit trois fois et y rentra en souverain. Du moment que nous aurons 70 ou 80 mille Français réunis dans le midi de

l'Espagne, le théâtre de la guerre est changé; l'armée de Portugal se trouve dégagée et elle peut se reporter successivement jusqu'au Tage. D'ailleurs ce serait sans inconvénient qu'elle gardât Burgos et la rive gauche de l'Ebre et que tout l'espace compris entre elle et la Sierra Morena fût à la disposition des ennemis jusqu'à ce que des renforts vinssent de France et que l'empereur eût pu prendre des dispositions. Le sacrifice une fois fait il n'y a plus de moyen d'y remédier. Les armées impériales en Espagne repassent l'Ebre d'où peut-être la famine les chassera, les affaires de l'empereur dans le nord de l'Europe peuvent s'en ressentir, l'Amérique qui vient de déclarer la guerre à l'Angleterre fera peut-être la paix. V. M. a sans doute réfléchi à toutes les conséquences d'un pareil changement; la perte momentanée de Madrid et des Castilles est nulle pour la politique de l'empereur, elle peut se réparer en plus ou moins de temps. La perte d'une bataille par l'armée de Portugal n'est qu'un grand duel qui se répare également, mais la perte de l'Andalousie et la levée du siège du Cadix sont des événemens dont les effets seront ressentis dans toute l'Europe et dans le nouveau monde. Enfin en fidèle sujet de l'empereur je dois déclarer à V. M. que je ne crois pas les affaires d'Espagne assez désespérées pour prendre un parti aussi violent. J'entrevois encore du remède si V. M. veut prendre les dispositions que j'ai proposées; tout en me préparant à l'exécution de ses ordres je me permets de lui demander de nouvelles instructions. J'ai surtout l'honneur de prier V. M. d'ordonner que les communications de l'Andalousie avec Tolède soient rétablies et quelque événement qui survienne de vouloir bien faire prendre à l'armée du centre la direction de Despeña Perros ou d'Almaden pour se joindre à l'armée du midi. Alors je répons de tout, et j'exécuterai les dispositions que j'ai énoncées dans ma lettre du 8 de ce mois,

Je, &c., &c., &c.

No. IV.

Lettre de M. le maréchal duc de Dalmatie à M. le Ministre de la guerre à Paris.

MONSIEUR LE DUC,—Toute communication de l'Andalousie avec la France étant interrompue et n'ayant rien reçu depuis les premiers jours de Mai; depuis un mois le roi ayant même retiré les troupes qui étoient dans la Manche et ne pouvant communiquer avec Madrid, j'entreprends de faire parvenir mes rapports à votre excellence par la voie de mer. Si le bâtiment que je fais à cet effet partir de Malaga peut arriver à Marseille, l'empereur sera plus tôt instruit de ce qui se passe dans le midi de l'Espagne et de la position de son armée.

A ce sujet j'ai l'honneur d'adresser à votre excellence copie des derniers rapports que j'ai faits au roi, lesquels contiennent les représentations que j'ai cru devoir soumettre à sa majesté pour le bien du service de l'empereur, la conservation des conquêtes et l'honneur des armées impériales.

Je ne suis instruit des malheurs que l'armée de Portugal a éprouvés que par les bruits populaires et les rapports de l'ennemi; car le roi en m'écrivant le 29 Juillet de Ségovie ne m'en a donné aucun détail. Je dois donc m'imaginer que les pertes que nous avons faites en Castille sont beaucoup exagérées et j'en tire la conséquence que les affaires de l'empereur en Espagne ne sont pas aussi désespérées que le roi paraît en être persuadé. Cependant sa majesté après être restée 23 jours sans m'écrire, lorsque les ennemis étoient en plein mouvement et que sa majesté se portoit avec 14,000 hommes de l'armée du centre à la rencontre du duc de Raguse qui

sans l'attendre s'étoit engagé précipitamment et éprouvait une défaite; le roi, dis, je en me faisant part le 29 Juillet de ses mouvemens me donna l'ordre formel d'évacuer l'Andalousie et de me diriger sur Tolède, et il me dit expressément que c'est l'unique ressource qui nous reste.

Je suis loin de partager l'avis de sa majesté, je crois fermement qu'il est possible de mieux faire, et que tout peut s'arranger en attendant que d'après les ordres de l'empereur V. E. ait pu mettre les armées qui sont dans le nord de l'Espagne à même de reprendre les opérations, ainsi que j'en fais la proposition à sa majesté dans les lettres dont je mets ci-joint copie. Mais mon devoir est d'obéir, et je me chargerais d'une trop grande responsabilité si j'éludais l'exécution de l'ordre formel d'évacuer que le roi m'a donné.

Je vais donc me préparer à exécuter cette disposition que je regarde comme funeste, puisqu'elle me force à livrer aux ennemis des places de guerre susceptibles d'une bonne défense, tout approvisionnées, les établissemens et un matériel d'artillerie immense, et de laisser dans les hôpitaux beaucoup de malades que leur situation et le manque de transport ne permettent point d'emmener. Je ne ferai cependant mon mouvement que progressivement, et je ne négligerai aucun soin pour qu'il ne reste en arrière rien de ce qui peut être utile à l'armée.

Je ne puis encore assurer que je ferai ce mouvement par Tolède, car du moment qu'il sera entrepris je serai suivi par 60,000 ennemis qui se joindront aux divisions que lord Wellington aura déjà portées sur le Tage. Ainsi il est possible que je me dirige par Murcie sur Valence suivant ce que j'apprendrai, ou les nouveaux ordres que je recevrai du roi.

Dans cet état de choses, je ne puis dissimuler à V. E. que je regarde l'évacuation de l'Espagne au moins jusqu'à l'Ebre comme décidée du moment que le roi m'ordonna d'évacuer l'Andalousie et de me diriger sur Tolède, car il est bien certain qu'il ne sera pas possible de rester en position sur le Tage ni dans les Castilles, et que dès-lors les conquêtes des armes impériales en Espagne dont l'empereur avait ordonné la conservation, sont sacrifiées.

A ce sujet je ne puis me défendre de réfléchir sur d'autres événemens qui se passent. J'ai lu dans les journaux de Cadix que l'ambassadeur du roi en Russie avait joint l'armée Russe, que le roi avait fait des insinuations au gouvernement insurgent de Cadix, que la Suède avait fait un traité avec l'Angleterre, et que le prince héréditaire avait demandé à la régence de Cadix 250 Espagnols pour sa garde personnelle. (Avant hier un parlementaire que le général Semélé avait envoyé à l'escadre Anglaise pour réclamer des prisonniers, resta pendant quelques instans à bord de l'amiral, lequel lui montra une frégate, qui, dit-il, est destinée à porter en Angleterre et ensuite en Suède les 250 Espagnols que le prince Bernadotte demande pour sa garde personnelle.) Enfin j'ai vu dans les mêmes journaux que Moreau, et Blücher étaient arrivés à Stockholm, et que Rapatel, aide-de-camp de Moreau, était à Londres. Je ne tire aucune conséquence de tous ces faits, mais j'en serai plus attentif. Cependant j'ai cru devoir déposer mes craintes entre les mains de six généraux de l'armée, après avoir exigé d'eux le serment qu'ils ne révéleront ce que je leur ai dit qu'à l'empereur lui-même ou aux personnes que S. M. aura spécialement déléguées pour en recevoir la déclaration, si auparavant je ne puis moi-même en rendre compte. Il est pourtant de mon devoir de manifester à V. E. que je crains que le but de toutes les fausses dispositions que l'on a prises, et celui des intrigues qui ont lieu, ne soient de forcer les armées impériales qui sont en Espagne à repasser au moins l'Ebre, et ensuite de présenter cet événement comme l'unique ressource (expression du roi, lettre du 20 Juillet) dans l'espérance d'en profiter par quelque arrangement.

Mes craintes sont peut-être mal fondées, mais en pareille situation il vaut mieux les pousser à l'extrémité que d'être négligeant, d'autant plus que ces craintes et ma sollicitude tournent au bien du service de l'empereur, et à la sûreté de l'armée dont le commandement m'est confié.

J'ai l'honneur de prier V. E. de vouloir bien, si ma lettre lui parvient, la mettre le plus tôt possible sous les yeux de l'empereur et d'assurer S. M. que moi et son armée du midi serons toujours dignes de sa suprême confiance. Je désire bien vivement que V. E. puisse me faire savoir que mes dépêches lui sont parvenues et surtout recevoir par elle les ordres de sa majesté.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.

(Signé)

DALMATIE

Séville, 12 Août, 1812.

No. V.

SIRE.—Je suis arrivé à Paris hier 21 du courant. Je me suis sur-le-champ présenté chez le ministre de la guerre et je lui ai remis la lettre de V. M. ainsi que celles de M. le maréchal Jourdan. S. E. m'a questionné sur les affaires d'Espagne, mais sans me demander mes dépêches pour l'empereur. Elle m'a, suivant les intentions de V. M., pourvu des ordres dont j'ai besoin pour poursuivre ma route avec célérité.

Ce matin le ministre m'a fait appeler et j'ai eu avec lui une longue conférence. Il m'a pressé de m'expliquer avec franchise sur ce que j'avais pu remarquer pendant mon séjour en Andalousie, m'a témoigné quelque inquiétude sur l'influence que pouvoit exercer le maréchal tant sur l'armée que sur les autorités civiles. Il a rappelé les intrigues de Portugal et a conclu en me disant qu'il dépouillait devant moi le carnatère de ministre pour causer avec un homme de votre confiance, et que les services que vous lui aviez rendus à l'époque de sa disgrâce devaient être pour V. M. une garantie du désir qu'il avait d'agir suivant ses intentions. Quelque franches que m'aient parues ces ouvertures je n'ai pas cru devoir parler de la partie la plus délicate de ma mission. J'ai seulement répondu que l'armée du midi serait toujours celle de l'empereur, que lorsque S. M. enverrait ses ordres déterminés, elle serait obéie, et que tout ce que j'avais entendu en Andalousie ne me laissait à ce sujet aucun doute. Au reste ma conversation avec le duc de Feltre m'a prouvé qu'aucune lettre de la nature de celle dont je suis porteur ne lui était encore parvenue, et cela est pour ma mission une circonstance favorable.

J'ai causé avec S. E. de la résistance que les chefs de l'armée Française en Espagne avaient toujours opposée aux ordres de V. M. Il a déclaré que tous avaient été mis sous vos ordres et sans aucune restriction, qu'avant son départ l'empereur avait témoigné son étonnement sur les doutes que manifestaient à cet égard des lettres de V. M., et qu'il avait ordonné que l'on fit connaître ses intentions d'une manière encore plus positive. J'ai cité la lettre où le maréchal Suchet s'autorise d'une phrase du prince de Neuchâtel, celles du général Dorsenne et du général Caffarelli; il paraît que tous les obstacles qui pouvaient entraver l'exécution de vos ordres ont été levés par des instructions adressées postérieurement aux généraux-en-chef. Quant à la désobéissance formelle du maréchal Soult S. E. a dit d'abord que V. M. avait le droit de lui ôter le commandement, mais elle est convenue ensuite qu'une démarche semblable ne pouvoit être faite que par l'ordre exprès de l'empereur.

Le ministre est aussi entré dans quelques détails sur les affaires militaires ; les ordres donnés par V. M. et par le maréchal Jourdan aux diverses époques de la campagne, ont eu, m'a-t-il dit, l'approbation générale, et ce qu'a écrit l'empereur, depuis qu'il a appris la bataille de Salamanque, prouve qu'il donne entièrement droit à V. M. L'opinion publique à cet égard est encore plus prononcée que celle des hommes en place, et je ne puis exprimer à V. M. avec quelle rigueur sont jugés en France les maréchaux Soult et Marmont.

Le duc de Feltre m'a parlé du mouvement sur Blasco Sancho. Peut-être, a-t-il dit, l'empereur reprochera un peu d'hésitation ; exécute deux jours plus tôt il aurait produit les plus heureux effets. V. M. se rappelle que j'avais prévu cette objection et je ne serai point embarrassé pour y répondre.

S. E. a cru que j'allais auprès de l'empereur pour solliciter de nouveaux renforts ; elle m'a dit que la guerre de Russie avait jusqu'à présent absorbé tous les moyens, qu'il était loin de pouvoir envoyer les troupes sur lesquelles paraissait compter M. le maréchal Jourdan, que l'on pourrait seulement pourvoir à la perte matérielle faite par l'armée de Portugal. Il paraît que les nouvelles troupes envoyées en Espagne ne s'élèvent pas au-delà de vingt mille hommes, au reste, la grande victoire remportée par l'empereur fera probablement prendre des dispositions plus favorables aux affaires de la Péninsule.

Le duc de Feltre a reçu des nouvelles du général Clauzel. Ce général annonce que l'armée Anglaise marche vers le nord, que lord Wellington s'est de sa personne porté vers le Duero, que l'armée de Portugal s'est ralliée, que ses pertes sont beaucoup moindres qu'on ne l'avait cru, que le général Foy avait fait un mouvement pour délivrer Astorga et Tordesillas, mais que déjà ces deux places s'étaient rendues, que l'on pourrait accuser de faiblesse les deux gouverneurs et que peut-être la conduite de celui de Tordesillas devait être jugée plus sévèrement encore.

J'ai parlé au ministre de la position embarrassante dans laquelle me mettait le décret du 26 Août ; il a répondu que je pouvais sans inconvénient me présenter à l'empereur avec les décorations du grade que m'a donné V. M. que ce n'était point contre les officiers à votre service que le décret avait été dirigé, et qu'il serait modifié en leur faveur.

J'ai l'honneur de prévenir V. M. que je partirai ce soir de Paris, je poursuivrai sans m'arrêter ma route jusqu'au quartier général de l'empereur.

J'ai l'honneur de mettre aux pieds de V. M. l'hommage de mon profond respect et de mon entier dévouement.

(Signé)

LE COLONEL DESPREZ

Paris, 22 Septembre, 1812.

No. VI. A.

Lettre confidentielle écrite au roi par monsieur le duc de Feltre.

Paris, 10 Novembre, 1812.

SIRE,—La lettre chiffrée que V. M. m'a écrite de Requeña le 18 Octobre, m'est parvenue il y a quelques jours, et je l'ai sur-le-champ transmise à l'empereur qui ne la recevra toutefois que 19 jours après le départ de cette même lettre de Paris. A la distance où l'empereur se trouve de sa capitale il est des choses sur lesquelles la politique force à fermer les yeux : du moins momentanément. Si la conduite de monsieur le maréchal duc de Dalmatie est équivoque et cauteleuse ; si ses démarches présentent le même

aspect que celles qu'il paroît avoir faites et qui ont précédé l'abandon du Portugal après la prise d'Oporto, il viendra un moment où l'empereur pourra l'en punir s'il le juge convenable, et peut-être est-il moins dangereux où il est qu'il ne le serait ici, où quelques factieux ont pu du sein même des prisons qui les renfermaient, méditer en l'absence de l'empereur une révolution contre l'empereur et sa dynastie, et presque l'exécuter, le 2 et 3 Octobre dernier. Je pense donc, sire, qu'il est prudent de ne pas pousser à bout le maréchal duc de Dalmatie, tout en contrariant sous main les démarches ambitieuses qu'il pourrait tenter, et en s'assurant de la fidélité des principaux officiers de l'armée du midi envers l'empereur et même de celle des Espagnols qu'il traîne à sa suite. L'arme du ridicule qu'il est facile de manier en cette occasion suffira, ce me semble, pour déjouer ses coupables projets s'ils existent, et le ramener à son devoir, sauf à faire prendre par la suite des précautions pour qu'il ne s'en écarte jamais.

Quoi qu'il en soit je suis incontestablement dans la nécessité d'attendre les ordres de l'empereur sur le contenu de la lettre de V. M. datée de Requena le 18 Oct. Elle voit par la présente que je partage ses sentimens sur l'objet dont elle traite; je viens d'être assez heureux pour donner à l'empereur et à sa famille de nouvelles preuves de ma fidélité et de mon attachement, et je suis assuré que si V. M. connaît les détails de ma conduite le 2 et 3 Octobre, elle la trouvera conforme aux sentimens que je me suis fait un plaisir de lui exprimer en faveur de l'empereur et de sa famille au moment où j'ai pris congé de V. M. à Lunéville il y a quelques années, &c., &c.

Note.—It is only necessary to add to this letter that notwithstanding the Duke of Feltre's professions of attachment, he was soon afterwards one of the most zealous courtiers of the Bourbons and the most bitter enemy of the emperor.

The constancy with which the Duke of Dalmatia served that great man is well known.

No. VI. B.

Colonel Desprez to the King.

Paris, 3 Janvier, 1813

SIRE,—J'ai eu l'honneur d'annoncer à V. M. mon arrivée à Paris. Mais j'ai dû en me servant de la voie de l'estafette user d'une extrême discrétion. La reine m'ayant conseillé de vous écrire avec quelque détail, et ayant daigné m'offrir de faire partir ma lettre par le premier courrier qu'elle expédierait, j'en profite pour rendre compte à V. M. de ma mission et lui faire connaître une partie des événemens dont j'ai été témoin.

Je suis arrivé à Moscou le 18 Octobre au soir. L'empereur venait d'apprendre que l'avant-garde commandée par le roi de Naples avait été attaquée et forcée à la retraite avec une partie de son artillerie. Déjà le départ était résolu et les troupes se mettaient en mouvement. On m'annonça à S. M. qui répondit d'abord d'une manière peu favorable. Cependant au milieu de la nuit on me fit appeler. Je remis à l'empereur les dépêches dont V. M. m'avait chargé, et sans les ouvrir, il me questionna sur leur contenu. Puis il fit sur les opérations de la campagne une partie des objections qu'avait prévues V. M.

Il dit que le mouvement en faveur de l'armée de Portugal avait été commencé trop tard, qu'il aurait pu être fait un mois plus tôt, que lui-même

avait dicté la conduite à tenir dans cette circonstance lorsqu'en 1808 il avait sans hésiter quitté Madrid pour marcher aux Anglais qui s'étaient avancées jusqu'à Valladolid. Je répondis que V. M. s'était mise en marche peu d'heures après la division Palombini, qu'elle avait dû attendre cette division pour conduire vers l'armée de Portugal un renfort tel que le succès ne pût être douteux; qu'elle avait d'autant moins cru devoir précipiter son mouvement, que M. le maréchal Marmont avait écrit plusieurs fois qu'il se croyait trop faible pour lutter seul contre l'armée Anglaise, que ce maréchal avait été maître du temps, qu'il n'avait point été battu dans sa position sur le Duero, mais bien sur un champ de bataille dans lequel rien ne l'avait forcé de s'engager. L'empereur prétendit ensuite que V. M. après avoir appris la perte de la bataille de Salamanque aurait dû se porter sur le Duero et rallier l'armée de Portugal. Je rappelai alors le mouvement fait du Guadarama vers Ségovie et la position critique dans laquelle vous avez laissé le duc de Raguse qui avait lui-même proposé ce mouvement. L'empereur dit qu'il connaissait très bien tous les reproches qu'à cet égard on pouvait faire au maréchal Marmont. Il ajouta que l'armée du centre ayant fait sa retraite sur Madrid elle aurait dû garder plus longtemps les défilés du Guadarama, qu'on avait trop tôt passé le Tage, que du moins ce mouvement ayant été résolu, il fallait ne point laisser de garnison au Retiro, briser tous les affûts, emporter les aigles et brûler les effets d'habillement; qu'il n'avait jamais considéré ce poste que comme propre à contenir la population de Madrid, que l'ennemi étant maître de la campagne, on devait l'abandonner et que de toutes les fautes de la campagne c'était celle qu'il avait le moins conçue. Je répondis à cette objection ainsi que j'en étais convenu avec V. M. L'empereur en venant ensuite à la lettre du duc de Dalmatie me dit qu'elle lui était déjà parvenue par une autre voie, mais qu'il n'y avait attaché aucune importance; que le maréchal Soult s'était trompé, qu'il ne pouvait s'occuper de semblables *peu-impertinences* dans un moment où il était à la tête de cinq cent mille hommes et faisait des choses immenses. Ce sont ses expressions; qu'au reste, les soupçons du duc de Dalmatie ne l'étonnaient que faiblement; que beaucoup de généraux de l'armée d'Espagne les partageaient et pensaient que V. M. préférait l'Espagne à la France; qu'il savait parfaitement qu'elle avait le cœur François, mais que ceux qui la jugeaient par ses discours devaient avoir une autre opinion. Il ajouta que le maréchal Soult était la seule tête militaire qu'il eût en Espagne, qu'il ne pouvait l'en retirer sans compromettre l'armée, que d'ailleurs il devait être parfaitement tranquille sur ses intentions puisqu'il venait d'apprendre par les journaux Anglais qu'il évacuait l'Andalousie et se réunissait aux armées du centre et d'Aragon, que cette réunion opérée on devait être assez en force pour reprendre l'offensive; que d'ailleurs il n'avait point d'ordres à envoyer, qu'il ne savait point en donner de si loin, qu'il ne se dissimulait point l'étendue du mal et qu'il regrettait plus que jamais que V. M. n'ait point suivi le conseil qu'il lui avait donné de ne pas retourner en Espagne; qu'il était inutile que je repartisse, que je resterais à l'armée où l'on m'emploierait. J'insistai alors pour être renvoyé à V. M. d'une manière qui parut faire sur l'empereur quelque impression, et il finit par me dire que je serai expédié mais que je ne pouvais l'être dans ce moment, qu'ayant besoin de repos je resterais à Moscou, et que puisque j'étais officier du génie, je serais chargé de diriger sous les ordres du duc de Trévise les travaux et la défense du Kremlin. Je reçus en conséquence un ordre écrit du prince de Neufchâtel. Lorsqu'après l'entière évacuation de Moscou le corps de M. le M. Mortier eut rejoint l'armée, je demandai et j'obtins d'y rester attaché jusqu'à ce que je fusse expédié. Je craignais que si je restais

au quartier général on ne m'y désignât des fonctions qui seraient un nouvel obstacle à mon retour. Je pensai que peut-être on éviterait d'envoyer à V. M. un témoin des événemens qui se passaient, et je préférai attendre qu'une occasion favorable se présentât. Étant arrivé à Wilna peu de temps après le départ de l'empereur, je demandai au duc de Bassano, et il me donna l'autorisation de venir attendre des ordres à Paris. J'ai eu l'honneur d'annoncer à V. M. dans une autre lettre que l'altération de ma santé me forçait à suspendre mon retour en Espagne.

L'armée au moment où je la quittai était dans la plus affreuse détresse. Depuis longtemps déjà la désorganisation et les pertes étaient effrayantes. L'artillerie et la cavalerie n'existaient plus. Tous les corps étaient confondus. Les soldats marchaient pêle-mêle et ne songeaient qu'à prolonger machinalement leur existence; quoique l'ennemi fût sur nos flancs, chaque jour des milliers d'hommes isolés se repandaient dans les villages voisins de la route et tombaient dans les mains des Cosaques. Cependant quelque grand que soit le nombre des prisonniers, celui des morts l'est incomparablement davantage. Il est impossible de peindre jusqu'à quel point la disette s'est fait sentir pendant plus d'un mois; il n'y eut point de distributions; les chevaux morts étaient la seule ressource, et bien souvent les maréchaux mêmes manquaient de pain. La rigueur du climat rendait la disette plus meurtrière; chaque nuit nous laissions au bivouac plusieurs centaines de morts. Je crois pouvoir sans exagérer porter à cent mille le nombre qu'on a perdu ainsi, et peindre avec assez de vérité la situation des choses en disant que l'armée est morte: la jeune garde qui faisait partie du corps auquel j'étais attaché était forte de 8000 hommes lorsque nous avons quitté Moscou, à Wilna elle en comptait à peine quatre cents. Tous les autres corps d'armée sont réduits dans la même proportion, et la retraite ayant dû se prolonger au delà du Niemen, je suis convaincu que vingt mille hommes n'auront pas atteints la Vistule. On croyait à l'armée que beaucoup de soldats avaient pris les devants et qu'ils se rallieraient lorsqu'on pourrait suspendre le mouvement rétrograde. Je me suis assuré du contraire; à cinq lieues du quartier-général, je ne rencontrai plus d'hommes isolés et je connus bien alors la profondeur de la plaie. Une phrase pourrait donner à V. M. une idée de l'état des choses: depuis le passage du Niemen un corps de 800 Napolitains, le seul corps qui eût conservé quelque consistance, faisait l'arrière garde d'une armée Française, forte naguère de trois cent mille hommes. Il est impossible d'exprimer jusqu'à quel point le désordre était contagieux; les corps réunis des ducs de Bellune et de Reggio comptaient 30,000 hommes au passage de la Berésina, deux jours après ils étaient dissous comme le reste de l'armée. Envoyer des renforts c'était augmenter les pertes, et l'on reconnut enfin qu'il fallait empêcher les troupes neuves de se mettre en contact avec cette multitude en désordre à laquelle on ne peut plus donner le nom d'armée. Le roi de Naples disait hautement qu'en lui laissant le commandement l'empereur avait exigé le plus grand sacrifice qu'il pût attendre de son dévouement. Les forces physiques et morales du prince de Neufchâtel étaient entièrement épuisées. Si maintenant V. M. me demandait quel doit être le terme du mouvement rétrograde, je lui répondrais que l'ennemi est maître de le fixer. Je ne crois pas que les Prussiens fassent de grands efforts pour défendre leur territoire. M. de Narbonne que j'ai vu à Berlin et qui était chargé de lettres de l'empereur pour le roi de Prusse, m'a dit que les dispositions de ce prince et de son premier ministre étaient favorables, mais il ne se dissimulait pas que celles de la nation ne sont pas les mêmes. Déjà plusieurs rixes s'étaient engagées entre les habitans de Berlin et des soldats de la garnison Française; et en

traversant la Prusse j'ai eu lieu de m'assurer que l'on ne pouvait guère compter sur cette alliée de nouvelle date.

Il paraît aussi que dans l'armée Autrichienne les officiers déclamaient publiquement contre la guerre.

Quelque triste que soit ce tableau, je crois l'avoir peint sans exagération et l'avoir observé de sang froid. Mon opinion sur l'étendue du mal est la même que lorsque j'étais plus voisin du théâtre.

No. VII.

Ghiart, le 2 Septembre, 1812.

MONSIEUR LE DUC DE FELTRE.—J'ai reçu le rapport du duc de Raguse sur la bataille du 22. Il est impossible de rien lire de plus insignifiant: il y a plus de fatras et plus de rouages que dans une horloge, et pas un mot qui fasse connaître l'état réel des choses. Voici ma manière de voir sur cette affaire, et la conduite que vous devez tenir. Vous attendrez que le duc de Raguse soit arrivé, qu'il soit remis de sa blessure, et à peu près entièrement rétabli. Vous lui demanderez alors de répondre catégoriquement à ces questions. Pourquoi a-t-il livré bataille sans les ordres de son général-en-chef? Pourquoi n'a-t-il pas pris des ordres sur le parti qu'il devoit suivre, subordonné au système général sur mes armées d'Espagne? Il y a là un *crime d'insubordination* qui est la cause de tous les malheurs de cette affaire; et quand même il n'eût pas été dans l'obligation de se mettre en communication avec son général-en-chef pour exécuter les ordres qu'il en recevait, comment a-t-il pu sortir de sa défensive sur le Duero, lorsque, sans un grand effort d'imagination, il étoit facile de concevoir qu'il pouvoit être secouru par l'arrivée de la division de dragons, d'une trentaine de pièces de canon, et de plus de 15 mille hommes de troupes Françaises que le roi avoit dans la main? Et comment pouvoit-il sortir de la défensive pour prendre l'offensive sans attendre la réunion et le secours d'un corps de 15 à 17 mille hommes?

Le roi avoit ordonné à l'armée du nord d'envoyer sa cavalerie à son secours; elle étoit en marche. Le duc de Raguse ne pouvoit l'ignorer, puisque cette cavalerie est arrivée le soir de la bataille. De Salamanque à Burgos il y a bien des marches. Pourquoi n'a-t-il pas retardé de deux jours pour avoir le secours de cette cavalerie, qui lui étoit si importante? Il faudroit avoir une explication sur les raisons qui ont porté le duc de Raguse à ne pas attendre les ordres de son général-en-chef pour livrer bataille sans attendre les renforts que le roi, comme commandant supérieur de mes armées en Espagne, pouvoit retirer de l'armée du centre, de l'armée de Valence et de l'Andalousie. Le seul fonds de l'armée du centre fournissoit 15 mille hommes de pied, et 2500 chevaux, lesquels pouvoient être rendus dans le même temps que le duc de Raguse faisoit battre son corps, et en prenant dans ses deux armées, le roi pouvoit lui amener 40 mille hommes. Enfin le duc de Raguse sachant que 1500 chevaux étoient partis de Burgos pour le rejoindre, comment ne les a-t-il pas attendus?

En faisant coïncider ces deux circonstances d'avoir agi sans l'ordre de son général-en-chef et de ne pas avoir attendu la réunion de deux jours pour ne pas recevoir 15,000 hommes d'infanterie et 2,500 chevaux que le roi, et 1500 chevaux de l'armée du nord, on est fondé à penser que ce maréchal a craint que le roi ne participe au succès de la bataille, et qu'il a sacrifié à la vanité la gloire de la patrie et l'avantage de mon service.

Donnez ordre aux généraux divisionnaires d'envoyer les états de leurs pertes. Il est intolérable qu'on rende des comptes faux et qu'on me dissimule la vérité.

Prescrivez au général Clausel, qui commande l'armée, d'envoyer la situation avant et après la bataille. Demandez également aux chefs de corps des situations exactes. Finalement, vous ferez connoître au duc de Raguse en temps opportun combien je suis indigné de la conduite inexplicable qu'il a tenue, en n'attendant pas deux jours que les secours de l'armée du centre et de l'armée du nord le rejoignissent. J'attends avec impatience l'arrivée du général aide-de-camp du roi pour avoir des renseignemens précis. Ce qu'il a écrit ne signifie pas grand'chose.

(Signé)

NAPOLEON.

No. VIII. A.

Extract from General Souham's Despatch to the Minister of War, Briviesca, 2nd October, 1812.

Par votre lettre du 6 Octobre vous m'annoncez que le duc de Dalmatie venait de réunir son armée à Grenade et à Jaen, et que le roi alloit se mettre incessamment en communication avec ce maréchal pour marcher de concert sur Madrid. En conséquence de ces mouvemens je résolus de marcher à la rencontre de l'ennemi, et de le forcer à lever le siège de Burgos. Le 18 toute mon armée se mit en mouvement sur trois colonnes, et le 19 elle occupait les positions ainsi qu'il suit. La droite à Termino, le centre sur les hauteurs de Monasterio, et la gauche à Villa Escuso la Solano et Villa Escuso la Sombrin. La journée du 20 devait être celle du combat, lorsque je reçus à l'instant, à deux heures du matin, par un aide-de-camp, une lettre de S. M. C. qui m'ordonne de ne point engager d'affaire générale, et d'attendre que par ses manœuvres lord Wellington soit forcé d'évacuer sa position de Burgos; ainsi il me faut renoncer à tous mes projets, et non sans un violent chagrin, car je puis assurer V. E. que mon armée était parfaitement disposée, et que j'aurais pu combattre l'ennemi avec avantage. Cependant l'armée n'a des vivres que pour quatre jours, et à cette époque, si lord Wellington n'est point en retraite, je serai forcé de l'attaquer. J'entrevois moins de péril de marcher en avant que de rétrograder. Dans un instant où le moral du soldat commence à se raffermir tout mouvement en arrière produit le plus mauvais effet.

(Signé)

COMTE SOUHAM.

No. VIII. B.

Extracts from two letters written by the Duke of Feltre to King Joseph, dated Paris, 8th Oct. and 19th Nov. 1812.

On one of the letters is the following note, in pencil, by the Duke of Wellington: "*Advantage of English newspapers.*"

"SIRE,—J'ai l'honneur d'adresser ci-joint à votre majesté quelques extraits des journaux Anglais les plus récents dont j'ai choisi ce qui pourrait être de quelque intérêt dans les circonstances actuelles."

"SIRE,—J'ai l'honneur d'adresser ci-joint à V. M. plusieurs extraits des journaux Anglais contenant quelques faits utiles ou intéressans à connaître."

These extracts taken from the Courier, Morning Post, Times, Statesman,

and Morning Chronicle, contain minute details upon the numbers, situation, and destination of the Sicilian, Spanish, and Anglo-Portuguese armies, and the most exact account of the reinforcements sent from England. In fine, a complete system of intelligence for the enemy.

No. IX.

Extract of a letter from Marshal Jourdan to Colonel Napier.

"Soisy sous Etiole, 14 Janvier, 1829"

"Le 10 Novembre, 1812, les armées du midi, du Portugal et du centre se trouvaient réunies sur la Tormes. Vous connaissez la position qu'occupait l'armée des alliés. Cette position ayant été bien reconnue, dans la journée du 11, par le roi, accompagné du duc de Dalmatie, de plusieurs généraux et de moi, je proposai de passer la Tormes, guéable presque partout entre Villa Gonzala et Huerta, et de nous porter rapidement sur Calvarissa de Ariba, qui se trouvait au centre de la ligne des ennemis. J'espérais que Lord Wellington ne pourrait éviter la bataille; et j'étais d'avis que nous devions faire tous nos efforts pour le forcer à l'accepter; me flattant qu'avec une armée de 80 mille hommes, dont 10 mille de cavalerie et 120 pièces de canon,* nous étions en état de remporter un brillant succès sur le même champ de bataille où quelques mois avant nous avions essuyé un revers.

"Le duc de Dalmatie, n'étant pas de mon avis, proposa d'aller passer la Tormes, à des gués qu'il avait reconnus à deux lieues au-dessus d'Alba: ce parti était sans doute plus prudent; mais il avoit, suivant moi, l'inconvénient que je voulais éviter, c'est-à-dire, qu'il laissait à nos adversaires la facilité de se retirer sans combattre. Cependant comme je n'étais revêtu d'aucun commandement, tandis que le duc de Dalmatie avait sous ses ordres les deux tiers de l'armée, le roi jugea convenable d'adopter son plan et lui en confia l'exécution; vous en connaissez le résultat: il fut tel que je l'avais prévu.

"Permettez-moi, Monsieur, d'ajouter une réflexion. Il me semble que Lord Wellington décidé à battre en retraite, aurait dû commencer à l'opérer le 14ème jour, où nous franchîmes la Tormes. En ne se mettant en mouvement que le 15, il se trouva dans la nécessité de défiler devant nous pendant une partie de la journée; et sans les mauvais temps, et surtout sans beaucoup trop de circonspection de notre côté, il eût peut-être couru quelque danger.

"On a publié que pendant leur retraite les alliés ne perdirent que 50 ou 60 tués, 150 blessés, 170 prisonniers. Il est, cependant, certain que le nombre de prisonniers Anglais, Portugais, et Espagnols, conduits au quartier-général à Salamanque, étoit le 20 Novembre, de 3520."

The justice of the marshal's opinion as to Lord Wellington having stayed too long on the Tormes is confirmed by the following note of a conversation held with the Duke of Wellington on the subject.

* These numbers are somewhat below those I have assigned to the French army; my calculation was made from the imperial muster rolls, but the difference may be easily accounted for by the length of time which elapsed when Marshal Jourdan wrote this letter. His numbers are evidently from memory, and probably he did not mean to include the king's guards and Spaniards.

"Lord Wellington would have fought the French on the old position of the Arapiles in 1812, notwithstanding their superior numbers, but he stayed too long at Salamanca."

No. X.

The Duke of Feltre, Minister of War, to the King of Spain.

Paris, le 29 Janvier, 1813.

SIRE.—J'ai eu l'honneur d'écrire à V. M. le 4 de ce mois pour lui faire connaître les intentions de l'empereur au sujet des affaires d'Espagne, et la nécessité de transporter le quartier-général de Madrid à Valladolid. Cette dépêche a été expédiée par duplicata et triplicata, et j'ignore encore si elle est parvenue à V. M. Depuis sa dépêche de Madrid du 4 Décembre je suis privé de ses lettres, et ce long silence me prouve que les communications de Madrid à Vittoria restent constamment *interceptées*. Il est vrai que les opérations du général Caffarelli qui s'est porté avec toutes ses troupes disponibles sur la côte de Biscaye pour dégager Santona fortement menacé par l'ennemi et parcourir la côte, a donné aux bandes de la Castille une facilité entière d'intercepter la route de Burgos à Vittoria. Les dernières nouvelles que je reçois à l'instant de l'armée de Portugal sont du 5 Janvier. A cette époque tout y était tranquille, mais je vois toujours la même difficulté pour communiquer. Cet état de choses rend toujours plus nécessaire de s'occuper très sérieusement et très instamment de balayer les provinces du nord, et de les délivrer enfin de ces bandes qui ont augmenté en forces et en consistance à un point qui exige indispensablement toute notre attention et tous nos efforts. Cette pensée a tellement attiré l'attention de l'empereur que S. M. I. m'a réitéré quatre fois successivement l'ordre exprès de renouveler encore l'expression de ses intentions que j'ai déjà adressée à V. M. par ma lettre du 4 Janvier pour l'engager à revenir à Valladolid, à garder Madrid par une division seulement, et à concentrer ses forces de manière à pouvoir envoyer des troupes de l'armée de Portugal vers le nord, en Navarre, et en Biscaye, afin de délivrer ses provinces, et d'y rétablir la tranquillité. Le général Reille, également frappé de l'état des choses dans le nord de l'Espagne, a bien compris la nécessité de prendre un parti décisif à cet égard. Il m'a transmis à cette occasion la lettre qu'il a eu l'honneur d'écrire à V. M. le 13 Octobre dernier, et j'ai vu qu'il lui a présenté un tableau frappant et vrai de la situation des affaires qui vient entièrement à l'appui de ma dépêche du 4 courant. Quant à l'occupation de Madrid, l'empereur m'ordonne de mettre sous les yeux de V. M. le danger qu'il y aurait dans l'état actuel des affaires de vouloir occuper cette capitale comme point central, et d'y avoir encore des hôpitaux et établissemens qu'il faudrait abandonner à l'ennemi au premier mouvement prononcé qu'il ferait vers le nord. Cette considération seule doit l'emporter sur toute autre, et je n'y ajouterai que le dernier mot de l'empereur à ce sujet ; c'est que toutes les convenances dans la position de l'Europe veulent que V. M. occupe Valladolid, et pacifie le nord. Le premier objet rempli facilitera beaucoup le second, et pour y contribuer par tous les moyens comme pour économiser un temps précieux, et mettre à profit l'inaction des Anglais, je transmets directement aux généraux commandant en chef les armées du nord et de Portugal, les ordres de l'empereur pour que leur exécution ne souffre aucun retard, et que ceux de V. M. pour appuyer et consolider leurs opérations n'éprouvent ni lenteur ni

difficulté lorsqu'ils parviendront à ces généraux. Je joins ici copie de mes lettres, sur lesquelles j'ai toujours réservé les ordres que V. M. jugera à-propos de donner pour l'entière exécution de ceux de l'empereur. Ma lettre était terminée lorsqu'un aide-de-camp de M. le maréchal Jourdan est arrivé avec plusieurs dépêches, dont la dernière est du 24 Décembre. J'ai eu soin de les mettre sous les yeux de l'empereur, mais leur contenu ne saurait rien changer aux intentions de S. M. L., et ne peut que confirmer les observations qui se trouvent dans ma lettre. J'aurai l'honneur d'écrire encore à V. M. par le retour de l'officier porteur des dépêches de M. le maréchal Jourdan.

Je suis, avec respect, sire, de votre majesté le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

Le ministre de la guerre,

DUO DE FELTRE

No. XI.

The Duke of Feltre to the King of Spain.

SIRE.—Depuis la lettre que j'ai eu l'honneur d'écrire à votre majesté le 29 Janvier, l'empereur, après avoir pris connoissance des dépêches apportées par l'aide-de-camp de monsieur le maréchal Jourdan, me charge encore de réitérer son intention formelle et déjà deux fois transmise à votre majesté, qu'elle porte son quartier général à Valladolid afin de pouvoir s'occuper efficacement de soumettre et pacifier le nord; par une conséquence nécessaire de ce changement, Madrid ne doit être occupé que par l'extrémité de la gauche, de manière à ne plus faire partie essentielle de la position générale et à pouvoir être abandonné sans inconvénient, au cas qu'il soit nécessaire de se réunir sur un autre point. Cette nouvelle disposition procure à votre majesté les moyens de faire refluer des forces considérables dans le nord et jusqu'à l'Aragon pour y détruire les rassemblemens qui existent, occuper en force tous les points importants, interdire l'accès des côtes aux Anglais, et opérer la soumission entière du pays. Il est donc d'une importance extrême pour parvenir à ce but, de profiter de l'inaction des Anglais, qui permet en ce moment l'emploi de tous nos moyens contre les insurgés et doit amener promptement leur entière destruction, si les opérations entreprises pour cet effet sont conduites avec l'activité, l'énergie et la suite qu'elles exigent. Votre majesté a pu se convaincre par la longue et constante interruption des communications autant que par les rapports qui lui sont parvenus de toute l'étendue du mal, et de la nécessité d'y porter remède. On ne peut donc mettre en doute son empressement à remplir les intentions de l'empereur sur ces points importants. Des changemens qui ont eu lieu pour le commandement en chef des armées du midi, du nord, et de Portugal, me font espérer que votre majesté n'éprouvera plus de difficultés pour l'exécution de ses ordres et que tout marchera au même but sans contradiction, et sans obstacle. Ces nouvelles dispositions me dispensent de répondre à différentes observations contenues dans les lettres de votre majesté, et m'engagent à attendre qu'elle me fasse connoître les résultats des changemens ordonnés par l'empereur. Je ne dois pas oublier de prévenir votre majesté d'un ordre que sa majesté impériale m'a chargé de transmettre directement à monsieur le général Reille pour lui faire envoyer une division de son armée en Navarre dont la situation exige impérieusement des secours prompts et efficaces. Cette disposition ne peut contrarier aucune de celles que votre

majesté sera dans le cas d'ordonner à l'armée de Portugal pour concourir au même but et amener la soumission des provinces du nord de l'Espagne.

Je suis, avec respect, Sire, de votre majesté le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

Le ministre de la guerre,

DUC DE FELTRE

No. XII.

Duke of Feltre to the King of Spain.

Paris, le 12 Février, (No. 2) 1813.

SIRE.— Par ma lettre de ce jour, No. 1, j'ai eu l'honneur de faire connaître à V. M. les intentions de l'empereur sur les opérations à suivre en Espagne. La présente aura pour but de répondre plus particulièrement à la lettre dont V. M. m'a honoré en date du 8 Janvier, et que j'ai eu soin de mettre sous les yeux de l'empereur. Les plaintes qu'elle contient sur la conduite du maréchal duc de Dalmatie et du général Caffarelli deviennent aujourd'hui sans objet par l'éloignement de ces deux généraux-en-chef. Je dois cependant prévenir V. M. qu'ayant fait connaître au général Caffarelli qu'on se plaignait à Madrid de ne point recevoir de comptes de l'armée du nord, ce général me répond sous la date du 27 Janvier qu'il a eu l'honneur de rendre à V. M. des comptes extrêmement fréquens, qu'il lui a envoyé la situation de l'armée et des doubles des rapports qui me sont adressés. Le général Caffarelli ajoute qu'il avait demandé à V. M. d'ordonner que deux divisions de l'armée de Portugal vinssent appuyer les opérations de l'armée du nord, et il pense que ces lettres se seront croisées avec les dépêches de Madrid parce que les courriers ont éprouvé beaucoup de retard, mais il y a lieu de présumer que tout ce qui a été adressé de l'armée du nord a dû parvenir à Madrid avant la fin de Janvier. V. M. réitère dans sa lettre du 8 Janvier ses demandes relativement aux besoins de l'armée. Toutes ont été mises sous les yeux de l'empereur. S. M. L. m'ordonne de répondre au sujet des fonds dont la demande se retrouve dans plusieurs dépêches précédentes, que l'argent nécessaire aux armées d'Espagne se serait trouvé dans ces riches et fertiles provinces dévastées par les bandes et par les juntas insurrectionnelles; qu'en s'occupant avec l'activité et la vigueur convenables pour rétablir l'ordre et la tranquillité, on y gagnera toutes les ressources qu'elles peuvent encore offrir, et que le temps ramènera dans toute leur étendue. C'est donc un motif de plus pour V. M. d'employer tous les moyens dont elle dispose pour mettre fin à cette guerre interne qui trouble le repos des habitans paisibles, ruine le pays, fatigue nos armées et les prive de tous les avantages qu'elles trouveraient dans l'occupation tranquille de ces belles contrées. L'Aragon et la Navarre aujourd'hui sous les lois de Mina alimentent de leurs productions et de leurs revenus cette lutte désastreuse, il est temps de mettre un terme à cet état de choses et de faire rentrer dans les mains du gouvernement légitime les ressources d'un pays florissant lorsqu'il est paisible, mais qui ne servent aujourd'hui qu'à son détriment.

Je suis, avec respect, Sire, de votre majesté le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

Le ministre de la guerre,

DUC DE FELTRE

No. XIII.

*The Duke of Feltre to the King of Spain.**Paris, le 12 Février, 1813.*

SIRE, — J'ai eu l'honneur d'écrire trois fois à V. M. dans le courant de Janvier, pour lui transmettre les intentions de l'empereur sur la conduite des affaires en Espagne, et j'ai eu soin de faire expédier toutes mes dépêches au moins par triplicata, tellement que je puis et dois espérer aujourd'hui qu'elles sont parvenues à leur destination. Je reçois en ce moment le dup^{la} d'une lettre de V. M. en date du 8 Janvier, dont le primata n'est point arrivé et j'y vois une nouvelle preuve de la difficulté toujours subsistante de communication; les inconvénients de cet état de choses deviennent plus sensibles dans les circonstances actuelles, où il étoit d'une haute importance que les ordres de l'empereur reçussent une prompte exécution. S. M. I. pénétrée de cette idée, attend avec une véritable impatience de savoir ce qui s'est opéré à Madrid, d'après ses instructions, et cette attente, journellement déçue lui fait craindre qu'on n'ait perdu un temps précieux, les Anglais étant depuis plus de deux mois dans l'impuissance de rien faire. L'empereur espère du moins que lorsque V. M. aura eu connaissance du 29^{me} bulletin, elle aura été frappée de la nécessité de se mettre promptement en communication avec la France et de l'assurer par tous les moyens possibles. On ne peut parvenir à ce but qu'en faisant refluer successivement les forces dont V. M. peut disposer sur la ligne de communication de Valladolid à Bayonne, et en portant en outre des forces suffisantes en Navarre et en Aragon pour combattre avec avantage et détruire les bandes qui dévastent ces provinces.

L'armée de Portugal combinée avec celle du nord est bien suffisante pour remplir cet objet, tandis que les armées du centre et du midi, occupant Salamanque et Valladolid, présentent assez de forces pour tenir les Anglais en échec en attendant les événements. L'empereur m'ordonne de réitérer à V. M. que l'occupation de *Valladolid* comme quartier général et résidence pour la personne est un préliminaire indispensable à toute opération. C'est de là qu'il faut diriger sur la route de Burgos et successivement sur tous les points convenables, les forces disponibles qui doivent renforcer ou seconder l'armée du nord. Madrid et même Valence ne peuvent être considérées dans ce système que comme des points à occuper par l'extrémité gauche de la ligne, et nullement comme lieux à maintenir exclusivement par une concentration de forces. Valladolid et Salamanque deviennent aujourd'hui les points essentiels entre lesquels doivent être réparties des forces prêtes à prendre l'offensive contre les Anglais et à faire échouer leurs projets. L'empereur est instruit qu'ils se renforcent en Portugal, et qu'ils paraissent avoir le double projet ou de pousser en Espagne ou de partir du port de Lisbonne pour faire une expédition de 25 mille hommes, partie Anglais partie Espagnols, sur un point quelconque des côtes de France, pendant que la lutte sera engagée dans le nord. Pour empêcher l'exécution de ce plan il faut être toujours en mesure de se porter en avant et menacer de marcher sur Lisbonne ou de conquérir le Portugal. En même temps il faut conserver des communications aussi sûres que faciles avec la France pour être promptement instruits de tout ce qui s'y passe, et le seul moyen d'y parvenir est d'employer le temps où les Anglais sont dans l'inaction pour pacifier la Biscaye et la Navarre comme j'ai eu soin de le faire connaître à V. M. dans mes précédentes. La sollicitude de l'empereur pour les affaires d'Espagne lui ayant fait réitérer à plusieurs reprises et reproduire sous

toutes les formes ses intentions à cet égard je ne puis achever mieux de les remplir qu'en récapitulant les idées principales que j'ai eu l'ordre de faire connaître à V. M. Occuper Valladolid et Salamanque, employer avec la plus grande activité possible tous les moyens de pacifier la Navarre et l'Aragon, maintenir des communications très rapides et très sûres avec la France, rester toujours en mesure de prendre l'offensive au besoin, voilà ce que l'empereur me prescrit de faire considérer à V. M. comme instruction générale pour toute la campagne et qui doit faire la base de ses opérations. J'ai à peine besoin d'ajouter que si les armées Françaises en Espagne restaient oisives et laissaient les Anglais maîtres de faire des expéditions sur nos côtes, la tranquillité de la France serait compromise et la décadence de nos affaires en Espagne en serait l'infailible résultat.

Je suis, avec respect, Sire, de votre majesté le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

Le ministre de la guerre,
DUO DE FELTRE.

No. XIV.

The Duke of Feltre to the King of Spain.

Paris, le 12 Mars, 1813.

SIRE,—La difficulté toujours subsistante des communications a apporté dans ma correspondance avec V. M. des retards considérables et de longues interruptions dont les résultats ne peuvent être que très préjudiciables au service de l'empereur. Depuis plus de deux mois j'expédie sans cesse et par tous les moyens possibles ordre sur ordre pour faire exécuter les dispositions prescrites par S. M. I., et je n'ai aucune certitude que ces ordres soient parvenus à leur destination. L'empereur, extrêmement mécontent de cet état de choses, renouvelle sans cesse l'injonction la plus précise de le faire cesser, et j'ignore encore en ce moment si les mouvemens prescrits se préparent ou s'exécutent, mais je vois toujours davantage que si des ordres relatifs à cette mesure doivent partir de Madrid cela entraînerait une grande perte de temps. L'empereur en a été frappé. Il devient donc tout-à-fait indispensable de s'écarter un moment de la voie ordinaire et des dispositions par lesquelles tout devoit émaner de V. M. au moins pour ce qui concerne le nord et l'armée de Portugal. Je prends pour cet effet le parti d'adresser directement aux généraux commandant de ces armées les ordres d'exécution qui dans d'autres circonstances devraient leur parvenir de Madrid, et j'ai l'honneur d'adresser ci-joint à V. M. copies des lettres que j'ai écrites au général Reille et au général Clauzel pour déterminer enfin l'arrivée des renforts absolument nécessaires pour soumettre l'Aragon, la Navarre et la Biscaye; les détails contenus dans ma lettre au général Clauzel me dispensent de m'étendre davantage sur cet objet important. V. M. y verra surtout qu'en prescrivant l'exécution prompte et entière des ordres de l'empereur j'ai toujours réservé l'exercice de l'autorité supérieure remise entre les mains de V. M. et qu'elle conserve également la direction ultérieure des opérations dès qu'elle pourra les conduire par elle-même.

Toutes mes précédentes dépêches sont d'ailleurs assez précises sur ce point pour ne laisser pas de doute à cet égard.

*The Duke of Feltre to the King.**Paris, 18 Mars, 1813.*

SIRE.—Parmi les lettres dont V. M. m'a honoré, la plus récente de celles qui me sont parvenues jusqu'à ce jour est du 1 Février, et je vois qu'à cette époque V. M. n'avait point encore reçu celle que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui adresser par ordre de l'empereur le 4 Janvier pour l'engager à transférer son quartier-général à Valladolid. Cette disposition a été renouvelée dans toutes mes dépêches postérieures sous les dates des 14, 19 Janvier, 3, 12, 25 Février, 1, 11 et 12 Mars, sans avoir eu jusqu'à présent de certitude que mes lettres fussent arrivées à leur destination. Enfin une lettre de M. le duc d'Albufera en date du 4 Mars, me transmet copie de celle que V. M. lui a adressée le 23 Février pour le prévenir que ma lettre du 4 Janvier est arrivée à Madrid, et qu'on s'y préparait à exécuter les dispositions prescrites par l'empereur. Ainsi c'est de Valence que j'ai reçu la première nouvelle positive à cet égard, et cette circonstance qui dévoile entièrement notre situation dans le nord de l'Espagne est une nouvelle preuve de l'extrême urgence des mesures prescrites par l'empereur et de tout le mal que d'inexplicables retards ont causé. S. M. I. vient à cette occasion de me réitérer l'injonction de faire sentir à V. M. la fausse direction qu'ont prise les affaires d'Espagne par le peu de soin qu'on a apporté à maintenir les communications avec les frontières. L'empereur est étonné qu'on ait si peu compris à Madrid l'extrême importance de conserver des communications sûres et rapides avec la France. Le défaut constant de nouvelles était un avertissement assez clair et assez positif de l'impuissance où se trouvait l'armée du nord de protéger la route de Madrid à Bayonne. L'état des affaires dans le nord de l'Europe devait plus que jamais faire sentir la nécessité de recevoir des nouvelles de Paris et de prendre enfin des mesures décisives pour ne pas rester si longuement dans un état d'isolement et d'ignorance absolu sur les vues et l'intention de l'empereur. V. M. avait trois armées à sa disposition pour rétablir les communications avec l'armée du nord, et l'on ne voit pas un mouvement de l'armée de Portugal ou de celle du centre qui soit approprié aux circonstances, tandis que l'inaction des Anglais permettait de profiter de notre supériorité pour chasser les bandes, nettoyer la route, assurer la tranquillité dans le pays. L'empereur m'a ordonné de faire connaître sa façon de penser sur cet objet au général Reille, auquel j'ai adressé directement les ordres de S. M. I. pour les forces qu'il a dû mettre sans retard sous les ordres du général Clauzel ainsi que j'ai eu l'honneur d'en prévenir V. M. par mes lettres des 29 Janvier, 3 Février et 12 Mars. En effet les circonstances rendent cette mesure d'une extrême urgence. L'inaction où l'on est resté pendant l'hiver a encouragé et propagé l'insurrection. Elle s'étend maintenant de la Biscaye en Catalogne, et l'Aragon exige, pour ainsi dire, le même emploi des forces pour le pacifier, que la Biscaye et la Navarre. Il est donc de la plus haute importance que V. M. étende ses soins sur l'Aragon comme sur les autres provinces du nord de l'Espagne, et les événemens qui se préparent rendront ce soin toujours plus nécessaire. D'un côté toutes les bandes chassées de la Biscaye et de la Navarre se trouveront bientôt forcées à refluer dans l'Aragon, et d'autre part l'évacuation de Cuenca, par résultat du mouvement général des armées du centre et du midi priverait le général Suchet de toute communication avec V. M. dans un moment où les ennemis se renforcent devant lui d'une manière assez inquiétante. Il est donc très important de se procurer une autre ligne de communication avec Valence et cette ligne ne peut s'établir que par l'Aragon. C'est à votre majesté

qu'il appartient de donner à cet égard les ordres nécessaires. Il suffra sans doute de lui avoir fait connaître l'état de choses et la position du maréchal Suchet pour lui faire prendre les déterminations que les circonstances rendraient les plus convenables. Il me tarde beaucoup d'apprendre enfin de V. M. elle-même l'exécution des ordres de l'empereur et de pouvoir satisfaire sur ce point la juste impatience de S. M. I.

No. XV.

Joseph O'Donnel to General Donkin.

Malaga, the 6th Decembre, 1812.

DEAR SIR,—The letter you did me the honor to adress to me on the 6th of September has been mislaid all this long time on account of my being separated from the armie since the moment I gave up the command of it, and it was only last night I had the pleasure of receiving it. I feel a great comfort in seeing an officer of your reputation affected so kindly with the sorrows which so unlucky as undeservedly (I believe) fall upon me as a consequence of my shameful defeat at Castalla. But I beg to be excused if I continue this letter in French. I know you understand it very well, and I can not explain my thoughts so well in English. Je crois, M. le général, que tout militaire, instruit des faits, et à la vue du malheureux champ de bataille de Castalla, ou du plan qui le représente, doit faire le même raisonnement que vous avez fait, à moins qu'il ne soit épris des petites passions et des préjugés qui ne dominent que trop souvent les hommes. Je crois l'avoir démontré à l'evidence dans mon rapport officiel au gouvernement (que vous devez avoir vu imprimé) accompagné de la carte des environs et des copies de tous les ordres que je donnai la veille du combat. J'aurois certainement été vainqueur si l'officier qui commandoit les 760 chevaux, avec deux pièces de 8 à mon aile gauche, eût obéi mes ordres, ou eût seulement tâché de se laisser voir de loin par la cavalerie ennemie, qui au nombre de 400 chevaux étoit stationnée dans le village de Viar; mais point du tout, cet officier, au lieu de se trouver sur Viar au point du jour de la bataille, pour tenir en échec la cavalerie ennemie, pour la battre s'il en trouvoit une occasion probable, ou pour la suivre en tout cas, et l'empêcher de tomber sur Castalla impunément, comme il lui étoit très expressément ordonné par des ordres écrits qu'il avoue, cet officier alla se cacher derrière Villena, et quoiqu'il entendit le canon de Castalla, et qu'il fût instruit de la marche des dragons de Viar par la route d'Onil, il resta tranquillement en position de l'autre côté de Villena jusqu'à passé huit heures du matin. Nous étions déjà battus, et trois malheureux bataillons hachés en pièces (quoiqu'ayant repoussé la première charge) quand M. le brigadier Santistevan se mit en marche de Villena pour venir à mon secours. Jugez donc, mons. le général, si j'ai pu empêcher ce désastre. Cependant, le public, qui ne peut juger que par les résultats, se déclina d'abord contre moi, et je ne m'en plains pas, car cela étoit fort naturel: c'est un malheur attaché à notre profession, et que les généraux Espagnols doivent ressentir sur tous les autres, puisqu'ils font la guerre sans ressources, et manquant de tout contre un ennemi aguerri qui ne manque de rien; mais je me plains des *Cortes* de la nation, je me plains de ces pères de la patrie, qui sachant que j'avois demandé moi-même à être jugé par un conseil de guerre, ont cependant donné le ton à l'opinion publique se répandant en invectives contre mon frère le régent,

avant de savoir si je suis en effet coupable. Après un pareil traitement, et dans l'état de misère et de détresse où se trouvent nos armées, où trouvera-t-on des généraux qui veuillent exposer leur honneur, et en accepter le commandement? Quant à moi je servirai ma patrie par devoir et par inclination jusqu'au dernier soupir, mais je n'accepterai jamais aucun commandement, supposant qu'il me fût offert. Les informations que l'on prend relativement à l'affaire en question ne sont pas encore finies, car tout va doucement chez nous. J'en attends le résultat ici avec l'aveu du gouvernement, et aussitôt que l'on aura prononcé en justice j'irai me présenter comme simple volontaire dans une de nos armées si l'on ne veut pas m'employer dans ma qualité de général subalterne. Je vous ai trop ennuyé de mes peines; c'est que j'en ai le cœur navré, et que votre bonté m'a excité à m'en soulager en vous les racontant. Il me reste encore un espoir flatteur, c'est le jugement de tous mes camarades qui ont vu de près mes dispositions à l'affaire de Castalla, et les efforts que j'avois fait pendant sept mois, luttant toujours contre la détresse et le désordre, pour préparer à la victoire une armée qui étoit tout-à-fait nulle quand je fus obligé à en prendre, malgré moi, le commandement. Je m'estimerai heureux, monsieur le général, de mériter aussi le suffrage d'un officier aussi distingué que vous l'êtes, et je vous prie d'agréer le témoignage du sincère attachement de votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

JOSEF O'DONNELL.

Monsieur le général Donkin,
 &c., &c.

No. XVI.

Freneda, February 25th, 1813.

SIR,—I have received your letter of the 12th instant, regarding the conduct of the second Italian regiment, and I entirely concur in all the measures you have adopted, and applaud the decision and firmness of your conduct. I am prepared, likewise, to approve of whatever you shall determine, upon deliberation, regarding the future state of the men of the regiment, whether to be formed into a regiment again, or not; or if so formed, whether to be kept as part of the army or sent back to Sicily.

The foreign troops are so much addicted to desertion that they are very unfit for our armies, of which they necessarily form too large a proportion to the native troops. The evil is aggravated by the practice which prevails of enlisting prisoners as well as deserters, and Frenchmen as well as other foreigners, notwithstanding the repeated orders of government upon the subject. The consequence is, therefore, that a foreign regiment cannot be placed in a situation in which the soldiers can desert from it, that they do not go off in hundreds; and in the Peninsula they convey to the enemy the only intelligence which he can acquire.

With this knowledge I seldom if ever use the foreign British troops of this army on the duty of outposts; and whatever you may determine regarding the second Italian regiment, I recommend the same practice to your consideration.

There is nothing new on this side of the Peninsula. The armies are nearly in the stations which they took up in the end of November.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

WELLINGTON.

Major-general Campbell,
 &c., &c., &c.

No. XVII.

Extract of a letter from the Marquis of Wellington to Lieutenant-general Sir John Murray, dated Freneda, April 6th, 1813.

"In regard to feeding the Spanish troops in Spain, I have invariably set my face against it, and have never consented to it or done it, even for a day in any instance. My reasons are, first that it entails upon Great Britain an expense which the country is unable to bear; secondly, that it entails upon the department of the army which undertakes it a detail of business, and a burthen in respect to transport, and other means to which the departments if formed upon any moderate scale must be quite unequal; thirdly, I know from experience that if we don't interfere, the Spanish troops, particularly if paid as yours are, and in limited numbers, will not want food in any part of Spain, whereas the best and most experienced of our departments would not be able to draw from the country resources for them. I have already consented to the formation of a magazine for the use of General Whittingham and General Roche's corps for a certain number of days, if it should be found necessary to give them assistance of this description. I can go no farther, and I earnestly recommend to you, if you give assistance at all, to give over a magazine to last a given time, but not to take upon yourself to supply the Spanish troops engaged in operations. If, however, you should notwithstanding this recommendation, take upon yourself to give such supplies, I must object, as commander-in-chief of the Spanish army, to your giving more than bread to the troops who receive pay, as that is positively contrary to the regulations and customs of the Spanish army. I recommend to you also to attend with caution to the demands of both General Whittingham and General Roche, and to observe that in proportion as you will comply with their demands, demands will be made upon you by General Elio and others, and you will involve yourself in a scale of expense and difficulty, which will cramp all your operations, and which is quite inconsistent with the views of government on the eastern coast of the Peninsula.

No. XVIII.

GENERAL STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY, APRIL 15th, 1812.

EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER-ROLLS.

	Present under arms.		Detached.		Hospital.	Effective.	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.		Men.	Horses.
Armée du Midi....	55,797	11,014	2,498	700	6,065	64,360	11,714
Centre.....	19,148	3,993	144	51	624	19,916	4,044
Portugal.....	56,337	8,108	4,394	2,278	7,706	69,037	10,386
Ebre.....	16,830	1,873	21	6	3,425	20,276	1,879
Aragon.....	11,746	3,239	2,695	658	1,467	18,948	3,927
Catalogne.....	24,924	1,259	1,163	49	5,540	35,627	1,308
Nord.....	48,232	7,074	1,309	72	8,677	58,276	7,213
Total.....	240,654	36,590	12,224	3,814	33,504	286,440	40,471
Reserve de Bayonne.....	4,038	157	36	35	865	4,939	192
Grand Total.....	244,692	36,747	12,260	3,849	34,369	291,379	40,663
Civic guards attached to the army of the south.....	6,497	1,655	"	"	258	6,755	1,497
Troupes Espagnoles.....	33,952	525	"	"	"	33,952	525
Total Espagnoles.....	40,449	2,180	"	"	258	40,707	2,022

GENERAL STATE, MAY 15, 1812.

	<i>Present under Arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>	<i>Total.</i>		
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.		Men.	Cavalry.	Artillery
Armée du Midi.	56,031	12,101	2,787	660	4,652	63,470	7,311	4,340
Centre.....	17,395	4,208	158	37	768	19,203	3,332	420
Portugal...	52,618	7,244	9,750	1,538	8,332	70,700	4,481	3,448
Aragon.....	27,218	4,768	4,458	605	3,701	35,377	2,976	1,980
Catalogne...	33,677	1,577	1,844	287	6,009	41,530	1,376	279
Nord.....	38,771	6,031	2,560	271	7,767	49,098	4,443	1,163
Total.....	225,710	35,929	21,557	3,378	31,227	279,378	23,919	11,630
Old Reserve at Bayonne.....	3,894	221	1,642	"	964	6,500	207	"
New Reserve at Bayonne.....	2,598	116	3,176	"	6	5,760	103	"
General Total..	232,202	36,266	26,375	3,378	32,196	291,647	24,229	11,630

GENERAL STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMIES, MARCH 15, 1813.

	<i>Present under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>	<i>Total.</i>		
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.		Men.	Cavalry.	Train.
Armée du Midi.	36,605	6,602	2,000	1,617	7,144	45,809	8,650	2,601
Centre.....	16,227	1,966	940	76	2,401	19,568	2,790	451
Portugal...	34,825	3,654	157	"	7,731	42,713	6,720	2,149
Aragon.....	36,315	3,852	55	"	2,442	38,812	6,123	1,799
Catalogne...	27,323	1,109	110	"	2,013	29,446	1,884	635
Nord.....	40,476	1,978	41	"	8,030	48,547	3,171	830
Reserve de Bayonne	6,577	55	80	"	634	6,591	79	21
Total.....	197,648	19,216	3,443	1,693	30,395	231,486	29,423	8,486

The operations and misfortunes of the French prevented any general states being sent home between the 15th of March and the 15th of August, 1813, when a new organization of the armies took place; but the numbers given in the narrative of this history are the result of calculations founded on the comparison of a variety of documents, and are believed to be a very close approximation to the real strength of the armies.

No. XIX.

ESPECIAL STATE OF THE ARMY OF PORTUGAL, JUNE 15, 1812.

HEAD-QUARTERS, TORDESILLAS.

	<i>Present under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>	<i>Total.</i>		
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.		Men.	Cav.	Train.
1st division.....Foy.....	5,138	"	310	"	516	5,973	"	"
2d do.....Clausel.....	7,405	"	678	"	613	8,696	"	"
3d do.....Ferey.....	5,547	"	12	"	926	6,485	"	"
4th do.....Sarrut.....	5,056	"	214	"	563	6,133	"	"
5th do.....Mancune.....	5,269	"	588	"	1513	7,370	"	"
6th do.....Brennier.....	5,021	"	124	"	720	5,865	"	"
7th do.....Thomieres.....	6,352	61	"	"	1905	8,257	61	"
8th do.....Bonnet.....	6,681	139	66	"	685	7,422	139	"
Light Cavalry, } 13 escadrons }	Curto.....	1,326	1398	1073	324	2,705	1722	"
Dragoons.....Boyer.....	1,389	1378	479	359	86	1,954	1736	"
Artillery.....	3,612	2239	513	258	220	4,345	347	2149
Genie.....	414	9	67	7	84	565	"	12
Equipage.....	955	1107	51	44	942	1,251	"	1064
Gen-d'armes et Infirmerie.....	345	75	"	"	15	340	54	"
Total.....	54,550	6506	4184	991	8633	67,370	4050	3244

From these 54,550 men, present under arms, must be deducted the artillery, engineers, equipages, and garrisons, the officers and sergeants, and the losses sustained between the siege of the forts and the battle of Salamanca; the result will be about 42,000 sabres and bayonets in the battle.

Renforcements en marche de l'armée du nord.....	1,370
Do de Bayonne.....	12,676

Note.—These troops did not join before the battle of Salamanca.

ARTILLERY OF THE ARMY OF PORTUGAL, JUNE 16, 1812.

MATERIEL.

	Poid et calibre	Nombre.	
Bouches à feu.....	Canon de 12 lbs.	2	Total des canons... 60
	8 do.	20	
	4 do.	33	
	3 do.	5	
	Obusiers de 6 pouces	11	Total des obusiers.. 14
	Ditto de 4 pouces 3 lignes	3	
	Total.....	74	
	nant de l'armée du nord.....	8	These guns arrived after the battle.
		82	

TOTAL LOSS OF THE ARMY OF PORTUGAL FROM JULY 10 TO AUGUST 10, 1812, INCLUDING THE BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.

EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER-ROLLS.

	Tués.	Blessés.	
Officiers supérieurs.....	Duke de Raguse.....	1	
	General Clausel.....	1	
	General Bonnet.....	1	
	General Ferrey.....	1	
	General Thomières.....	1	
	General Desgravier Bertholet	1	
	General Carrié.....	1	Prisonnier.
Aide-de-camp du duc de Raguse.	General Menne.....	1	
	Colonel Richemont.....	1	
	Le Clerc de Montpreé.....	1	
	Darel.....	1	
Total.....	Tués 4 Blessés 7		
Officiers inférieurs et soldats	Tués ou Pris.	Blessés.	Traineurs.
Officiers.....	162	233	
Soldats.....	3,867	7,529	645
Grand Total.....	4,029	7,761	645
Officiers et soldats....	12,435		
Chevaux.....	1,190		
Canons.....	12		
Deux aigles de 101 ^{ème} Regt. de ligne.			

No. XX.

STRENGTH OF THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ARMY UNDER LORD
VISCOUNT WELLINGTON, ON THE MORNING OF JULY 22, 1812.

EXTRACTED FROM THE ORIGINAL MORNING STATE.

Note.—The numbers are exclusive of officers, sergeants, trumpeters, artillerymen, and staff, showing merely the sabres and bayonets in the field.

British cavalry, one division, present under arms. 3,314 men, 3,368 horses.	
British infantry, seven divisions	do 22,067 " "
Total British.....	
25,381	
D'Urban's Portuguese cavalry, three	
regiments, about.....	
1,500	These troops are not in the state.
Portuguese infantry, seven divisions,	
and two independent brigades....	
16,107	
17,517	
Total Anglo-Portuguese.....	
42,898	
Carlos d'España's Spanish division, about 3,000	
Julian Sanchez' cavalry.....	
500	
3,500	
Sabres and bayonets.....	
46,398	

NUMBER OF BRITISH, GERMAN, PORTUGUESE, AND SPANISH
GUNS AT THE BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.

	Weight of calibre.	No. of guns.
British horse artillery.....	6 lbs.	18
Foot do.	9 lbs.	12
Do. do.	12 lbs.	12
German do.	9 lbs.	6
Portuguese and British brigaded together.....	24 lb. howitzers	6
		54
One Spanish battery.....		6
General total.....		90 pieces.

No. XXI.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE LOSS OF THE ALLIES ON THE TRA-
BANCOS AND GUARENA RIVERS, JULY 18, 1812.

	Officers.	Sergeants.	Rank and file.	Horses.	Men.
British	3	3	56	59 killed....	543
	16	7	274	65 wounded..	
	"	"	27	21 missing...	
Portuguese.....	1	2	31	" killed....	
	6	3	87	" wounded..	
	"	"	27	" missing...	
Total.....	26	15	503	145	

LOSS OF THE ALLIES IN THE BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.

	Officers.	Sergeants.	Rank and file.	Horses	Men.
British	{ 28 188 13	{ 24 136 "	{ 336 2400 74 287	{ 96 Killed .. 120 Wounded .. 37 Missing ..	5924
Portuguese	{ 74 1		{ 1436 180	{ 18 Killed .. 13 Wounded .. 7 Missing ..	
Total ..	304	207	4713	291	

LOSS OF THE GERMAN CAVALRY ON THE ALMAR STREAM,
JULY 23.

Men and Officers.	Horses.	
117	117	117

THE BRITISH LOSS BY INFANTRY DIVISIONS AND
CAVALRY BRIGADES.

Cavalry	{ Le Marchand's Brigade	lost.	Men and officers	105	141
	{ Anson's do.	do.	do.	5	
	{ Victor Alten's do.	do.	do.	31	
	{ 1st Division General Campbell	do.	do.	69	2886
	{ 3rd do. General Pakenham	do.	do.	456	
	{ 4th do. General Cole	do.	do.	537	
Infantry	{ 5th do. General Leith	do.	do.	464	
	{ 6th do. General Clinton	do.	do.	1198	
	{ 7th do. General S. Hope	do.	do.	119	
	{ Light do. General C. Alten	do.	do.	29	
	{ Artillery General Framingham	do.	do.	14	3027

No. XXII.

STRENGTH OF THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ARMY AT
VITTORIA.

EXTRACTED FROM THE MORNING STATE OF THE 19TH JUNE, 1813.

	Present under arms.	On Command.	Total. Present. On Command.
British Cavalry	7,791	851	
Portuguese do.	1,452	225	
Total Cavalry	9,243		1076
British Infantry	33,638	1771	
Portuguese do.	21,905	1038	
Total infantry	57,563		2809
	Sabres and bayonets ..	66,806	3685
Deduct the 6th division left at Medina de Pomar ..	6,320		
	Sabres and bayonets ..	60,486	
	Spanish Auxiliaries.		
Infantry	{ Morillo's division	about 3,000	
	{ Giron's do.	do. 12,000	
	{ Carlos d'Espagna's do.	do. 3,000	
	{ Longa's do.	do. 3,300	
Cavalry	{ Penne Villemur	do. 1,000	
	{ Julian Sanchez	do. 1,000	
		23,000	
Grand Total		83,486	

NUMBER OF ANGLO-PORTUGUESE GUNS AT THE BATTLE OF VITTORIA.

COLONEL A. DICKSON, COMMANDING.

British horse artillery				9 lbs.				45
Do. do.				6 lbs.				30
Do. do.				5½ inch howitzers				15
Total								90

No Spanish guns set down in the return. Number unknown.

No. XXIII.

JUSTIFICATORY PIECES.

Lord William Bentinck to Sir E. Pellew.

At Sea, June 18th, 1818.

SIR,—Y. E. has seen the information I have received of a projected attack upon Sicily by Murat, in conjunction with the Toulon fleet. It seems necessary that the French fleet should leave Toulon, should reach the coast of Naples, embark the men and land them in Sicily, or cover their passage from Calabria or the Bay of Naples, if the intention be, as in the last instance, to transport them to Sicily in the tonnage and small craft of the country. The most important question is, whether this can be effected by the enemy. I have no difficulty in saying on my part, that in the present disposition of the Neapolitan army in Sicily, and in the non-existence of any national force, and the imperfect composition of the British force, if half the number intended for this expedition should land in Sicily, the island would be conquered.

(Signed)

W. BENTINCK.

Sir E. Pellew to Lord W. Bentinck.

H. M. S. Caledonia, June 19th, 1818.

MY LORD,—I feel it my duty to state to your lordship that in my judgment the Toulon fleet may evade mine without difficulty under a strong N. W. wind to carry them through the passage of the Iliees islands, without the possibility of my interrupting them, and that they may have from twelve to twenty-four hours' start of me in chasing them. When blown off the coast, my look-out ships would certainly bring me such information as would enable me to follow them immediately to the Bay of Naples. Your lordship is most competent to judge whether in the interval of their arrival and my pursuit, the French Admiral would be able to embark Murat's army, artillery and stores, and land them on the coast of Sicily before I came up with them. The facility of communication by telegraph along the whole coast of Toulon would certainly apprise Murat of their sailing at a very short notice, but for my own part, I should entertain very sanguine hopes of overtaking them either in the Bay of Naples or on the coast of Sicily before they could make good their landing.

Lord William Bentinck to Lord Wellington.

At Sea, June 20th, 1818.

MY LORD,—By the perusal of the accompanying despatch to Lord Castle-

reagh, your lordship will perceive that Murat has opened a negotiation with us, the object of which is friendship with us and hostility to Buonaparte. You will observe in one of the conversations with Murat's agent, that he informed me that Buonaparte had ordered Murat to hold twenty thousand men in readiness for the invasion of Sicily in conjunction with the Toulon fleet. I enclose the copy of a letter I have in consequence addressed to Sir E. Pellew, together with his answer, upon the practicability of the Toulon fleet sailing without the knowledge of the blockading fleet. Your lordship will have received my letter of the 21st of May enclosing a copy of my despatch to Lord Bathurst, relative to the discontent of the Neapolitan troops in Sicily and the consequent state of weakness if not of danger resulting from it to that island. I stated also that this circumstance had induced me to detain in Sicily the two battalions which had been withdrawn from Spain.

Lord Wellington to Lord William Bentinck.

Huarte, July 1st, 1813.

MY LORD,—In answer to your lordship's despatch, I have to observe, that I conceive that the island of Sicily is at present in no danger whatever.

No. XXIV.

Letter from General Nugent to Lord William Bentinck.

Vienna, January 24th, 1812.

MY DEAR LORD WILLIAM,—I hope you have received the letter I wrote to you, shortly after my arrival here by a person sent for that purpose. Soon after his departure the affair of La Tour happened, as King mentions in his letter. It required some time before I could judge of the result it would have, and the manner it would be considered by the emperor and the government here, and then to settle again the manner of sending officers down to the Mediterranean, for some of those then destined to be sent were implicated. All these circumstances caused the delay of the present, which otherwise you would have had much sooner. Another cause of the delay was that I wanted to inform you of the answer which would be given by this house to the speculations that I was commissioned by the prince-regent to propose, relative to the archduke. There was no decisive answer given, and the only manner of forming an opinion upon that subject was by observing and getting information of their true intentions. I am now firmly convinced that these are such as we could wish, and that it is only fear of being committed that prevents them to speak in a more positive manner. Their whole conduct proves this, more particularly in La Tour's affair, which has produced no change whatsoever nor led to any discovery of views or connexions. There is even now less difficulty than ever for officers going to the Mediterranean. They get passports from government here without its inquiring or seeming to know the real object. As it can do nothing else but connive, to which this conduct answers, I think a more explicit declaration is not even requisite, and I am convinced that when the thing is once done they will gladly agree. This is likewise King's and Hardenberg's and Johnson's opinion upon the subject, and as such they desire me to express it to you, and to observe that the situation of things here makes the forwarding of

the measures you may think expedient in the Mediterranean and the Adriatic the more desirable.

They are here extremely satisfied with the conduct of government in England, and by the accounts we have, the latter is much pleased with the conduct of this country, particularly relative to the affairs of Prussia. These are however not decided yet. But whatever the consequence may be and whatever this country may do for the present, I am convinced that your measures will ultimately contribute much to the result. I am happy to perceive by the last information from England that everything seems to have been settled there by you. The recruiting business of Major Burke is going on rapidly. As it was not begun at the time of my departure I can only attribute it to your presence. The letters contain likewise that government is come to the most favorable resolutions relative to the archduke, and I hope the formation of the troops will soon be effectuated. The dispositions of the Adriatic coasts and the Tyrol are as good as can be, but all depends upon establishing a basis, and without that all partial exertions would be useless or destructive. At the same time that some regiments would be formed, I think it would be very expedient to form at the same place a Dalmatian or a Croat regiment, particularly as in the present state of things it will be much easier even than the other. The men could be easily recruited in Bosnia, and sent from Durazzo to the place you should appoint. The bearer will give you every information upon the subject, and at all events, I should propose to you to send him immediately back to Durazzo, and, should you adopt the above, to give him the necessary orders and the commission for recruiting and sending the men to the place of formation. No person can be better qualified than he is. He knows the languages, the country, and the character of the people, and understands everything relative to commercial affairs. As to the place of formation, I think I already proposed Cephalonia to you. Lissa or one of the nearer islands would give too much jealousy in the beginning in those parts, until our capital increases so as to undertake an important enterprise, at all events it is important to form a noyau of the three nations; it is then that we may hope to be joined by the whole of Dalmatia and Croatia after a short time. Major and other officers will shortly proceed to the Mediterranean. They will be directed to Messina where I request you will send orders for them. It would be very useful and saving to provide means for transporting them to that place from Durazzo, and if possible to establish a more frequent and regular intercourse between you and the latter. Johnson who soon sets off from here will in the meantime establish a communication across Bosnia to Durazzo. His presence in those parts will be productive of many good effects. You will find that he is an able active and zealous man, and will certainly be very useful in forwarding your views. I can answer for his being worthy of your full confidence. Should you adopt the proposition relative to the recruiting, it would be necessary to put at his disposal the requisite funds.

You will judge by the account the bearer of this will give you whether cloth, &c., can be had at a cheaper rate from this country or where you are, and he will bring back your directions for this object. Allow me to observe that it would be highly useful to have clothes for a considerable number of men prepared beforehand. Many important reasons have prevented me hitherto from proceeding to the Mediterranean as speedily as I wished. I hope however not to be detained much longer, and soon to have removed every obstacle. I think to set off from here in the beginning of March, and request you will be so kind as to provide with the return of the bearer to

Durazzo the means of my passage from thence, where I shall come with a feigned name. I hope he will be back there by the time of my arrival. I shall endeavor to hasten my journey, as I have important information in every respect. By that time we shall know the decision relative to the north. King has informed you of the reasons which made an alteration necessary in regard to Frozzi's journey. Part of your object is in fact fulfilled already, and there are agents in Italy, &c. As to the other and principal part relative to connexions in the army, and the gaining an exact knowledge of it and of the government in Italy, with other circumstances, I expect soon to have a person of sufficient consequence and ability to execute your instructions, and he will go to Milan, &c. as soon as it can be done with safety. His permanent residence in that country seems to be necessary, that he may be able to accomplish fully the object, and as the sum you have assigned for this purpose is sufficient for a considerable time, you can determine whether he is to remain there permanently or not. Frozzi will bring you an exact account of what has been arranged relative to this business, and will himself be a very proper person for communications between you and Italy or this country. He will for that purpose go back to Italy, the obstacle that opposed it hitherto being now no more. I cannot but repeat the importance of giving all possible extent to the arch-duke's establishment, and particularly the raising of as much troops as possible, for all will depend upon having the means of landing. We are then sure of augmenting very speedily, and finding the greatest assistance. The place for beginning cannot be determined on exactly, but there is much to be expected in Dalmatia and Croatia where we could be joined by the inhabitants and troops. The lower part would be best adapted in case we begin with a small force. I shall send and bring officers particularly acquainted with the country, and provide every other assistance such as plans, &c., and I think it would be expedient to prevent for the present any enterprise in that country that would alarm them. Since I began my letter a courier has arrived from Paris.

The contingent of the Rhenish confederacy have got orders to be ready for marching. Reinforcements are sending from France to the north, and every preparation is making for war. Buonaparte told to Swartzenburg that he would begin in April and all circumstances seem to agree with this. On the other side Russia is very slow in making peace with Turkey. He entirely neglects Prussia, and for this reason it is to be feared that the latter will place his capital with Buonaparte notwithstanding that this cabinet is endeavoring to prevent it. I should be then very much afraid for the conduct of this house, well inclined as the Emperor is. Proposals were made by France but no resolution has been taken until it is known how things turn out. The worst is that Romanzow is still in credit with Alexander, which prevents all confidence in other houses and makes Russia adopt half measures. This sketch of the situation will give you some idea of the wavering and uncertain state people are in. There is no calculation to be made as to the conduct of government, nor must we be surprised at anything they may do. On the other side our speculations are not built upon them, but upon the disposition of the people; and whatever may happen I am convinced that this is a good foundation if the measures are taken and the means prepared. A principal object of mine in these parts has been to prepare the measures for the case that it comes here to the very worst. The most important thing is the augmenting in every possible manner the force at your disposition. The accounts we have to-day of your return and the powers I hope you have, give me the best hopes of your overcoming every

difficulty. I must here observe that as Johnson's proceedings are entirely subordinate to, and make a part of your plans and operations in general, and that he cannot of course depend upon King, you will be so good as to give him decisive instructions to that purpose, and assign him the means and powers for acting in consequence. I shall combine with him in my passage through Bosnia everything in the hopes that you will approve of this.

Letter from Mr. King to Lord William Bentinck.

Vienna, January 24th, 1812.

MY LORD,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship's letter of the 25th of August, which was delivered to me towards the latter end of October, by Captain Frozzi whom I should immediately have furnished with the means of proceeding to Italy for the purpose of carrying your lordship's instructions into effect, had it not appeared to me that the measures which I had taken on my arrival here, had already in a great degree anticipated your lordship's intentions. As a confirmation of this, I beg leave to transmit for your lordship's perusal the reports (marked A) of three messengers whom I sent to the north of Italy for the purpose of ascertaining the state of the public mind, particularly in the ci-devant Venetian territories and adjacent districts. These reports confirm in a very satisfactory manner the assurances, which I have received through various other channels, that the inhabitants of those countries are ready and determined to avail themselves of the first opportunity to shake off a yoke which is become insupportable. I have also the honor to transmit to your lordship the copy of a letter from Count Montgelas, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Bavaria, to the commissary-general at Nymphen, from which it appears that the Bavarian government is not altogether ignorant of the intentions of the Swiss and Tyrolese, but I am happy to have it in my power to inform your lordship that the persons who seem to have excited the suspicions of the Bavarian government do not enjoy the confidence of our friends in Switzerland, and have not been made acquainted with their intentions; it is nevertheless indispensably necessary that we should act with the greatest possible caution in the employment of emissaries, lest the French and Bavarian governments should take the alarm and adopt measures which would defeat our projects or at least occasion a premature explosion. On these grounds (having previously consulted with General N. to whom Captain Frozzi was particularly addressed and who entirely coincides in my opinion I think it eligible to send this officer back to Sicily, and I trust that in so doing I shall meet with your lordship's approbation. I beg leave to observe that the only service Captain Frozzi could render in Italy at the present moment would be to ascertain the number and distribution of the French forces in this country, but as these undergo continual changes I think it will be sufficient to despatch a confidential agent to your lordship with the latest intelligence from Italy, at a period when the northern war and consequent occupation of the French troops will enable your lordship to derive advantage from such intelligence.

The general opinion is that hostilities will commence between France and Russia in the month of April at which period the preparations of the French government will be completed, and there is little reason to hope that the Russians will avail themselves of the interval, either to annihilate the army of the duchy of Warsaw or to advance to the assistance of the King of Prussia, who will in all probability ally himself with France not-

withstanding his former declarations to the contrary. The latest intelligence from Berlin states that Count St. Marsan had presented the ultimatum of his government, which demands an unconditional surrender of all the Prussian fortresses, and insists on the military force and resources of Prussia being placed at the disposal of French generals. It is positively asserted that the King is inclined to submit to these humiliating proposals, but nothing has been as yet definitively concluded. I am sorry to inform your lordship that the aspect of affairs in this country is highly discouraging; the injudicious financial measures which Count Wallis has thought proper to adopt have rendered it impossible for government to place the army on a respectable footing, and have considerably increased the discontent of the people, who however still retain their characteristic aversion to the French. The government is determined to maintain a strict neutrality during the approaching crisis if possible.

In my former letter I mentioned to your lordship my intention of establishing a person at Durazzo in order to forward messengers, &c., &c., and to transmit to me occasionally intelligence of the state of things in the Adriatic. But having received of late repeated assurances of the increasing discontent of the inhabitants of those parts of the coast who have the misfortune to be under the dominion of the French, and of their willingness to make every effort to shake off the yoke, and being aware how important it is at the present moment not to neglect an object of this nature, I have desired Mr. Johnson to proceed thither in order to form connexions in Albania, Dalmatia, and to avail himself in every possible manner of the spirit of discontent which has so decidedly manifested itself. Mr. Johnson who has been employed on the continent for some years past as an agent of government, and who has given proofs of his zeal and abilities, will repair to Durazzo, or according to circumstances to some other town in the neighborhood of the Adriatic, and will there reside as agent of the British government. He will communicate his arrival to your lordship with as little delay as possible.

By the following piece of information, which I have derived from an authentic source, your lordship will perceive that the French and Swedish governments are far from being on friendly terms. An alliance has been proposed by the former to the latter and instantaneously rejected. The terms of the alliance were as follows, viz. 1st, a body of 30,000 Swedes to be placed at the disposal of France; 2d, 3000 seamen to be furnished to the French marine; and 3d, a regiment of Swedes to be raised for the service of France as was the case before the French revolution. I transmit this letter to your lordship by Captain Steinberg and Ensign Ferandi, two officers who have served creditably in the Austrian army. The former has connexions and local knowledge in his native country which may become particularly useful. I fear it will not be in my power to send 50 subaltern officers to Sicily, as your lordship desired. I shall however occasionally despatch some intelligent officers who will I think be extremely useful in the formation of new corps.

No. XXV.

Extracts from the correspondence of Sir Henry Wellesley, Sir Charles Stuart, and Mr. Vaughan.

Mr. Vaughan to Sir Charles Stuart.

" Cadiz, August 3d, 1818.

"The Spanish troops in Catalonia and elsewhere are starving, and the government are feeding them with proclamations to intendants. Since I

have known Spain I have never known the seat of Government in a worse state. There is a strong feeling against the English and a miserable jacobin party which is violent beyond measure."

Ditto to Ditto.

"Chichana, Nov. 2d, 1813.

"Never was anything so disgraceful in the annals of the world as the conduct of all the Spanish authorities on the occasion of the sickness breaking out. It is believed that no persons have the sickness twice, and as almost every family in Cadiz has passed the epidemic of the fever, the interested merchants would not allow it to be said that the epidemic existed, they have continued to issue clean bills of health to vessels leaving the port in the height of the mortality, and did all they could to intimidate the government and Cortes into remaining amongst them."

Sir Henry Wellesley to Lord Wellington.

"Sept. 13th, 1813.

"A curious scene has been passing here lately. The permanent deputation* having been appointed, the Cortes closed their session the 14th. There had been for some days reports of the prevalence of the yellow fever which had excited alarm. On the 16th, in the evening, I received an official note from the ministers of state, apprising me of the intention of the government to proceed to Madrid on the following day, but without assigning any reason for so sudden a resolution. At night I went to the regency, thinking this was an occasion when it would be right to offer them some pecuniary assistance. I found Agar and Cisear together, the cardinal being ill of the gout. They told me that the prevalence of the disorder was the sole cause of their determination to leave Cadiz; and Cisear particularly dwelt upon the necessity of removing, saying he had seen the fatal effects of delay at Carthage. They then told me that there was disturbance in the town, in consequence of which they determined on summoning the extraordinary Cortes. I went from the Regency to the Cortes. A motion was made for summoning the ministers to account for the proceedings of the regency. Never was I witness to so disgraceful a scene of lying and prevarication. The ministers insisted that it was not the intention of the regency to leave Cadiz until the Cortes had been consulted, although I had in my pocket the official note announcing their intention to do so, and had been told by Cisear that the extraordinary Cortes was assembled for no other reason than because there were disturbances in town."

Sir Henry Wellesley to Lord Wellington.

"Cadiz, Dec. 10th, 1813.

"The party for placing the Princess at the head of the Spanish regency is gaining strength, and I should not be surprised if that measure were to be adopted soon after our arrival at Madrid, unless a peace and the return of Ferdinand should put an end to all such projects."

Mr. Stuart to Lord Wellington.

"June 11th, 1813.

"The repugnancy of the Admiralty to adopt the measures suggested by

* Called the Extraordinary Cortes.

your lordship at the commencement of the American war for the protection of the coast, has been followed by events which have fully justified your opinion. *Fifteen merchantmen have been taken off Oporto in a fortnight, and a valuable Portuguese homeward-bound merchant ship was captured three days ago close to the bar of Lisbon.*

No. XXVI.

Extract from a manuscript memoir by Captain Norton, thirty-fourth regiment.

COMBAT OF MAYA.

"The thirty-ninth regiment, commanded by the Hon. Col. O'Callaghan, then immediately engaged with the French, and after a severe contest also retired, the fiftieth was next in succession and they also after a gallant stand retired, making way for the ninety-second, which met the advancing French column first with its right wing drawn up in line, and after a most destructive fire and heavy loss on both sides, the remnant of the right wing retired, leaving a line of killed and wounded that appeared to have no interval; the French column advanced up to this line and then halted, the killed and wounded of the ninety-second forming a sort of rampart, the left wing then opened its fire on the column, and as I was but a little to the right of the ninety-second I could not help reflecting painfully how many of the wounded of their right wing must have unavoidably suffered from the fire of their comrades. The left wing after doing good service and sustaining a loss equal to the first line retired.

COMBAT OF RONCEVALLES.

Extracts from General Cole's and Marshal Soult's Official Reports, MSS.

General Cole to Lord Wellington.

" Heights in front of Pampeluna, July 27th, 1813.

— "The enemy having in the course of the night turned those posts, were now perceived moving in very considerable force along the ridge leading to the Puerto de Mendichurri. I therefore proceeded in that direction, and found that their advance had nearly reached the road leading from Roncesvalles pass to Los Aldudes, from which it is separated by a small wooded valley. Owing to the difficulty of the communications the head of Major-general Ross's brigade could not arrive there sooner; the major-general however, with great decision, attacked them with the Brunswick company and three companies of the twentieth, all he had time to form; these actually closed with the enemy and bayoneted several in the ranks. They were however forced to yield to superior numbers, and to retire across the valley; the enemy attempted to follow them, but were repulsed with loss, the remainder of the brigade having come up."

Marshal Soult to the Minister of War.

" Linzoin, 26 Juilliet, 1813.

"Leurs pertes ont également été considérables, soit à l'attaque du Lin-

douz par le général Reille, où le 20^{me} régiment a ~~été~~ ^{présenté} ~~début~~ ^{début} à la suite d'une charge à la bayonnette exécutée par un bataillon du 8^{me} léger, division Foy, soit à l'attaque d'Altobiscar par le général Clauzel.

Extract from the correspondence of the Duke of Dalmatia with the Minister of War.

Ascaïn, 12 Août, 1813.

"Dès à présent, V. E. voit la situation de l'armée, elle connaît ses forces, celles de l'ennemi, et elle se fait sans doute une idée de ses projets, et d'avance elle peut apprécier ce qu'il est en notre pouvoir de faire; je ne charge point le tableau, je dis ma pensée sans détour, et j'avoue que si l'ennemi emploie tous ses moyens, ainsi que probablement il le fera, ceux que nous pourrons en ce moment lui opposer étant de beaucoup inférieurs, nous ne pourrons pas empêcher qu'ils ne fasse beaucoup de mal. Mon devoir est de le dire à V. E., quoique je tiens un autre langage aux troupes et au pays, et que d'ailleurs je ne néglige aucun moyen pour remplir de mon mieux la tâche qui m'est imposée.

No. XXVII.

EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER-ROLLS.

Report of the movements of the army of Aragon during the first fifteen days of September, 1813.

"Le 12^{me}, toute l'armée d'Aragon, se réunit à Molino del Rey; une partie de celle de Catalogne et la garnison de Barcelonne se placent à droite, à Ollessa et Martorel, pour partir tous ensemble, à 8 heures du soir, et se porter la droite par San Sadurni, le reste par la grand route d'Ordal sur Villa Franca, où l'armée Anglaise était rassemblée. Le général Harispe rencontra à onze heures du soir une forte avant-garde au Col d'Ordal, *dans les anciens retranchemens.* Un combat des plus vifs s'engagea sous les ordres du général de l'avant-garde Mesclop. Les 7^{me} et 44^{me} reg^{ts} montrèrent une haute valeur, ainsi qu'une partie du 116^{me}. Les positions sont prises et reprises, et nous restent enfin, couvertes de morts et de blessés Anglais. Dans la poursuite, le 4^{me} hussards se saisirent des 4 pièces de canon Anglais, &c., avec trois ou quatre cents prisonniers, presque tous du 27^{me} reg^{ts} Anglais. La droite ayant rencontré des obstacles et quelques troupes ennemies à combattre dans les passages, est retardée dans sa marche, et n'arriva pas avant le jour au rendez-vous entre L'Ongat et Grénada. Un bataillon du 117^{me} venant à gauche, par Bejas sur Avionet, rejoint l'armée en position, avec des prisonniers.

"Le maréchal Suchet dirigea un mouvement de cavalerie et d'artillerie qui tenaient la tête pour donner le temps à l'infanterie d'entrer en ligne. Les Anglais étaient en bataille sur trois lignes en avant de Villa Franca, ils commencèrent aussitôt leur retraite en bon ordre. On les poursuivit et on les harcela, la cavalerie fit plusieurs charges assez vives. Ils opposèrent de la résistance, essuyèrent des pertes, surtout en cavalerie, précipitèrent leur marche, brûlèrent un pont et s'éloignèrent vers Arbos et Vendrils, laissant plus que 150 hommes pris et beaucoup de morts et de blessés, surtout des hussards de Brunswick. Notre avant-garde va ce soir à Vendrils et plusieurs centaines de déserteurs sont ramassés."

No. XXVIII.

No. 1.—*Extract from the official state of the allied army, commanded by Lieutenant-general Sir John Murray, at the Col de Balaguer, 17th June, 1813. Exclusive of officers, sergeants, and drummers.*

	Present fit for duty.	Sick.	Command.	Horses.	Mules.	Total men.
British and German cavalry..	739	12	6	733	"	757
British, Portuguese and Sicilian artillery.....	783	8	199	362	604	990
British engineers and staff corps.....	79	5	36	"	"	119
British and German infantry..	7,226	830	637	"	"	8,693
Whittingham's infantry.....	4,370	503	316	"	"	5,189
Sicilian infantry.....	955	121	272	"	"	1,378
General Total.....	14,181	1479	1466	1095	604	17,126

No. 2.—*Extract from the original weekly state of the Anglo-Sicilian force, commanded by Lieutenant-general Sir William Clinton. Head-quarters, Tarragona, 25th September, 1813. Exclusive of officers, sergeants, and drummers.*

	Present fit for duty.	Sick.	Command.	Horses.	Mules.	Total men.
Cavalry.....	663	61	215	875	40	939
Artillery, engineers, and staff corps.....	997	67	58	507	896	1,122
Infantry.....	9,124	1,300	1,019	115	429	11,533
General Total.....	10,784	1,518	1,292	1,497	1,465	13,594

No. 3.—*Extract from the original state of the Mallorquina division (Whittingham's). Tarragona, 15th of December, 1813.*

	Under arms.	Sick.	Command.	Horses.	Mules.	Total men.
Infantry.....	4,014	400	627	110	21	5,041

No. 4.—*Extract from the original state of the first army commanded by the camp-marshal, Don Francisco Copons et Navia. Head-quarters, Vich, 1st of August, 1813.*

	Under arms.	Sick.	Command.	Horses.	Mules.	Total men.
Infantry disposable.....	10,219	1535	2207	586	"	13,961
In Cardona.....	1,182	115	308	"	"	1,695
Sec d'Urgel.....	984	172	144	"	"	1,300
Artillery, &c.....	871	7	59	6	"	1,070
Grand Total.....	13,262	1829	2808	592	"	18,026

No. 5.—*Extract from the original state of the second army commanded by the camp-marshal, Don Francisco Xavier Elio. Vinaros, 19th September, 1813.*

	Present under arms.	Sick.	Command.	Total men.	Horses.
Total of all arms.....	26,835	3181	7454	37,470	4073

Note.—This state includes Villa Campa's, Sarsfield, Duran's, the Empeinado's, and Roche's divisions, besides the troops immediately under Elio himself.

No. XXIX.

No. 1.—*Force of the Anglo-Portuguese army under the Marquis of Wellington's command. Extracted from the original morning state for the 24th of July, 1813.*

	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank & file.	Men.	Total. Horses.
British and German cavalry { present under arms.....}	916	5,834	6,750	5834
Ditto infantry.....	4,665	29,926	34,581	"
Portuguese cavalry.....	251	1,241	1,492	1178
Ditto infantry.....	2,894	20,565	23,459	"
Grand Total, exclusive of sick { and absent on command ...}	8,726	57,566	66,282	7012 { Infantry and cavalry.

The artillerymen, &c., were about 4000.

No. 2.—*Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning state, 15th of October, 1813.*

	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank & File.	Total.
British and German cavalry and infantry	5,859	37,250	43,109
Portuguese ditto.....	4,253	21,274	25,527
Grand Total, exclusive of sick, absent { on command, &c.}	10,112	58,524	68,636

The artillerymen and drivers about.... 4,000

Total..... 72,636

No. 3.—*Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning state, 9th November, 1813.*

	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank & file.	Total.
British and German cavalry and infantry....	5,356	39,687	45,043
Portuguese ditto.....	2,990	22,237	25,227
Grand Total, exclusive of sick, absent on { command, &c.....}	8,346	61,924	70,270

The artillerymen, &c. &c., about..... 4,000

Total..... 74,270

No. 4.—*Sir Rowland Hill's force at the battle of St. Pierre. Extracted from the original morning state, 13th February, 1813.*

	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank and file.	Total.
Second division { British.....	802	5,371	6,173
{ Portuguese.....	277	2,331	2,608
Le Cor's Portuguese division.....	507	4,163	4,670
Total under arms, exclusive of artillerymen...	1,586	11,865	13,451

No. 5.—*Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning state, 13th February, 1814.*

	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank and file.	Total.	Cavalry.
British and German cavalry.....	1,093	7,315	8,408	9,893
Portuguese cavalry.....	280	1,210	1,490	
				Infantry.
British and German infantry.....	4,853	29,714	34,567	56,306
Portuguese infantry.....	2,828	18,911	21,739	
General Total, present under arms.....				66,204
Artillerymen, &c., about.....				4,000

No. 6.—*Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning state, 10th April, 1814.*

	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank and file.	Total.	
British and German cavalry.....	1,159	7,640	8,799	9,987
Portuguese cavalry.....	230	958	1,188	
				Infantry.
British and German infantry.....	4,946	29,909	34,945	54,550
Portuguese infantry.....	2,622	16,983	19,605	
General Total, present under arms.....				64,537
The Artillerymen, &c., about.....				4,000

No. 7.—*Actual strength of the infantry divisions engaged in the battle of Toulouse. Extracted from the original morning state, 10th April, 1814.*

Infantry, present under arms.	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank. and file.	Total.	
Second division, British.....	715	4,123	6,940	Grand Total, infantry, officers, and soldiers, Pre- sent under arms. 30,963
Ditto Portuguese ...	235	1,867		
Third division, British.....	529	2,741	4,679	
Ditto Portuguese....	228	1,163		
Fourth division, British.....	531	3,028	5,363	
Ditto Portuguese....	239	1,585		
Sixth Division, British.....	558	3,233	5,681	
Ditto Portuguese....	246	1,644		
Light division, British.....	378	2,469	4,318	
Ditto Portuguese....	231	1,240		
Le Cor's Portuguese division, .	455	3,507	3,962	
	4343	26,620		

Note.—There is no separate state for the cavalry on the 10th of April, but on the 15th of May, 1814, they stood as follows:—

Cavalry, present under arms	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank and file.	
Bock's brigade of Germans.....	112	694	Total cavalry, present under arms. 6,954
Ponsonby's brigade of British....	188	1,221	
Fane's brigade of British.....	240	1,506	
Vivian's brigade of British.....	128	960	
Lord Edw. Somerset's brigade of British	214	1,691	
	882	6,072	

Total of Anglo-Portuguese cavalry and infantry, present under arms.....	37,917
Add the Spaniards under Freyre and Morillo, together said to be.....	14,000
Artillerymen, &c.....	51,917
Grand Total..	53,417

Note.—My authority for the number of guns employed during this campaign are copies of the returns given to me by Sir Alexander Dickson, who commanded that arm. The number of artillerymen is not borne on the morning states; but in the original weekly state of the 15th of May, 1814, I find the artillerymen, engineers, drivers, and wagon-train, amounted to four thousand eight hundred and twenty-one, with five thousand and thirty horses and mules. This may be taken as the average strength during the campaign; and as more than half were with Sir John Hope, and some with Lord Dalhousie, the number at the battle of Toulouse could not have exceeded fifteen hundred, making a total of all ranks and arms of fifty-three thousand combatants.

No. XXX.

No. 1.—*General state of the French armies under Soult and Suchet. Extracted from the Imperial Muster-rolls, July, 1813. The armies of the north, centre, and south being, by an imperial decree, re-organized in one body, taking the title of the army of Spain.*

	Present under arms.		Detached.		Hospitals.	Total	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.		Men.	Horses.
Army of Spain.....	94,983	12,676	2,110	392	14,074	114,167	13,029
Aragon.....	32,362	4,919	3,621	551	3,201	39,184	5,470
Catalonia.....	25,910	1,869	163	..	1,370	27,457	1,744
General Total.....	156,255	19,464	5,899	943	18,654	180,608	20,242

No. 2.—15th of September, 1813.

					Total.		
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Horses.
Army of Spain.....	81,351	11,159	4,004	1,438	22,488	107,843	11,272
Aragon.....	32,476	4,447	2,721	320	3,616	38,813	6,305
Catalonia.....	24,026	1,670	120	..	2,137	26,283	2,497
General Total.....	137,853	17,276	6,845	1,758	28,241	172,939	20,074

Note.—The garrison of San Sebastian, though captive, is borne on this state.

This is the last general state of the French army in my possession, but the two following notes were inserted in the Imperial Rolls:

"Army of Spain, 16th November, 1813.—102 battalions. 74 squadrons, without garrisons. 74,152 men present under arms. 100,212 effectives. 17,206 horses.

18,230 Hospital
8,555 Troop horses.
1,800 Officers' horses.
5,384 Horses of draft." }

"Army of Spain, 1st December.—93 battalions. 74 squadrons. 17,989 horses."

No. 3.—*Detailed state of the army of Spain, July, 1813, when Soult took the command.*

Right wing—Lieutenant-general Reille.		Effective and non-effective.	
	Men.	Horses	
First division, Foy, 9 battalions.....	5,922	189	Present under arms { 6784 } 17,235 { 5676 } men. horses. { 8906 }
Seventh ditto, Maucune, 7 ditto.....	4,186	110	
Ninth ditto, La Martiniere, 11 ditto.....	7,127	151	
Centre.—Drouet, Count D'Erlon			
Second division, D'Armagnac, 8 batt.....	6,961	116	624 { 8590 } horses. { 8728 } { 6627 }
Third ditto, Abbé, 9 ditto.....	8,030	285	
Sixth ditto, Daricau, 8 ditto.....	5,956	223	
Left Wing.—Lieutenant-general Clausel.			
Fourth division, Contoux, 9 battalions...	7,056	150	432 { 7477 } horses. { 5201 } { 7567 }
Fifth ditto, Vandermaessen, 7 ditto..	4,181	141	
Eighth ditto, Taupin, 10 ditto..	5,981	141	
Reserve.—General Villette.			
French.....	14,959	2091	17,029
Foreign..... 4 battalions of the Rhine, strength not given.			
4 ditto Italians, General St. Pol, ditto.			
4 ditto Spaniards, General Cassabianca, ditto.			
Cavalry.—Pierre Soult.			
	Men.	Horses.	Effective and non-effective.
22 squadrons.....	4723	4416	Men. Total.
Ditto.—Trielhard.....	2358	2275	5098 { 7,691 }
Total according to the organization, but } 77,450			91,086
exclusive of the foreign battalions.... }			
Men under arms.			
Troops not in the organization.....		14,938	16,946
Generals { Garrison of St. Sebastian, 1st July }		2,731	3,086
Rey } forming part of this number... }			
Cassan.—Ditto of Pampeluna, 1st July.....		2,951	3,121
Lameth.—Ditto of Santona, 1st May.....		1,465	1,674
Second reserve, not in the above.....		5,595	6,105
Effective and non-effective.			
	Men.	Horses.	Men. Horses.
General Total.....	97,983	12,676	Present under arms... 114,167 13,028

No. 4.—*Detailed state of the army of Spain, 16th of September, 1813.*

		Effective and non-effective.	
		Men.	
Right wing { Foy.....	5002	14,875 present under arms.	Men.
{ Maucune.....	4166		
{ Menne.....	5707		
Centre..... { D'Armagnac.....	4353	15,098 ditto	45,752
{ Abbé.....	5003		
{ Maranzin.....	4842		
Left wing { Conroux.....	4716	15,759 ditto	
{ Roguet.....	5982		
{ Taupin.....	5071		
Reserve..... Villatte.....	8256	The Italian brigade, about 2000, ordered to Milan.	10,494
Provisional troops of the right wing, destined to reinforce the garrison of Bayonne.....	2168		

	Men.	Horses.	Total. Men.
Cavalry.—Pierre Soult.....	4456	4617	8,325
Ditto Trielhard	2368	2563	
Gend'armes { mounted.....	291	247	
{ dismounted.....	1210		1,399
Parc.....	895	885	
Engineers.....	504	127	
Garrisons... {	Pampeluna.....	3805	15 164
	San Sebastian.....	2366 prisoners of war.	
	Sancti.....	1633	
	Bayonne.....	4631	
	St. Jean Pied de Port.....	1786	
	Navarrens.....	842	
	Castle of Lourdes.....	107	
			81,064
Deduct garrison of San Sebastian.....			2 366
Total, present under arms			78,698

No. XXXI.

Orders for the several divisions of the allied army for the attack of the enemy's fortified position in front of Toulouse for to-morrow, 1st April, 1814. Published in the United Service Journal, October, 1838.

(Extract.)

St. Jory, 9th April, 1814.

"The front attack of the third division is to extend from the river Garonne to the great road which leads from the village of La Lande to Toulouse (the road from Montauban), inclusive of that road.

"The light division will be immediately on the left of the third division, and it will extend its front of attack from the great road above mentioned until it connects its left flank with the right of the Spanish troops.

"The operations of these two divisions are meant, however, more as diversions than as real attacks; it not being expected that they will be able to force any of the passes of the canal which covers Toulouse. The line of the canal is to be threatened chiefly at the bridges and at the locks or any other points where the form of the ground, or other circumstances, most favor the advance of the troops. A considerable part both of the third and of the light divisions must be kept in reserve."

No. XXXII.

Note.—The analysis of the allied army on the 10th of April, given in Appendix XXIX, sections 6 and 7, has been very carefully made and faithfully set down; but as the real number of the allies has lately become a point of dispute between French and English writers, I here give the morning state of the whole army, accurately printed from the original document delivered by the adjutant-general to Lord Wellington on the morning of the 10th of April, 1814. The reader will thus be enabled, with the help of my text, to trace each division in its course and ascertain its true numbers.

MORNING STATE OF THE FORCES IN THE PENINSULA, UNDER THE COMMAND

Head Quarters, St. Jory,

Date of State last received.	DIVISIONS.	OFFICERS.							SERGEANTS.							TRUM- DRUM.		
		Colonels.	Lieut.-Colonels	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets or Ensigns.	Staff.	Quarter-Masters of Cavalry.	Present.	Sick.		Command.	Prs. of War and Missing.	Total.	Present.	Sick.	
											Present.	Absent.					Present.	Absent.
BRITISH.																		
7th Apr.	Cavalry.. ..	1	13	17	106	189	25	94	25	581	9	17	68	7	682	108	..	8
" Do.	1st Dn. Infantry	3	16	6	64	53	56	48	..	433	13	40	38	4	528	142	4	3
9th Do.	2nd	2	2	10	45	123	29	41	..	320	5	89	68	18	500	143	1	23
" Do.	3rd	2	3	10	38	69	30	32	..	231	3	82	47	5	368	114	..	20
6th Do.	4th	..	3	9	42	86	27	30	..	232	3	76	56	4	371	102	1	15
7th Do.	5th	1	3	6	35	82	39	38	..	245	28	63	30	10	376	99	10	10
8th Do.	6th	..	4	9	41	102	41	25	..	236	4	59	41	1	341	101	1	19
5th Do.	7th	1	4	6	38	74	31	31	..	187	5	62	42	16	312	92	2	8
9th Do.	Lt	2	2	4	24	68	13	19	..	182	2	39	21	1	245	66	1	3
7th Do.	Ld. Aylmer's Bde.	..	6	7	37	74	19	26	..	188	7	7	8	..	210	72	1	4
TOTAL ..																		
PORTUGUESE.																		
7th Apr	Cavalry.. ..	2	4	4	17	39	15	41	4	64	2	..	28	..	94	40	..	..
9th Do.	2nd Dn. Infantry	..	2	2	16	16	28	10	..	122	..	19	32	..	173	39	..	1
" Do.	3rd	2	..	2	9	17	23	14	..	101	5	20	39	..	165	58	2	5
6th Do.	4th	1	1	1	10	12	24	51	..	103	..	27	23	..	153	36	..	6
7th Do.	5th	1	2	2	13	12	22	49	..	105	3	25	18	..	151	34	1	2
8th Do.	6th	1	2	3	12	13	16	47	..	119	3	12	20	..	154	33	1	5
5th Do.	7th	2	3	4	17	18	27	43	..	110	4	12	23	..	149	33	..	3
9th Do.	Lt.	..	2	3	13	11	26	29	..	101	3	6	27	..	137	51	3	2
7th Do.	Unattached Dvn.	2	4	7	25	22	51	89	..	197	7	47	26	1	278	07	3	6
8th Do.	1st Brigade ..	1	1	6	9	12	27	16	..	137	1	10	20	..	168	64	..	2
" Do.	10th	..	4	4	18	14	23	38	..	124	7	7	15	..	153	31	..	3
Total Portuguese																		
Total British ..																		
Grand Total ..																		

3 men deserted 2nd Line Bn. K. G. L.

1 Do. " 1st Line Do.

1 Do. " 47th Foot

1 Do. " 4th Do.

The men transferred are invalids sent home.

OF HIS EXCELLENCY FIELD MARSHAL THE MARQUIS OF WELLINGTON, K. G.

10th April, 1814.

PETERS OR MERS.			RANK AND FILE.						HORSES.				ALTERATIONS.							
Command.	Prs. of War and Missing.	Total.	Present.	Sick.		Command.	Prs. of War and Missing.	Total.	Present.	Sick.	Command.	Total.	Men.							
				Present.	Absent.								Joined.	Dead.	Discharged.	Deserted.	Transferred.	Promoted.	Reduced.	Effective Rank and File, Portuguese included.
4	2	152	7640	106	406	1071	233	9456	7289	611	602	8502	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8144
..	3	152	5894	244	632	200	165	7155	..	..	..	..	4	6	..	4	10	3	4	5894
3	5	178	4123	112	2251	474	716	7676	..	..	..	..	..	11	..	..	4	..	..	5990
7	4	145	2741	75	1352	207	229	4694	..	..	..	..	1	1	..	..	..	..	..	3924
5	6	129	3028	44	1700	279	201	5252	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	4613
3	8	130	3277	363	1075	224	315	5254	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	2	17	1	..	4438
3	..	124	3233	54	1253	309	103	4922	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4677
4	11	117	2738	114	1074	391	673	4990	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4474
..	3	73	2409	77	696	131	146	3519	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	1	3709
..	..	77	2496	212	312	92	..	3112	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	2	..	..	2496
			37639	1401	10721	3468	2801	56030	7289	611	602	8502	5	24	..	6	33	4	6	..
10	..	50	958	5	73	598	16	1650	855	114	404	1373	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
4	..	44	1267	71	472	101	..	2511	..	..	..	..	1	1	..	..	..	..	..	..
6	..	71	1183	105	598	383	..	2269	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..
5	..	47	1585	30	635	199	..	2449	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
3	..	40	1161	13	550	176	..	1900	..	..	..	..	69	3	..	..	2	1	..	..
2	..	42	1614	44	469	151	..	2308	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
2	..	38	1736	48	228	211	48	2271	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
7	..	63	1240	54	237	394	11	1936	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
6	3	85	3507	215	835	219	76	4852	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3507
2	4	72	1510	68	328	146	213	2265	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	1510
5	..	39	1550	115	351	62	4	2102	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1550
			17941	768	4776	2660	368	26513	855	114	404	1373	70	5	1	..	2	1	..	..

Note.—The figures belonging to the grand total are wanting in the original.

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